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This thesis reports an exploratory, ' quantitative study into the 
implementation of strategic. decisions. Implementation was viewed as a 
discontinuous organisational activity involving strategic change. The 
organisational vehicle of change is seen as "the project" and the 
specific unit of analysis adopted is the capital investment project. 
Manufacturing organisations were studied because these were shown to 
most frequently undertake such projects. ' 
Adopting a theoretical perspective derived from systems theory 
and cybernetics a model of implementation was developed which recog- 
nises two dimensions of implementation success (modes of organisation- 
al change) to be contingent upon a dimension of project uncertainty 
and two dimensions of information. From this model ten hypotheses were 
developed. 
Data on 45 projects was collected from a diversity of manufac- 
turing companies. This was obtained using a structured questionnaire 
instrument administered to a single informant during a retrospective 
personal interview. Initially the data was analysed using principal 
components factor analysis to determine the factorial compositions and 
reliabilities of scales measuring theoretical constructs. Subsequent- 
ly, causal modelling and stepwise regression techniques were employed 
to test the hypotheses. 
Analysis demonstrated that the essentially structural approach 
to implementation taken in the study adequately explained many of the 
observed associations between constructs. Hypothesised associations 
between organisational structure and implementation success could not, 
generally, be supported. Finally, the theoretical model adopted was 
not able to account for a number of empirically observed associations. 
These associations were explicable in terms of a behavioural or social 
dimension. The wider implications of the study are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
- INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SUBJECT RATIONALE 
This thesis reports an original, exploratory, quantitative study 
into the implementation of strategic decisions. A number of authors 
writing during the mid 1980's commented on the dearth of research on 
this subject. Bonoma (1984) noted, that . "the literature is silent" on 
the problems of implementation. Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984, p. 2), note, 
"problems, of strategy implementation have received less attention than 
have those of strategy formulation". Alexander (1985) comments that 
"little has been written or researched on it". Bernard Taylor, writing 
a decade earlier in the preface to Mumford and Pettigrew (1975, p. xi) 
makes a similar comment about the "vital but, neglected area of imple- 
mentation". Finally, if we introduce the concept that implementation 
involves "change" to an organisation (e. g. Nutt, 1986;,, Pettigrew, 
1990) we note that the literature on the effects of technological 
change on organisations is not well developed either, (Tushman and 
Nelson, -1990). Issues pertinent to the study of technological change 
are subsumed within the approach to implementation used in this study, 
hence Tushman and Nelson's observation supports those of Taylor, 
Bonoma, Hrebiniak and Joyce, and Alexander. For a decade and a half 
therefore, it has been recognised that the implementation phenomenon 
has been a neglected'area, of study. 
No doubt as a consequence of such recognition, interest in the 
implementation question has increased in recent years (Porter, 1987; 
Wheelen and Hunger, 1987, p. 209; Reed and Buckley, 1988). This is dis- 
tinct from an earlier emphasis on the, decision-making, strategy formu- 
-lation or strategic planning processes 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984, p. 2; 
Alexander, 1985). A logical reason for the historical lack of interest 
in implementation is furnished by Stonich (1982, p. xv) who comments 
"The philosophy was that if the formulation effort was sound, imple- 
mentation would follow automatically". Ansoff (1984, p. 387) in a simi- 
lar vein, notes three assumptions underpinning the prescriptions 
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developed for'strategic planning. The second of these was the assump- 
tion that "the key problem in strategy was to make the right deci- 
sions". Ansoff continues by noting that the "accumulated experience of 
the past twenty years 'has progressively cast serious doubts on all 
three assumptions". These doubts by the early and mid 1980's were 
prompting a number of authors to comment in the vein of Glueck and 
Jauch (1984) that "A good strategy without effective implementation is 
not likely to succeed", hence good implementation was critical to 
effective performance (see also Paul et. al., 1978; Hitt and Ireland, 
1985; Alexander, 1985; De Geus, 1988). Ultimately, Bonoma (1984) in a 
formulation now adopted by management teachers (Wheelen and Hunger, 
1987) explicitly contrasts a dimension of appropriate/inappropriate 
strategy with a dimension of excellent/poor implementation. From this 
he concludes that poor implementation can disguise good strategy, and 
conversely that excellent implementation can rescue an inappropriate 
strategy. This conclusion gives the subject of implementation at least 
equal importance with that of strategy formulation. 
Finally it has been noted by several of the above authors that, 
in practice, implementation is frequently poor. Alexander (1985) 
comments that, "significant difficulties are often encountered during 
implementation". Bonoma (1984) and Brebiniak and Joyce (1984, p. 2) talk 
about the problems of implementation and De Geus (1988) notes that in 
a crisis "implementation is rarely good". It would appear from these 
comments that implementation needs to be improved. 
The above discussion has noted, firstly, that little has been 
written in the literature. about implementation. Secondly, that imple- 
mentation is an important and relevant subject and thirdly, that 
understanding how to improve implementation efforts would be of prac- 
tical benefit. Taken together this. suggests that expanding the exist- 
ing, body of knowledge of the implementation phenomenon is a valid 
topic for research. 
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1.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
In the Business Policy/Strategic Management literature (the 
grounded discipline for this study) there is a careless use of the 
terms "strategy" and "strategic decision" when used in connection with 
implementation. This is illustrated by Ansoff (1984, p. 387): 
"strategy'formulation and strategy implementation... could 
start after the strategic decisions were made. " 
or Alexander (1985): 
"after a comprehensive strategy or single strategic deci- 
sion has been formulated, significant difficulties are 
often encountered during the subsequent implementation 
process. " 
Both passages imply that implementing a strategy is synonymous 
with implementing a strategic decision. Are they synonymous? The 
approach taken in this study is that they are not. At risk of preempt- 
ing chapter 2, the broad justification for this follows. 
A popular definition of the word "strategy" (Andrews, 1980; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Quinn, 1978) is to view strategy as'a pat- 
tern in a stream of decisions. This definition does not single out 
strategic decisions and must incorporate operational decisions also. 
Drawing on sources such as Simon (1960), Hickson et. al. (1986) the 
essential characteristics of operational decisions are that they are 
routine, frequent and repetitive, whereas strategic decisions are 
novel, infrequent and unstructured. Noting the definition of strategy 
given above, we observe that strategy is being simultaneously defined 
in both continuous and discontinuous terms. Whilst some authors may be 
happy with such a conundrum, this author is not. Therefore, in terms 
of the problem of strategy implementation, it will be helpful to 
restrict the study to investigating either the continuous aspects of 
strategy 'implementation or the discontinuous aspects. 
The distinction between implementation being a continuous or a 
discontinuous phenomenon is not explicitly stated (to the author's 
knowledge) by writers and researchers in this field. If one focuses on 
the continuous aspects of strategy implementation one is drawn to 
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investigate an-essentially operational phenomenon. Such a perspective 
is adopted by academics and practising managers. For example, a manag- 
er in a U. K. owned financial services group was heard by the author to 
state "Implementing strategy-is the process of managing the business. " 
Academics such as Wheelen and Hunger (1987) Glueck and Jauch (1984) 
Stonich (1982) view implementation as synonymous with the routine 
processes of operational planning and or budgeting. They emphasise 
resource allocation, planning, control and information systems and the 
role of structure and culture in achieving -actionas the- outcome of 
implementation. Such a perspective frequently views implementation as 
a process intermediate between planning and control processes. This 
model is widely found in the literature of not only Business Policy 
(e. g., Steiner, 1979; Luffman et. al., 1987; Wheelen and Hunger, 1987) 
but also Accountancy (e. g. Neale and Holmes, 1988) Management Science 
(e. g. Higgins, 1980) Marketing (e. g. Weitz and Wensley, 1984) and no 
doubt other literatures. However, in the author's opinion, such a 
model more correctly describes strategy maintenance, which is viewed 
as one component of strategy implementation.. 
The other component of strategy implementation is strategic 
change. This comes from taking a discontinuous view of strategy by 
restricting one's perspective to the implementation of strategic deci- 
sions. The-plan, implement and control model is found to be unsuit- 
able in this situation. So, just as strategy making may be dichoto- 
mised into continuous strategic planning and discontinuous strategy 
formulation processes. (Stonich, 1982) so we believe strategy implemen- 
tation should be properly dichotomised into continuous strategy main- 
tenance and discontinuous strategic change processes. This thesis 
investigates the strategic change process only, a process referred to 
as programming. 
Although this thesis is grounded in the Business Policy litera- 
ture, perspectives and ideas have been drawn from several other disci- 
plines. Research by organisational theorists into strategic decision 
making has been heavily drawn on and made a major contribution to this 
study. Studies into the problems of implementing Management Science/ 
Operational Research projects have been underway since the early 
1970's and this literature too has been extensively used. Several 
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other literature bases have also contributed, to a greater or lesser 
extent, to the study. However, probably the greatest contribution 
comes from the Systems Theory and Cybernetics literature. These two 
related disciplines and most notably the work of Ross Ashby (1956) 
provide the grounded theory for this study. 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 of this thesis investigates the meaning of strategy 
and strategic decision. This investigation leads to a model of organi- 
sational planning which highlights the differences between the two 
alternative approaches to the implementation question noted above. 
This model is used to develop the view that implementation is "pro- 
gramming" and ultimately leads to the decision to focus the study on 
strategic change. In chapter 3 the idea that change is the product of 
implementing a strategic decision is elaborated. This perspective, 
together with ideas drawn from systems theory and Cybernetics, is 
developed into a taxonomy of strategic decision types. Finally, this 
taxonomy in turn leads to the identification and definition of- a 
taxonomy of project types. 
Chapter 4 develops the ideas of chapter 3 further in order to 
determine the principle dimensions of the implementation phenomenon. 
This leads to, a particular view of organisational learning and identi- 
fies this concept as providing a basis for measuring the success of 
implementing a strategic decision. Finally, the theoretical develop- 
ments within the chapter are used to arrive at-ten testable hypothe- 
ses. In chapter 5 concepts identified in chapter 4 are operationalised 
and a research instrument is designed. Methodological issues regarding 
the administration of the research instrument are discussed., 
Chapter 6 describes the data collection phase of the research 
and outlines a number of the sample's statistical characteristics. The 
construct validity of the research instrument is investigated, pri- 
marily through the use of Principal Components Factor analysis. Final- 
ly a number of scales for the theoretical constructs are developed. In 
chapter 7 the system of theoretical hypotheses is investigated using 
causal modelling techniques. In the main the theoretical hypotheses 
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are proven.. A number of anomalous findings are also identified and 
investigated to arrive at a final model of the relationships between 
the theoretical constructs. Chapter 8 draws on anecdotal evidence, 
theoretical and methodological arguments to'account for the anomalous 
relationships identified in chapter 7. A number of other topics are 
discussed relating to the study's validity and questions of wider 
concern. Finally in chapter 9, the major conclusions of the research 
are summarised. In addition, further research is suggested which takes 
into account the limitations of the study and also how perspectives 
and models developed during the study could be used as a basis for 
additional future research. 
1.4 SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
The foregoing discussion has established that this thesis is 
only concerned with the implementation of strategic decisions. The 
hypotheses developed in chapter 4 of this thesis, the theory on which 
they are based and other perspectives used and developed up to this 
point are entirely general and are therefore not restricted to a par- 
ticular subset of such decisions. However, validity considerations 
(discussed in chapter 5) indicate that the operationalisation of the 
theoretical concepts should be focused on investigating the implemen- 
tation of capital investment decisions in U. K. manufacturing compa- 
nies. No other restrictions on organisational size or manufacturing 
industry sector were applied. The use of personal interviews as the 
principal data collection technique imposed restrictions on the size 
and geographical distribution of the sample studied. Attempts were 
made to disperse the sample geographically and to include a represen- 
tative selection of industry sectors within it. The sample size was 
large enough for the appropriate use of the analytical techniques 
employed. 
In terms of Clark's (Bennett, 1986) taxonomy of approaches to 
research the contribution of this study is seen by the author as being 
of the "Basic objective research" type. Bennett (1986) summarises this 
as: 
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"Here, the research is concerned with tackling a general 
problem of the application of knowledge which can arise 
in many contexts but does not aim to solve a particular 
practical problem... the level of generality is still high 
[relative to pure basic research] and the people receiv- 
ing the feedback about the research are professionally 
trained and/or academic. " 
Reviewing the Business Policy literature on strategy and strate- 
gic decision implementation, one rapidly realises that the majority of 
it is descriptive or normative. Where prescriptive or contingency 
theory approaches are adopted then the literature tends to focus 
solely on human and behavioural aspects of the phenomenon. In particu- 
lar, the literature is dominated by studies of the social behaviour 
stimulated by change and the tactics to be adopted to counter such 
behaviour (see for example Hutt, 1986; Ansoff, 1984). There appear to 
be relatively few studies which have taken a wider approach to the 
subject. Because of this relative lack of prior research this study 
adopts an exploratory approach, seeking to contribute to an under- 
standing of the structure and contingent dimensions of the implementa- 
tion phenomenon. In keeping with this philosophy the principal re- 
search questions addressed are of a very general nature. They may be 
summarised as, what is implementation? What are the principal contin- 
gent dimensions of the phenomenon? What happens to an organisation 
when a strategic decision is implemented? What is implementation 
success? The answer obtained to this final question is potentially of 
considerable importance as it relates to the strategic advantage(s) 
both explicit and more especially implicit, stemming from the imple- 
mentation. This is particularly important in Business Policy, when in 
Strategic Management guise, it relates to the central question of "why 
some firms develop and thrive while others stagnate and go bankrupt" 
(Wheelen and Hunger, 1987). Although the study is of the basic objec- 
tive research type, a number of its findings and conclusions are of 
direct benefit to practising managers. These are explicitly stated in 
the final chapter of the thesis and suggest a number of items that 
managers need to be sensitive to when evaluating capital investment 
proposals and systems that need to be installed if strategic decisions 
are to be successfully implemented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The aim of this chapter is to achieve an operational definition 
of the word "implementation". Initially we view implementation as a 
managerial process. This leads to a consideration' of planning process- 
es, which in turn ultimately identifies two contending views of the 
implementation question. In choosing one of these views the implemen- 
tation of strategy` question is narrowed to a'question of the implemen- 
tation of strategic decisions. 
2.1' A MANAGERIAL DICHOTOMY 
When one encounters the term "implementation" in the Business 
Policy literature, it is frequently viewed as an activity positioned 
between "strategy formulation" and "control" (Wheelen and Hunger, 
1987) "strategy formulation" and "monitoring" (Luffman et. a1: 1987) 
"choice" and "evaluation" (Glueck and Jauch, "1984) or "short-range 
planning" and "evaluation" (Steiner, 1979). Similar models can also be 
found in' the Accountancy (e. g., Neale and Holmes, ` 1988) Management 
Science (e. g., Higgins, 1980) and Marketing (e. g., Weitz and Wensley, 
1984) literatures. The general form of all these models is summarised 
in figure 2.1 below. The figure is primarily based on Wheelen and 
Hunger (1987) - with some minor changes in nomenclature. 
Figure 2.1: A Model of Strategic Management 
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This "Plan, Implement, Control" model implies that implementa- 
tion is an activity (i. e., process) intermediate between, but logical- 
ly separate from, the planning and control activities. If this is the 
case, then strategy implementation will be definable through a de- 
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tailed review. of, the planning and control processes. The questions to 
be. asked. are therefore, "In what way do planning and control differ? " 
and, "Does this difference correspond to implementation? ". We now 
address these questions. 
2.1.1 THE MANAGERIAL PROCESS 
, The model illustrated in figure 2.1 above is a model of the 
managerial process. It is one description of what managers do. The 
early views, of, management were set forth in the 1900s by Fayol who 
suggested five basic managerial functions: planning, organising, 
coordinating, commanding and controlling. and in the 1930's by Gulick 
using the acronym "POSDCORP" standing for-planning, organising, staff- 
ing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting (Mintzberg, 
1973). Steiner (1979) took the view that "planning cannot be usefully 
distinguished from the-rest of the management process... ". Mintzberg 
(1973) identified three broad categories of role fulfilled by manag- 
ers; the Interpersonal role, the Informational role and the Decisional 
role. (Although Mintzberg's study was biased towards top managers, he 
felt that the results were applicable to all managers. ). Simon (1960) 
viewed "decision making" as synonymous with "managing". This decision- 
al perspective is implicitly recognised by Luffman et. al. (1987) by 
the description of their equivalent model to figure 2.1 above, as a 
model of the strategic decision making process. Anthony (1965) also 
associates planning, control and decision making by noting that plan- 
ning (roughly, deciding what to do) and control (roughly, assuring 
that desired results are obtained) are used to facilitate decision 
making. However, Anthony (1965, p. 10) makes the following observation: 
"a classification into (1) planning and (2) control 
[functions]... is not a useful breakdown. The trouble 
essentially is that, although planning and control are 
definable abstractions and are easily understood as 
calling for different types of mental activity, they do 
not relate to separable major categories of activities 
actually carried on in an organisation, either at differ- 
ent times, or by different people, or for different 
situations. " (Original emphasis retained. ) 
In other words, while planning and control are separate mental 
activities carried out in support of managerial decision making 
(which, to adopt Simon's view, is synonymous with the managerial 
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process) they- donot exist as two separate definable activities. 
Anthony noted that this is contrary to the ideas of Fayol. This obser- 
vation is particularly troublesome to our goal of identifying an 
objective definition of implementation as an organisational process. 
It-in fact implies that no actual separation between planning and 
control exists. Therefore, what "space" exists to accommodate imple- 
mentation? There are two possible explanations for this conclusion. 
Either implementation is inseparable from a managerial planning/con- 
trol process, or the -model- in figure 2.1 above is fundamentally 
flawed. If we adopt the first explanation then we are dealing with a 
nonexistent phenomenon. This is unlikely given the literature cited in 
chapter 1. The second explanation appears to. be most probable and 
implies a need for a new model of the managerial process. We will 
attempt to develop such a model'in the following sections. 
2.1.2-TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Discussed above was a model of the managerial process which 
included planning, control and decision making. These items were shown 
to be intimately interconnected and mutually dependent upon each 
other. Indeed, as all of these descriptions are perspectives on the 
same phenomenon then we would expect them be complementary. However, 
while we are able to identify these items as global-attributes of the 
managerial process, they do not indicate how many types of<managerial 
process exist. 
The literature supports the view that there are two types of 
management (Steiner, 1979) or managerial "regimes" (Ansoff, 1984). 
Chandler (1962) noted that the Pennsylvania Railroad (circa 1880-1910) 
was one of the first American businesses to distinguish between the 
broad long-term entrepreneurial activities of the vice-president and 
the day-to-day operational responsibilities of the general manager. 
Steiner (1979) identifies two types of management. That which is done 
at the top being strategic, everything else being operational manage- 
ment. This view is shared by Ansoff (1984) who identifies the concerns 
of strategic management as setting objectives and goals for the organ- 
isation. The end product of which is a "potential for future fulfil- 
ment". Operations management, on the other hand, is concerned with 
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converting this potential into actual profit. These ideas correspond 
closely to Drucker's (1974) ideas of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Effectiveness, Drucker states, stems from the manager taking an opti- 
mising approach to his job of administration and, focusing on new 
opportunities to produce revenue. Efficiency is doing. better what. is 
already being done; it is a minimum condition for survival. In other 
words, we can say that strategic management is effectiveness seeking, 
whereas operations management is efficiency seeking. Emery (1969) 
likewise identified two forms of planning echoing many of the at- 
tributes identified above. One type he describes as'high-level, which 
he equates with strategic planning. This was broad in scope, used 
aggregated variables and was concerned with an extended planning 
horizon. The other form was described as low-level and was concerned 
with limited activities, used detailed disaggregated data and had a 
relatively short horizon. These attributes equate, low-level planning 
with operational planning. 
Looking at characteristics of managerial decision making we 
again identify a simple dichotomy of types. Chandler (1962) notes two 
types of administrative decision, the strategic and tactical. Strate- 
gic decisions are long-term and look towards the provision of future 
resources. Tactical decisions ensure the efficient use of current 
resources. Simon (1960) noted two polar types of organisational deci- 
sion. These he labelled programmed and non-programmed decisions. Non- 
programmed decisions are seen by Simon as novel, unstructured and 
consequential. They are made using judgment, intuition and creativity. 
Programmed decisions, by contrast, -are routine and repetitive. They 
are handled by internalised habits and formal written standard operat- 
ing procedures. It is interesting to compare the attributes assigned 
by Simon for programmed and non-programmed decisions with the model of 
decision style, or strategy, devised by Thompson and Tuden (1979). 
Focusing solely on the decisional dimension of beliefs about causation 
(dichotomised as Agreement/Disagreement) then the decision styles 
adopted along this dimension are judgmental or inspirational for 
disagreement (uncertain cause) and computational or compromise for 
agreement (certain causes). Simon's programmed decisions are therefore 
made using the decision strategies, computation and compromise. Mintz- 
berg et. al. (1976) associate the decisional attributes of novelty, 
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consequentiality and complexity with strategic (important) decisions. 
Hickson et. al. (1986)-also identify attributes of novelty and conse- 
quentiality with "top level" or strategic decisions. These descrip- 
tions associate non-programmed decisions with strategic decisions and 
the strategic managerial process. We therefore equate programmed 
decisions with the operational process. 
Finally, we will look at' the information required to make 
strategic or operational decisions. Emery (1969) describes strategic 
information as being broad in scope and aggregated. Operational infor- 
mation is limited and detailed. Lucas (1976) used Anthony's (1965) 
planning and control framework to characterise the information re- 
quired for managerial decisions. As Anthony's framework identifies 
three planning/control types (c. f., our two) Lucas also identified 
three sets of informational characteristic. However, two of Lucas's 
sets of characteristics were virtually identical and we may combine 
these with no meaningful loss of information. The so modified informa- 
tional characteristics identified by Lucas then closely parallel those 
of Emery. 
The above discussion has attempted to demonstrate the utility of 
characterising managerial processes as being of two types, the strate- 
gic and the operational. Attributes of these two types have been 
identified for planning, decision making and their associated informa- 
tion requirements. However, a question remains as to whether these 
define two distinct categories, or identify two poles of a single 
dimension. During the above discussion it was noted that strategic 
decisions are not wholly different from all others but are towards one 
end of a continuum, every day questions being at the other (Hickson 
et. al., 1986). Simon (1960) views programmed and non-programmed 
decisions similarly. Likewise, many of the planning and informational 
attributes identified above do not identify distinct categories, but 
represent polar opposites. We conclude therefore, that strategic and 
operational managerial processes define extremes of a single continu- 
um. We will call this continuum the Managerial Dimension. Many of the 
characteristics defining the strategic and operational poles of this 
dimension are summarised in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: The Managerial Dimension 
Attributes 
Management Regimel, 7 
MANAGERIAL 
Management Style_ 
Management Group 
Managerial Focus3 
- Managerial Purjose3 
, 
Managerial Aim 
Time horizon 
DECISION MAKLN 
Decision Type 
Decision attributes6 
Decision Styles8 
INFORMATIONS 
Source 
Accuracy4 
Detail 
Frequency 
Time horizon4 
Use 
(Refs. 1: "Ansoff, 1984; (-4: Emery, 1969; 
( 7: Steiner, 1979; 
Strategic operational 
Entrepreneurial Administrative 
Top Managers All other., managers 
Broad Limited 
Seeks effectiveness Seeks efficiency 
Profit potential Actual profit 
Long-term Day-to-day 
Non-Programmed Programmed 
Novel Routine 
Un-Structured Repetitive 
Consequential 
Judgmental Computational 
Inspirational Compromise 
External environment Internal records 
Unimportant Vital 
Summaries High 
Periodic Frequent 
Long Medium/Short 
Predictive 'Control/Action 
2: Chandler, 1962; 3: Drucker, 1974) 
5: Lucas, 1976; 6: Simon, 1960) 
8: Thompson and Tuden 1979; ) 
Our goal is to, arrive at, a workable (objective) description of 
implementation as a managerial process. The description typified by 
the model illustrated in figure 2.1 above was shown to be unsatisfac- 
tory. As a first step in arriving at an alternative description we 
have identified a key dimension, labelled the Managerial dimension. 
This dimension was shown to have strategic and'operational poles. As 
this dimension- characterises the managerial process, we would also 
expect it to characterise the planning and control processes within an 
organisation. Planning and control should therefore exist in two 
dichotomous forms, which we may label as strategic planning and opera- 
tional planning. We will now look in more detail at the meaning of 
"planning" and in the first instance, "strategic planning". 
, 
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2.2 PLANNING MODELS 
2.2.1 STRATEGIC, PLANNING 
Several authors have used the words "strategic planning" to mean 
a particular type, or style, of high-level planning. Steiner (1979) 
saw, strategic planning and long-range planning as synonymous, the 
difference being a change in nomenclature between the 1960s and late 
1970s. Ansoff (1984, p. 15) however, while acknowledging many similari- 
ties between strategic and long-range planning, drew a clear distinc- 
tion between them: - 
"In long-range planning the future is expected to be 
predictable through extrapolation of the historical 
growth... In Strategic planning the future is not neces- 
sarily expected to be an improvement over the past - nor 
is it assumed to be extrapolative. " 
Valid though these distinctions are, -they are not 
the, concern of 
this discussion. Our use of the term "strategic planning", simply means 
planning carried out at the strategic end of the managerial dimension. 
As such it is concerned with the long-term future of the organisation 
and is primarily the responsibility of . 
top, management. This definition 
encompasses Ansoff's interpretation of both long-range planning and 
strategic planning.. 
Steiner and Cannon (1966, p. 11-12) used the term "strategic plan- 
ning", more in the sense we intend to use.. it. The characteristics that 
Steiner and Cannon attributed to this form of planning are,., presented 
in table 2.2, below. 
Table 2.2: Strategic Planning 
1. Conducted at the highest level of management. 
2. Concerned with the development of fundamental objectives and 
goals and the development of resources. 
3. Concerned with both long- and short-range decision making. 
4. Deals with parts of the whole enterprise. Only. in a few selected 
areas does it involve much detail. 
5. Continuous process, irregular subject matter. ` 
. It requires large amounts of information derived from, and 
relating to, disciplines outside the corporation. 
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The key words for our purposes in the above definition are given 
in characteristic number 2; namely "objectives"-and "goals". we have 
previously noted that Ansoff (1984) uses similar terms to describe the 
activities of strategic' management. Formen (1982, p. 19) sees the es- 
sence of planning as`"The transformation of corporate goals and objec- 
tives into polices... ". Finally, Anthony (1965) used the same three 
key words (objective, goal, policy) to define strategic planning. 
2.2.1.1 Objectives and Goals 
Andrews (1971) refers to words such as, objective, goal, policy, 
as "accordion-like", i. e., their definitions appear to expand and 
contract depending on which author is using them at the'time. In the 
absence of universally accepted definitions of these terms, authors 
have considerable, but not infinite, licence to define them as they 
see fit and for the ends they are to'serve. The spirit of this study 
is not to identify every definition in the literature but to select 
those definitions which best suit the needs of the conceptual frame- 
work. 
How are we to define these three key words to achieve a concep- 
tual model for planning? Drucker (1974) does not shed much light on 
this problem when he states "... objectives are 'strategy"'. Reviewing 
the literature-on the meaning of such words as 'policy' and 'strate- 
gy', Higgins (1980) identified several definitions in the literature. 
These definitions frequently use the words objective, goal and policy 
in a form similar to those used above to define strategic planning. 
From this one may conclude that titles like "strategy", "corporate 
strategy", "strategic planning" and "strategy formulation" are largely 
synonyms. Andrews (1971) identified 'a policy' as a guide to action 
serving an objective. He also states that objectives can be all-encom- 
passing or specific and that in descending hierarchical order objec- 
tives can be policies for reaching higher goals. This contains two 
ideas that will help in our'definitions. Firstly, we are dealing with 
a hierarchy of terms. Secondly, policies are essentially questions 
that ask - how? 
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Wilson (1980) adopted the view that policy was essentially a 
macro level concept. Bonoma (1984) noted that there are many policies 
within an organisation. These he broadly categorised as identity 
policies (theme and culture) and directional policies (strategy and 
leadership). This identifies a strategy as a directional policy. As 
planning is concerned withthe direction of the organisation we will, 
in the spirit of. Andrews, state that "strategy" is a_guide to action 
serving an "objective". This definition is similar to that of Ansoff's 
(1984) "... a strategy is a set of decision making rules for guidance 
of-organisational behaviour". 
Having arrived at a definition for "policy" and "strategy", what 
about "objective" and "goal"? Ackoff (1970) took the view "that. objec- 
tives are "states, or outcomes of-behaviour that-are desired" whereas 
"goals are objectives whose attainment is desired by a specific time". 
This view is'similar to that of Bower "An objective is typically 
enduring and time-less" whereas goals are "achievement targets shorter 
in time range or narrower in scope than the objectives, but designed 
as specific sub-objectives in making operational plans" (Steiner, 
1979, p. 6). These authors suggest that the prime difference between 
these two terms is that objectives are relatively permanent, whereas 
goals are transitory. Bower makes the additional distinction that 
goals are achievement targets serving a particular operational plan. 
We can now look in detail at the meaning of objective. 
Ansoff (1984) sees the distinction between objectives and goals 
differently to that. adopted here. However, he indicates that objec- 
tives provide a yardstick by which the present and future performance 
of-a firm may be measured. This view is supported by Wetherbe and 
Montanari (1981) "objectives must be reasonable, measurable (desired 
level and range) and have a time horizon specified". Drucker (1974) 
similarly suggests that objectives must make possible the concentra- 
tion of resources and effort and provide' the "standards against which 
performance is to be measured". These ideas indicate that objectives 
must be quantifiable and that they provide a basis for control and 
resource allocation. Hofer (1976) views an objective as having four 
components; an attribute, an index, a target and a time frame. An 
objective on this basis could be stated as: 
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To sustain growth (attribute) 'of sales (index) at 210% 
per year (target) in the short term (time'frame). 
While accepting the above as a`valuable contribution to the 
current debate, we will take exception to the inclusion of a time 
frame within the definition of an objective. As noted 'above, objec- 
tives are to be seen as relatively time-less. An objective therefore, 
does not require a time frame. We may also note that the attribute 
associated with an objective (growth, in the'aböve example) is rela- 
tively superfluous as it is implied by the target. The attribute 
therefore only serves as a categorical device, in the above example to 
demonstrate that the objective is derived from a growth strategy. 
Hence, the essence of an objective is that it specifies a target value 
for a'particular variable. To use the terminology of control theory, 
an objective specifies a "set point". Thus'we define an archetypal 
objective' as being of the following form: 
To [strategic aim] of [variable] at [target value]. 
Adapting the above example to this form we may rewrite it as, 
To [sustain growth] of [$ sales] at [210% p. a. ] 
Drucker `(1974) suggests that objectives should be set in the 
eight key areas of; marketing, innovation, human organisation, finan- 
cial resources; 'physical resources, productivity, social responsibili- 
ty and profit requirements. He also suggest that objectives must be 
derived from the "purpose" and "mission" of acompany, these terms are 
defined by asking the question', "What is our business and what should 
it be? ". (In a business enterprise', economic performance is the ra- 
tional and purpose. ) Ansoff (1984) however, suggests that a firm will 
pursue no more than four or five`objectives (e. g. growth, solvency, 
market share). As noted earlier, we are dealing here with hierarchical 
terms. We may therefore choose to refer to Ansoff's four or five 
objectives as 'prime objectives' and Drucker's as 'sub-objectives'. 
The objective at the top of the hierarchy is the organisation's 
'purpose'. As noted above, strategies provide the guidance for formu- 
lating objectives. Here, we say they connect the prime- to the sub- 
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objectives., The organisation's purpose is, using Drucker's ideas, 
linked to the prime-objectives. via the mission statements. 
The above classification of terms has defined two parallel 
hierarchies. One hierarchy covers mission and strategy and refers to 
the rules or policies that state bow an aim is to be achieved. Pur- 
pose, prime-and sub-objectives refer to what is to be achieved, i. e., 
they identify targets for the organisation. At the, top of each 
hierarchy items are effectively permanent. At. the bottom are items 
which will probably change from time to time. In addition, the two 
hierarchies are highly interdependent, each adding meaning to the 
other. It is tempting to continue these two parallel hierarchies of 
terms to include goals as--sub-sub-objectives,. perhaps arguing that 
they are connected to sub-objectives via a sub-strategy,. or tactic. 
This idea is untenable, for it was argued above that goals differ from 
objectives by the inclusion of a time frame. Although permanence is a 
feature of hierarchical level, it is not a necessary feature. However, 
impermanence is a necessary feature of the idea of goal. Goals are not 
therefore sub-sub-objectives but exist as logically independent enti- 
ties. In addition, as objectives embody-the aim of a plan and goals 
exist to serve that plan, then goals must be defined only in terms of 
objectives. Our general definition of a goal is therefore: 
To attain [a specific objective] by [a specific time]. 
2.2.1.2 Critical Success Factors 
Having defined, for our purposes, the meaning of objective, goal 
etc., and. identified where each is appropriate, we still have not 
arrived at a satisfactory description of strategic planning as a 
process. To do this we must look in greater detail at the variables to 
which targets are being assigned. Rockart (1979) built on the ideas of 
Daniel, and later Anthony, Dearden and Vancil to arrive at the concept 
of "critical success factors". These Rockart defined as "the limited 
number of areas in which results, if they are satisfactory, will 
ensure successful competitive performance for the organisation". 
Although Rockart's interest was in identifying executive information 
needs, the concept is of use here when we note that "critical success 
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factors support the attainment'of organisational objectives". (Rockart 
actually uses. the word goal. However, examples of these-'goals' are; 
earnings per share, market share, new product success, which corre- 
spond more closely to our objectives. ) As strategic planning was 
earlier identified as been concerned with the "development of objec- 
tives", a concept identified with the "attainment of objectives" must 
be included in our conceptual model of strategic planning. What is 
more, we have identified objectives as providing a basis for business 
control. Rockart (1979) noted-that critical success factors are cen- 
tred on the information needs of management control and identified the 
attributes of these information needs as: 
1. External to the organisation (e. g. information on 
market structure, future trends. ) This data is general- 
ly unavailable from the company's financial accounting 
system and, in the majority of cases, unavailable from 
the company's usual day-to-day transaction-processing 
systems. 
2. Data are from multiple data sets. This requires coordi- 
nating pieces of information from, organisationally, 
widely dispersed parts of the company. 
3. 'Data may be based on subjective assessments. 
I 
Referring to the classification of informational characteristics 
in table 2.1, we see that the frequent reliance of critical success 
factors on external sources of data, and the inadequacy of the routine 
data from within the organisation, place these factors at the strate- 
gic end of the strategic/operational dimension. 
Some examples of critical success factors cited by Rockart and 
their associated "prime measures" are listed in table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Some Critical Success Factors 
Critical Success Factor Prime Measure 
Image in financial markets. Price/earnings ratio. 
Technological reputation with orders/bid ratio. 
customer. Customer "perception" interview. 
Market success. Change in market share. 
Growth rates of company markets. 
Rockart suggests that any one organisation will have typically 
five to eight critical success factors. He, identifies four sources for 
these: 
1. Structure of the particular industry. 
2. Competitive strategy, industry position, and geographi- 
cal location. 
3. Environmental factors. 
4. Temporal factors. 
The critical success factors relating to the type of industry 
will be relatively stable over time. However, those relating to 
strategy, environment and temporal factors", could, be highly transitory. 
We see therefore, that critical success factors sit at the head of a 
hierarchy of "success factors". This is, however, a very fluid 
hierarchy, with an interchange occurring between the top and bottom 
levels, reflecting changes in the organisation's environment, or 
anticipated future changes. Both Steiner (1979) and Ansoff (1984) make 
reference to entities which they call "key success factors". Ansoff 
defines these as "the small number of variables which are. critical to 
success", and cites examples as; response to market, product innova- 
tion, portfolio balance etc. Both Ansoff's definition and examples are 
sufficiently similar to Rockart's concept, for us to consider key and 
critical success factors to be one and the same. _. 
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2.2.1.3 A Model of Strategic Planning 
The above discussion has identified two related items which we 
may use - to define the substance of strategic planning. The first of 
these items is a hierarchy of variables or "success factors" a smaller 
subset of which will be critical at any one time. The other, a 
hierarchy of target values or "objectives": to be ascribed to the 
success factors. These two ideas enable us to arrive at the model of 
steady-state strategic planning illustrated here as figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Strategic Planning ` 
PURPOSE 
--------ý 
OBJECTIVES 
I 
r- 
critical 
success 
factors 
success J 
factors 
Prime objective 
Targets set on success 
factors 
Variables of prime interest to 
the organisation 
Pool of all possible 
variables. 
The process of strategic planning, as we perceive it here, can 
be viewed as consisting of three stages: rc 
1. The identification of, those success factors which are,. 
or are likely to become, critical. 
2. Comparing actual values of success factors against 
target values (objectives). 
and 3. Establishing target values (objectives) for the success 
-factors. --. - 
The arrows in figure 2.2 represent information flows. The first 
process above is indicated in figure 2.2 by the arrows connecting the 
pool of success factors with the pool of critical success factors. 
This stage will involve forecasting and/or surveillance and probably 
require external information. The second process, that of strategic 
control, is illustrated by the double arrow and single arrow connect- 
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ing variables and targets. -This process is essentially a form of 
variance analysis and will initiate action if the variance is outside 
acceptable limits. The third process is illustrated by the double 
arrow connecting variables to targets. The motive for using a double 
arrow to connect, the variable and target levels in the figure, is to 
highlight the fact that this information flow is involved in both the 
second and third strategic planning process. It therefore represents a 
dominant information flow. 
Whereas the first and second process may be viewed as continu- 
ous, the third process will. be intermittent, as it will only be initi- 
ated when an objective needs to be added or changed. The idea that 
strategic planning involves both continuous and intermittent compo- 
nents is recognised implicitly by Steiner and Cannon (1966). They 
note that strategic planning is a continuous process with irregular 
subject matter (see item 5 in table 2.2). Stonich (1982) explicitly 
recognised this point and uses the term strategy formulation to refer 
to, the intermittent activity and strategic planning to refer to the 
continuous activity. Some authors (e. g., Stein, 1981; Ansoff, 1984) do 
not make this distinction and-see formulation as a continuous process. 
Here we will find it a useful distinction and so follow Stonich's idea 
and nomenclature. 
Above we defined a goal as that which serves the attainment of 
an objective., A goal. (or goals) must. therefore come into existence 
when an objective is not being met. This situation could occur when 
either a new objective is specified, or an existing objective is 
outside its critical-range. In either case a success factor has become 
critical, in Rockart's sense that the factor is (or has become) impor- 
tant to-organisational success. To quote Hunsicker (1980) "Changes in 
key success factors... often create the most important strategic 
threats and opportunities". Goals are therefore generated by changes 
in success factors. To illustrate this point we may consider two 
examples. The first is hypothetical and illustrates an objective 
becoming critical. Consider the success factor of stock level. Stock 
control is usually an operational concern, but still necessary for 
organisational success. If the total stock level moves outside its 
acceptable range stock control will have become an issue of strategic 
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concern, a success factor will have become critical. Such a situation 
will initiate some goal orientated activity, the object of which will 
be to return stock levels to their target value as quickly as possi- 
ble. Once back under control stock level ceases to be critical, al- 
though still a success factor. An example of an instance where an 
objective is changed also illustrates this point. This example is 
based on an interview between the author and a director of the compa- 
ny. 
A mail order company identifies-customer service as a critical 
success factor. A prime measure of customer service is seen as order 
delivery time. An objective-is set that the order delivery time should 
not exceed 48 hours. Further investigation shows that to satisfy this 
objective, with the projected increase in sales volume, -increased 
warehousing/order packaging facilities are required. In other words, 
warehouse capacity is seen as another, but potentially temporary, 
critical success factor. The goal to build extra warehouse capacity is 
therefore established and actioned. Once., the warehouse is built 
(assuming a , 'successful outcome) the goal no longer need exist, ware- 
house capacity ceases to be critical, although it will remain a suc- 
cess factor. The objective (delivery in 48 hours) will have been 
achieved and remain in place. Similarly customer service still remains 
a critical success factor. 
This second example illustrates a further point, namely that a 
single changed objective, may generate several goals. In the example 
quoted above, computing capacity was seen as another critical success 
factor. The additional goal to install increased computer capacity was 
therefore also required to attain the objective of delivery within 48 
hours. Having determined a model of strategic planning, we now consid- 
er its polar opposite, operational planning. 
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2.2.2 OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
Besides strategic planning, Steiner and Cannon (1966, p. 12-13) 
also identified a type of, planning which they call Tactical. (Steiner 
and Cannon noted that Schorr used 'administrative' planning to convey 
the same idea. )eThe characteristics that Steiner and Cannon attributed 
to tactical planning are presented in table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Tactical Planning 
1. 'Done within, and in pursuit of, strategic plans. 
2. It is detailed. 
3. Covers the whole of an organisational unit (and its sub-units). 
4. Done in detail for short periods of time. 
5. Large numbers of people usually participate, compared to 
strategic planning. 
6. Relies more on qualitative'measures and internally generated 
data. 
7. More routine than strategic planning. 
Comparing the characteristics listed in table 2.4, with those in 
table 2.1 identifies Steiner and Cannon's tactical planning with the 
operational end of our managerial dimension. We will therefore refer 
to planning possessing these characteristics as operational planning. 
Unfortunately, Steiner and Cannon's characteristics do not give 
any real clues as to how we may develop a conceptual framework of 
operational planning. However, they do note that operational planning 
is done within and in pursuit of strategic plans. Also, as' noted 
earlier, operational management is primarily concerned with the effi- 
cient use of resources, hence operational planning must also deal with 
resources. Glueck and Jauch (1984, p. 315) observe that "resource allo- 
cation expressed in the budget needs to be carefully linked to strate- 
gy" and "... a budgeting methodology integrated into the planning 
framework is likely to lead to a higher attainment of the key objec- 
tives of an organisation". Newman and Logan (1981) in their discussion 
of management control state that financial budgets are "the best 
'comprehensive' control system". Netherbe and Montanari (1981), Sto- 
nich (1982), and others make similar statements. Hrebiniak and Joyce 
(1986) describe objectives and budgets as "measures of desired per- 
formance", and Anthony (1965) identifies budget preparation as a 
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planning activity and as a basis for control. As budgets are prepared 
routinely and in detail for short periods of time, typically one year, 
we may identify a major component of operational planning as budget 
preparation. In addition and in an analogous way to objectives, we see 
that budgets are targets that form a basis for operational control. 
Finally, we should note that budgets, although given in financial 
terms, in fact govern the allocation of all the company's. -resources, 
whether they be technological, personnel or informational. - 
On what basis are budgets prepared? The literature appears to 
have two views on this question. These may be labelled the top-down 
and: bottom-up approaches. The above discussion implies the top-down 
approach as budgets- are reflections of the strategic objectives. 
Wetherbe and Montanari (1981) also take this view by citing Lin's 
comment that "budget generation should start with the setting of 
objectives". Traditionally however, budgets are based on the previous 
level of appropriation. In relatively stable environments historical 
budget data may accurately reflect the primary focus of the output 
area. In other environments, an understanding. of the rank order of the 
value of the tasks to be performed by each unit may be abetter basis 
for budget: preparation. (This idea is the basis for Zero Base-Budget- 
ing- (Wetherbe and Montanari, 1981) and Priority Base Budgeting 
(Sketchley, 1982)). This implies a bottom-up approach to budgeting as 
the definition of the "prior activities and tasks are appropriate 
regardless of the budgeting model used, with the major difference 
being the source of operational information" (Wetherbe and Montanari, 
1981). Budgets therefore appear to be determined either by "objec- 
tives" or "tasks". However, if we accept the view that strategic 
managerial processes are concerned with directing an organisation by 
searching out new opportunities, then prescriptively we would antici- 
pate budgets to be determined by higher level objectives, not lower 
level tasks. We therefore argue in favour of the top-down approach of 
Lin and others (e. g., Glueck and Jauch 1984, p. 316) as indicating the 
"correct" information flow in the model being developed here. Steiner 
(1979, p. 215) summarises this approach and the connection between 
objectives, budgets and tasks in the sentence "budgets are integrating 
methods to translate strategic plans into current actions". 
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In the above passage by Steiner (1979) we equated "current ac- 
tions" with "tasks" and noted that they are determined-by budgets. 
Budgets were also identified with targets as they identify what re- 
sources are available to perform operational tasks. A task is also a 
target as it specifies what actions have to be performed and the 
logical outcome of a decision making process,. e. g., planning, is a 
commitment to action (Mintzberg et. al., -1976). We therefore, have 
identified a hierarchy of terms (task and budget) relating-to what has 
to be done by operational management. The question as to how 'the 
resources are to be allocated-and how-the actions are to be"performed 
are, as Simon (1960) noted, determined by habit, or written standard 
operating procedures. Wheelen and Hunger (1987) saw procedures and 
standard operating procedures as synonymous. They define procedures as 
"a system of sequential steps or techniques that describe in detail 
how to perform a particular task or job". Procedures therefore'are the 
set of rules used to translate budgets into tasks. Finally we may note 
that different terms within the hierarchy defined here have associated 
with them differing 'levels of permanence. - Budgets are fixed over 
relatively-long periods of time '(a year' typically) and the decisions 
leading to routine actions (tasks) are made on-=a day-to-day basis. In 
a manner analogous- to the two parallel hierarchies of'strategic tar- 
gets (objectives) and policies (strategies)' identified previously, -we 
have two operational hierarchies of targets (budgets) and policies 
(procedures). The planning terms so far identified may be summarised 
using these two hierarchies, as in figure 2.3 below. 
Figure 2.3: Planning Hierarchies 
Target Policy 
(what) (how) 
PURPOSE 
i 
Mission 
_1 
PRIME-OBJECTIVE -... Strategy 
i I 
SUB-OBJECTIVE -ý. Tactic 
BUDGET 
TASK 
I 
Procedure 
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Permanence 
of target 
High 
I Life of organ- 
isation 
May change, but 
infrequently 
A year. 
Lw 
Day-to-day 
It will be: observed that goals do not appear inýeither 
hierarchy. The reason for this was stated previously. In addition the 
term "tactic" has been used to identify the point at which the 
hierarchies change from being predominantly strategic to predominantly 
operational. The use of this term is arbitrary but has been adopted 
reflecting its use in the literature as implying something less than a 
strategy and'nearly operational in character. The figure is also 
prescriptive, as the arrows imply the status of terms relative to each 
other. In-the remainder of this discussion-we will focus our attention 
on the hierarchy of targets, leaving the policy hierarchy implicit. 
2.2.2.1 A Model of Operational Planning 
We are now able to specify a model of operational planning. 
Budgets are operational targets and are the operational equivalent of 
objectives. In place of success factors, which are the variables to 
which objectives refer,, we identify "operational factors" as the 
variables to which budgets refer. These operational factors will, in 
some instances, be a sub-set of the strategic success factors. As 
Rockart (1979) noted, success factors relating to the organisation's 
internal operations are likely to be summaries and aggregates of many 
operational measures. Our model of operational planning therefore 
takes the form illustrated in figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4: Operational Planning 
I 
BUDGETS 
operational 
variables- 
f 
Targets set on operational 
variables 
Variables of interest to 
operational management 
We view operational planning as a two stage process. One stage 
is budget variance assessment (i. e., assessing actual against expected 
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resource use) . 
illustrated- by the double and single arrow in the model. 
The other stage is implied by the double, arrow alone and sees the 
budget as determining the level of operational activity.: The dominant 
information flow in operational planning is therefore from the budget 
to the operational variables box. 
2.2.3 ORGANISATIONAL PLANNING 
Finally we, are able to define a model of the planning process 
within an organisation by simply combining the, strategic and opera- 
tional planning models described above. This model is illustrated in 
figure 2.5 below. 
Figure 2.5: 'Organisational-Planning 
TARGETS 
VARIABLES 
A -ý 
PURPOSE 
---------- 
I 
OBJECTIVES 
critical 
success 
factors 
--------ý 
i Strategic Operational 
B 
In addition to the information flows previously identified, 
figure 2.5 includes two additional internal and four external informa- 
tion flows. The internal flow connecting objectives to budgets -re- 
flects the previous discussion that budgets are determined by objec- 
tives. Similarly the information flow between operational and success 
factors reflects Rockart's (1979) (and others, e. g., Lucas, 1976; 
Emery, 1969) observation that aggregated internal information will 
form or contribute to the success factors. The external information 
flow labelled "A" in the figure corresponds to Rockart's, Lucus's and 
Emery's emphasis on the role of external information in strategic 
planning. The nature of this information has been extensively studied 
success 
factors 
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by Aguilar (1967) and others (e. g., El Sawy, 1985). The strategic 
information flow from the organisation (labelled "C") will typically 
consist of information published by the organisation, e. g., annual 
accounts. Finally, the two external operational information flows 
labelled "B" and "D" represent information about the organisations 
transactions. ' For example, the "B" stream will include customer orders 
and the "D" stream invoices. 
The above model is prescriptive, as certain `information flows 
are excluded. For example it does not indicate that budgets determine 
objectives, or that objectives directly determine operational factors. 
The model also implies that, with the exception of information ex- 
changes to assist with control, the two planning systems operate 
largely independently. Finally the model, although labelled a model of 
the planning process, is also a model of the organisational control 
process. It therefore satisfies Anthony's (1965) observation that 
planning and control are not separable activities carried out in an 
organisation. While being congruent with this aspect of Anthony's 
work, it does not appear to be congruent with Anthony's conclusion 
that organisational planning systems fall into three categories. We 
will investigate this point next. 
2.2.3.1 A Comparison with other Planning Models 
The above discussion has lead us to develop a model of organisa- 
tional planning and control consisting of two piers, one strategic the 
other operational. Several authors (e. g., Steiner, 1979) advocate a 
three cycle planning process, such as the planning, programming, 
budgeting system (Wheelen and Hunger, 1987, p. 303). These systems were 
generally viewed as having a theoretical grounding in Anthony's (1965) 
framework of planning and control. This consisted of three activities 
which he termed Strategic planning, Management control and operational 
control. This three term framework has been used by many authors since 
as a basis for their research (e. g. Lucas, 1976; Leader and Mendelow, 
1986). Anthony (1965) was not entirely-satisfied with his framework 
however. As he points out (p. 15) "we found it easy to identify two 
rather different types of planning activities", which were strategic 
planning and management control. With the inclusion of a third catego- 
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ry, operational control, Anthony (p. 17) states, "even now [we] are by 
no means satisfied with the results" and later in the text "the lines 
between categories are blurred... it is easy to find situations that do 
not fit clearly in a single category". 
The activities characterising Anthony's framework are reproduced 
here as table 2.5 (Anthony, 1965, p. 19): 11 
Table 2.5: Examples of Activities in a Business Organisation 
Included in Major Framework Headings. 
Strategic Planning 
Choosing company. 
objectives. 
Planning the 
organisation. 
Setting personnel 
policies. 
Setting financial 
policies. 
Setting marketing 
policies. 
Setting research 
policies. 
Choosing new product 
lines. 
Acquiring a new 
division. 
Deciding on non- 
routine capital 
expenditures. 
Management Control Operational Control 
Formulating budgets. Controlling hiring. 
Planning staff Implementing 
levels. policies. 
Formulating personnel Controlling credit 
practices. extension. 
Working capital Controlling placement 
planning. of advertisements. 
Formulating Scheduling 
advertising programs. production. 
Deciding on research Controlling 
projects. inventory. 
Choosing product Measuring, appraising, 
improvements. - and improving 
Deciding on plant workers' efficiency. 
rearrangement. 
Deciding on routine 
capital expenditures. 
Formulating decision 
rules for operational 
control. 
Measuring, appraising, 
and improving man- 
agement performance. 
Support for a two-cycle planning process model, similar to the 
model developed here, is supplied by Camillus and Grant (1980). They 
criticise planning systems based on a three stage, cycle_while acknowl- 
edging that such schemes had "hitherto been accepted as sound theory" 
and noting that "The three cycle process is in apparent consonance 
with Anthony's (1965) framework". With reference to three stage plan- 
ning cycles and Steiner's (1979) classification in particular, Camil- 
lus and Grant (1980) say the following: 
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"Steiner's classification is largely based on.. the time 
dimension and to that extent is somewhat more arbitrary 
and descriptive than normative. in character... In short,. 
while the three-cycle process does not necessarily vio- 
late any basic planning and control concepts, it is. 
equally true that other more efficient processes involv- 
ing fewer cycles can also be designed in keeping with the 
basic constructs. " 
It is this view that lead them to a model of planning similar to 
the one developed here. The model they finally propose is reproduced 
here as figure 2.6. 
A 
Figure 2.6: Camillus and Grant, Two-Cycle Process 
Cycle 1: Strategic Planning 
Level: Corporate management 
Focus: Defining corporate mission, objectives 
in terms of rates of change in key 
parameters, strategies, and policies, 
articulating basic strategic assumptions 
Horizon: 3 to 15 years (operating cycle plus 
redeployment time) 
I 
Cycle 2: Operational Planning 
Level: Executive and operating management 
Focus: Defining quantitative goals in terms of 
financial statements, physical targets 
and time deadlines; generating action 
plans intended to achieve goals; 
developing contingent plans of action 
Horizon: 1 to 3 years (depending on operating 
cycle) 
The semantic-differences between Camillus and Grant's model and 
our model are not too different if it is assumed that "defining quan- 
titative goals in terms of financial statements" is synonymous with 
our idea of 'budgeting'. Camillus and Grant further point out that: 
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"any corporate planning process would fall within the 
first two segments of Anthony's framework. It also fol- 
lows that corporate planning processes designed in keep- 
ing with Anthony's framework would not necessarily re- 
quire more than two distinct cycles. ", (original emphasis 
retained. ) 
So, while criticising three-cycle planning processes and arguing 
for a two stage process similar to that developed here, Camillus and 
Grant, (1980) do not reject Anthony's (1965) framework of planning and 
control systems even though Anthony, as we have seen, had reservations 
about it. The model developed here does account for this apparently 
contradictory conclusion. If we focus on the internal information 
flows identified in figure 2.5 we observe three counter flows within 
and between, the two managerial piers. It is these information flows 
which define Antony's framework but it is the orientation of the 
information which define the two piers. The orientation. of the infor- 
mation has been defined previously and summarised in table 2.1, e. g., 
strategic information is long-range and aggregated; operational infor- 
mation is short-range and detailed. The internal information flows 
identified in figure 2.5 and their congruence with Anthony's framework 
are discussed below. 
Anthony (1965, p. 16) describes strategic planning thus: 
"Strategic planning is the process of deciding on objec- 
tives of the organisation, on changes in these objec- 
tives, on the resources used to attain these objectives, 
, and on 
the policies that are to govern the acquisition, 
use and disposition of these resources. " 
From previous discussions this description identifies the infor- 
mation flows within the strategic pier (particularly the circular flow 
between critical success factors and objectives) with Anthony's idea 
of strategic planning. As the dominant flow is from variables to 
targets, this circular flow represents a planning process. 
Anthony (1965, p. 17) describes management control thus: 
"Management control, is the process. by which managers 
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively 
and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organisa- 
tion's objectives. " 
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This description (together with inspection of table 2.5) iden- 
tifies "management control" with budget setting. As such it is identi- 
fied with the information flow joining objectives and budgets. The 
other part of the description, "in the accomplishment of the organisa- 
tion's objectives" is descriptive of the reverse information flow 
illustrated in our model as joining operational and success factors. 
Management control is therefore the two information flows operating 
between the two piers of our 'model. As neither flow is viewed as 
dominant, then` describing this process as "control" is arbitrary. 
Anthony (1965, p. 118) describe Operational control thus: 
"Operational control is the process of assring that 
specific tasks are carried out effectively and-efficient- 
ly. "., 
This description associates operational control with the infor- 
mation flows within the operational pier of our model. As the dominant 
flow in this instance was from targets to-variables, then-this repre- 
sents a control process. 
So, to summarise the discussion so far,. we have been able, 
through a discussion of planning concepts, to develop a model of 
organisational planning and control . This model is congruent with the 
seminal conceptual framework of Anthony (1965) as it implies that 
planning and control are closely allied activities and accounts for 
the three categories within this framework. At the same time the model 
satisfies criticisms of planning systems based, in apparent consonance 
with Anthony's framework, on more than two cycles. However, none of 
this development has enabled us to explicitly identify the boundaries 
of the implementation process as something intermediate, between plan- 
ning and control (figure 2.1). However, we have laid the foundations 
for this step. 
2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON IMPLEMENTATION 
The discussion so far has been developed around a single dimen- 
sion, of managerial activity, or process. This dimension was dichoto- 
mised into strategic and operational poles. Ansoff (1984, p. 183) iden- 
tifies two major organisational dimensions: 
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"Inside the organisation, there are two major streams of 
activity (or two subsystems): (1) logistic subsystem 
which is engaged in conversion of the input resources 
into goods/services; and (2) managerial subsystem which 
is concerned with guidance and control of the activities 
of the organisation. " 
Ansoff further observes that the logistic subsystem works with 
resources, whereas the managerial subsystem works with information and 
is sub-divided into strategic and operational management. It appears 
reasonable to equate our managerial process dimension with Ansoff's 
managerial subsystem. Ansoff's Logistic/Information dimension we will 
refer to as an "activity" dimension. Viewing these dimensions as two 
rectangular coordinates produces a four cell matrix which provides a 
convenient basis for representing planning systems. Three of the four 
cells of this matrix are occupied by Anthony's (1965) categorisation 
of planning systems. This matrix is illustrated below in figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7: Organisational Planning Systems 
A 
C Logistic 
T 
I 
V 
I 
T 
Y Information 
Operational 
Control 
Strategic Management 
Planning 
L- 
Control 
I 
Strategic Operational 
MANAGERIAL 
The justification for this arrangement is through inspection of 
table 2.5. In the strategic planning and management control classifi- 
cations words like setting, choosing and deciding predominate. These 
are information based activities. In operational control the words 
controlling, scheduling and measuring are used. These are resource 
based activities. In addition Anthony's definition of operational 
control refers to "tasks" which we have previously equated with "ac- 
tions" and are therefore logistical. The correspondence between the 
matrix in figure 2.7 and the information flows in figure 2.5 can be 
noted by viewing the matrix from the lower right corner. This shows 
strategic planning, managerial control and operational planning in the 
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correct. orientation to one another. But what of the fourth planning 
process identified by the matrix but not included in Anthony's frame- 
work? We posit that this cell is identified with project planning. 
Steiner (1979) notes that project plans are made, for a concrete activ- 
ity. This associates projects with the logistical pole of our activity 
dimension. Steiner also, notes that project plans are detailed and have 
a time span.. The idea of, a fixed time span is reminiscent. of our defi- 
nition of a strategic goal; namely, a goal, actions. a specific objec- 
tive by a specified time. The association of goals with, projects 
identifies project planning as a strategic activity. Project planning 
therefore satisfies the criteria for a strategic and logistical plan- 
ning process to occupy the missing cell in figure 2.7. The completed 
planning process matrix is reproduced in figure 2.8. Here we have also 
included the "targets" of concern, to each planning process. 
Figure 2.8: Organisational Planning Systems (II) 
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Having arrived at the planning framework-of figure 2.8 the 
question is, why did not Anthony (1965) include project planning in 
his framework? A possible answer could be that Anthony was interested 
in continuous planning processed. Project planning, by its emphasis on 
transitory goals, is intermittent. This follows from our earlier 
discussion of strategic planning processes where a distinction was 
drawn between a continuous strategic planning process and an intermit- 
tent strategy formulation process. Strategy formulation was concerned 
with changing objectives and these changes generated goals. 
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2.3.1 IMPLEMENTATION AND PROGRAMMING 
As the ultimate aim of organisational planning is to translate 
objectives into routine day-to-day tasks, then we are able to identify 
in figure 2.8 two routes by which this may be achieved. One route 
operates through budgets as an intermediate stage. Here we are talking 
about a process which is primarily concerned with ensuring the ade- 
quate allocation of resources to enable established organisational 
objectives to be achieved. Glueck and Jauch (1984, p. 315) appear to 
take this approach to budgeting and implementation by noting that 
routine year-to-year allocation decisions are important to the 
"strategic direction of the firm". Stonich (1982) and Wheelen and 
Hunger (1987) adopt a similar approach to implementation. In this 
situation it is difficult to see how the process of implementation 
differs from that of managing the organisation. Indeed, this point of 
view was expressly made to the author by a manager in a U. K. owned 
financial services group, "Implementing strategy is the process of 
managing the business. " If we adopt this perspective, then figure 2.5 
is not only a model of organisational planning, but also of implemen- 
tation. As we observed earlier, implementation as a concrete, inde- 
pendent, definable activity does not exist as such. 
If however, we view a route from changed objectives to tasks, 
then we see implementation as synonymous with project planning. Imple- 
mentation is now a definable independent concrete activity. It has its 
own specific aim, namely to realise a goal. Steiner (1979) points to 
this interpretation by observing that the time span of a project is 
the implementation time. Ansoff (1984) also takes the view that 
projects implement strategy; which is the same as implementing objec- 
tives if we adopt Drucker's (1974) view that "objectives are 
strategy". Ultimately though, once the new objective has been achieved 
its continued implementation becomes a matter of budgeting. It may 
therefore be more appropriate to describe the continuous mode of 
implementation described above as "strategy maintenance" and the 
discontinuous mode as "strategy change". Both views of implementation 
expressed here are appropriate. Indeed they are not necessarily con- 
tradictory. There is a view, for example, that an organisation at any 
one time is composed of a variety of projects (Hawthorne, 1978). 
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These may be "candidate" or "executed" projects (Bussey, 1978). What 
we have stated here is that the implementation of executed projects 
involves different processes to the implementation of candidate 
projects. So a project focus on implementation appears to be quite 
appropriate. 
A further congruence between the two implementation modes is 
possible if we adopt a decision-making perspective. Simon (1960, p. 4) 
the main proponent of this perspective, states that "Executing 
policy... is indistinguishable from making more detailed policy". Hence 
he views decision making as the paradigm for most executive activity. 
As both budgeting and project planning connect the unstructured, non- 
programmed, decision making activities of the strategic managerial 
process to the structured, programmed, operational decision making 
process, then we may reasonably describe implementation as "program- 
ming"*. A general definition of implementation, from a decision theory 
perspective, is therefore: 
"Implementation is the process of interfacing an 'unpro- 
grammed' decision making process to the organisation's 
'programmed' decision making processes. " 
Although this definition demonstrates. a unison of approach to 
the question of implementation, it does not assist with narrowing down 
an approach for study. However, the decision making perspective of our 
definition is relevant to our concern with the implementation of 
strategy,, as a well recognised definition of strategy is 'a pattern in 
a stream of decisions' (Andrews, 1980; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; 
Quinn, 1978). Previously we identified two types of decision, the 
operational and strategic. We will now assess the literature on the 
strategic type in greater detail, with a view to determining an appro- 
priate focus for this study. 
* This view of implementation as programming differs significantly 
from the way other authors use the term. One of the earliest uses of 
the word 'programming' is by D. Novick (Steiner, 1963). It was used 
in the same sense as Steiner and Cannon's (1966) tactical planning, 
which we have called operational planning. Later, Steiner (1979) used 
the word to mean an intermediate form of planning between 'long-term 
planning', and 'budgeting'. Programming in this sense is also re- 
ferred to by various authors as 'Action planning' or 'medium-range 
planning' and budgeting as 'short-range planning'. 
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2.3.2 THE STRATEGIC DECISION 
Mintzberg et. al. (1976) defined a decision as a specific com- 
mitment to action (usually a commitment of resources) and the term 
strategic as meaning "important", in terms of the actions taken, the 
resources committed, or the precedents set. The political literature 
on strategic decisions defines them as the major definitions of prin- 
ciples of operation within which smaller sub-decisions can take place 
Wilson, 1980). Some authors (e. g. Wheelen and Hunger, 1987) would 
reserve this description for a definition of policy. 
In terms of the attributes used to define strategic decisions 
Mintzberg et. al. (1976) Stein (1981) Pennings (1985) Hickson et. al. 
(1986) and others identify novelty, rarity, complexity, lack of struc- 
ture and open-endedness. They are made at high level, are non-routine 
and will set off "waves" of lesser decisions and commit substantial 
resources. In addition standard procedures are rarely sufficient to 
cope with the complexities posed by these decisions. Although there 
are few precedents for the strategic decision it will set precedents. 
As previously noted, strategic decisions are also non-programmed 
(Simon, 1960). Finally, words like "significant" and "consequential" 
are relative terms that must be interpreted by the organisations 
themselves. It is possible that a big matter in one organisation will 
be less weighty in another (Hickson et. al., 1986). 
The emphasis in the above definitions on novelty and rarity show 
strategic decisions to be intermittent. This observation associates 
the implementation of strategic decisions with implementation by 
projects and therefore strategic change. Indeed, some authors prefer 
to view strategy solely in these terms. Stein (1981) defines strategy 
as a "system whose elements are strategic decisions". Pettigrew (1990) 
states "my current preference is to approach the study of strategy 
with a vocabulary that leans rather more heavily on change than 
choice". The association between strategic change and strategic deci- 
sions implies that implementation by projects is the more substantive 
approach to the implementation issue than implementation by budgets. 
This study will therefore be concerned only with the implementation of 
strategic decisions, i. e., we adopt Stein's definition of strategy. 
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2.3.3 A RODEL ' FOR IMPLEXENTATION 
., ý 
Having reduced the implementation question to that of implement- 
ing projects enables a model of organisational planning to be drawn 
containing an explicit implementation stage. This model is illustrated 
in figure 2.9. - 
Figure 2.9: Strategic Change 
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Our aim here has been to identify implementation as an independ- 
ent organisational activity. Equating implementation with project 
planning satisfies this aim as projects start with a definable goal. 
It has also been shown that the end product of a project is task 
definition. These are the concrete activities that have to be per- 
formed if the new objective installed by the project is to be main- 
tained by the normal budgeting activity of the organisation. The key 
information flows necessary for the implementation of a goal are also 
indicated in figure 2.9. Goal recognition is a product of strategic 
planning and in particular, of strategy formulation. A major informa- 
tion input into the implementation process must therefore originate 
from the strategic pier of the organisation. The process of converting 
the project goal into a larger number of tasks is referred to as 
"factoring" (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1986) or "means-end analysis" (March 
and Simon, 1958). March and Simon (1958, p. 191) describe this as a 
technique of successive approximation, i. e., starting from a general 
goal discover a set of general means of accomplishing the goal and 
then take each of these means in turn as new sub-goals. The process 
proceeds: 
ý-º 
ý-/ 
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"until it reaches a level of concreteness where known, 
existing programmes (generalised means) can be employed 
to carry out the remaining detail. Hence, the process 
connects new general purposes with an appropriate subset 
of the existing repertory of generalised means. " 
Using our nomenclature, "generalised means" are "tasks" and 
"general purposes" are "objectives". 
It would appear reasonable to' assume that much of the informa- 
tion needed to enable a means-end analysis to proceed will be detailed 
and supplied directly to the project. One source of such information 
will be internal and from the operational pier of the organisation. 
Another information source will be external, and again we would expect 
this information to be highly detailed and specific to the particular 
project. 
We are now also in a position to identify the flaw in the con- 
struction of figure 2.1 noted previously. Superficially figures 2.1. 
and 2.9 are similar. However, the flaw with figure 2.1 is that it does 
not make explicit the distinction made here between implementation as 
strategy maintenance and implementation as strategy change. Noting 
that' planning may also be viewed as continuous and intermittent leads 
to a modified model of the management process to replace that of 
figure 2.1. This model is illustrated in figure 2.10. 
Figure 2.10: A Modified Model of Strategic Management 
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The main feature of figure 2.10 is that it is' divided into two 
levels. The continuous level refers to strategic planning and strategy 
maintenance. The lower, intermittent, level indicates that, periodi- 
cally, the strategic planning process signals possible changes in 
strategy. This initiates a strategy formulation process, which in turn 
initiates strategic change. Ultimately the change is integrated into 
the continuous strategy maintenance activity of the organisation. As 
strategy maintenance is an essentially logistic process, it influences 
the organisations internal resources directly. If we take internal 
resources to include "procedural techniques" (Wheelen and Hunger, 
1987) then strategic change also directly influences the organisa- 
tion's internal resources. The theory underlying this point is dis- 
cussed in chapter 4 and is an important concept within the remainder 
of the thesis. Finally, we note that the focus of the remainder of 
this thesis is solely with the issue of strategic change, hence the 
emphasis placed on this process in figure 2.10. 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have sought to answer the question, what is 
the implementation of strategy? We concluded that two approaches may 
be taken in order to answer this question. While noting that both 
approaches have aspects in common (they may both be defined as "pro- 
gramming") they are sufficiently dissimilar to enable them to be 
investigated separately. One approach is to equate implementation with 
the normal budgeting, or resource allocating, activities of the organ- 
isation. A justification for this perspective was made if implementa- 
tion is equated with strategy maintenance. An alternative approach and 
the one to be adopted in this study, is to view implementation as an 
intermittent activity strongly associated with strategic decisions and 
change processes. This approach leads to a view of strategy implemen- 
tation as the implementation of specific projects. Each project has a 
definite start and end and are "grafted" on to the organisation as 
required. As such, implementation is seen as a temporary bridge join- 
ing the strategic and operational piers of an organisation. 
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In the following chapter we will look in greater detail at the 
origin of and type of projects that may be implemented. This will rest 
on a deeper understanding of what strategic decisions are and how 
organisational change is involved in implementation. At this point we 
abandon the broad question of implementing strategy and focus on the 
narrower question of the implementation of strategic decisions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRATEGIC DECISIONS,. PROJECTS AND CHANGE 
It was demonstrated. in the previous chapter that a substantive 
issue within, the implementation of strategy question concerned the 
implementation of strategic decisions.., Strategic decisions were shown 
to be implemented through projects and a key concept linking strategic 
decisions to projects was the concept of change. In this chapter we 
aim to develop a clearer understanding of the associations between 
these items, thus laying the foundation for further operationalisation 
of the study. 
This chapter is broadly structured into three parts. Initially 
we, adopt a number of different perspectives on the "organisation". One 
of these, the cybernetic, is used to develop a taxonomy of strategic 
decisions based on types of organisational change. In the second part 
this taxonomy is tested using a secondary data analysis of a well 
respected U. K. study of strategic decision making. Finally, the taxon- 
omy of strategic decisions is linked to a taxonomy of strategic 
projects. 
3.1 A TAXONOMY OF STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
Our concern here is only with organisations constituted for the 
purpose of the production of wealth or well-being in the form of goods 
or services. These may be public or privately owned. There are many 
perspectives that an individual researcher may use to describe and 
explain those organisational variables with which they are concerned. 
Machlup (1974) felt sure that there were at least 21 concepts of the 
firm. Here we will use three of these, the organisational (or bureau- 
cratic) perspective, "a typical co-operative system with authoritative 
co-ordination", the accounting perspective, "a collection of assets 
and liabilities", and the cybernetic (Beer, 1967) an "exceedingly 
complex and probabilistic system... (which is) a tightly knit network 
of information.. ". We start by investigating the concept of informa- 
tion and uncertainty in cybernetic systems. 
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3.1.1 INFORMATION AND-UNCERTAINTY 
The idea that an organisation, such as a factory, bank or hospi- 
tal, 
- may 
be viewed as a collection of "bits and pieces", connected 
together by communication channels operating through input/output 
interfaces, is central to the Cybernetic, General System Theory and 
Communication theory approach to the study of such organisations. Such 
a description identifies a system, which is defined by Ackoff and 
Emery (1972, p. 18) as : 
"... an entity composed of at least two elements and a 
relation that holds between each of its elements and at 
least one other element in the set. The elements form a 
completely connected set that is not decomposable into 
. -unrelated subsets". 
Note that although a system may be part of a larger system, it 
cannot be decomposed into independent subsystems. Calling the 
bits-and-pieces, "entities" (in the sense that they are subsystems) 
then the larger system may be represented as a directed graph. Figure 
3.1 illustrates such a graph showing four entities and eight active 
communication channels, or relations. 
Figure 3.1: Graphical Representation of a System. 
Lecrend 
0- Entity. 
-- Communication 
channel. 
This graph, or network, shows the "connectiveness" of the sys- 
tem. It is a relatively trivial matter to show that the maximum number 
of one way communication channels that can exist in a system of 'n' 
entities is n(n-1). In figure 3.1, therefore, twelve communication 
channels could have been drawn between the four entities. This is 
because the channel, or relationship, between entities A and B say, is 
not necessarily the same as that between B and A. The nature and the 
extent of the control which the system displays is revealed in the 
behaviour of the connectiveness of the network. This connectiveness 
will probably change from moment to moment, and the states of the 
communications lines at any instant represents the amount of informa- 
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tion in the system (Beer, 1967). 
This idea of information as being represented by the pattern of 
states (active, inactive) of the communication channels within a 
system leads to the counter intuitive notion, used in cybernetics 
etc., that information is a measure-of choice. To expand on this, we 
note that the number of entities in the system determines the permuta- 
tive, capacity of the system's possible states. This permutative capac- 
ity is referred to in the cybernetic literature as "variety". Berta- 
lanffy (1973), Beer (1967) and others note that the permutative capac- 
ity of a system in which each communication channel may be active or 
inactive (on or off) is 2n(n-1). Increasing the number of entities in 
a system, therefore, greatly increases the variety and hence the 
uncertainty, in the system. In the-sense that an organised system may 
be thought of as "a machine for doing so-and-so", Beer (1967, p. 44) 
notes: 
"A machine in its pristine state is therefore full of 
uncertainty; its content is chaos. Once the machine 
begins to operate, however, a degree of order is intro- 
duced; and this ordering begins to eliminate the ruling 
uncertainty. This is what enables us to handle... systems: 
it is 'information'.. Information kills variety; and the 
reduction of variety is one of the main techniques of 
regulation;... " 
The design of an organisation is therefore determined by the 
need to handle the inherent uncertainty within that organisation. The 
means by which this is done is through handling information. In this 
sense an organisation is an information processing machine (Beer, 
1967; Galbraith, 1979; Feldman and March, 1981). 
The idea that uncertainty is an important organisational varia- 
ble also pervades much of the organisational theory literature. Van De 
Ven and Ferry (1980) use domain uncertainty as one of three underlying 
dimensions of organisational design. They note that this dimension 
underlies most conceptions of organisational rationality. In particu- 
lar, they argue that the well-known Thompson and Tuden (1979) typology 
of decision-making strategies as Computational, Judgmental, Bargaining 
or Inspirational, is based on the dichotomisation of this dimension of 
uncertainty. 
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Burns and Stalker (1961) found the rate of change of the market 
and technology, a variable which distinguished the appropriateness of 
organisational form. Woodward (1965) found the type of production 
process important, Harvey (1968) the number of new products intro- 
duced; and Hall (1962) the predictability of the task as determinants 
of organisational form. From these and other studies Galbraith (1969) 
hypothesised that organisational form was determined by the need to 
process information. The amount of information generated, Galbraith 
reasoned, was dependent on the size of the organisation, the amount of 
connectivity or interdependence among the elements necessary for 
decision making, and the degree of uncertainty concerning the organi- 
sation's task requirements. 
Simon (1960) and Emery'(1969)'both observe that the hierarchical 
character of most organisations stems from the need to reduce the 
complexity of the organisation and is therefore a response to uncer- 
tainty. Uncertainty can also be reduced by using various de-coupling 
techniques between entities. For example, the specification of stand- 
ard rules and procedures (March and Simon, 1958) buffering and the use 
of flexible or slack resources. A third method for handling uncertain- 
ty is, through the use of coordinating methods, namely plans and budg- 
ets. Galbraith (1969) identifies several more techniques used by 
organisations to handle uncertainty. 
From the above discussion it is noted that uncertainty can 
originate from several sources. The number of entities constituting 
the system, or organisation, affects the variety of the system and 
hence its uncertainty. Similarly the production process used and the 
nature of the tasks performed by the organisation will affect uncer- 
tainty. Such sources may be thought of as internal uncertainty. Howev- 
er, no organisation exists in isolation, it must be responsive to, 
and exist within, a much wider system, its environment. In the lan- 
guage of Systems theory, the organisation is an open system (Katz and 
Kahn, 1966). That the environment is multi-dimensional and has a 
significant effect on an organisation is acknowledged by many authors 
(e. g. Sanderson and Luffman, 1988) and a number of definitions and 
measures appear in both the organisational (Downey et. al., 1975) and 
business policy (Ansoff, 1984) literature. In addition, several au- 
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thors observe that an organisation has little control over the effect 
the environment has on itself (e. g. Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979). This 
is not universally true, however. In some respects the organisation 
has control over its environment. It. can,, for example, partially 
determine its market and also its suppliers - its domain. In this 
sense Van De Ven and Ferry (1980, p. 92) note that "in varying degrees 
organisations create their own environments by their choice of 
domain". 
The above discussion suggests that an organisation is subject to 
two sources of environmental uncertainty. First is the uncertainty 
stemming from the organisation's transactions with its environment. We 
will call this endogenous uncertainty, in the sense that it is under 
partial control by the organisation. Second is exogenous or uncon- 
trolled uncertainty. Beer (1985) identifies two forms of exogenous 
uncertainty, i. e., sources or types of strategic environmental infor- 
mation. These he identifies as focusing on what is actually happening 
to correctly assess trends (the alpha loop) and being alert to novel- 
ty, i. e., being able to judge its relevance (the beta loop). Porter's 
(1980) model of the forces driving industry competition can be identi- 
fied with these ideas of environmental uncertainty. Specifically, the 
force due to industry competitors is identified with exogenous, alpha 
uncertainty, whereas the forces due to potential entrants and threat 
of substitutes is identified with exogenous, beta uncertainty. Final- 
ly, we would identify the forces due to suppliers and buyers bargain- 
ing power with endogenous uncertainty. 
The above arguments lead us to an extended view of the system 
and its environment. This is illustrated in figure 3.2. 
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-Figure 3.2:.. The System and its Environment 
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3.1.1.1 Organisational Change 
To summarise the above discussion, we see that a purposeful 
organisation is confronted with uncertainty. This can stem from the 
internal nature and structure of the organisation itself, its transac- 
tions with its environment as well as the nature of the environment in 
which it, operates. This uncertainty gives rise to the need to process 
information. Because of limitations on the processing capacity of the 
organisation, a system of priorities is imposed upon the communication 
channels connecting the entities within the organisation. These prior- 
ities take the form of allowed relationships; the development of an 
hierarchical authority structure is probably the most obvious effect 
of this process. However, it is also manifest in the way resources are 
allocated, as formalised in plans and budget. 
The definition of strategy adopted in this study was given in 
chapter 2 as the pattern of strategic decisions made by an organisa- 
tion (Stein, 1981). Chandler (1962) demonstrated that an organisa- 
tion's structure and its strategy were interdependent. Namely, as 
organisations pursued a diversification strategy, say, then the organ- 
isational structure also needed to change. From this we may infer that 
strategic decisions change the structure of an organisation. In addi- 
tion, we have noted previously that an organisation's structure is 
determined by the uncertainty with which the organisation has to deal. 
If we therefore assume that a strategic decision occurs because the 
organisation is subject to exogenous uncertainty and that the response 
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is to alter the organisation's structure via strategic decisions, then 
we are in a position to be able to define a taxonomy of strategic 
decisions in terms of the structural changes made to an organisation 
in the implementation of the decision. 
3.1.1.2 The Taxonomy 
Assuming that an organisation has sufficient control over its 
structure to effect appropriate changes, then we note that such 
changes will influence the internal and, or, endogenous uncertainty 
with which the organisation has to cope. This conclusion is a conse- 
quence of a basic law in cybernetics dealing with regulation and 
control, the Law of Requisite variety (Ashby, 1956). This law is 
stated by Ashby (1956, p. 207) as, "only variety can destroy variety". 
We may paraphrase this as, "only controlled uncertainty can destroy 
uncontrolled uncertainty". Galbraith (1969) acknowledges this law 
(wittingly or unwittingly is not clear) when he hypothesised that "the 
information processing capacity of an organisation must be equal to 
the information processing requirements of the task. " Ansoff 
(1984, p. 471) makes a similar point. 
Here, we use this law to note that if an organisation is sub- 
jected to an increase, say, in exogenous uncertainty, then it can only 
respond effectively by increasing the permutative capacity (variety) 
of the organisation's internal "network". Reference to figure 3.2 
shows there to be only three ways in which this can be achieved. These 
are: 
1. An entity can be added (or deleted) from the network. This 
will greatly change the potential internal variety of the 
network, in accordance with the relationship noted earli- 
er. Decisions of this type will be referred to as ENTITY 
decisions. Creating an entirely new department or product 
line, or building a new factory are examples of this type 
of decision. 
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2. The communication channels, or relationships, between 
entities can be modified. For example, although all chan- 
nels exist in potential, in practice only a small fraction 
will be officially sanctioned. Changes to the number of 
official channels will change the internal variety of the 
network. Alternatively, the capacity and/or quality of the 
existing channels could be changed. Decisions involving 
changes to the internal communication channels of the 
organisation will be referred to as RELATIONAL decisions. 
Reorganisations using existing resources, training pro- 
grammes, budgeting and planning are examples of such 
decisions. 
3. Finally, the controlled communication channels between the 
environment and the organisation can be changed, providing 
new sources of variety. Decisions of this type will be 
referred to as INTERFACE decisions. Beer (1985) notes that 
advertising serves this purpose. Similarly, finding new 
product markets or` raw material sources are examples of 
this type of decision. 
These three types of strategic decision, Entity, Interface and 
Relational, constitute a taxonomy based on modes of organisational 
change. 
A consequence of these definitions and Ackoff and Emery's (1972) 
previously cited definition of a system, is to note that an Entity 
decision cannot be a pure type. It must also involve a relational 
component to connect the new entity to the rest of the system, and may 
also involve an interface decision. If this is not so, then the new 
entity would not be part of the original system. Interface and Rela- 
tional decisions on the other hand, which only involve the communica- 
tion channels of the network, hence the control exhibited by the 
organisation (Beer, 1967) can both exist as pure types. A further 
point relates to what we may term the "strategicality" of decisions 
involving changes to an organisations communication structure. March 
and Simon (1958, p. 188) note: 
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"when decisions are satisficing rather than optimising 
decisions, resource allocation to new programmes will 
depend substantially on the communication- structure 
through, which proposals are processed... " 
In other words, changes to the organisation's 
4 
communication 
structure, by any of the above means,, will influence the pattern of 
future decisions and therefore resource allocation within the organi- 
sation. Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 27) make precisely this point in their 
description of strategic decisions: 
"A strategic decision is one in which those who, are in- 
volved believe will play a bigger rather than a smaller 
part in shaping what happens for a long while 
afterwards. " 
It is also noted by Mintzberg et. a1. (1976) that strategic 
decisions are likely to set precedents for future decisions. Decisions 
which change an organisation's communication structure are therefore 
strategic and the above taxonomy is a taxonomy of strategic decisions. 
3.1.2 OPERATIONALISING THE TAXONOKY 
In order to test the efficacy of the above taxonomy it is neces- 
sary to define measures of these decision types, i. e. some parameters 
along which the three types may be differentiated. Two dichotomous 
parameters will provide sufficient variety, or permutative capacity, 
to achieve this. In-suggestinga scheme for identifying these meas- 
ures, we need to take a closer look at the nature of the entities in 
the network. The problem in doing this lies in the fact that the 
boundaries of a system are essentially-arbitrary, at both the macro 
and micro levels (Beer, 1967). As Emery (1969, p. 4) comments: 
"The game of building larger systems from-smaller ones can 
go on almost indefinitely. -Where one stops this process 
depends on one's interests and point of view... [at the 
micro level the terminal points] are also essentially 
arbitrary... At some point, however, one ceases to be 
concerned with the structure of a component [and treat 
it] as an elementary black box with known transformations 
between inputs and outputs but with unknown internal 
structure. " 
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As Emery's ! "viewpoint" was the hierarchical structure of the 
system, he viewed the entities as consisting of "elementary tasks" and 
"nodes". The elementary tasks could be equated with operational per- 
sonnel, and the nodes with supervisory/managerial personnel. However, 
structure-is'not directly our concern. We may note, however, that the 
larger system-in-focus must be a viable system; that is, capable of 
maintaining a-separate existence within a specified environment (Beer, 
1985). This 'viable system may contain viable systems within itself, 
and it may also be contained within a larger viable system. We do not 
need to focus on these systems. However, we do need to look at the 
separate entities constituting the system on focus. 
r Emery noted that an entity should be a black- box with known 
input/output- relationships. One of the features of large systems, a 
company say, -is their high complexity. This makes the determination of 
input/output- relationships very difficult. As Beer (1967) notes, one 
is reduced to'a process of input manipulation and output classifica- 
tion when investigating such complex systems. To reduce this complex- 
ity to a level at which the input/output relationships are known 
suggests that an entity must be a simple'system of low complexity. A 
further, property of an entity is that it is a source of information, 
in the sense that removing the entity reduces the variety in the 
system. We may also stipulate that it is man-made. As such it will 
embody standardised skills. We have already noted the idea that our 
systems are- organised' towards a purpose. Therefore, we would expect 
the entity to also serve the same purpose and to facilitate the proc- 
ess of achieving this purpose. These requirements define a technologi- 
cal artifact (Van Wyk, 1979). Such artifacts can be considered as 
concrete (physical devices) or abstract (standardised procedures of 
conduct). However, one important way to conceptualise such artifacts 
(derived from General Systems theory) is to view them in terms of 
three attributes; matter, energy and information. The matter and 
probably energy components can be viewed as being a physical object. 
The information component can be supplied by a human operator. Thus, 
the elementary black box, or entity, with which we are concerned, is a 
physical technological artifact. In other words, a single or collec- 
tion of, fixed assets. 
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3.1.2.1 An Accounting Perspective 
. Edwards and Kellar 
(1979) observe that all organisations of the 
type being considered here, combine economic resources for the produc- 
tion of goods and services. Further, they classify economic resources 
as being either "Work" or "Property", where work is taken to be the 
sum total of the tasks performed by everybody in the organisation, and 
property is the collective name for all the assets used. This classi- 
fication, coupled with the idea that entities are technological arti- 
facts, suggests that we may view the organisation as a collection of 
assets -a view of the organisation very similar to that of the ac- 
countant (Machlup, 1974). Ijiri et. al. (1974) observe that accountan- 
cy data are generally surrogates used in place of a principle; where 
the principle is the measure one wishes to use, but the surrogate is 
more convenient either to obtain or use.. This suggests that an ac- 
counting view of the organisation (a view not frequently encountered 
in the organisational literature) may be used to identify surrogate 
measures of the three decision types. 
Using this accounting perspective, we define the larger system- 
in-focus as an accounting unit or entity. French (1985) defines an 
accounting unit as "something which is a party to financial transac- 
tions, or an activity or scheme for which financial transactions are 
undertaken, and1or which accounting records are kept relating only to 
its transactions". Examples could be the administration of a trust 
fund, the trade of one branch of a chain of retail stores or the 
entire chain of stores. Essentially an entity is a profit centre, and 
as such is capable of existing as a viable unit in its own right. This 
accords with the view that the larger system-in-focus must be a 
"viable system". In addition, the separate entities constituting this 
larger system may be viewed as the assets of the organisation, either 
taken singly or aggregated to satisfy the requirement of a technologi- 
cal artifact. The Fund Theory in accounting (Gynther, 1967) defines 
the accounting-unit-area as a group of assets and a set of activities 
or functions for which the assets are employed. This definition of a 
Fund is similar to that of a technological artifact and further sug- 
gests the association between entities and assets. 
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on this basis, an Entity decision can be seen to represent the 
acquisition (or disposition) of assets (plant, machinery, buildings 
etc. ). As such, implementing a decision of this type requires capital 
expenditure, say, both on the fixed assets (called capital assets in 
America, (French, 1985)) and current assets (i. e., via working capi- 
tal). Implementing an Entity decision, therefore, involves a down side 
risk to the organisation's Balance Sheet statement. That is, if the 
anticipated benefits due to the decision do not materialise, through 
the retained earnings mechanism, then the shareholders / owners equity 
will be reduced in both the long and short term. In addition, we note 
that capital expenditure decisions can be difficult to reverse if 
things do go wrong (Jones and Trentin, 1971). This could be due to 
losses incurred on resale of the asset and the "visibility" of the 
decision to outside stockholders. In summary, an Entity decision may 
be identified as a Balance Sheet risk decision and as such, represents 
the acquisition (or disposition) of capital resources by the organisa- 
tion. 
In contrast, we hypothesise that a Relational decision will 
involve no, or negligible, commitment of financial resources during 
its implementation. This is not to say that such decisions are without 
financial consequences. Any strategic decision, by the definition used 
here, is aimed at providing a long term benefit for the organisation. 
We are simply saying that Relational decisions will not pose a signif- 
icant risk to the organisation's statutory financial statements in the 
period covering the decision's implementation. They may, however, 
involve the redistribution of existing resources, as defined in plans 
and budgets and the commitment of non-financial resources could have 
been significant, making a reversal of the decision far from trivial. 
Finally, Interface decisions, being concerned with the establishment 
of communication links, are unlikely to involve capital expenditure to 
a significant extent. These decisions may however, involve revenue 
(i. e. recurrent as opposed to once and for all) expenditure for adver- 
tising and promotion, or the purchase of raw materials. As such they 
represent a down side risk to the organisation's Profit and Loss 
statement, in the sense that the organisation is being committed to an 
on-going expenditure. An interface decision therefore, involves the 
consumption of existing resources. If the anticipated benefits are not 
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forthcoming, it could, be relatively simple to review the situation and 
reverse the decision, thus eliminating the risk. 
As the above identification of decision type with accounting 
statement risk requires deciding whether the expenditure is capital or 
revenue, significant or not, it cannot be expected that these identi- 
ties will be perfect. surrogates of the decision types. The distinction 
between capital and revenue expenditure, for example, is not as simple 
as one would expect and has on occasions to be determined by the law 
courts, (Skitmore, 1977). Consider also the case of a fleet of vehicles 
used by an organisation to distribute its goods. This fleet represents 
a communication channel between, the organisation and its environment 
and is therefore an Interface topic. However, if the fleet is pur- 
chased outright, or, on recent current U. K. legislation, leased, it 
I- 
will appear as a capital or Balance Sheet item and not, as anticipated 
here, a Profit and Loss item. If, however, the fleet is contract 
hired, it will then appear as a profit and Loss item. Contract hire is 
currently gaining in popularity in the U. K. Similarly, it is conceiva- 
ble that a reorganisation could create a new department, thus a new 
Entity, without using capital resources. This decision would, using 
the surrogate measures developed here, be incorrectly classified as a 
Relational decision. 
The above discussion suggests that the proposed taxonomy of 
strategic decisions can be tested by noting the down-side risk 
(present or absent) to each of the organisation's two statutory finan- 
cial statements, implicit in the nature of the resource commitment 
required to implement the decision. Specifically, we anticipate that 
an Entity decision is associated with a Balance Sheet risk, an Inter- 
face decision with a Profit and Loss risk, and a Relational decision 
with neither a Balance Sheet nor a Profit and Loss risk; it is a Non- 
financial risk. No decision on this taxonomy is identified with both a 
Balance Sheet and a Profit and Loss risk. Unfortunately most work in 
the area of strategic decision making has not reported the financial 
information necessary to test this hypothesis. However, the original 
data gathered during one longitudinal empirical study of strategic 
decision making in U. K. organisations (Hickson et. al., 1986) was 
accessible, and has been reinterpreted here in terms of our taxonomy. 
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3.2 THE BRADFORD STUDIES 
The largest single study of strategic decision making reported 
in the literature to date is that of Hickson 'et. al. (1986). This 
study investigated 30 diverse U. K. organisations. Five strategic 
decisions were selected from each organisation, based on their variety 
of subject matter, from a list prepared by each organisation's Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). This yielded ä sample of 150 decisions. Five 
cases were chosen because this was the lowest common denominator to 
the number identified by each CEO. The average number of decisions 
listed was six or seven and the maximum was nine. The majority of the 
decisions studied were made during the late 1970's. 
The 30 organisations studied by Hickson et. al. were categorised 
as public manufacturers (N=2) private manufacturers (N=9) public 
commercial service (N=3) public non-commercial service (N=8) and 
private commercial service (N=8). In addition to this classification 
by organisation, each of the 150 cases were classified by decision 
topic. The ten topic classifications (in order of frequency) were: 
Table 3.1: Strategic Decision Topic Categories 
Technology(N=23) - Equipment and/or premises. 
Reorganisation(N=22) - Internal restructuring. 
Controls(N=19) - Planning, Budgeting and requisite 
data-processing. 
Domain(N=18) - Marketing and distribution. 
Service(N=16) - New, expanded or reduced services. 
Product(N=12) - New products. 
Personnel(N=12) - Job assessment, training, unions. 
Boundary(N=11) - Purchases of, and mergers with 
other organisations. 
Inputs(N=9) - Finance and other supplies. 
Locations(N=8) - Site and site disposal. 
Inspection of these topic categories and their description 
allows a tentative classification according to the taxonomy proposed 
here. On this basis the categories will be: 
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Table 3.2: Hypothesised Decision Topic Categories 
Framework Decision Topic " 
ENTITY Location; Boundary; Technology; 
INTERFACE Domain; Inputs; 
RELATIONAL Reorganisation; Personnel; Controls; 
Product and Service topics have been omitted as there is no 
clear indication on this basis as to which category they belong, other 
than to state that it should not be the Relational category. This 
difficulty stems from the observation that these two topics are both 
output topics. Product decisions apply to the outputs of manufacturing 
organisations; whereas service topics apply to the outputs of private 
and public service organisations. As output decisions one would antic- 
ipate an Interface type of organisational change. However, they may 
also require an Entity type of change for their expedition. 
For the purpose of this investigation, each of the 150 decisions 
were categorised during an interview with the principal author of "Top 
Decisions" according to the financial risk associated with its imple- 
mentation. Essentially, whether the predominant financial commitment 
required to implement the decision was seen as capital, revenue or 
neither. This reclassification of the 150 decisions indicated that 42% 
were Balance Sheet risk decisions, 19% Profit and Loss risk, and 39% 
Non-financial risk decisions. (Note, four of the cases were decisions 
not , to take some action. These have been classified on the 
basis of 
the risk that would have occurred if the action had been taken). 
3.2.1 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
To test the thesis presented here, the empirical technique of 
hierarchical cluster analysis was used. This technique identifies 
similarities between objects using some aspects of the objects to 
assess their similarity. In this instance the objects are decision 
topics and the aspects, or variables, are the three risk categories. 
Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1986) cite a number of uses of the tech- 
nique; it was used by Hickson et. al. in their study. 
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Clustering was performed using the Euclidian distance metric, 
single linkage method. This technique was chosen as being the least 
contentious of the numerous methods available (Aldenderfer and Blash- 
field, 1986). For the same reason each variable was not standardised. 
However, the Euclidian metric is sensitive to a measure of similarity 
called elevation. In this case the similarity variables are frequency 
counts and this means the Euclidian metric will simply cluster on the 
basis of sample size. To remove this effect the variables were norma- 
lised by dividing each frequency count by the total'of the three risk 
categories within each topic category. The variables actually used 
were therefore relative frequencies. 
The hierarchical cluster analysis produces a tree diagram, which 
is illustrated in figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3: Cluster Analysis on Topic Categories 
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SERVICE 
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PERSONNEL 0.054 
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CONTROLS 
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Distance 
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0227 T0.250 
0 
0.335 
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In interpreting this structure, one notes that initially each 
object (decision topic) is treated as a separate category and that 
finally, all objects are treated as a single category. The dissimilar- 
ity between objects is measured by 'distance'. The greater the dis- 
tance at which objects are joined together, the greater their dissimi- 
larity. Figure 3.3 indicates two zones where topic categories are 
joined. One zone occurs at approximately one eighth of the total 
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distance (between 0.054 and 0.078) and reduces the original ten ob- 
jects to five clusters. A second combination zone at about half of the 
total distance (between 0.208 and 0.338) reduces the number of clus- 
ters to just one. This indicates that the ten topic categories used by 
Hickson et. al. can be reduced to just five. These five clusters have 
been delineated using horizontal lines in figure 3.3. 
Some measure of the internal validity of this structure can be 
inferred by noting that the same clusters were identified using other, 
notably Pearson, distance metrics. No tests for the significant number 
of clusters, or validity between clusters were performed, the reason 
being that the use of discriminant analysis, MANOVA, multiple ANOVA, 
F-Ratios and other tests are, as Aldenderfer and Blashfield observes, 
"useless at best and misleading at worst. " Hence the following obser- 
vations are based on the simple heuristic method of inspection de- 
scribed above. 
Each of the decision topics categorised by Hickson et. al. is 
itself a cluster of decisions. This analysis indicates that their ten 
categories can be further reduced to five clusters, each on average 
covering 30 decisions. The relative frequencies of each risk category 
characterising each of the five topic clusters and the number of 
decisions within each of these five clusters is illustrated in Table 
3.3. A chi-squared analysis of table 3.3 indicates a strong associa- 
tion between the two of 'risk' and 'topic' (d. f. =6, p(O. 005). 
Note: B/S, refers to a Balance Sheet risk decision. P/L and N/F 
to Profit and Loss, and Non-financial risk categories, respectively. 
Table 3.3: Relative Frequency of Risk Categories by Topic Clusters. 
CLUSTER 
TOPICS 
RISK (%) 
B/S P/L N/F 
Decisions -, 
in clusters. 
cl 
c2 
c3 
c3 Controls 
c4 Input 
85 69 
3 12 85 
26 50 24 
37 5 58 
0 44 56 
Number) % 
54 
34 
34 
19 
9 
36 
23 
23 
13 
6 
cl - Product, Technology, Location and Boundary topics. 
c2 - Personnel and Reorganisation topics. 
c3 - Domain and Service topics. 
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Comparing the hypothesised cluster membership relationships 
(Table 3.2) with the cluster analysis results (figure 3.3) identifies 
cluster cl as Entity decision topics plus the Product category. In 
addition, the resource commitment to these topics is, as anticipated, 
characterised by a high (85%, table 3.3) proportion of Balance Sheet 
risk decisions. Similarly, cluster c2 is primarily associated with 
decision topics involving negligible financial risk and comprises 
Relational decisions. An explanation as to why control topics were not 
included in this cluster is obtained by observing that 7 of the 19 
decisions in this category involved the purchase of data processing 
equipment and were therefore classed as Balance Sheet risk decisions. 
This was sufficient for the analysis to separate this topic as a 
separate cluster. Inspection of figure 3.3 however, shows this catego- 
ry to be 'near' the Relational cluster. This conclusion is supported 
by discriminant analysis, which assigns to control decisions a 92.6 
per cent probability of. being associated with cluster c2. Finally, 
clusters c3 and c5 correspond to Interface topics. The separation into 
two clusters, with the introduction of Service decisions, is explained 
by the observation that cluster c3 is concerned with interfacing the 
organisation to its environment, whereas c5 interfaces the environment 
to the organisation. The observed separation into two types of Inter- 
face decision is therefore not surprising. In terms of Porter's (1980) 
model of the five forces driving competition, two (the bargaining 
power of buyers and suppliers) can be equated with Interface topics. 
This model, therefore, also indicates that Interface decisions are 
essentially of two types. 
It will be observed that, although three variables were used to 
identify the topic clusters in the above analysis, these three varia- 
bles exhibit only two degrees of freedom. This is because the sum of 
the relative frequencies of the three risk categories is constrained 
to total 100 per cent. Specifically, arbitrarily specifying two of 
the variables uniquely fixes the third. As only two degrees of freedom 
are present, the locations of the decision topics, and the resulting 
clusters, can be accurately represented in two dimensional space. The 
problem is how to construct the axes defining this space. Factor 
analysis could be used to combine the three variables into two orthog- 
onal factors. These two factors would account for all the variation in 
the data, because there are only two degrees of freedom. This approach 
has not been used, however, because of the difficulty in interpreting 
such factors. Instead, a representation based on equilateral triangu- 
lar co-ordinates has been used. This method uses three axes, one for 
each of the three risk categories, thus enabling a straight forward 
interpretation of each axis. The chemical literature makes extensive 
use of this method to illustrate graphically concentrations within 
ternary systems (Treybal, 1968). 
Figure 3.4, over, shows the ten decision topics specified by 
Hickson et. al. (1986) plotted on equilateral triangular co-ordinates. 
Each axis is scaled from 0 to 100 per cent to represent the relative 
frequencies of each risk category. Each apex of the triangle corre- 
sponds to only one risk category being present. In line with the 
postulated relationship between the taxonomy and surrogate measures, 
each apex has been labelled with the appropriate organisational change 
category. In addition, the five topic clusters identified by cluster 
analysis are represented by broken boxes, and labelled in accordance 
with the convention used in table 3.3a. Boxes have been used because 
they are convenient, not because the clusters are assumed to be rec- 
tangular in shape. 
The point labelled 'p' on figure 3.4 represents the average of 
all 150 decisions, that is the mid-position of all the data if they 
formed'a single cluster. The co-ordinates of this point have been 
given previously as 42% Balance Sheet risk, 19% Profit and Loss risk, 
and 39% Non-financial risk. The three small arrows point to the appro- 
priate axis from which these figures may be read, namely, horizontal 
for Balance Sheet, upwards and to the left for Profit and Loss, and 
downwards and to the left for Non-financial. The input decision, 
cluster c5, is therefore seen to correspond to 0% Balance Sheet, 44% 
Profit and Loss-and 56% Non-financial risk, as given in table 3.3a. 
The data in table 3.3a may be used to locate the centroids of the 
topic clusters which are not shown on figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Decision Topics positioned by Risk Category. 
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Initially we observe that most of the universe defined byý the 
axes in figure 3.4, is empty. This is in line with the postulate that 
decisions should cluster around the apexes of the diagram. In addi- 
tion, further inspection of figure 3.4 confirms the previous discus- 
sion, namely that cluster cl corresponds to Entity decisions and c2 
with Relational decisions. Cluster c3, however, is fairly well dis- 
placed from the 100 per cent Profit and Loss apex-postulated for 
Interface decisions. A possible explanation of this is that such 
decisions would not be viewed by senior management as strategic. Note 
that Profit and Loss risk decisions are decisions involving revenue 
expenditure to implement the decision. Revenue expenditure is normally 
the province of operational managers with budgets. The strategic 
component of revenue expenditure is therefore handled during the 
budget fixing process, which is a control topic. This may explain why 
Profit and Loss risk decisions are relatively poorly represented in 
the total sample. Thus, although Interface topics are strategic, 
Profit and Loss risk is not as good a surrogate measure for such 
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decisions as Balance Sheet risk is for Entity decisions or Nonfinan- 
cial risk is for Relational decisions. 
If the above ý discussion on the absence of pure Profit and Loss 
risk categories is valid, then it implies that a non-strategic / 
strategic dimension can be drawn on figure 3.4. This dimension will 
bisect the figure, passing through the 100 per cent Profit and Loss 
risk apex on the left, and the Balance Sheet risk axis at the 50 per 
cent scale point on the right. It will be observed that such an axis 
passes nearly through the point 'p'. The significance of such an axis 
will be returned to latter, but provisionally we may note that if 
strategic decisions are viewed as being 'important' (Mintzberg et. 
al., 1976) then topic clusters c3 and c5 may be viewed as being rela- 
tively less important than topics cl, c2 and c4. 
In conclusion, empirical cluster analysis-produces results 
consistent with the theoretical taxonomy developed at the beginning of 
this chapter. Also, a non-strategic / strategic dimension has been 
identified within the decision topics which has implications for the 
relative importances of strategic decisions. Finally, the placing of 
product and service topics in two different categories justifies the 
classification of output decisions as being of two inherently separate 
types dependent on the nature of the organisation's purpose. 
3.2.1.1 A Classification of Organisations 
Hickson et. al. placed each of their 30 organisations into one 
of five categories. A hierarchical cluster analysis was performed in 
the manner previously described on these organisational categories. 
This analysis is illustrated in figure 3.5 over. 
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Figure 3.5: Cluster Analysis on Organisation Categories 
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Three clusters of organisations are identified from the above 
analysis. These may be titled, Manufacturing, Commercial service and 
Non-commercial service. (No construction, retail or tourism organisa- 
tions were studied by Hickson et. al. (1986) whether such organisa- 
tions would form their own cluster or fall within one of those identi- 
fied is open to speculation. ) The actual distribution of risk category 
by organisation cluster is illustrated in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Relative Frequency (%) of Decisions in Organisation 
Clusters by Risk Category. 
RISK 
ORG'N B/S P/L N/F Number 
MFG 65 9 25 11 
CS 31 36 33 11 
NCS 25 10 65 8 
MFG - Manufacturing (public and private) 
CS - Commercial service (public and private) 
NCS - Non-Commercial service (public only) 
A chi-squared analysis for this table shows a high degree of 
association between the two dimensions of risk and organisation 
(d. f=4, p(0.005). The data presented in table 3.4 indicates that the 
three types of organisation differ quite markedly in the relative 
proportions of each risk category, and by inference the proportions of 
Entity, Interface and Relational decisions considered by them. That 
this is so can be-partially justified through the work of Aguilar 
(1967). Aguilar was interested in the sources and content of external 
information used by organisations as input into their strategic deci- 
sion making processes: essentially, information about the exogenous 
factors affecting an organisation. In defining strategic decisions 
Aguilar decided, based on his studies, that strategic decisions were 
not, day-to-day, or pertaining to organisation and staffing. In ef- 
fect, Relational decisions were not strategic decisions. In Hickson 
et. al. 's sample, reorganisations alone were the second most frequent 
decision topic encountered. This discrepancy can be understood by 
noting that, firstly 91 per cent of the organisations studied by 
Aguilar were manufacturing companies, predominantly chemical manufac- 
turers and secondly, the manner in which Hickson et. al. selected 
their decisions for study, would tend to under represent the most 
frequent decision types. It is possible, therefore, that Aguilar 
identified so few organisation and staffing decisions in his sample 
that he concluded they were not strategic. Hence, although the propor- 
tions between decision types indicated in table 3 are partially arti- 
facts of the method by-which the investigators selected the decisions, 
nevertheless significant differences do exist between types of strate- 
gic decisions encountered within the three types of organisation 
studied. 
The three organisation types identified above may be represented 
by plotting each organisation's position using equilateral triangular 
co-ordinates (figure 3.6). As exactly five decisions were studied by 
Hickson et. al. within each organisation the three axes on this figure 
represent the frequency (0 to 5) of the number of times that risk 
category was studied within a given organisation. The apexes of the 
diagram have been labelled with the type of organisation for which the 
appropriate risk category is most likely to occur within, as indicated 
by inspection of table 3.4. 
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Figure 3.6: Organisations positioned by Risk Category. 
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The mid points of each organisation cluster are indicated by an 
'X' on figure 3.6 and labelled in accordance with table 3.4. As there 
is some overlapping of clusters on this diagram, discriminant analysis 
was used to locate the cluster boundaries. The broken lines shown on 
figure 3.6 and labelled 'a', represent the boundaries separating the 
three organisation type clusters. Of 11 manufacturing organisations 
studied, 9 occur in the manufacturing section of figure 3.6. Of 11 
commercial service organisations, 6 are placed in that sector. All 8 
non-commercial organisations studied are correctly located. Most of 
the variation caused by the overlapping of clusters occurs within the 
indicated sub-cluster. Three of the organisations within this sub- 
cluster are commercial service organisations. These are an insurance 
company, an entertainment company (both private) and a public utility 
ý ýi °ýý (2)-ý-(2ý (3) n2 "2 vno 
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(water) organisation. A. private manufacturing company (brewery) is 
also located within this sub-cluster. 
3.2.1.2 The Relative Importance of Topic Clusters 
A further valuable conclusion that may be drawn from the analy- 
sis of Hickson et-al. 's (1986) data, and the framework used here, is 
in determining the relative importance of the types of decision. In 
the study by Hickson et. al. a variable called 'consequentiality' was 
defined for each decision topic category. This was a composite varia- 
ble consisting of two Likert 5 point rating scales (Radicality - how 
far the. decision changed things, and Seriousness - how serious it 
would be for the organisation if things went wrong) and two measured 
factors, one discrete (Diffusion - how widespread were the decision's 
effects) and one continuous (Endurance - how far ahead people looked 
when making the decision). Ranking each of these factors leads to an 
overall ranking of the consequentiality of a decision topic. Using 
the five decision topic clusters identified above, the consequentiali- 
ty rating has been used to determine the. relative importance of each 
topic cluster. "This is summarised in table 3.5, below. 
Table 3.5: Consequentiality of Decision Topic Clusters 
Cluster Mean rank 
on 1-10 scale 
overall 
rank 
cl Location/Product/Technology 3.5 1 
/Boundary 
c4 Control 5 2 
c2 Reorganisation/Personnel 5.5 3 
c3 Service/Domain 7.5 4 
c5 Inputs 10 5 
The observation that the control cluster is ranked very close to 
cluster c2 lends further support to the thesis that these items are 
associated. 
Cluster cl (Entity decisions) is seen to be the most significant 
group of decisions. This should not be too surprising, once it is 
noted that any Entity decision also involves, as a necessary conse- 
quence, a Relational decision. This effect was noted by Woodward 
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(1965) where, on a number of occasions, Technology and Location deci- 
sions were simultaneously used as opportunities for reorganisations. 
Further support for seeing cluster cl items, the Balance Sheet risk 
decisions, as the most consequential is provided by Paul et. a1. 
(1978). They comment that "an overly bold and un-recoverable Balance 
Sheet risk is the true risk [whereas] the effects of a poor Profit and 
Loss risk... can often be managed within the time frame of the current 
fiscal year". However, their reason for stating this is observed in 
the comment that, "a Balance Sheet mistake is almost always corrected 
by a clean sweep of existing management". A similar conclusion is 
reached by Pahl and Winkler (1974). Pahl and Winkler studied the 
processes of power among directors of 19 companies. They decided that 
power was not, necessarily, synonymous with authority but depended on 
the ability to control the allocation of capital. Hence, decisions 
involving capital will involve power interests not present in non- 
capital decisions. Finally, we note that the rank order of each topic 
cluster is in agreement with the predicted rank based on the notion of 
decision reversibility identified earlier. Specifically, cluster cl, 
the Entity topics involving capital expenditure are the least reversi- 
ble and therefore the most consequential. Clusters c3 and c5 are 
Interface topics involving revenue expenditure are the most reversible 
and therefore the least consequential. This association between re- 
versibility and type of financial commitment to a project was also 
observed by Jones and Trentin (1971, p. 132): 
"Because the commitment of funds in capital projects is 
irrevocable, plans and proposals for these expenditures 
are carefully examined by management and the directors. A 
faulty decision to enlarge the staff for a particular 
function may be corrected by cutting back, thereby termi- 
"nating the effect of the decision. But funds put into 
brick and mortar represent sunk or fixed costs and cannot 
generally be terminated or retrieved without considerable 
financial sacrifice. " 
We therefore conclude that decisions involving Balance Sheet 
risks (Entity decisions) are the most consequential for organisations. 
Interestingly, Non-financial risk decisions (Relational) are more 
consequential than the least consequential Profit and Loss risk deci- 
sions (Interface). This observation supports the hypothesis made 
earlier, namely that a non-strategic / strategic dimension can be 
drawn bisecting figure 3.4 and that decisions involving predominantly 
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Profit and Loss risk (revenue expenditure) are essentially operational 
in nature., This ranking , also reflects the relative 
frequencies of 
Balance Sheet, Non-financial, and Profit and Loss, risk decisions in 
the total, sample; namely 42%, 39% and 19% respectively. This again 
supports the thesis that Profit and Loss risk decisions are the least 
strategic and therefore least consequential. 
3.2.2 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
The central conclusion of Hickson et. al. 's work was that deci- 
sion making at the level of top management or administration can be 
described by three types of organisational, or social, process. These 
three processes were derived by factoring ten process variables into 
two dimensions (labelled 'Discontinuity' and 'Dispersion') and then 
using hierarchical cluster analysis on the 136 decisions for which 
data was complete. The three process clusters so identified were 
named, Sporadic (informally spasmodic and protracted) Fluid (steadily 
paced, formally channelled and speedy) and Constricted (narrowly 
channelled). It was also observed that each of the three types of 
process accounted for approximately one third of the total sample, and 
that they form a triangular pattern when represented on the Disconti- 
nuity / Dispersion dimensions. By combining clusters c3 with c5 and c2 
with c4, table 3.3 shows similar relative proportions between the 
three resulting aggregate clusters, that is, approximately one third 
of the decisions fall into each combined cluster. 
On inspection of the factor loadings published by Hickson et. 
al. for the 10 process variables on the two dimensions, it is observed 
that the Dispersion dimension is primarily (67%) a dimension of au- 
thority. Specifically, how high within the hierarchy the process 
culminated, indicated by a score for the level at which implementation 
was authorised and could then commence. Assuming that authority level 
is a measure of importance, then the non-strategic / strategic dimen- 
sion previously noted in connection with figure 3.4 is seen to be 
analogous to the Dispersion dimension identified by Hickson et. a1. 
Their Discontinuity dimension would then appear on figure 3.4 as a 
line passing through point 'p' (the centroid of all decisions; on the 
figure located at 42% Balance sheet, 19% Profit and Loss and 39% Non- 
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financial 'risk) and parallel with 'the Balance Sheet risk axis. The 
pattern formed by the three main clusters cl, - c2 and c3 in terms of 
these Dispersion and Discontinuity dimensions suggests the possibility 
of a correspondence between the taxonomy of organisational change 
presented here and Hickson 'et. =a1. 's`taxonomy of decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the examples cited by Hickson et. al. as arche- 
types of the three processes are: 
o Sporadic - Boundary topic in manufacturing company; 
categorised as Balance Sheet risk. = 
and Product topic in manufacturing company; 
categorised as Balance Sheet risk. 
o Constricted - Service topic in commercial service company; 
categorised as Profit and Loss risk. 
o Fluid - Input topic in commercial service company; 
categorised as Non-financial risk. 
and Input topic in,. non-commercial service organ- 
isation; categorised as Non-financial risk. 
These examples. identify Sporadic processes with the cl cluster 
of topics, Constricted processes with _c3 
topics and Fluid processes 
with c5 topics. However, Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 161) point out that 
"a topic label is not an instant selector of one single type of deci- 
sion-making process... In fact, there is no topic which is handled in 
one single way". A contingency table analysis bears out this observa- 
tion, as non-significant results, are obtained. between both the Risk v 
Process categories (d. f. =4, p=0.90, Goodman-Kruskal Gamma = -0.08). 
and organisational Change v Process categories (d. f. =4, p=0.27, Good- 
man-Kruskal Gamma = -0.14). A further analysis does indicate however, 
that cl, cluster topics (Balance Sheet risks) are primarily associated 
with Sporadic processes. These topics may also be processed in a Fluid 
mode, except Product topics which can be processed in a Constricted 
mode. The associations between Fluid and Constricted processes with 
Non-financial and Profit and Loss risk topics respectively are less 
well defined than between Sporadic processes and Balance Sheet risk 
topics. However Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 248) conclude that in deter- 
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mining decision process the "matter-for decision matters most", which 
again suggests that decision process is dependent upon the nature of 
the organisational change implicit in the decision under considera- 
tion. 'As previously noted, certain types of decision appear to predom- 
inate in each of the three types of organisation, as illustrated in 
table 3.5 and figure 3.6. Hickson et. al. also-make this observation, 
but tend to view the demarcation more along ownership lines than the 
categorisation used here based on nature of output. 
Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 257) comment on the way in which one 
process may be changed into another type: 
"For instance, what begins as an idea for a complete new 
product line can be scaled down so that the topic under 
consideration becomes just a modification to existing 
product lines. Thus its consequences will become less 
-serious and more susceptible to confident forecasts... So 
a vortex matter is replaced by one that is familiar and 
can be moved along in a less bothersome constricted way. " 
The "vortex'matter" refers to a subject processed in a Sporadic 
way. Hickson et. al. state that such decisions are characterised by 
high complexity and high politicality. Tractable matters are processed 
Fluidly and are characterised by lower complexity and least political- 
ity. Familiar matters are processed in a Constricted mode and are 
characterised by least complexity and are only mildly political. This 
dual explanation of decision process in terms of Complexity and Polit- 
icality is the primary theoretical framework used by Hickson et. a1. 
However, if the associations presented here are valid, then instead of 
concluding, as Hickson et. a1. (1986, p. 241) do, that "to know the 
process, first know the complexity of the problems and the politicali- 
ty of the interests", we would conclude - to know the process, first 
know the nature of the organisational change being proposed, - which, 
in terms of the taxonomy presented here would be, Entity, Interface or 
Relational changes. 
The theoretical explanation presented by Hickson et. al. for 
their findings is not necessarily different to the explanation of 
process proposed here. We have previously noted, from the work of Pahl 
and Winkler (1974) that Entity changes (equated with capital invest- 
ments) involve high powered interests. Hickson et. al. 's association 
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of politicality`with Sporadic processes is therefore in agreement with 
the approach presented here if we equate power with politicality. 
However, although knowing the nature of organisational change implicit 
in a decision may be a'necessary condition for determining process, 
the work of Hickson et. al. shows that it is not a sufficient condi- 
tion. " Specifically the conditions and mechanisms by which a matter of 
nominally one type may be transformed into a that of another is worthy 
of further research. The basic cybernetic arguments with which this 
paper started would lead us to hypothesis that six such mechanisms 
exist, as the mechanism by which a Vortex matter is translated into a 
Tractable one, say, cannot be assumed to be the same as that by which 
a Tractable matter is transformed into a Vortex one. 
Starting from the premise that strategic decisions involve 
changing an organisation, a taxonomy of three decision topics was 
proposed. This taxonomy was operationalised in terms of financial 
accounting concepts, specifically in terms of the risk to the organi- 
sation's statutory financial statements inherent in the decision's 
implementation. Finally, empirical data was analysed which lead to a 
confirmation of the taxonomy. It was also tentatively shown that a 
correspondence may exist between the taxonomy of strategic change 
proposed here and the empirical categorisation of strategic decision 
making processes developed by Hickson et. al. (1986). We now aim to 
investigate the possibility of adapting the proposed taxonomy to 
identify a taxonomy of implementation projects. 
3.3 A TAXONOMY OF IMPLEMENTATION PROJECTS 
Extending the taxonomy of strategic decisions developed above to 
a taxonomy of implementation projects is quite natural in light of the 
method used to operationalise the taxonomy. This was achieved by 
assessing the down side risk to the organisation's statutory financial 
statements during the implementation of the decision. This operational 
definition enabled risk to be categorised as either balance sheet, 
profit and loss, or non-financial. In chapter 2 it was argued that 
implementation (in the form of strategic change) was carried out via 
projects. Projects may also therefore be categorised according to the 
nature of the down side risk, in financial terms, to the organisation 
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during implementation. If the risk is to the balance sheet, then 
implementation will be via the capital project. If it is to the profit 
and loss account, it will be by the revenue project. Finally, if no, 
or insignificant, financial resources are to be committed, implementa- 
tion will be by the social project. -This scheme is summarised in table 
3.6 below, together with the type of change implicit in the strategic 
decision initiating the project. 
-Table 3.6: Taxonomy of Projects 
Strategic Financial implementation Project type 
Change risk to: to implement 
Entity Balance Sheet CAPITAL PROJECT 
Interface Profit and Loss Account REVENUE PROJECT 
Relational Negligible risk involved SOCIAL `PROJECT 
The inclusion within the taxonomy of projects involving no, or 
negligible, financial risk may, at first sight, appear superfluous. As 
we are considering the implementation of strategic decisions then all 
projects within the taxonomy will have long term financial conse- 
quences-for the organisation. In addition, the taxonomy is based only 
on a financial dimension. Low consumption of financial resources does 
not imply low consumption of other resources, such as managerial time 
or effort. --Indeed, we 
have already noted the priority ordering of the 
risk categories in terms of decision consequentiality. This showed 
that non-financial risk decisions, i. e., social projects, are the 
second most consequential, next to capital projects. Woodward 
(1965, p. 44) notes this point when referring to "technical and adminis- 
trative developments" as causes of radical change within organisa- 
tions. In terms of our implementation taxonomy we may note that "tech- 
nical developments" refers to technology topics, which are likely to 
be implemented via capital projects. "Administrative developments" 
will be implemented by social projects, being reminiscent of reorgani- 
sation and personnel topics. Woodward's identification of these two 
items is therefore in agreement with the implied prioritisation of the 
project categories imputed from our earlier discussion of decision 
making. Thus social projects are an important category of our taxono- 
my. 
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This scheme of classifying projects as capital, revenue or 
social can be readily accommodated within a general definition of a 
project,. -viz: 
"An activity directed towards a specific 'objective, with 
an expected duration, is the responsibility of a named- 
individual, and a budget. " 
This definition (based on Coomds et. al. 1987, p. 70) includes our 
definition of a goal (derived in chapter 2, i. e., objective and dura- 
tion) but also includes reference to a named 
_individual 
and 
.a 
budget. 
Our project classification scheme can be accommodated by simply 
changing the budget aspect of this general definition. Coombs et. 
al. 's reference to a project being made the responsibility of a named 
individual is also interesting. It accords with one of the three key 
questions to be addressed if strategy implementation is to succeed 
(Wheelen and Hunger, 1987). Failure to allocate responsibility was 
also noted by Mills (1988) as a key problem in implementing capital 
projects within the U. K. The definition above is therefore prescrip- 
tive and not a trivial statement of normal practice. 
Our three way definition of projects also appears to have utili- 
ty in terms of describing how strategy is implemented. Wheelen and 
Hunger (1987, p. 210) give an example of how various programmes would 
have to be developed to implement a forward vertical integration 
growth strategy in a retail organisation. Examples of these programmes 
are; (1) an advertising programme: (2) a training programme: (3) a 
programme to develop reporting procedures and: (4) a programme to 
modernise the stores. If we view these programmes in terms of Hickson 
et. al. 's (1986) decision topic categories and equate with our project 
taxonomy, then we identify programme (1) with a revenue project: (2) 
with a social project: (3) also with a social project and (4) probably 
with a capital project. Wheelen and Hunger appear to see programmes 
and projects as synonymous; other authors do not. Jones and Trentin 
(1971) and Bonoma (1984) both view a programme as a collection of 
projects. Adopting and expanding this idea we will define a programme 
as a linear combination of, at least one but possibly several, capi- 
tal, revenue and social projects. The common starting point will be a 
single strategic objective. This will have been factored into a number 
of separate goals, each generating its own project. 
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3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
From the basic proposition that strategic decisions are essen- 
tially about changes to an organisation, three types of organisational 
change were identified using arguments derived from 'cybernetic con- 
cepts. These three types of change were labelled, Entity, Interface 
and Relational. By invoking concepts derived from accountancy practice 
and technology it was postulated that-the three types'of organisation- 
al change could be identified by considerations of the downside risk, 
in financial terms, ' to the organisation during the decision's imple- 
mentation: Three types of risk were` identified, namely Balance Sheet, 
Profit & Loss and Non-financial. 
Empirical data collected by Hickson et. al. (1986) were re- 
analysed to test the' above taxonomy. These data, originally analysed 
from a behavioural perspective of the organisation, enabled a number 
of conclusions to be reached. First, 'the three risk categories identi- 
fied were reasonable surrogates for the three types of organisational 
change proposed. Specifically, Balance Sheet risks were surrogates for 
Entity changes, Profit and Loss risks for Interface changes and Non- 
financial risks for Relational changes. Second, the same three risk 
categories were shown to identify three types of organisation. These 
were labelled as Manufacturing, Commercial service and Non-Commercial 
Service. These three organisational types were characterised by the 
relative proportion of each risk category encountered in a sample of 
strategic decisions from each type. Specifically, Balance Sheet risk 
decisions predominated in Manufacturing organisations, whereas Non- 
financial risk decisions predominated in Non-commercial Service Organ- 
isations. In Commercial Service organisations no risk category predom- 
inated to any great extent. Third, using concepts defined by Hickson 
et. al. (1986) it was shown that Balance Sheet risk decisions were 
viewed as being the most consequential for an organisation. Non-finan- 
cial risk decisions were second in consequentiality with Profit and 
Loss risk decisions viewed as being the least consequential. this 
prioritisation was seen to reflect the irreversibility of the strate- 
gic decision after implementation. Fourthly, an association between 
the taxonomy presented here and the three modes of decision-making 
process identified by Hickson et. al., was tentatively affirmed. This 
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lead to the assertion that decision-making processes are primarily 
explicable in terms of the nature of the organisational change implic- 
it in the decision topic. However, a fuller explanation of process 
also needs to take into account the factors-that cause, as Hickson et. 
al. observe, a process of nominally one type to be changed into anoth- 
er type. 
Finally, a categorisation of projects was derived based on the 
aforementioned risk, categories. From this it was hypothesised that 
strategic decisions involving an Entity change would probably be 
implemented via a capital project. Relational changes would be imple- 
mented via social projects and"Interface changes via revenue projects. 
The. prioritisation of risk categories also : leads - to the conclusion 
that capital projects are the most important to an organisation. We 
also defined a programme as a combination of several projects. In this 
sense, a project is the atomic unit of analysis for the study of the 
implementation of strategy. Having produced a parsimonious classifica- 
tion of projects we now need to develop a model of project implementa- 
tion and identify a meaning of implementation success. 
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CHAPTER-4 
FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce 'a conceptualisation 
of project implementation which is quantifiable. Initially we will 
identify the concepts and constructs necessary to define a contingent 
framework for the analysis. Following this, a case study is presented 
illustrating some, of the points made during-, the theoretical discus- 
sion. The contingent framework is developed in the third section and 
the, chapter ends with a number of hypotheses based on the principle 
causal relationships identified within the framework. 
4.1 IMPLEMENTATION AND ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING 
4.1.1 CHANGE AND CULTURE 
It has been argued here that change is the natural outcome of an 
implementation process. The observation that implementation produces 
change within organisations is a common theme in much of the litera- 
ture dealing with the implementation of Management Information Systems 
(e. g. Mumford and Pettigrew, 1975; Sorensen and Zand, 1975; Ginzberg, 
1978) the literature dealing with the adoption of technological inno- 
vation (Seashore et. al., 1983; Zaltman et. al., 1973) as well as 
the business policy-literature dealing with strategy implementation 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). In the previous chapter change was con- 
ceptualised using cybernetic concepts and we will continue to adopt 
this approach here. In doing so we focus more on the structure of the 
change than on its social and behavioural aspects. In other words, we 
are looking at the implementation effects which are inevitable. 
In any academic endeavour it is probably the intention of the 
author(s) that their thesis will make a relevant contribution to 
theory and practice. Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984) identified three 
criteria that must be satisfied for this to be the case: 
Page 77 
1. Logic - The use of a logical model to enable the 
deduction of consequences. 
2. Action -- Variables must be 'objective' and` 
'manipulable'. -I 
3. Contingent - Not to say "It all : depends" but to say 
perspective what it all depends on. "In addition the 
choice and the criteria for choosing must 
be indicated. 
To satisfy these criteria it will be necessary to identify those 
factors which affect change. Two such factors (identified in chapter 
3) are the concepts of Uncertainty and Information, both of which have 
received considerable attention in the contingency theory literatures 
(e. g., Downey et. al., 1975; Galbraith, 1969). Another factor, identi- 
fied by Stonich (1982) as important to strategy implementation, is the 
concept of organisational culture. This concept has, over the last 
decade, also been implicated in discussions on, socialisation process- 
es and outcomes, leadership, employees" commitment, motivation and 
satisfaction at the workplace, and organisational effectiveness and 
efficiency. However, a problem with the culture concept is the large 
number of differing conceptualisations found within the management 
literature. As Alvesson (1989) commented: 
"Culture can be - and sometimes is - used in a way which 
comprises everything and, thus, nothing. " 
Culture is therefore another of Andrew's (1971) "accordion-like" 
words. We will take the approach adopted in chapter 2 for dealing with 
it, namely define it in the way that most suits or needs. The need 
here is for an instrumental conceptualisation. 
Many authors define culture as behavioural "norms", "values", 
"symbols" and "assumptions". Alvesson demonstrated that many of these 
definitions are tautological. Schein (1984) defines organisational 
culture in these terms but makes the additional point that his defini- 
tion "derives from a dynamic model of learning". Clegg et. al. (1988) 
in a discussion of Economic Culture, produce an instrumental defini- 
tion of culture as an 'institutional framework', thus making the term 
"culture" effectively redundant. 
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Norman (1985) in his discussion of strategic management capabil- 
ity commented that "perhaps culture could-be defined as the instituti- 
onalised [communication] language and values of an organisation. " This 
formulation is interesting in the light of cybernetic theory, as in 
this theory entities within a system communicate through channels and 
transducers. The function of the transducer is to code and decode the 
information passing into or from the communication channel. How the 
transducer is designed determines how information is coded and decoded 
for transmission. In organisations the most common form of, transduc- 
tion is converting thoughts and ideas into language, -written or spo- 
ken. 'Whether the original thoughts can be decoded will depend upon the 
recipients' understanding of, and, the ambiguity of, the words communi- 
cated. This may depend upon a shared understanding of the organisa- 
tions norms, values etc. 
Both Clegg et. al. 's and Norman's conceptualisation of culture 
appears to view the concept in terms of the institutions prevailing in 
the organisation, be they at the macro- or micro-economic level. These 
in turn can be conceptualised in terms of communication nets and 
principles incorporated within the organisation's transducers. This 
raises the question of how these institutionalised properties of an 
organisation come into existence and how they can be changed. Schein 
points, to an answer of this question by noting the connection between 
culture and learning. Norman also takes the view that culture acts as 
a "storage of past learning" and as an instrument to "communicate this 
learning throughout the organisation". Subsequently, Norman (1985, 
p. 231) makes the following formulation: 
"I would interpret the increasing interest in the concept 
of culture as really an increasing interest in organisa- 
tional learning" 
The thesis that concepts of change and learning are closely 
related is supported by several authors. Cyert and March (1963, p. 99) 
viewed the firm as an "adaptive system". The dictionary definition of 
adaptation is the act of adjusting to change. Cyert and March 
(1963, p. 100) argue that: 
"a business organisation is an adaptive institution. In 
short, the firm learns from its experience. " 
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Cadwallader (1959) in a paper on the 'analysis of change in 
complex social' organisations makes a similar-point "... open systems 
adapt to a fluctuating environment through processes` of learning and 
innovation. " 
4.1.2 ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING 
Superficially, redefining the concept of organisational change, 
via the concept of organisational culture, as organisational learning, 
does not appear to advance us very far. In' addition, some authors 
would tend to reject the concept of organisational learning outright. 
Lupton and Tanner (1987, p. 77) state unequivocally: 
"An organisation cannot learn. The term organisational 
learning can only mean firstly, that each individual 
member of the organisation can learn more--about what it 
is and how it functions as a socio-technical system with 
economic purposes and secondly, that the knowledge and 
understanding gained can be more widely shared by the 
organisational members. " 
is a social, behavioural viewpoint this comment may make 
sense. From a Cybernetic standpoint it does not. Firstly, Katz and 
Kahn (1966, p. 391) point out in a discussion of organisational change 
that: 
"The major error in dealing with problems of organisation- 
al change... is to... confuse individual change with modi- 
fications to organisational variables. 
The confusion between 'individual and organisational 
change is due in part to the lack of precise terminology 
for distinguishing between behaviour determined largely 
by structured roles within a system and behaviour deter- 
mined more directly by personality needs and values. " 
In other words an organisation is more than the sum of its 
individual members. The constraints imposed upon its members by the 
structure of the organisation are also important in understanding 
change. It may also be supposed, from the preceding argument, that 
these structural constraints are important in understanding organisa- 
tional learning. 
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A second critique of Lupton and Tanner's stance comes from 
Cybernetic theory. The Cybernetic paradigm views the organisation as 
having a limited repertoire of action patterns or programmes (Stein- 
bruner, 1974). -These patterns persist until feedback on critical 
variables forces a variable out of its tolerable range, whereupon 
there is a change in the pattern. If the new pattern restores the 
variable back to its tolerable range the pattern will persist. "Learn- 
ing occurs in the sense that there is a systematic change in the 
pattern of activity in the organisation" (p78). This process manifests 
itself as a change in behaviour of the organisation. Furthermore, 
Steinbruner identifies these action patterns, or programmes, with the 
organisation's standard operating procedures. The limited repertoire 
of action patterns therefore refers to a repertoire of standard oper- 
ating procedures. These procedures embody the organisation's past 
learning and constitute its skills. They are distinct from the skills 
of the organisational members as they define the constraints under 
which those members must operate. 
That standard operating procedures are important to the study of 
organisations was recognised by Cyert and March (1963, p. 101): 
"standard operating procedures should be one of the major 
objects for study by students of organisational decision 
making... We do not think a reasonable theory of the firm 
can ignore such procedures. " 
They follow this comment with a twofold categorisation consist- 
ing of; 'Specific standard operating procedures' (task performance 
rules, information handling rules, recording and reporting rules, 
plans and budgets) and 'General choice procedures' (maintaining the 
existing rules, use simple rules and rules to avoid the need to pre- 
dict uncertain future events). In addition Cyert and March linked 
changes in standard operating procedures with the organisation's 
learning behaviour. Specifically, "Standard operating procedures are 
the memory of an organisation (p100)". 
The importance of standard operating procedures to the study of 
organisations may also be illustrated if we accept Stonich's 
(1982, p. 34) view of corporate culture as, "the way an organisation 
performs a given set of tasks". This approach to corporate culture is 
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supported by invoking the socio-technical" concept developed by Trist 
and others (see Trist et. al., 1963). The principle of this'approach 
is that socio-psychological factors are in-built characteristics of 
work systems, they are not additional characteristics. If standard 
operating procedures define the way given tasks are performed (Wheelen 
and Hunger, 1984) then standard operating procedures must also deter- 
mine an organisation's socio-psychological climate, in other words its 
culture. Accepting Norman's (1985) statement that an interest in 
corporate culture is an interest in organisational learning shows that 
the focus of our study is properly with an organisation's standard 
operating procedures. 
A further link between organisational learning and standard 
operating procedures, if we accept some minor changes in nomenclature, 
is provided by some of the more recent anecdotal writings of Waterman 
(1988) and Peters (1984). Waterman writes about 'skill building' and 
viewing the company as a 'bundle of skills, capabilities and compe- 
tence' and that firms should seek to develop new, better skills. 
Peters (1984) uses similar metaphors referring to organisations having 
a repertoire of skills and distinctive competency and these form the 
basis for adaptive strategy. These comments echo the cybernetic view 
of the organisation developed above and, in addition, suggest that 
skills, or standard operating procedures, are the basis for 'finding' 
or 'discovering' business unit strategies in the learning organisa- 
tion. 
4.1.3 SKILLS AND VARIETY REDUCTION 
In chapter 3 it, was suggested that the primary task of an organ- 
isation when implementing a strategic decision, was variety absorp- 
tion. Variety represents uncertainty and it is reduced by processing 
information. Finally this leads to organisational learning, reflected 
in changes to the standard operating procedures and thus, behaviour. 
The method by which a repertoire of standard operating procedures 
absorbs variety can be derived from Ashby's (1956) conceptualisation. 
A slightly modified version of Ashby's arguments will be presented 
here. 
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Consider a game of two players, D and R. The object of the game 
is that R should score an a. All possible moves and outcomes are 
represented in table-4.1. Note that no outcome is repeated in any 
column of-. the table; a restriction which will be modified later. 
Table 4.1: Adapted from Ashby, table 11/3/1. p202. 
R 
CL ßy 
D plays first by selecting a number (1.. 3) corresponding to a 
row in the table. R responds by selecting a Greek letter corresponding 
to a column in the table. If the outcome (given by the intersection of 
the selected row and column) is an a, then R wins, else R looses. 
Now consider the case where D has a fourth move available but R 
still only three responses. The situation will be as illustrated in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Increased Variety to D 
1 
D2 
3 
bac 
acd 
cba 
R 
a0 Y 
D 
1 
2 
3 
4 
bac 
acd 
cba 
ddb 
It will be apparent that R cannot win in all cases. If D selects 
row 4, then R can only make a sub-optimal choice by selecting y say, 
with outcome b. In effect the variety of possible outcomes from the 
game has increased from 1 (a only) to 2 (a or b). In general, the 
minimum variety of outcomes from the game is given by the quotient: 
D's variety 
R's variety 
This is a demonstration of Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety 
which states "the variety in the outcomes, if minimal, can be de- 
creased further only by a corresponding increase in that of R" (p207). 
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In other words, the' only way R can return'to a wholly optimal outcome 
from the game i. e. a variety of'1 (a's only) is by inventing, or 
learning a new response, b say, such that the game's outcomes are as 
illustrated in table 4.3. ' 
Table 4.3: Increased Variety to R 
1 
D3 
4 
R 
aBY 
bacc 
acdb 
cbad 
ddba 
A consequence of the restriction imposed upon the construction 
of tables 4.1 to 4.3, i. e. no outcome can be repeated in a column, is, 
that if R's response to D's move is unvarying, always selecting a say, 
the variety of the outcomes will equal that of'D. If this restriction 
is removed, by allowing say each element in a'column to be repeated k 
times, then the variety of the outcomes will be: 
Variety of Outcomes k D's variety 
kx R's variety 
In this situation, if R's move is unvarying, some of D's variety 
will be absorbed. 
Ashby (1956) demonstrated that the basic formulation of a game 
between two players had considerable generality and could be readily 
extended to give'useful insights into, the functioning of physical and 
biological systems. Specifically player D was equated with a disturb- 
ance influence, e. g. environmental, which threatens the system. Player 
R is a regulator whose function is to prevent the essential variables 
of the system from moving outside their proper ranges. The values of 
these essential variables correspond 'to the outcomes of the game. of 
all the possible outcomes only a few are compatible with the system's 
survival, so that "... the regulator R, to be successful, must take its 
value in a way so related to that of D that the outcome is, if possi- 
ble, always within the acceptable set" (p209). In terms of the current 
thesis, D the disturbance, is the specific strategic decision being 
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implemented*. More specifically - it will= be a -particular project 
(Capital, Revenue or Social). R is the organisation that has at its 
disposal a repertoire of skills or-standard operating procedures (a, ß 
etc. ) that it may use to help absorb the variety from the project, 
thus ensuring an acceptable outcome for the organisation. 
Using this formulation we gain a more fundamental insight into 
the meaning of the definition of implementation developed in, chapter 
2. To reiterate: - 
Implementation is the process of interfacing an 'unpro- 
grammed' decision making process to the organisations 
'programmed' decision making processes. 
In chapter 2 the process of programming was identified with 
"Means-end" analysis (March and Simon, 1958). Specifically, this 
process requires the organisation (the regulator) to select from its 
repertoire those procedures that will maintain the organisation's 
essential variables within bounds. We may hypothesise therefore that 
if the organisation's procedures are flexible (k as defined above much 
greater than 1) and, or, the programme's variety (the disturbance) is 
small, then this may be achieved using existing procedures. If on the 
other hand the organisation's procedures are relatively inflexible (k 
close to unity) and, or, the programme's variety is large, then this 
integration may not be possible using existing procedures and, as 
argued above, new procedures will have to be invented/learnt. In one 
important respect this latter outcome for the implementation process 
is the more substantive; the logic being that an increase in the 
flexibility of the organisation's standard operating procedures and or 
an increase in the number of standard operating procedures, will lead 
to an increased ability by the organisation to handle future disturb- 
ances, i. e. environmental variety. In other words the organisation's 
relative competitive advantage will have been increased, provided it 
can capitalise upon its new found flexibility. This concept, that 
changes to procedures can lead to longer term competitive advantage, 
* Ultimately D is an environmental threat to which the strategic 
decisions is a response. The variety absorbed between, D the strate- 
gic decision and D the environment, is the province of strategy 
formulation. This is outside the scope of this study. 
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appears to be similar to the idea of Gateway Capacity identified by 
Zaltman et. al. (1973, p. 45) in their book looking at factors leading 
to the adoption of innovations within organisations. They define the 
concept thus: 
"In addition to the intrinsic value derived from the 
adoption of an innovation, an additional value can, accrue 
to the extent that the adoption of an innovation can open 
avenues to the adoption of other innovations. It could 
well be that the increased opportunity for the adoption 
of other innovations is the intrinsic value of the ini- 
tial facilitating innovation. " (original emphasis re-- 
tained. ) 
By way of anecdotal evidence for this supposition a case study 
from the author's research will be discussed next. 
4.2 A CASE STUDY 
4.2.1 CASE DESCRIPTION 
The research took place within a packaging manufacturing company 
that, at the time of the research, was a subsidiary of a division of a 
U. K. owned multinational. The following summarises over four hours of 
tape recorded unstructured interviews within the company, combined 
with the author's reflective surmising upon the data. Four interviews 
were held, initially with the Managing Director (C. E. O. ) and subse- 
quently with the Financial Manager, Departmental Manager and the 
Project Engineer principally responsible for the project. The initial 
interview with the C. E. O. had a number of objectives not in common 
with the three following interviews. Firstly, to identify a recent 
project (now fully implemented and part of the day-to-day operations 
of the firm) which was seen, at the time of its inception, as being 
important to the company. Secondly, to identify the team responsible 
for the project's implementation and to obtain the C. E. O. 's coopera- 
tion in arranging interviews with them. This project was then used as 
the principal subject during all following interviews, as well as the 
remainder of the C. E. O. 's interview. Of the managerial team that had 
been principally involved in the selected project, only one member was 
unavailable for interview, having left the company. Besides the inter- 
view data, the project's capital application documentation was also 
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made available for inspection but not, unfortunately, for copying. 
The selected project was the development of a new packaging 
product for an existing customer to package an existing product. The 
customer was, at the time of the early stages of the project, in a 
situation of single supply-with respect, to their existing packaging 
supplier for the particular product. As a result it was the customer 
that first broached the possibility of the project, partly stimulated 
by the desire to break the monopoly of its existing supplier, partly 
to reduce packaging costs and partly to have an innovative package 
that would differentiate it from its U. K. competitors. At the same 
time this customer approached another packaging supplier for a similar 
product to package another similar product line. This second packaging 
company was able to make an exclusivity deal with a continental equip- 
ment supplier for their technology within the U. K. This left the 
author's company having to select an equipment supplier with, what was 
generally seen as, second best technology. However, the company was 
able to make prototype products on a machine from this supplier using 
their chosen materials and subsequently were able to negotiate a 
contract with the customer guaranteeing minimum orders and prices for 
the product. The calculated financial yield for the project was ap- 
proximately four times the minimum normally considered acceptable. 
The product requested by the packaging company's customer in- 
cluded some innovative (for the U. K. ) features, but otherwise was 
similar to a range of products already being manufactured in small 
volumes by the company. These products were being produced in a sepa- 
rate department within the company and it was decided to install the 
new production equipment within this 'Speciality Products' department. 
This resulted in a substantial increase in this department's annual 
turnover. 
There were several specific features of this project that made 
it complex. Firstly, it included some innovative technology; as far as 
the U. K. in general and this firm in particular was concerned. Having 
seen the technology in operation at various European demonstration 
sites and having used the equipment to produce prototype packages, 
this technological innovation was not perceived as a risk. Secondly, 
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the product that the customer was packaging had ahighly seasonal 
sales pattern, concentrated in, the winter months. Although the other 
speciality packaging products produced by the company also had season- 
al sales patterns, the vast majority of the company's normal product 
line (collapsible=boxes for consumer non-durable products) did not. In 
addition these other speciality products were produced in small vol- 
umes resulting in an under utilisation of some°of the existing produc- 
tion equipment. In fact one of the attractions to the company of this 
project was that use could be made of some of these slack resources, 
thus increasing overall production efficiency. Thirdly, the customer 
required large volumes of the package (over 20 million units per 
annum) when they were producing. As production was effectively contin- 
uous, this necessitated that a new shift system be introduced, com- 
pared to the normal day working arrangement previously used. Fourthly 
and-finally, because of the large volumes of packages being produced 
by this production facility and noting that the package was not col- 
lapsible and therefore occupied large volumes of space, it was effec- 
tively not possible to store the product. In effect it had to be 
manufactured and shipped without passing through intermediate buffer 
stores. This was again a novel feature as the company's previous 
experience was that production passed into buffer storage. 
In discussing the implementation of this project there was a 
clear perceptual split between the managers and the engineer responsi- 
ble for the installation and commissioning of the project, as to what 
the major problems with the project had been. The engineer focused his 
attention on the technical problems associated with the project. These 
were, that the delivery of the equipment from the manufacturer was 
about 3 weeks late and more importantly, a feature of the technology 
of the equipment was that a cutting tool would wear out and then need 
resharpening. Initial information supplied by the equipment manufac- 
turer and continental users was that this tool would need replacing 
about once a shift. In fact early experience showed it to need re- 
placement about every hour. The consequences for the utilisation of 
the equipment were dire; particularly as the late delivery of the 
equipment and its poor utilisation, meant the company was experiencing 
extreme difficulties in meeting contractual obligations with its cus- 
tomer. The managers on the other hand took a different perspective. 
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The C. E. O. for example, when asked what-the major implementation 
problem had been, identified the above described technical problems, 
then changed his mind and identified liaison with the customer as the 
major difficulty. In the end this problem was only solved when the 
initial person responsible'for liaising with the customer was re- 
placed. In the final analysis the project was adjudged to have been 
highly successful, to the extent that the capital for a near identical 
project, to supply a different customer, had been approved for commis- 
sioning about six'months'after these interviews took place. 
4.2.2 CASE ANALYSIS 
Analysis of this case leads to a number of conclusions, some of 
which will be referred to at appropriate points during the remainder 
of this chapter. As to the argument in hand, namely that changes to 
standard operating procedures are an important consequence of imple- 
mentation and result in gateway capacity effects, it is particularly 
significant. The major difficulty, from the managerial perspective, 
was the difficulty of achieving'close liaison with the customer. This 
problem stemmed from the large volumes being produced and the lack of 
buffer storage prior to shipment to the customer. The technical prob- 
lems (which in the end were solved) only'served to exacerbate the 
liaison problem, which otherwise would probably not have become so 
obvious so early in the project's history. The principal cause of the 
liaison problem was that, with buffer stocks, the company traditional- 
ly could solve its production problems without affecting supplies to 
its customers. In this instance the company had, in effect, become a 
Just-In-Time (JIT) supplier, where any disruption to its production 
would have an almost immediate effect on the customer. To minimise the 
upset to the customer a new (or highly modified) standard operating 
procedure had to be learnt and in this case the person principally 
responsible for operating the liaison procedure required replacing. 
JIT is not just a scheduling technique, but can also be viewed 
as a business strategy (Doll and Vonderembse, 1987). It could be 
argued therefore, that a manufacturing company with a JIT capability, 
or at least some of the principal skills required to successfully 
implement JIT, has a competitive advantage of some worth. Whether or 
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not the company would wish to use this capability is another question. 
In terms of the company researched here, 'the departmental manager was 
at pains to point out that the principal customer to' be supplied by 
the new machine on'order, was in fact being supplied by another compa- 
ny also. In the event of 'a breakdown by one supplier they could'switch 
to the other. This possibly suggests that he viewed the rigours of 
being a JIT supplier more of a threat than a 'strategic opportunity. 
4.3 A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
4.3.1 A SOCIO-TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A , concept to be taken into consideration 'in the construction of 
a contingency framework is the view of the organisation as a Socio- 
Technical entity (e. g., see Trist et. al., 1963). This concept origi- 
nates in the work of Trist and Bamforth who, in a study into the 
introduction of new coal mining techniques, found that predicted 
productivity improvements did not occur due to the disruption of the 
workers' social' relationships. This approach has since been developed 
by several authors into a formal research methodology (e. g. Herbst, 
1974) particularly for the implementation of computer-based informa- 
tion systems projects (e. g., De Maio, 1980; Courbon and Bourgeois, 
1980) and was the basic perspective adopted by Mumford and Pettigrew 
(1975) in their treatise on the implementation of strategic decisions. 
It possibly also accounts for the observation made by Ansoff (1984) 
that most of the research into implementation has focused on the human 
problems associated with change. 
A number of similar dichotomous concepts appear in several areas 
of the literature. Bonoma (1984) refers to a Structural-Human dichoto- 
my within an organisation. Schultz and Slevin (1975) introduced the 
concepts of Technical and Organisational Validity in connection with 
the implantation of Operational Research/Management Science projects. 
Technical-Validity is associated with whether the project met its 
design specification, Organisational Validity is associated with 
whether the project was used and/or contributed to organisational 
effectiveness. Their argument being that the probability of success of 
an OR/MS/MIS project is a function of these two aspects. Mushkat 
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(1987) adopted these concepts and applied them-at the strategic level 
in developing an understanding of plan acceptance in public organisa- 
tions. Randolph and Posner (1988) in discussing Project Management (be 
it a production, marketing or accounting project) commented "Projects 
involve a merging of technical and people issues... ". They went on to 
outline ten principles, four technical or planning aspects and six 
social or managerial aspects, for effective project management. 
Schultz and Slevin (1979) noted that different people within an organ- 
isation take different attitudes to what constitutes the success of 
management science projects, which echo the two aspects identified 
here. Similarly the case study quoted above showed that the technical 
and managerial staffs within the firm held differing views of what 
constituted the major problem encountered with the projects' implemen- 
tation., 
The aim of the above discussion was not to present a comprehen- 
sive summary of the uses etc. of a socio-technical approach, but to 
present evidence for two valid perspectives which may be adopted when 
investigating organisational questions and in particular, implementa- 
tion. Any contingent framework must therefore recognise and include 
both these aspects of the phenomena. 
4.3.2 A CYBERNETIC APPROACH 
The discussion of Ashby's (1956) concepts developed earlier 
identifies the principal contingent dimensions required to construct a 
model of project implementation. The principal exogenous factor driv- 
ing the adaptation of the organisation was D, the disturbance which 
injects variety into the organisation. In the context of this thesis, 
D is a specific project resulting from a strategic decision. It fol- 
lows, therefore, that one of the principal independent variables af- 
fecting implementation success, conceptualised as organisational 
learning, will be variety injected. Variety is not a particularly 
simple concept to measure (Beer, 1985). However, it has been noted 
that the concept of variety is closely allied with the concept of 
uncertainty. We therefore identify project uncertainty as a principal 
contingent factor in our model. 
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Again returning to*the"earlier development based upon Ashby's 
concepts, we note that the function of the regulator R, is to select 
procedures that will restrict the variety of possible outcomes to a 
limited 'acceptable set. In chapter 3 it was noted that information is 
the destroyer of variety i. e. uncertainty. We therefore identify 
project information as a second principal contingent factor in our 
model. 
The final concept identified here as important to a contingency 
model is organisational learning. Learning reflects organisational 
change, identified with the adaptation of organisational procedures or 
skills. Implementation success is therefore the extent and type of 
learning or adaptation occurring in the organisation. Figure 4.1 
illustrates these ideas. The description of the figure follows. 
Figure 4.1: Organisational-Adaptations. 
(A) 
1 
D .2 3 
R 
aßY 
bac 
acd. 
cba 
ýý 
(B) 
I 
D3 
4 
R 
a0 
bac 
acd 
cba 
dab 
OR 
(c) 
1 
D3 
R 
aß y5 
bacc 
acdb 
cbad 
ddba 
Ashby's (1956) Law of Requisite Variety states that the variety 
of the disturbance D`has to be matched by the variety'of response of 
regulator R. ' The function of R is to maintain the organisation's 
essential variable within tolerable range. This acceptable outcome is 
illustrated in figure 4.1 by table entry a. Taking model (A) in figure 
4.1 to represent the initial state of the organisation, the organisa- 
tion may respond to an increase in environmental variety (from 3 to 4 
in the figure) in two ways. Either an existing procedure (ß) may be 
identified capable of absorbing'the increased variety (situation B) or 
a new procedure (3) may be developed to absorb the increased variety 
(situation C). In a real organisation there will be many essential 
variables, each effected differently by the disturbance. The total 
organisational response will therefore be a combination (in varying 
degree) of both types of adaptation. We also observe that the two 
types of adaptation are independent of each other, indeed, at the 
level of a single essential variable, they are mutually exclusive. 
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These ideas are reflected in March and Simons, concepts. of 
short- and-long-run adaptiveness. A particularly interesting passage, 
in light of the above formulation, is the following (March and Simon, 
1958, p. 170): 
"If an organisation has a repertoire" of programmes, then 
it is adaptive in the short-run insofar as it has proce- 
dures for selecting from this repertoire a programme 
appropriate to each specific situation that arises. The 
process used to select an appropriate programme is the 
"fulcrum" on which short-run adaptiveness rests. If, now, 
the organisation has processes for adding to its reper- 
toire of programmes or for modifying programmes in the 
repertoire, these processes become still more basic 
fulcra for accomplishing longer-run adaptiveness. Short- 
: run adaptiveness corresponds to what we ordinarily call 
problem-solving, long-run adaptiveness to learning. " 
March and Simon's ideas are referring to the processes underly- 
ing the two types of adaptation. Our formulation based on Ashby's 
concepts is concerned with the results of the adaptations. These 
adaptations are therefore the outcome of the project implementation 
process. They represent dimensions of implementation success. Long-run 
adaptation requires organisational change. As argued and demonstrated 
previously, this can lead to long-term gateway capacity benefits 
(long-term in the sense of been realised after the "implementation- 
time" of the specific strategic goal initiating the project). Short- 
run adaptation refers to problem-solving and we equate this with 
achieving planned or expected outcomes from the project via existing, 
known, procedures. 
Cyert and March (1963) also make reference to the concepts of 
short- and long-run adaptation in their treatise, "A Behavioural 
Theory of the Firm". Specifically they concentrate upon the "... rela- 
tively short-run adaptive process and its consequences (p100)" arguing 
that long-run effects "... are of modest relevance for a theory of firm 
behaviour. " Our concern is not "behaviour" and it would appear reason- 
able, in view of the discussion within this chapter, that equivalent 
weight should be given to both outcomes. Further, it is not at all 
clear to this author what Cyert and March meant by their concepts of 
Long- and Short-Run adaptation. They talk about the long-run conse- 
quences and the short-run results of an adaptive process. One inter- 
pretation would be Strategic versus Operational adaptation, which is 
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similar in meaning to the intended use of the concept here. However, 
they appear to argue that long-run adaptation can only occur or become 
manifest within a stable environment. There is no such intended mean- 
ing in this work. In fact, it has been argued here that it is the 
long-run consequences, or adaptation to the change introduced by the 
implementation of a strategic decision, that is one source of future 
strategies. 
The above discussion has provided us with a socio - technical 
, perspective and 
the principal concepts necessary for constructing a 
contingency framework of project implementation. These concepts are 
project uncertainty, information and implementation success, identi- 
fied with long- and short-term adaptation. We will further refine 
these concepts in the following sections. 
4.3.3 CONTENT VALIDITY 
For. the reader to more fully understand the-purpose underlying 
the following sections of- this chapter it is necessary to introduce 
some methodological notes relating-to the theory of measurement. The 
issues involved here are more fully explained, in chapter 51 so this 
discussion will be brief. 
Our ultimate-aim is to develop measures of the concepts identi- 
fied as belonging to our contingent model. Theconcepts Uncertainty, 
Information and Success are very broad and we would reasonably expect 
different people to interpret. these terms differently. What is more, 
they would not necessarily interpret these concepts in terms of the 
cybernetic basis used here. If we are to reliably measure these con- 
cepts it is necessary. to remove the ambiguity surrounding these words. 
This involves identifying concepts within these broad concepts which 
serve to define the terms. We have already noted that Success is 
composed of two broad sub-dimensions, provisionally labelled short- 
and long-run adaptation. We will call such sub-dimensions "secondary 
concepts", whereas Uncertainty, Information and Success we call 
"primary concepts". We will also ultimately identify "tertiary level 
concepts". In terms of the nomenclature introduced in chapter 5, our 
concern here is with establishing the "content validity" of our pri- 
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mary constructs. Finally we note that, in the absence of agreed crite- 
ria for assessing content validity, its determination rests mainly on 
an appeal to reason (Nunnally, 1978). This is essentially the approach 
taken here. ra 
4.3.4'PROJECT UNCERTAINTY 
We focus here on identifying those parameters of a project'that 
contribute to its uncertainty and-subsume these within a variable 
called Project UNCERTAINTY. Uncertainty is identified with items, con- 
tributing to the variety of the project. Raine et. al. (1981) in a 
study into the management and commissioning of industrial projects 
identified'a subset of-projects which they called 'complex'. They 
defined' a 'complex' project as one possessing one or-more of the 
characteristics; Large,, ' Novel 'and Urgent. All three characteristics 
were to be seen as relative to the- organisation's usual experience. 
Each of these characteristics appear to be'-identified with some aspect 
of uncertainty. We will therefore use - this framework as a starting 
point for defining our project uncertainty concept. We will also 
include complexity as a further concept within Uncertainty. Specifi- 
cally we view complexity-as a perceptual component of Uncertainty, not 
an objective component. - 
The term 'Large' 'conveys a meaning of size. -However, Raine et. 
al., point out that this term should also be taken to include a sense 
of dependence upon distinct technical and other skills. Here the term 
SCOPE will be used rather- than 'Large' to incorporate a° meaning of 
SIZE (e. g. cost) 'a meaning of STRATEGICALITY (e. g. how important and 
consequential was the project to the company) and a component relating 
to the project's use of technical and other skills, called SKILL USE. 
The term NOVELTY, when associated with a'project, suggests a 
number of components that may contribute to the overall concept and 
are identified in the business policy literature (see for example, 
Steiner, 1979, p: 180; Ansoff, 1987, p. 110). Specifically we would 
identify the SITING for the project (new or existing) the PRODUCT (new 
or existing) the MARKET (new or old customers) and INNOVATION (well 
proven contractor supplied or highly experimental). A further compo- 
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nent of the Novelty construct would be TECHNOLOGY, ' used in the same 
sense as Woodward (1965). Woodward categorised technology as Custom, 
Batch and Mass Production (Production Continuity, Workflow, are terms 
with similar meaning used by various authors). Woodward's 'original 
thesis was that Technology was a principal determinant of certain 
important aspects of organisational structure within manufacturing 
organisations. Hickson et. al. (1970) were some of the first authors 
to question Woodward's thesis. Miller and Droge (1986) similarly found 
no contribution of technology to structure in their study. However, 
Hickson et. al. (1970) did find a relationship between technology and 
seven 'secondary' structural features. They conclude "... only those 
[structural features] directly centred on the production workflow 
itself show any connection with technology. " In this context it is 
noted that implementation is a process that will directly affect the 
production workflow. Hayes and Wheelwright (1979) used a categorical 
scheme, similar to Woodward's original formulation of the technology 
concept, to define a Process Life Cycle. They noted that an organisa- 
tion needed to departmentalise or divisionalise when different tech- 
nologies are used within the same organisation. This was recommended 
because of the problems in finding one set of controls to suit all 
types of technological process. From-this argument we conclude that an 
important contribution to the Novelty concept will be the "fit" be- 
tween the technology predominant within the organisation and the 
technology of the project. This certainly appears to have been the 
case with the project illustrated in the case study. Here the organi- 
sation's predominant technology, even within the department where the 
project was installed, was medium to large batch. The new project 
introduced a continuous mass production technology. That managerial 
problems subsequently occurred is not surprising in light of the above 
discussion. 
The third concept contributing to Uncertainty suggested by Raine 
et. al. (1981) is URGENCY. Urgency suggests associations with concepts 
of SURVIVAL and SIMULTANEITY (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). Survival 
refers to the organisation's life expectancy without the project. 
Simultaneity is associated with a lack of time for decision making. 
Both, in tern, imply the project will be given high PRIORITY and that 
there will be diverse PRESSURE promoting the project. A further con- 
Page 96 
cept that may affect Urgency is that of the strategic WINDOW. This 
concept relates to the idea, found within the strategic marketing 
literature, that a product launch can occur too early or too late to 
have an impact. In other words there is an optimal time to develop and 
launch a product, the strategic window (Abell, 1978). Finally we 
identify FINANCIAL ATTRACTIVENESS as a component of Urgency, particu- 
larly in the case of for-profit organisations; the logic being that a 
project with a very high return on investment will be viewed as more 
urgent and promoted more vigorously than one with only a minimal 
return on investment. 
The final component of Uncertainty is COMPLEXITY. Complexity was 
defined above as a perceptual concept. We therefore identify PERCEIVED 
COMPLEXITY as a component of the Complexity concept. Risk is a further 
concept identified as a generator of uncertainty (Mumford and Petti- 
grew, 1975). Here we focus on PERCEIVED RISK as a second and final 
component of the Complexity concept. 
Secondary and tertiary components of the UNCERTAINTY concept 
derived from the above discussion are summarised in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: The Uncertainty Concept 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Concept Concepts Concepts 
UNCERTAINTY SCOPE SIZE 
STRATEGICALITY 
SKILL USE 
NOVELTY SITING 
PRODUCT 
MARKET 
INNOVATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
URGENCY PRIORITY 
SURVIVAL 
SIMULTANEITY 
E 
WINDOW 
PRESSURE 
FINANCIAL 
ATTRACTIVENESS 
COMPLEXITY PERCEIVED 
COMPLEXITY 
PERCEIVED RISK 
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4.3.5 PROJECT INFORMATION 
4.3.5.1 Secondary Inforaation Concepts 
The second contingent variable of our model is INFORMATION. Here 
we need to consider concepts that absorb variety, or lead to a reduc- 
tion of Uncertainty. The cybernetic model illustrated in figure 4.1, 
identifies-two properties of the organisation's procedures that will 
influence project success; interpreted here as adaptation or organisa- 
tional learning. These two aspects of the organisation's procedures 
are their RANGE and FLEXIBILITY. (Flexibility is identified with the 
parameter k in Ashby's formulation; section 4.1.3. ) Specifically we 
note that the greater the procedural Range and or Flexibility, the 
greater the variety that can be absorbed by the existing set of organ- 
isational operating procedures. In addition Range and Flexibility are 
organisational parameters exogenous to any particular project. Follow- 
ing earlier arguments we further note that both these parameters will 
be a product of the past history, or experience, of the organisation. 
However, it does not follow that an organisation with a large Range of 
procedures has to have (or not have) Flexible procedures. Range and 
Flexibility are therefore independent of each other (i. e., 
orthogonal). 
In addition to the innate capability for variety absorption 
reflected in the concepts of Range and Flexibility, an organisation 
will also perform specific activities associated with decision making 
and problem solving. In other words it will initiate a specific proc- 
ess to collect, assimilate, etc., information to achieve the project 
goal. Invoking the socio-technical perspective outlined above we may 
also reasonably expect this process to reflect social, or human, and 
technical activities. The social processes we see as been primarily 
focused on preempting, or overcoming, any social or human resistance 
to the project, or the changes introduced by the project. The "resist- 
ance-to-change" phenomenon and strategies for handling it, is a common 
theme in the literature dealing with implementation issues (see for 
example Sorensen and Zand, 1975; Hawthorne, 1978; Steiner, 1979; 
Ansoff, 1984; Janis, 1985). Here we will subsume these processes 
within a concept of behavioural LUBRICATION. The technical processes 
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we will subsume within a concept of information ACTIVITY. As we noted 
for the Range and Flexibility concepts, there is no reason to suppose 
that the concepts of Lubrication and Activity are other than orthogo- 
nal to each other. We' will therefore treat them as separate sub- 
dimensions of Information, but it will also prove convenient to sub- 
sume them within a single information Process dimension. 
The above discussion has identified four secondary concepts 
contributing to the overall, Information concept. These have been 
identified as the experience dimensions of procedural Range and Flexi- 
bility, and the process dimensions of behavioural Lubrication and 
information Activity. We now further develop these concepts. 
4.3.5.2 Tertiary Information Concepts 
The procedural Range dimension relates to the variety of histor- 
ically predefined procedures at the disposal of the organisation. One 
concept measuring Range will therefore be FAMILIARITY. This concept 
refers to the similarity of the project to past projects, the experi- 
ence gained through having a wide product and or market base, etc. A 
further component of Range is simply the SIZE of the organisation, 
measured in terms of number of employees. The greater the size the 
more information the organisation can process. A perceptual indicator 
of Range will be ABILITY, ability to implement projects. Finally we 
identify DELEGATION as an indicator of procedural Range. This concept 
corresponds to the organisation drawing on the experience, or proce- 
dural range, of other organisations, e. g., outside consultants and 
contractor. 
The concept of procedural Flexibility suggests an organisation 
with an organic structure (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Randolph and 
Posner (1988) point out that projects require people to communicate, 
particularly across departmental boundaries, in a fairly unstructured 
way. The lack of a clear hierarchical structure and a broadening of 
role responsibility beyond that of a functional department, are fea- 
tures that characterise organic organisations. Covin and Slevin (1988) 
note that organic structures have a greater information processing 
capacity than do organisations with the polar opposite mechanistic 
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structures. Hawthorne (1978) states? 'that organic- organisations are 
better able to respond to technological change and De Geus (1988) 
believes organic organisations are better at organisational learning. 
Finally, we note that Khandwalla (1977) explicitly equates the flexi- 
ble organisation with an organic top management style. From these 
arguments it is concluded that procedural Flexibility may be equated 
with the concept of structural ORGANICITY. 
Turning now to``the process concepts'we first look at behavioural 
Lubrication. Noting that Lubrication is associated with achieving 
social change enables us tot look at such models for insight into the 
Lubrication concept. One' such theory (originally formulated by Kurt 
Lewin, ' but commonly referred to as the Lewin-Schein Change Theory) 
views social change as a three stage process of Unfreezing, Moving and 
Refreezing. This theory has "found some utility in understanding the 
process of implementing management science projects (Zand and Soren- 
sen, 1975; Ginzberg, 1978). Ginzberg summarised the model as follows: 
"Unfreezing, entails the disconfirmation of existing, 
stable behaviour patterns - establishing a "felt need" 
for change, - and the development of an atmosphere in 
which the individual feels he can safely try something 
new. 
Moving is the "action" phase of the change effort. This 
requires the presentation of 'information necessary for 
change and the learning of new attitudes and behaviours 
which are necessary parts of the change. 
Refreezing entails the stabilisation of the change and 
the integration of new attitudes and behaviours into 
existing patterns and relationships. " 
We will adopt this model as identifying three 
, 
basic dimensions 
to Lubrication. These are. UNFREEZING, MOVING and REFREEZING. 
Finally we have the information Activity concept. If we equate 
this process with problem solving then we may also equate it with 
decision making. This suggests one approach to identifying dimensions 
of the Activity concept. Simon's (1960) model of decision-making 
, consists of 
three phases. These are Intelligence, Design and Choice. 
Mintzberg et. al. 's (1976) model of strategic decision making recog- 
nises, Identification (Recognition & Diagnosis) Development (Design & 
Search) and Selection (Screen, Evaluation & Authorisation) phases. An 
alternative non-decision-making approach is based on a taxonomy of 
Page 100 
Information Occupations for the U. S. information industry sector 
(Rubin and Sapp, 1981) These classifications are Producers; Proces- 
sors; Distributors and Infrastructure. 
There are several similarities between these alternative ap- 
proaches and models; although, we note that the Identification stage of 
Mintzberg et. al. 's model is an aspect of strategy formulation, not 
implementation, we therefore reject this stage from our formulation. 
Mintzberg et. al. 's Development stage contains two of Simon's stages, 
namely Design and Intelligence (Simon equates Search with Intelli- 
gence). Selection and Choice are also congruous. Hence, Simon's and 
Mintzberg et. al. 's models are similar over the area of the strategic 
decision making process of concern here. The congruence between Rubin 
and Sapp's taxonomy is not as clear. Processors imply activities like 
Analysis or Design. Producers could be identified by a Search, or 
information gathering activity. Distributors imply Communication, 
which could be a precursor to making a Choice. These associations are 
quite tentative. Also, there is no obvious correspondence between 
Rubin and Sapp's Infrastructure category and any of the stages of 
Simon's or Mintzberg et. al. 's models. In the event, the Rubin and 
Sapp (1981) taxonomy was adopted as offering the greatest scope for 
constructing a broad Activity concept. In addition, being empirically 
rather than theoretically based, this model is likely to be simpler to 
reify. To better place the concepts within a project (as opposed to 
industry) context, the dimensions, ANALYSIS, SEARCH, COMMUNICATION and 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY were adopted from Rubin and Sapp (1981) and 
incorporated into the information Activity concept. Information Tech- 
nology was seen as a dimension in its own right, but was. also seen as 
a facilitator of the other three dimensions. A further dimension, 
DESIGN RESOURCES, is also included in the Activity construct to sub- 
sume the effort, time and money spent by the organisation to carry out 
the Activity processes. 
Besides actively processing information an organisation can take 
steps to reduce the need to process information. Galbraith (1969) 
notes that "slack resources" (e. g., long delivery time, high inventory 
levels, overtime) serve this function in an organisational setting. We 
suggest that "contingency allowances" serve this function within the 
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context of a particular project. CONTINGENCIES are therefore identi- 
fied as the final sub-dimension of the information Activity concept. 
Components of . 
the INFORMATION concept derived from the above 
discussion are summarised in table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: The information Concept 
Primary 
Concept 
Secondary Tertiary 
Concepts Concepts 
INFORMATION 
r 
FLEXIBILITY 
ý 
ORGANICITY 
RANGE I FAMILIARITY 
I Experience I DELEGATION 
L-------J ABILITY 
ir ---.. ---- SIZE LUBRICATION UNFREEZING 
1ý MOVING 
II REFREEZING 
ACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
I Process 1 COMMUNICATION 
L_______J SEARCH 
INFO. TECH. 
DESIGN RESOURCES 
CONTINGENCIES 
4.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS 
The final concept within the contingency framework is Implemen- 
tation Success. It has been argued that this concept has two dimen- 
sions, short- and long-run adaptation. We will refer to short-run 
adaptation as EXPECTATION and long-run adaptation as CHANGE. 
Expectation refers to achieving anticipated outcomes from the 
implementation and relies on historical skills used to assess the 
particular project. Most researchers in the implementation area define 
success only along this dimension. They adopted a wide variety of 
perspectives and biases, hence the variety of dimensions of Expecta- 
tion that we identify from the literature are also wide. For example, 
measures found in the literature dealing with implementation success 
(e. g. business policy, innovation, project management) could typically 
include, achieving anticipated financial returns (e. g. return on 
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investment) or, "... outperforming the competition in terms of profit" 
(Vasconcellos e Si, 1988). 'The literature on project management tends 
to define project success in terms of completion on time, to budget 
and performance to specification (Randolph and Posner, ' 1988): Many 
writers would argue that 'an important measure of success relates to 
the achievement of objectives (which should be quantified and measura- 
ble). Alexander (1985) subsumed many of these approaches by defining 
an 'implementation index' consisting of the three dimensions outlined 
above. These are: 
1. Achieved the initial-goals and objectives of the 
strategic decision; 
2. Achieved the financial results (sales, income, and/or 
profits) that were expected; and 
3. Was carried out within the various resources (money, 
manpower, time, etc. ) initially budgeted for it. 
'A potential difficulty with any formulation of 'a construct to 
measure implementation success, is the difficulty of separating 'the 
effects of the implementation from the strategy being implemented. 
Inspecting the success dimensions above it is seen that some (e. g. 'the 
project success measures, dimension 3 above) are specific to the 
implementation. Others, however (e. g. Sales, income, profit returns) 
are as likely to depend upon the strategy being appropriate, as on the 
quality or success of the implementation. In other words, an Implemen- 
tation Success measure should, with reference to the definitions given 
in chapter 2, at most only include factors relating to Goal achieve- 
ment (e. g. the building of a new warehouse) not to the achievement of 
the objective that gave rise to the Goal (e. g. to satisfy customer 
orders within 48 hours). To paraphrase Drucker's (1974) definitions of 
efficiency and effectiveness, we may summarise this argument by saying 
that the-concern here is not, "was it the right thing to do? " but "was 
it done right? " 
Referring to Alexander's success dimensions, only the last one, 
achieving budgets, unequivocally refers to the project. We identify 
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this dimension with the concept-of ACCURACY. A second dimension of 
Expectation will be EASE, the Ease of achieving Accuracy. Ease there- 
fore relates to the. lack of problems, particularly unanticipated 
problems, encountered during the project. A third and final dimension 
will be project SATISFACTION. This relates to a willingness to repeat 
the'project and an overall sense of "a-job-well-done". 
The long-term dimension of implementation success, labelled 
Change, refers to. procedural changes that may confer gateway capacity 
benefits on the organisation, i. e., possible future benefits that 
spin-off from the project. We posit that the effects of such changes 
may operate,, at a social and a technical-level. Changes at a social 
level we will label CULTURE. These refer to structural and behavioural 
changes attributable to the project. The motive for adopting this 
nomenclature stems from an association between Schein's (1984) defini- 
tion of organisational culture and the organic - mechanistic organisa- 
tional taxonomy of Burns and Stalker (1961). Schein defines organisa- 
tional culture in terms of "values", and "beliefs". Burns and Stalker 
refer to the two types as exhibiting two managerial styles and note, 
in connection with a discussion of the differences between the two 
types, that the Organic form achieves its. cohesion by the development 
of "shared beliefs about the values and goals of the concern". Khand- 
walla (1977) also identifies the organic - mechanistic forms as repre- 
senting two management philosophies. Finally we note that in the paper 
by Schein (1984) he describes two cultural types which mirror the 
Burns and Stalker taxonomy. These associations between Schein's ideas 
for organisational culture, Khandwalla's and - Burns and Stalker's de- 
scription as management philosophy and style, together with our previ- 
ously noted association between the organic - mechanistic taxonomy and 
procedural flexibility and therefore organisational structure, forms 
the basis of the above assertion that project implementation changes 
culture. Culture, therefore, is an important dimension of Change. 
On the technical side we have previously noted that the proce- 
dures of an organisation represent, or embody, its skills. As imple- 
mentation can change procedures, then it will also change skills. 
SKILLS is therefore another dimension of change. We will draw a dis- 
tinction here between Skills as a dimension of change to wide organi- 
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sational. procedures and COMPETENCY as change to those procedures 
specifically associated with implementing projects. Competency is 
therefore associated with changes in the organisation's ability to and 
time taken to, implement projects. Finally we identify APPLICABILITY 
as a further dimension of Change. This concept refers to whether the 
Culture, Skills and Competency changes that occur have a wider organi- 
sation value and use beyond the department or subsidiary implementing 
the project. It 'is also associated with how well these changes and 
immediate strategic advantages are-communicated throughout the organi- 
sation. .1. il 
.. 
Components of the SUCCESS concept derived from the above discus- 
sion are summarised in table 4.6 below: 
Table 4.6: The Success Concept 
C) 
Primary 'Secondary Tertiary 
Concept Concepts Concepts 
SUCCESS EXPECTATION 
--E 
EASE 
ACCURACY 
SATISFACTION 
CHANGES CULTURE 
COMPETENCY 
SKILLS. 
APPLICABILITY 
The, theme running through all of the concepts identified here is 
that of organisational change or learning. Uncertainty represents the 
size of the change or learning task_, imposed on the organisation by a 
particular project. Information broadly identifies the innate adapt- 
ability of'the organisation to change (experience) and what it does to 
change (process). Finally, Success is defined in terms of what the 
organisation learnt in the past that helped it to implement a particu- 
lar project (Expectation) and what learning adaptations occurred that 
may lead to new opportunities in the future (Change). We now seek to 
formally identify the associations between these concepts. 
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4.4 HYPOTHESES 
The specific hypotheses to be tested in this study may be con- 
veniently portrayed as the'expected associations between the concepts 
of our contingency model. It will be, necessary to work with five 
contingency variables in explaining these associations. These will be 
Uncertainty (UXX) and the Information sub-dimensions -of Experience 
(i. e., procedural Range, IRX; and Flexibility, IFX) and Process (i. e., 
Lubrication, ILX; and Activity, 'IAX). The Success dimensions of Change 
(SCX) and Expectation (SEX) are the principal dependent, or outcome, 
variables in our model. We will now formulate specific hypotheses 
between these variables. These hypotheses will be formulated as the 
statistical alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis being thatýthe 
association between variables-is not of the form suggested. 
Uncertainty is a measure of the variety injected into an organi- 
sation by a particular project. ' It is determined by the strategic goal 
initiating the project. Uncertainty is therefore an exogenous variable 
in our model. We have argued that Uncertainty is absorbed through 
adaptation of the organisation's procedures. The greater the Uncer- 
tainty of 'a project, the greater the adaptation or procedural change 
that will have to occur to accommodate the new project. Conversely, 
the greater the Uncertainty of a project the less is the chance of the 
organisation having appropriate past experiences to draw on. Finally 
we will adopt the basic proposition of Galbraith's thesis (Galbraith, 
1969, p. 5; also 1979, p. 409) that: 
"the greater the uncertainty of the task, the greater the 
amount of information that has to be processed during the 
execution of . the task. ". 
In terms of our framework this hypothesis relates Uncertainty to 
information Process. The three propositions may be formally stated as 
the following hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 1: Increased project Uncertainty (UXX) causes an 
. 
increase in Change (SCX). 
Hypothesis 2: Increased. project Uncertainty (UXX) causesa 
decrease in Expectation (SEX). 
-Hypothesis 
3: Increased project Uncertainty (UXX) causes an 
increase in information Process (Lubrication, 
ILX and Activity, IAX). 
The experience items of Information (procedural Range and Flexi- 
bility) are properties of the organisation brought to the particular 
project situation. These items are therefore exogenous to the project. 
Specifically we note that they represent the innate ability of the 
organisation to absorb variety. An organisation with a large degree of 
Experience will be able to accommodate Uncertainty without Change and 
also achieve a high degree of Expectation. This Experience also repre- 
sents a pool of procedures that will, -benefit the information Process. 
Formalising these statements as hypotheses we have: 
Hypothesis 4: Increases in information Experience (Range, 
IRX and Flexibility, IFX) will cause a de- 
, crease in Change (SCX). 
Hypothesis 5: Increases in information Experience (Range, 
IRX and Flexibility, IFX) will cause an in 
crease in Expectation (SEX). 
Hypothesis 6: Increases in information Experience (Range, 
IRX and Flexibility, IFX) will cause an in 
crease in information Process (Lubrication, 
ILX and Activity, IAX). 
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The information Process variables, Activity and Lubrication, 
operate to reduce Uncertainty by either processing information or 
reducing the need to process information. These activities will raise 
the Expectation of implementation Success. Information Process will 
also be used to design new procedures resulting in Change. Process is 
therefore also related to Change. Specifically we state the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7: Increases in Information Process (Lubrica- 
tion, ILX and Activity, IAX) will cause an 
increase in Change (SCX). 
Hypothesis 8: Increases in Information Process (Lubrica- 
tion, ILX and Activity, IAX) will cause an 
increase in Expectation (SEX). 
Hypotheses 1 to 8 may be conveniently summarised in a path dia- 
gram, figure 4.2. In figure 4.2 boxes represent concepts and arrows 
represent hypotheses. The direction of the arrow represents the pre- 
sumed direction of causality and the sign indicates the direction of 
association. 
Figure 4.2: Path Model of Hypotheses 
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Besides the above hypotheses, arguments presented in this chap- 
ter also exclude certain associations between constructs. The first of 
these is that no association should exist between the Uncertainty and 
Information Experience concepts. The other is that there'should be no 
association between the two implementation Success concepts of Change 
and Expectation. Specifically we state the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9: ' Uncertainty (UXX) and Experience (Range, IRX 
and Flexibility, IFX) are orthogonal. 
Hypothesis 10: Change (SCX) and Expectation (SEX) are or- 
thogonal. 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 are implicitly indicated on figure 4.2 by 
the absence of paths connecting Uncertainty and Experience, and Change 
and Expectation. 
Here we have established the theoretical basis of the study, 
identified and developed concepts from the theory and formally stated 
ten testable hypotheses. In the following chapter we discuss the 
operationalisation of the concepts and the methodological issues 
involved in testing the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5 
-RESEARCH INSTRUMENT DESIGN AND. METHODOLOGY 
The aims of this chapter are threefold. First, to describe the 
design of a research instrument that operationalises -the concepts 
identified in the previous chapter. Second, to discuss the methodolog- 
ical issues associated with the administration of the research instru- 
ment and finally to-discuss some of the practical aspects of the 
chosen methodology with respect to data collection. 
It will-, be appreciated that all three strands of this chapter 
are closely interconnected. It is therefore unreasonable to assume 
that each of these. three topics can be discussed in a sequential 
order, each logically separated from, the other. While this ideal is 
aimed for, the reader must be prepared to occasionally find methodo- 
logical issues discussed, during instrument design, data collection 
issues discussed with methodological issues, etc. 
5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN-. 
in chapter 4a theoretical perspective and hypotheses were 
developed relating the variables Uncertainty and Information to the 
Success of implementing a' strategic decision. In addition secondary 
and tertiary concepts underlying these three broad concepts were 
identified. The concern here is with the'measürement of these theoret- 
ical'concepts. 
This "statement of intent" implicitly rejects the idea of a 
research design based on case studies. Case studies and related meth- 
odologies (i. e., Action research, where the author participates in the 
study and Application description, where the' author, usually a prac- 
titioner, details their experience) are valuable where exploration, 
classification and hypothesis development are the aims of the study. 
They are also valuable where the investigator has not, or cannot, 
specify the set of independent and dependent variables in advance 
(Benbasat et. al., 1987). Here the hypotheses, dependent and independ- 
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ent variables have been specified and so a quantitative, -non-case, 
research approach is suggested. In addition the pattern of hypotheses 
identified in figure 4.2., suggests a form of data analysis based on 
the statistical technique of path analysis (see chapter 7). As with 
most statistical techniques path analysis requires a relatively large 
numbers of cases to be analysed if confidence is to be placed in the 
findings. Hence, a research instrument had to be designed which was 
suitable for statistical analysis and capable of being administered 
within the resources available to the researcher. These considerations 
suggest the construction and administration of a questionnaire type 
instrument. This questionnaire would have to yield quantitative data 
suitable for statistical analysis and thus be highly structured, i. e., 
unambiguous and closed questions would be asked. 
The construction of such an instrument requires the concepts 
identified in chapter 4 to be operationalised into constructs. 'Co- 
ncept' and 'construct' are defined by Kerlinger as follows: 
"A concept is a word that expresses an abstraction formed 
by generalisation from particulars. A construct is a 
concept. It has the additional meaning, however, of 
having been deliberately and consciously invented or 
adapted for a special scientific purpose. " (Quoted in 
Venkatraman and Grant, 1986) 
This process of operational isation raises important research 
issues of reliability, instrument validation, construct measurement 
etc. As these topics are subsumed within the broader research topic of 
validity we will discuss them within this context. However, as the 
immediate concern is with the validity of quantitative research the 
discussion will be biased in this direction. 
5.1.1 THE VALIDITY ISSUE 
A full treatment of this topic would require us to discuss the 
philosophical basis of scientific explanation, what Nunnally (1967) 
refers to as "the deepest innards of scientific explanation". The 
summary that follows will not refer to these issues and is therefore, 
of necessity, superficial. (The interested reader is referred to Chap- 
ter 1 of Cook and Campbell (1979) for a summary of these "deeper" 
issues. ) The validity question is applicable to all forms of research, 
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be it qualitative or quantitative. However, 'our particular need here 
is with validity as it relates to quantitative research. We will 
therefore further restrict this summary to validity issues as they 
relate to quantitative research studies. 
., 
The question of validity, in its broadest sense, appears to be 
implicated in all aspects of research, with the exception of theory 
development. In fact we may posit that research can be defined in 
terms of just theory and validity issues. The literature on this topic 
abounds with adjectives attached to the word 'validity'. Many of these 
variants are hierarchically related and-those encountered are summa- 
rised here in figure 5.1 over. In reading the body of the table, those 
items in upper case type are -viewed as independent. Those items in 
lower case type are subsumed within the item to which they are at- 
tached by the line. Where two items appear to be alternative forms of 
the same concept, they are related with an equals symbol. A broken 
line indicates ambiguity within the literature regarding placement of 
the item. A fuller description is given subsequently. 
Different authors would identify different elements and struc- 
ture the hierarchical associations within figure 5.1 differently. The 
list in figure 5.1 is not necessarily exhaustive but represents this 
author's attempts to clarify and understand the issues raised by the 
question of validity. We will now investigate more precisely the 
meanings of some of these terms, principally for the purpose of iden- 
tifying those items of greatest significance to the task in hand. 
The broadest definition encountered of the 'validity' concept is 
that due to Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 37) as "the best available 
approximation to the truth... of propositions". To this they note that 
"one can never know what is true. At best, one can know what has not 
yet been ruled out as false. " This latter point is important, as it 
implies that establishing absolute validity is an impossible goal 
(also see Peter, 1981, for a similar view). 
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Figure 5.1: A Glossary of Validity Terms 
FACE VALIDITY 
ABSOLUTE VALIDITY 
CRITERION-RELATED VALIDITY+ 
Predictive Validity 
Concurrent Validity 
Postdictive Validity 
INTERNAL VALIDITY* 
EXTERNAL VALIDITY* 
STATISTICAL CONCLUSION VALIDITY* 
CONTENT VALIDITY+.. -- 
} 
ý 
CONSTRUCT VALIDITY*+ 
Content Validity 
= 
Domain Validitym # Nomological Validity = Extrinsic Va idity 
Trait Validity = Intrinsic Validity 
Factorial Compositionx 
Internal Consistency 
Unidimensionality 
Reliability 
Discriminant Validity 
Convergent Validity 
Principal sources for figure 5.1: 
+ Carmines and Zeller, 1979. 
* Cook and Campbell, 1979. 
x Nunnally, 1967. 
  Section 5.1.2. 
Van De Ven and Ferry, 1980. 
Face validity is, as Nunnally points out, an important (and 
occasionally the only) starting point in instrument design. However, 
the impossibility of achieving absolute validity should not be used as 
justification for face validating constructs. That validity is 'as- 
sumed' by some authors is attested to by a number of articles pub- 
lished during the 1980's criticising the lack of formal validity 
assessment; see Peter (1981) in marketing research, Venkatraman and 
Grant (1986) in strategy research and Straub (1989) in MIS research. 
Criterion-related validity was synonymous with the word 'validi- 
ty' until the mid 1950's (Peter, 1981). It is established by correlat- 
Page 113 
ing performance on a test with some criterion variable. The'correla- 
tion coefficient obtained is then'referred to as the Validity Coeffi- 
cient-(Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Criterion-Related validity is 
usually established without recourse to any theoretical background; or 
theory of measurement; it is based solely on the existence (or other- 
wise) of an association. It will not be discussed further. The remain- 
ing five "independent" items on figure 5.1 constitute the substantive 
validity issues, as far as"this thesis is concerned. 
Internal and External validity are two issues that appear to be 
principally concerned with issues of research design. Both concepts 
are defined and discussed by Cook and"Campbell (1979). Internal valid- 
ity concerns the type of statements that can be made about a causal 
relationship of the presumed form. External validity concerns the 
generalisability with which such statements or conclusions can be 
drawn across different persons, settings and times. The principal aim 
of internal validity is to eliminate alternative causes for the ob- 
served relationships, i. e. if the principal hypothesis is'that A 
causes B, 'internal validity attempts to eliminate alternative hypothe- 
ses such 'as C causing both A and B, or A causing C which causes' B. 
This is. equivalent to the statement that internal validity is`con- 
cerned with the elimination of systematic (non-random) variation or 
bias from the observations. In terms of a methodology to assess inter- 
nal validity Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 55) comment: 
"Estimating the internal validity of a relationship is a 
deductive process in which the investigator has to sys- 
tematically think through how each of the internal valid- 
ity threats may have influenced the data ... In all of 
this process the investigator has to be his own best 
critic... " . 
External validity is established in a similar way. We will 
address issues of internal validity at several points throughout the 
remainder of this chapter. Factors judged to be threats to this 
study's external validity will be discussed in chapter 8 on limita- 
tions. 
An issue closely related to internal validity is Statistical 
Conclusion validity. Both are concerned with "drawing false positive 
or false negative conclusions about causal hypotheses, " (Cook and 
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Campbell, 1979, p. 80) however, whereas internal validity is concerned 
with the effects of systematic error on validity, , statistical. conclu- 
sion validity is; concerned with the effects of random error. As such 
it relates principally to three questions of data analysis, or more 
specifically, statements about the covariation between data (Cook and 
Campbell 1979, p. 37):. 
1. Is the study sensitive enough to permit, reasonable' 
statements to be made with the sample data in hand? 
2. If it is sensitive enough, is there any reasonable 
evidence from which, to infer the presumed cause., and 
effect covary? 
3. If there is such evidence, how strongly do the two 
variables covary?. , 
The first of these questions concerns statistical power, the 
second statistical significance and the third is concerned with the 
estimation of Effect Size. Whereas the issue of statistical signifi- 
cance generally receives adequate attention in most reported research 
the issues of statistical power and effect size (like validity in 
general) have been given far less attention: see Sawyer=and Ball 
(1981) Hazenet. a1. (1987) and Baroudi and. Orlikowski (1989). for 
discussions concerning the Marketing, Management and MIS literatures 
respectively. Establishing statistical conclusion validity is there- 
fore a-quantitative procedure. However, it is considered to be more 
appropriate to defer a full discussion of these issues and of statis- 
tical conclusion validity in general, until chapter 7 where the spe- 
cific theoretical hypotheses will be tested. 
Finally this-discussion brings us to the issues of content and 
construct validity. Indeed, most of the literature specifically ad- 
dressing validity tends to focus solely on these aspects. Content and 
Construct validities relate to the issue of measurement and as such 
articles in the literature discussing these topics appear with titles 
like; Construct Measurement, Instrument Validation, as well as Con- 
struct Validity. 
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The first exponents of these concepts appear to have been Cronb- 
ach and Meehl (1955). Their formulation has been endorsed by Cook and 
Campbell (1979) as-well as others. There is however, -some-disagreement 
within the literature as to whether content validity is, subsumed 
within a broader concept of construct validity, or whether it exists 
as a separate item in its own right. Cook and Campbell (1979) take the 
former view, as do those authors following their lead (Peter, 1981; 
Vankatraman'and Grant, 1986; Straub, 1989). Nunnally (1967 & 1978) and 
Carmines and Zeller (1979) take the latter view and Van De Ven and 
Ferry (1980) appear to ignore it altogether. Here a middle of the road 
approach is adopted, in that content validity can be taken to have 
either interpretation, - as indicated in figure 5.1. The justification 
for this rests principally upon the technique used to establish con- 
tent validity. -- 
Carmines and Zeller (1979, p. 20) define content. validity as "the 
extent to which an empirical measurement reflects a specific domain of 
content. " The method for establishing this is essentially qualitative 
and consists of interviewing a number of "experts" and probing them 
for their conceptualisations of the concept. This technique is also 
advocated by those authors in the Cook and Campbell mould cited above. 
There are a number of problems with this approach, which Carmines and 
Zeller discuss. Basically these objections rest upon firstly the 
"acceptance of the universe of content as defining the variable to be 
measured" (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955, p. 282) and secondly there is no 
agreed criterion by which content validity can be measured therefore, 
"inevitably content validity rests mainly on appeal to reason" (Nun- 
nally, 1978, p. 93). 
From the perspective of this research, the principal abstract 
concepts underpinning this thesis are; Information, Uncertainty and 
Success of Implementation (Chapter 4). As these concepts are-derived 
from the cybernetic theory on which this thesis is based, it was 
thought to be highly improbable that a sample of "experts" would 
converge on the same theoretical conceptualisations. This "interview- 
ing of experts" approach to establishing content validity was there- 
fore judged to be an inappropriate technique. In its place we ap- 
proached the question of content validity in chapter 4 from a review 
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of the literature and face validity perspective. The reader is re- 
ferred to Nunnally (1967, p. 83 and"84) for examples of further in- 
stances in which content validity is an inappropriate or an insuffi- 
cient indicator of validity. This discussion now brings us to what is 
for this-thesis, the major topic of interest, that of construct valid- 
ity. 
5.1.2 CONSTRUCT VALIDATION 
The issue of construct validity-is closely allied with the issue 
of external validity, i. e. both are concerned with the justifications 
of making generalisations (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Construct validi- 
ty however, is specifically related to measurement.: Establishing 
construct validity, involves establishing the degree. of correspondence 
between a construct and its (observable) measures and is therefore 
principally a quantitative approach. Nunnally (1967, p. 87) identifies 
three processes required to do. -this: 
1. Specify the domain of observables for the construct. 
2. Determine to what extent all, or some, of these observ- 
ables correlate with each other: or are affected alike 
by experimental treatments., 
3. Determine whether or not - one, some, or all measures of 
such variables act as though they measure the con- 
struct. 
The first of these processes appears to be closely allied to the 
issue of content validity. They differ (or converge) to the extent 
that content validity establishes a "domain of content", whereas here 
we wish to establish a "domain of observables". It appears reasonable 
to suppose that in some instances the two processes are co-incident 
and this could explain the confusion within the literature referred to 
earlier. It is further noted that an important stage in instrument 
design (section 5.2) is establishing the domain of observables of the 
underlying theoretical concepts. 
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As regards the techniques required to establish the domain of 
observables for a construct (referred to in future as establishing 
"Domain Validity") Nunnally (1967, p. 88) comments: 
"No precise method can be stated for properly outlining 
the domain of variables for a construct. The outline 
essentially constitutes a theory regarding how variables 
will relate to one another; ... the theorising process is necessarily intuitive. " 
The second of Nunnally's three processes essentially describes 
what Cook and Campbell (1979) refers to as trait validity, and Van De 
Ven and Ferry (1980) call intrinsic'validity. Closely allied-with the 
question of validity (and measurement in general) is reliability. 
Reliability concerns the consistency, stability, or dependability with 
which an instrument measures, a set of dimensions. Validity refers to 
whether or not an instrument accurately measures what it is intended 
to measure. The two criteria are highly dependent mathematically and 
from a practical standpoint the concept of reliability becomes indis- 
tinguishable, or is subsumed within, the overall concept of validity 
(Van De Ven and Ferry, 1980; Venkatraman and Grant, '1986). In particu- 
lar, a number of authors identify establishing reliability as a neces- 
sary but not sufficient criterion for establishing trait validity. 
Apart from reliability, a number of other issues are associated with 
establishing trait validity, these will be discussed subsequently. 
The last of Nunnally's three processes for establishing con- 
struct validity relates to the usefulness of the construct within a 
theoretical framework; "To determine construct validity, a measure 
must fit a theory about the construct; " (Nunnally; 1967, p. 93). This 
statement equates this process with what Cook and Campbell (1979) call 
nomological validity, and Van De Ven and Ferry (1980) call extrinsic 
validity. A related view is expressed by Carmines and Zeller 
(1979, p. 17) "one validates not the measuring instrument itself but the 
measuring instrument in relation to the purpose for which it is being 
used". In practice therefore, the methods for establishing nomological 
validity are indistinguishable from the techniques used to test a set 
of theoretical hypotheses based upon the constructs (Cronbach and 
Meehl, 1955). Whether a researcher testing such a set of hypotheses is 
engaged in an exercise of hypothesis corroboration or construct vali- 
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dation depends upon the researcher's a priori intentions when under- 
taking the research. The function of' the research undertaken and 
reported in this thesis was to test a set of theoretically derived 
hypotheses. In this sense therefore, nomological validity will not be 
assessed here. The reader is however free to interpret the testing of 
these hypotheses (the subject matter of chapter 7) as a test of nomo- 
logical validity. 
Before moving on to a more detailed examination of trait validi= 
ty, there are some final comments about the limitations of assessing 
construct validity. It has previously been noted that absolute validi- 
ty cannot be established, nor can absolute construct validity, it can 
only be inferred (Peter, 1981). Again, to quote Nunnally (1967, p. 98): 
"Strictly speaking, science can never'-be sure that a 
construct has been measured or that a theory regarding 
that construct has been tested, even though it may be 
useful to speak as though such were the case. ... as far 
as science takes us, -there are only (1) words denoting 
constructs, (2) sets of variables specified for such 
constructs, (3) evidence concerning internal structures 
of such sets, (4) words concerning relations among con- 
structs (theories), (5) which suggest cross-structures 
among different sets of observables, (6) evidence regard- 
ing such cross-structures, and (7) beyond that, nothing. " 
Hence, - as Cronbach observes, a single study does not establish 
construct validity (Peter, 1981 ). 
5.1.3 TRAIT VALIDITY 
Nunnally _(1967, p. 
101) comments that the explication of con- 
structs-mainly consists of determining: 
1. The internal statistical structure of a set of varia- 
bles said to measure a construct. 
. 2. The statistical cross-structure between different 
measures of one construct and those of other con- 
structs. 
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The, second of these processes is essentially the-process of 
theory testing, or establishing nomological validity. The first item 
refers to establishing trait validity. 
In assessing trait validity we are principally interested in the 
way single indicators of a construct vary across cases within a sam- 
ple. The statistical structure of interest is therefore the variance 
structure of the indicators. Rummel (1970) identified the components 
contributing to the total variance of one variable within a set. These 
variance components are illustrated on the figure 5.2: 
Figure 5.2: Components of XD's Variänce 
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The common variance, or communality of the variable Xj, is the 
variance the variable shares with other variables of the set, whereas 
the uniqueness is the variance not shared with other variables of the 
set. The specificity of the variable is that portion of its uniqueness 
that is repeatable, whereas the random error is that portion of the 
uniqueness that is unrepeatable, in the sense that repeated measures 
would yield different values. The tendency towards consistency found 
in repeated measures of the same variable or phenomenon is referred to 
as reliability (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). The degree of communality 
shared by a set of variables purporting to measure the same phenomenon 
is taken'to be indicative of the validity with which the set measures 
a hypothetical common concept. In truth, as stated previously, all 
that can be said is that the variables appear to be measuring some- 
thing similar. Whether or not this is the hypothesised concept can 
only be inferred. 
With reference to figure 5.1 each of the components identified 
as contributing to trait'validity will now be'discussed. These are the 
I Random 
Specific Error 
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factorial composition, internal consistency, - discriminant and conver- 
gent validities. 
5.1.3.1 Factorial Composition* 
A statistical technique specifically designed to partition- the 
variances of several variables into common and unique - components. is 
factor analysis (Kim and Mueller, 1978a). Nunnally (1978) suggests 
that factor analysis can play an important, part in assessing predic- 
tive (criterion-related), content and construct validities. With 
respect to construct validity factor analysis provides'useful informa- 
tion regarding the dimensions of the construct as revealed by-the 
indicators chosen; this is an aspect of trait validity (Peter, 1981). 
For example, the Uncertainty concept defined in chapter 4 is, at the 
first level of abstraction, hypothesised to contain four dimensions, 
which were identified as Scope, Novelty, Urgency and Complexity. If a 
factor analysis of all the indicators of the uncertainty, construct 
yields four dimensions that can be identified with these concepts, 
then this is supportive evidence of construct validity in general and 
trait validity in particular. 
5.1.3.2 Reliability 
The second item listed in figure. 5.1 as contributing to trait 
validity is internal consistency. Internal consistency is in its turn 
sub-divided into unidimensionality and reliability. Unidimensionality 
is the extent to which the indicators being considered reflect one 
underlying construct, and an appropriate technique for demonstrating 
unidimensionality is factor analysis (Vankatraman and Grant, 1986). 
The approach here though, in comparison to establishing factorial 
composition discussed previously, is that the researcher's principal 
interest is only in the first, unrotated, factor extracted by the 
analysis. In establishing factorial composition the researcher is 
primarily interested in a more complete description of the factor 
structure. This distinction between factorial composition and unidi- 
* The term Factorial Composition is Nunnally's (1967) preferred term 
for what some authors refer to as Factorial validity. 
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mensionality has been made by the author drawing upon diverse source 
material. - 
The second issue relating to internal consistency is reliabili- 
ty. This has been mentioned previously and relates to the tendency for 
multiple measures of the same construct to be consistent and as such 
is inversely-related to the degree of random error encountered when 
measuring a phenomenon (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Assuming that the 
indicators of a construct are valid (i. e., measure a given construct) 
then reliability assumes major importance as it relates to the accura- 
cy with which a set off indicators measures a construct.: -. This in tern 
influences the confidence with which observed correlations between 
indicators of different constructs can be said to correspond to rela- 
tionships between the constructs. By way of illustration, consider two 
concepts X and Y and their, in this instance, single indicators x and 
y. We further assume that X is causing Y, and that x is influenced 
only by X and y by Y. A simplified path diagram for this situation is 
represented in figure 5.3 below:. " 
Figure 5.3: Two-Concept, Two-Indicator Model 
Concepts: 
H 
ºY 
ICL ß1 Indicators: 10. y rXy 
If all of the variables are standardised (i. e. have unit vari- 
ance and a mean of zero) then H, the structural parameter linking X 
and Y is given by: 
H= rXy/a. ß 
Where rxy is the correlation coefficient between the indicators 
x and y, and a and ß are so called epistemic correlations. This equa- 
tion expresses H, the parameter of interest, in terms of one known, 
rxy, and two unknown quantities, a and P. It follows therefore, that 
little can be stated about the relationship between the constructs X 
and Y unless a and ß are known. In actual fact, the epistemic correla- 
tions are the square roots of the reliability coefficients of each 
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indicator. Therefore, in order to make' inferencesýaböut relationships 
between hypothetical constructs, *the indicators of these constructs 
must be known to be valid and reliable. The reader is referred to 
Sullivan and Feldman (1979) for a fuller and more rigorous treatment 
of these concepts. 
5.1.3.3 Discriminant Validity 
The third component of trait validity identified in figure 5: 1 
is discriminant validity. Discriminant validity refers to the extent 
to which a, concept differs from other concepts (Venkatraman and Grant, 
1986). 
5.1.3.4 Convergent Validity 
The final component to be discussed here as an assessment of 
trait validity is that of Convergent Validity. This concept owes its 
origin to Campbell and Fisk's Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. The idea 
underpinning convergent validity is based on a specific view of valid- 
ity, namely that validity is represented in the agreement between two 
attempts to measure the same trait through maximally different meth- 
ods. Achieving "maximally different" methods in practice is fraught 
with problems, although a common approach is to ask equally knowledge- 
able respondents to complete the same questionnaire (Phillips, 1981) 
or administer one questionnaire by interview and another by paper and 
pencil (Baroudi and Orlikowski, 1989). In either instance such tech- 
niques require a considerable increase in the cooperation from an 
organisation and the work load on the researcher. (For a full discus- 
sion of, and critique of, the Multitrait-Multimethod procedure, the 
reader is referred to Sullivan and Feldman, 1979). 
5.1.4 PRIORITISING VALIDITY 
To end this discussion of the validity issue it should be noted 
that methods for increasing one kind of validity will probably de- 
crease another kind. For example, rigid control of stimuli impinging 
on respondents will increase statistical conclusion validity, but 
probably decrease external and construct validity. Multi-item measures 
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increase construct validity, but the tedium of answering them can 
decrease reliability. Many such tradeoffs are inevitable in the design 
of a single study. Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 83) comment: 
"... we think it unrealistic to expect a single piece of 
research will effectively answer all of the validity 
questions surrounding even the simplest causal relation- 
ship. " 
If Cook and Campbell's view is accepted it becomes necessary to 
explicitly state the priority ordering of the' various validity types 
in a piece of research. The purpose of this research is substantive 
theory validation. In particular, specific causal hypotheses are to be 
tested and therefore high internal validity is required. Next in 
importance to this study is construct validity. This is because con- 
struct validity' relates to the accuracy with which theoretical con- 
structs are measured, hence the inferences that may be drawn about the 
hypothesised theoretical associations. Third' in importance is statis- 
tical conclusion validity and finally, external validity. This priori- 
ty ordering is the 'one proposed by Cook' and Campbell (1979) for re- 
search aimed at theory testing. 
Issues of internal validity will be addressed during the remain- 
der of this chapter. Construct validity, principally in the guise of 
trait validity, will be assessed in chapter 6. 'Statistical conclusion 
validity will be addressed in chapter 7 and external validity in 
chapter 8. We now turn to instrument design. 
5.2 INSTRUMENT DESIGN 
The instrumental requirement of this section is to take the 
theoretical concepts identified in chapter 4 and turn them into meas- 
urable constructs. The above discussion on reliability suggested that 
single-item scales are limited in that they cannot adequately and 
accurately capture the broader concept being measured. Single item 
scales can be considered acceptable when they relate to a simple 
unidimensional construct and are measured with minimal measurement 
error. These assumptions cannot generally be defended (Vankatraman and 
Grant, 1986) hence multi-item scales are a better alternative to 
reduce the level of measurement error and to capture the breadth of a 
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concept. We will not, therefore, attempt to-reify'our'-concepts by 
single item scales, or necessarily by two or three scales. " But-what 
scale metrics to use? We address this question next. 
5.2.1 A SCALE METRIC 
Section 5.1 identified a number of criteria to be met by the 
research instrument. It should be' a- questionnaire, highly structured 
and amenable to numerical analysis. Furthermore the techniques to be 
applied in examining the results have been identified as multivariate 
regression (the 'basis of Path analysis) and Factor analysis for as- 
sessing trait validity. These techniques require interval level data. 
However, many types of data of interest to the Social Sciences are. not 
amenable to measurement at the interval level 'and recourse to-ordinal 
level data has to be made. The extent to which ordinal level data can 
be substituted for interval level'data'has been a source of major 
controversy. Asher (1983, p. 27) discusses this controversy with respect 
to path analysis techniques and concludes that the interval level 
requirement of the' technique "does not appear to be a troublesome 
one". Kim and Mueller (1978, p. 74) discuss the question with respect to 
factor analysis and arrive at a similar conclusion. They note that 
"... correlation coefficients are fairly robust with respect to ordinal 
distortions in the measurement". ' Another important conclusion of Kim 
and Mueller's discussion is that it is inappropriate to substitute 
ordinal measures of 'association (Kendall's tau,. Goodman and»Kruskal's 
gamma) for the interval measure, Pearson's r, even when Pearson's r is 
calculated using ordinal data. 
Having determined that'the proposed analytical techniques may be 
used with ordinal level data, the next question 'is how many divisions 
should be used on the ordinal-'scale? Asher (1983) notes that the 
greater the number of categories in the ordinal variable, the less 
critical is the interval requirement. ' Kim and Mueller (1978) note that 
"variables must contain at least four different values, ". A further 
set of constraints comes from the psychological literature which shows 
that an individual cannot simultaneously compare more than seven 
objects (plus or minus two) without being confused (Saaty, 1983). 
Taken together these constraints suggest that an ordinal scale with 
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between four and nine categories would be satisfactory. However, this 
represents an extreme range and five to seven categories is probably 
safer. It is not difficult to identify studies in the literature using 
ordinal scales within the above range. Hickson et., al. (1986) used 
five point scales in their study into strategic - decision making, - as 
did-a study reported. in Carmines and Zeller (1979, p. 64). Both studies 
employed factor analysis. Hence, where- the research instrument re- 
quired ordinal scales, -five point scales were used. 
In the interest of giving the questionnaire a unified appear- 
ance, hence minimising a threat to internal validity through respond- 
ent confusion, five point ordinal scales were used throughout; unless 
unavoidable. This rule was obeyed even if measures from-other studies 
were being incorporated in the questionnaire which had been validated 
using different ordinal scales. However, where possible, nominal 
scales were chosen in preference to the ordinal scale, as suggested in 
Asher's (1983) review of the nominal/ordinal debate. 
5.2.2 DESIGN PARAMETERS 
5.2.2.1 Units of Analysis 
It is likely that the construction of a research instrument will 
be facilitated and internal validity enhanced (at the expense of 
external validity) if the study is restricted to a smaller sub-set of 
strategic decisions than the universe of such decisions so far consid- 
ered. In chapter 3 it was demonstrated that a parsimonious. classifica- 
tion of strategic decisions could be produced by analogy with the 
types of organisational change produced by the decision. In chapter 2 
the project was identified as the basic unit of analysis for the study 
of implementation. This, together with the taxonomy of strategic 
decisions developed in chapter 3, enabled projects also to be classi- 
fied according to a three term framework, as capital, revenue or 
social projects. It was further shown that the capital project was 
generally seen as being the most strategic for the organisation. For 
this reason the research instrument will be developed specifically 
with capital projects in mind. Any perceived extensibility of the 
framework to other project types will therefore be unintentional. 
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`Although the primary research interest is the capital project, 
it will be necessary to obtain some data about the organisations in 
which the project took place. This is dictated principally by the 
Information Experience concepts Range and Flexibility outlined in 
chapter 4 but such information will also be valuable when comparing 
samples of organisations and for categorisation. This requirement dic- 
tates two units of analysis, the first and most important is the 
"capital project", the second is the "organisation". 
5.2.2.2 Logical Model 
A model of the logical stages that a capital project could pass 
through is illustrated in figure 5.4 below: 
Figure 5.4: Capital Project Stage Model 
Pre- 
Approval 
Post-Approva 
Install- Commiss- Opera- 
ation , oning tion ýi 
Goal Approval Task 
recognition definition 
p Time 
This model is derived from the conceptual model of implementa- 
tion developed in chapter 2, starting with Goal Recognition and ending 
with Task Definition, or integration. Between these extremes there is 
a requirement for formal approval to be given f or the expenditure of 
capital monies. In the case study (reported in chapter 4) this fol- 
lowed the submission of a formal Capital Application document, speci- 
fying the case for the project to the divisional head office. In some, 
probably smaller, firms there may not be a need for a formal approval 
procedure. This point corresponds to the final stage in the strategic 
decision model developed by Mintzberg et. al. (1976). 
Approval logically separates the model into two parts. That 
preceding approval represents a planning, design period for the 
project during which time support for the project is developed infor- 
mation is collected, analysed etc. and generally a case for the capi- 
tal expenditure made. In many instances this stage will be a simple 
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extension of the strategic process that initiated the change in objec- 
tive-that generated the project's goal. 
Following approval (labelled Post-Approval) there are potential- 
ly three stages. The precise number will depend upon the project being 
implemented. An acquisition will logically not contain an installa- 
tion, ' or commissioning stage. A project to acquire and install a new 
item of capital equipment will logically include an installation (or 
building) phase in which the'equipment or plant is ordered and erect- 
ed/installed. Following this is a commissioning phase during which the 
equipment, plant etc. is handed over from its makers to its- users. 
Makers` includes those=who designed it and users includes those who 
will maintain it. The meaning of the word commissioning can vary from 
industry to industry and its meaning can differ between people working 
on the same project (Raine et. a1., 1981). Here we will take it to be 
the technical proving time for the project, involving precommissioning 
(unit testing, no-load trials and cleanness checks) start-up (testing 
and loading systems to their design capacity) and trials (safety, 
output and efficiency checks). The start of the final operational 
phase will probably be co-incident with the start-up stage of commis- 
sioning, hence the demarcation line between the two will be blurred 
(as indeed it is between installation and precommissioning). The 
principal difference between the commissioning and operational stages 
is along the Socio-Technical dimension identified in chapter 4. Com- 
missioning is a technical activity or process; the operational stage 
is seen as principally a social or managerial process of assimilating 
the new tasks etc. into the organisation. The end point for this stage 
is also, therefore, rather arbitrary. 
Nothing can be inferred from the stage model illustrated in 
figure 5.4 about the relative importance or duration of each stage. It 
does, however, represent a more or less logical progression of activi- 
ties through time, moving as indicated in the figure. A research 
instrument broadly structured around this model is more likely to be 
familiar to potential respondents than one structured around say, the 
theoretical constructs. This structure could therefore assist the 
respondents' recollections of the project and thereby increase the 
study's internal validity. Ginzberg's (1978) description of the Lewin- 
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Schein change model suggests similarities between this project stage 
model and the precepts of the change model (section 4.3.5.2). Specifi- 
cally, Unfreezing is associated with the preapproval stage; Moving, 
the "action" stage, with installation and commissioning and Refreezing 
with operation. 
5.2.2.3 Sample Frame 
The total time between goal recognition and the end of commis- 
sioning in figure 5.3 above could be quite long (at least a year) and 
will probably show considerable variation. The use of "procedural 
change" as a measure of success in the study requires that the 
projects investigated should have been in operation for sufficient 
time for the organisation - to have at least 
identified procedural 
changes.. This time period could be arbitrarily set at six months. 
In order to capture the full range of data required in the study, 
respondents will have to be able to recollect events nominally span- 
ning an eighteen month period. This consideration has two consequences 
for the study. First, can respondents be reasonably expected to recol- 
lect information at least eighteen months old? Second, can the sample 
frame be chosen to minimise the time between completion of the project 
and the research taking place? 
The first question above was relevant to the case study reported 
in chapter 4. A case methodology based on unstructured interviews with 
several respondents was used to collect this data. The project to 
which the case relates was initiated by a customer inquiry some 5 
years before the interviews took place. Analysis of transcripts of the 
four interview tapes did not indicate any significant difficulty on 
the part of the respondents in recollecting events this far in the 
past. Although the respondents were shown to emphasis different as- 
pects of the project (most noticeably showing up the Managerial vs. 
Technical perspectives) on matters of fact there were no noticeable 
variations. It is concluded, therefore, that respondents are quite 
likely to be able to remember facts about important strategic deci- 
sions several years after the event. The same conclusion is reached by 
looking at the study into strategic decision-making reported by Hick- 
son et. al. (1986). This major study of 150 strategic decisions in 30 
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organisations used, - in the main, retrospective interviews. However, 
the early (1974) stage of this research involved intensive case analy- 
sis of six decisions, three of which were tracked over a two to three 
year period as they happened. The final stage of the research (1978- 
1980) included retrospective interviews with informants about these 
same six decisions. Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 25)'comment: 
"The hindsight story that is forthcoming in interview is 
the same in main events and characters, just less clut- 
tered with detail. The main pathways of the process are 
recalled and less attention is given to what became 
byways and dead ends". 
This passage'suggests that retrospective interviews with'inform- 
ants giving information "about what had happened and not about them- 
selves or their opinions... minimally biased by personal perspective" 
(p. 24) concerning events several years in the past, will be reliably 
recalled. 
Accepting the above conclusion that retrospective factual infor- 
mation can be reliably recorded, it appears reasonable to presume that 
the reliability of the data will be further improved if relatively 
recent decisions are studied. The analysis presented in chapter 3 
demonstrated that the chosen unit of analysis (capital projects) were 
undertaken in all three organisational types identified within the 
study of Hickson et. al. (1986). (Strictly this holds for the Balance 
Sheet risk category which the capital project classification derives 
from. ) However, it was also noted that capital projects were most 
common (at least twice as frequent) within manufacturing type organi- 
sations. Therefore, the study used a sample frame based on manufactur- 
ing organisations. The precise specification of the sample frame will 
be deferred until section 5.3. 
5.2.3 CAUSALITY CONSIDERATIONS 
The question of establishing causality between a set of varia- 
bles or concepts is a subject of discussion and inquiry dating back to 
the early Greeks, Plato and Aristotle (Green and Tull, 1975). It is 
also one of Nunnally's (1967) "deepest innards" issues mentioned in 
section 5.1.1 above. More recently the question has been addressed by 
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Simon (1957) particularly with respect to causal modelling, of which 
path analysis is one technique (see chapter 7). 
In Simon's conceptualisation independent variables are viewed as 
"causing" dependent variables. The system of hypotheses developed in 
chapter 4 views dimensions of implementation Success as_the dependent 
variables, with Uncertainty and Information causing these. Information 
Process is. in its turn viewed as being caused by Uncertainty and 
Information Experience., In establishing causal inferences, Green and 
Tull (1970, p. 76) note that three kinds of evidence can be used, no one 
type of which "nor, indeed, all three types combined, can ever demon- 
strate conclusively that a causal relationship exists". Green and 
Tull's three types of evidence are: (1). associative variation, (2) 
sequence of events and (3) absence of other possible causal factors. 
The first item is essentially demonstrating that a significant associ- 
ation exists between events. This is the aim of chapter 7. The third 
item is the question of internal validity noted previously. The second 
item is typically construed as meaning that the causal event precedes 
the caused event in. time.. Questions relating to the precedence of the 
causal association between Uncertainty and Information will be ad- 
dressed in chapter 8. Here, however, we note that the precedence 
between Uncertainty and Information with Success will be more readily 
established if the Uncertainty and Information measures relate pri- 
marily to the pre-approval stage in model 5.4 and the Success measures 
do not. A further design constraint on the research instrument is 
therefore, to aim to separate the Uncertainty/Information indicators 
from the Success indicators around the time of project approval. 
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5.2.4 QUESTION CONSTRUCTION 
15.2.4.1 Questionnaire Architecture 
The discussion above his identified a number of design con- 
straints for the research instrument. These are summarised as: 
1. The instrument be highly structured. 
2. Use'five point ordinal scales if 'nominal scales are not 
available. 
3. Two units of analysis, the "organisation" and the 
"capital project 
4'. Base sample frame on'manufacturing organisations. 
5. Structure the instrument using the model of figure 5.4. 
6. Aim to ensure that Uncertainty and Information indica- 
tors are temporally precedent to Success indicators. 
To these are added: 
7. Use validated measures where possible. 
8. Jumble up different measures of the same concept. 
Constraints 7 and 8 are added to-improve the validity and reli- 
ability of the instrument. 
A copy öf the research instrument is attached as Annex A. So as 
to conform with requirements for the binding of theses, the instrument 
. in annex A is formatted differently Co the instrument used to carry 
out the study. In addition question 13 in section 1 and question 6 in 
section 2b are presented to emphasis their theoretical construction 
and not as they were presented in the actual research instrument. 
The instrument started with a page of instructions for the 
respondent. These instructions were based mainly on Khandwalla 
(1977, p. 66&) and served to introduce the study, its broad aims, iden- 
tify the type of respondent required, define some of the terminology 
used in the instrument and reassure the respondent with respect to the 
type of information being sought, the type of responses required and 
the confidentiality of the information supplied. 
Page 132 
, The remainder of the instrument was structured into two sections 
corresponding to the two units of analysis identified above. Section 1 
related to the firm and its environment. Section 2 related, to the 
particular capital investment project selected by the respondent and 
was subdivided into sub-sections reflecting the project stages model 
of figure 5.4 above. The first of these sections collected general 
information about the project. The next sub-section, labelled 2a, 
related to the early pre-approval phase while section 2b related to 
the post-approval phase of the project. The final sub-section, 2c, was 
orientated towards the project's late operational phase. ., 
The broad correspondence between the theoretical constructs and 
instrument architecture was as follows. Section 1 contained questions 
aimed at categorising the organisation and respondent, plus questions 
about the Information Experience constructs of Range and Flexibility. 
Section 2 contained questions to categorise the project, plus informa- 
tion about the Uncertainty and Information constructs. Section 2a 
contained most of the questions defining the Uncertainty and Informa- 
tion Activity constructs and section 2b contained questions defining 
the Success and Information Lubrication constructs. Finally section 2c. 
contained further questions defining Success. This correspondence was, 
as stated above, broad and questions relating to constructs other than 
those outlined above were included for a variety of, logistical rea- 
sons, the most important of these being the desire to keep the method 
of answering questions similar. For example, questions answered using 
a centre zero scale (principally those measuring change) were grouped 
together, multiple part questions were separated from single part 
questions, etc. 
5.2.4.2 Question Sources 
Here we aim to identify the principal sources used to construct 
the research instrument. The section will be structured around the 
theoretical constructs, not the architecture noted above. Specific 
questions are referenced as (Section. Question number>. So, for exam- 
ple, question 2a. 15 refers to question number 15 in section 2a. The 
detailed operationalisation of the theoretical constructs is covered 
in chapter 6. 
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5.2.4.2.1 Categorical Questions 
A number of questions were included in the research instrument 
for purposes of categorisation and comparison. Several of these served 
a dual function as they were also of use in reifying the theoretical 
constructs. 
The dimensions used for categorisation were: respondent status, 
organisational size, ownership, industry sector, product diversity and 
performance. Respondent status was determined from job title (question 
1.1) and post-coded into status and functional responsibility dimen- 
sions. Organisational size was measured using annual turnover (ques- 
tion 1.15) and number of employees (question 1.14). Ownership was 
categorised in terms of nationality (question 1.2) independence 
(question 1.3a and 1.3b) and share holding of the C. E. O. (question 
1.10a and 1.10b). Industrial sector (question 1.4) was categorised 
using the common industrial economics categories for manufacturing 
industries (Hitt and Ireland, 1985). Product diversity (question 1.5) 
was based on the major strategic categories identified by Rumelt 
(Glueck and Jauch, 1984, p. 238). However, two of Rumelt's categories, 
Related and Un-related businesses, were deemed to be too fine for the 
purpose' of this study and were combined into a single Multi-Business 
category. Finally, performance (question 1.16) was measured relative 
to major competitors using growth in profit, sales volume, market 
share and return on investment criteria (Hooley and Jobber, 1986). 
5.2.4.2.2 Uncertainty Questions 
The principle underlying the Uncertainty concept was that of 
variety injection into the organisation. Secondary Uncertainty con- 
cepts (principally identified from the study by Raine et. al., 1981) 
were Scope, Novelty, Urgency and Complexity (figure 4.4). The first of 
these concepts was sub-divided into Size, Skill Use and Strategicali- 
ty. Size was simply measured by project cost (question 2a. 1). The 
rationale for this comes from Ouchi, who noted that the market price 
for an item subsumed the item's information content; provided the 
market was efficient (cited by Macintosh, 1985, p. 176). The information 
content of a project is the project's Uncertainty, viewed from the 
perspective of the organisation. A further consideration with respect 
to size comes from the comment by Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 27) that 
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what constitutes a strategic- decision - "is a relative' judgment, rela- 
tive to the organisation * in which the decision is being made" which 
suggests that size' should be measured relative to' the' organisation. 
For this reason the' turnover at the time of project `authorisation 
(question 2a. 2)-and the organisation's annual capital budget (question 
1.11a) was also recorded. Skill Use was measured using a single item 
(question 2b. 14). Strategicality measured the importance-of the 
project. One indicator was Consequentiality, a term taken from Hickson 
et. al. (1986), and operationalised in terms of their concepts of 
Diffusion' (question 2.4) Endurance' (question 2a. 11) Seriousness 
(question 2b. 36) and Radicality (question 2c. 1). Further indicators of 
Strategicality were: the proportion of capital projects normally 
accepted by the organisation-(question 1.9) the use of post-completion 
audit techniques (question 2.8) relative to the normal use of such 
techniques (question 1.8) and the number of goals set `for the project 
(question 2.6). Categories used to construct question 2.6 were largely 
derived from Hickson et. al. 's (1986) Diffusion 'measure (question 
2.4).. ' 
Novelty was operationalised using a number of objective single 
item scales. Siting (question 2.2) was partially designed using cate- 
gories identified during the case study investigation noted in chapter 
4. 'Product novelty-(question 2a. 15) categories were based on Andrews, 
D. (1971). Market novelty (question 2a. 14) was constructed along 
market and customer dimensions and based principally on question 1.6. 
Novelty of Innovation (question 2a. 16) was designed using a number of 
sources including Raine et. - al. (1981)-and face validity arguments. 
Finally Technological novelty measures were based on Khandwalla's 
(1977) operationalisation of Woodward's'(1965) operating technology 
concept (Khandwalla's scales were identified by Miller and Dröge 
(1986) as the best available). A uni-dimensional measure of operating 
technology was preferred in this study over multi-dimensional measures 
(e. g., Perrow, 1967) because Technological novelty was defined as the 
difference between two technology levels, one for the project (ques- 
tion 2a. 29b) the other for the department (question 2a. 29c) or organi- 
sation (question 2a. 29a) and subtraction is more clearly defined where 
uni-dimensional measures are employed. A feature of the Novelty con- 
struct worth mentioning here, is that each item is orthogonal to the 
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others, ' i. e., independent. For example, high Product novelty does not 
necessarily- imply high Market novelty, i. e., a novel product could be 
targeted at an existing market, and-vice versa. In the language of 
measurement theory, the indicators of Novelty are theoretically not 
parallel. This point will be returned to in chapter 6. 
The majority - of the Urgency indicators were derived from face 
validity arguments and analysis of the case study reported in chapter 
4. These included Priority (questions 2a. 5,2a. 6,2a. 9 and 2b. 7) 
Pressure (questions 2a. 7,2a. 8 and 2a. 10) and Financial Attractiveness 
(questions 2a. 18 and 2a. 25) indicators. The Window concept (question 
2a. 12) was suggested by the strategic marketing literature (Abell, 
1978). The Simultaneity (question 2b. 8) and Survival (question 2a. 13) 
indicators came respectively from the "Strategic Problem Size" and 
"Implementation Horizon" concepts of Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984). 
Finally, Complexity was constructed from perceptual measures of 
Complexity and Risk, both measured along Technical and Organisational 
dimensions. Risk (question 2a. 26a) included Financial risk and Com- 
plexity (question 2a. 27) included a measure of the diversity of design 
options available to the organisation '(question 2a. 3). 
5.2.4.2.3 Information Questions 
The principle underlying the Information concept was that of 
variety reduction or absorption by the organisation. Secondary Infor- 
mation concepts were constructed in chapter 4 using Experience - 
Process (past-present) and Social - Technical dichotomies. The con- 
cepts so identified were procedural Flexibility, Range, behavioural 
Lubrication and information Activity. An appropriate measure of Flexi- 
bility for this study was identified from Burns and Stalker's (1961) 
classification of organisations as exhibiting Mechanistic or Organic 
forms. An 11 item measure (question 1.13) was developed using Khand- 
walla's (1977) 7 item Flexibility scale and the 9 items identified by 
Zaltman et. al. (1973) in their discussion of Burns and Stalker's 
concepts. The actual study instrument had a number of scale items 
reflected. 
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A number of tertiary concepts identified in chapter 4 as con- 
tributing to procedural Range were; Familiarity, Delegation, Ability 
and Size. The idea underpinning these concepts was, what experience 
had the organisation of similar projects and what changes had the 
organisation undergone in the past that could assist the current 
project's implementation. These concepts were viewed as attributes of 
the organisation and so would have to be operationalised in an organi- 
sational context. Indicators of these concepts were developed primari- 
ly through face validity arguments, although Hickson et. al. (1986) and 
Ansoff (1984) suggested some. Size (question 1.14) was interpreted as 
number of employees. If employees are viewed as information processing 
units (a perspective, based on the idea that organisations process 
information, Galbraith, 1969; Feldman and March, 1981) then the great- 
er the number of employees in an organisation, the greater its innate 
information processing capacity. Perceived Ability (question 2c. 5) was 
constructed along high and low technical and organisational dimen- 
sions, yielding a4 item measure. Delegation (question 2b. 23) was used 
to measure the extent of external (to the organisation) expertise used 
for each stage of the project, yielding a4 item measure. Finally, 
Familiarity was constructed on, a number, of sub-dimensions measuring 
the organisation's "innovativeness". These were; existence and use of 
standardised capital project evaluation procedures (questions 1.7 and 
1.8) proportion of capital and revenue expenditures directed towards 
innovation (question 1.11 parts a, b and c) frequency of similar types 
of project encountered in the past (question 2.1) diversity of product 
base (question 1.6) and, approach to new product development (question 
1.5). Question 1.5 was based on the Miles and Snow strategic groups 
(Wheelen and Hunger, 1987: 96) as Defenders, Reactors /Analysers com- 
bined and Prospectors. A final indicator of Familiarity was Environ- 
mental Uncertainty (question 1.12). This related to the rapidity and 
intensity of change in the organisation's industry and was measured 
using the validated instrument recorded by Miller and Dröge (1986). 
The basis for constructing the Behavioural Lubrication variable 
was the Lewin - Schein Change Model. This model was operationalised by 
Sorensen and Zand (1975) for the case of software implementation 
projects, using a 60 item questionnaire. These 60 items were divided 
into six groups obtained by dichotomising as Favourable - Unfavourable 
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each of the three precepts of the Lewin - Schein model; Unfreezing, 
Moving and Refreezing. In another report of their work (Zand and 
Sorensen, 1975) they noted the test-retest reliabilities of each of 
the six groupings, or "forces", as being in the range 0.69 to 0.97 and 
commented that, "the forces do not seem limited to management science 
projects". In addition they presented a parsimonious listing of their 
instrument containing 39 items. By changing references in these-items 
from Management scientist to Engineer and deleting one of two near 
identical items from the list, a 38 item question was constructed to 
measure Behavioural Lubrication (question 2b. 6). In the actual re- 
search instrument, items in question 2b. 6 were grouped together ac- 
cording to managerial responsibility, i. e., items referring to Top 
managers were grouped together, as were items referring to Unit manag- 
ers, etc. 
The fourth and final secondary component of Information is 
Activity. Several indicators of this concept were derived from face 
validity arguments, e. g. Contingencies (question 2a. 26b) and Design 
Resources (question 2a. 31). A further multi-item indicator of Design 
Resources (question 2.7) was based on the decision-topic categories 
used by Hickson et. al. (1986). This question also served to catego- 
rise individual projects. The remaining sub-dimensions of Activity 
were derived from Rubin and Sapp (1981) as Analysis, Communication, 
Search and Information technology. Analysis was viewed as measuring 
the use of formalised capital evaluation procedures. Drucker (1988) 
summarised the principal aims of such procedures (question 2a. 24) and 
Ho (1988) was used as a source for items'specifically relating to 
capital project risk assessment (questions 2a. 19 and 2a. 20). Many of 
the Communication indicators were suggested by the study of Hickson 
et. al. (1986). These included a project politicality indicator 
(question 2a. 4) and indicators of the extent of formal and informal 
meetings-(question 2a. 21 to 2a. 23). Information Search indicators were 
questions 2a. 30,2a. 32,2a. 33 and 2a. 35. Questions 2a. 32 and 2a. 33 
were multi-item "interest unit" measures derived from Hickson et. al. 
and, for question 2a. 32, the "Role Specialisation" measure developed 
by Pugh et. al. (1968). Question 2a. 35 was based on a number of 
sources, including Mintzberg's (1973) study of managerial activities. 
Information Technology (I. T. ) was viewed as being of potential use 
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when performing Analysis, Communication and Search activities, there- 
fore indicators were designed for each of these dimension. Question 
2a. 36 looked at the value of written 'documentation, question 2a. 34 
(based on the previously noted Mintzberg study) was used to measure 
I. T. use in Communication and question 2a. 39 (based on Freyenfeld, 
1984) was designed to capture' the I. T. component in information 
Search. Questions 2a. 37 and 2a. 38 were included'to capture the global 
aspect of I. T. use. 
Afinal note with respect to the Activity concept relates to the 
problem of differentiating between Information and Data. McRae (1971) 
notes that data and information are "joint products", as both are 
normally produced simultaneously and the two words frequently used 
interchangeably. However, data are individual facts and information 
(in the Computer Science sense, Woodhouse et. al., 1982; Tsichritzis 
and-Lochovsky, 1982) is meaning attached to data. Information is 
defined in this study as' that which reduces variety, a perspective 
which for practical purposes'was taken to be the same as the Computer 
Science definition. In formulating questions relating to the collec- 
tion or'use of information, it was therefore necessary to clearly 
differentiate the value of information'collected from the quantity of 
data collected. This differentiation was achieved in the research 
instrument by appending a definition of information value to question 
2a. 32. 
5.2.4.2.4 Success Questions 
Questions relating to theoretical constructs were based upon the 
tertiary 'concepts identified in chapter 4. The Success concepts were 
summarised in table 4.6. 
The dimensions of Success/Expectation identified in chapter 4 
were Ease, Accuracy and Satisfaction. The principle underlying the 
Ease concept was lack of problems. Implementation problems were iden- 
tified using a multi-part question (question 2b. 20) developed from 
Alexander (1985) and Raine et. al. (1981). In addition, the perceived 
overall extent of problems was measured along technical and non-tech- 
nical dimensions, together with the overall ease of implementation 
(questions 2b. 28,31,33 and 34). To assist with the interpretation of 
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the data, question 2b. 21 was included to encourage respondents to 
provide anecdotal accounts of how problems identified in question 
2b. 20 were resolved. The next concept, Accuracy, refers to the 
achievement, of targeted specifications. Questions 2b. 2,2b. 3,2b. 30 
and 2b. 32 used centre zero scales for this purpose. The basic dimen- 
sions used to construct, these questions came. from the "implementation 
success index" developed by Alexander (1985) with the addition of 
adequacy of contingency allowances (question 2b. 2). The third and 
final Success/Expectation concept was Satisfaction. This concept was 
operationalised by questions 2b. 9 to 2b. 13 (based on the behaviourally 
anchored success measures used by Sorensen and, Zand (1975) in their 
study of implementing OR/MS projects) and questions 2c. 3 and 2c. 4 
measuring the willingness of the organisation to repeat the project. 
Success/Change dimensions identified in chapter 4 were Culture, 
Competency, Skills and Applicability. Cultural change. was measured 
along structural and behavioural dimensions. The structural change 
indicators (question 2b. 5) were taken as changes to the Organicity of 
the organisation and were operationalised from question 1.13. Beha- 
vioural change indicators (question 2b. 4) were taken from Mirvis and 
Macy (1983, p. 520). Two Competency indicators were used, 
_ 
one relating 
to the time taken to carry out projects (question 2b. 29) the other was 
multi-part and, investigated the competency of the organisation along 
technical and organisational dimensions (question 2c. 6). Culture. and 
Competency measures used scales centred on "no change". Skills related 
to changes in the organisation's operating procedures and was measured 
using two global single measure items (questions 2b. 35 and 2c. 1) and a 
multi-item measure (question 2b. 15) investigating the effects of the 
project on specific functional areas of the organisation. This ques- 
tion was adapted from the "Role Specialisation" measure developed by 
Pugh et. al. (1968) and Hickson, et. al. (1986). Finally, questions 
measuring Applicability and diffusion throughout the organisation of 
procedural changes introduced by the project (questions 2a. 28,2b. 19, 
2b. 24 to 2b. 27 and 2c. 2) were developed using face validity arguments. 
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5.2.4.2.5 Miscellaneous 
A number of questions were contained in the research instrument 
which may be best placed under the heading of, miscellaneous. These 
questions were included for a variety of reasons, such as, general 
interest, testing ideas contained in the thesis not necessarily con- 
forming to the theoretical model developed in chapter 4 and increasing 
respondent co-operation. To assist with possible follow up work, the 
title of the particular capital projects was also asked for. 
The idea developed in chapter 3 that projects are components of 
(possibly larger) programmes was investigated with question 2.3. The 
stimulus that initially generated the project was investigated with 
question 2.5. This question was based on a modified version of Por- 
ter's (1980) five force model (Wheelen and Hunger, 1987: 94) and Hick- 
son et. al. 's (1986) Diffusion concept. Hickson et. al. 's Authority 
measure (question 2a. 17) was included as an indicator of decision- 
process. One of the major theses of this study, underlying the argu- 
ment that procedural Change is a dimension of Success, is that the 
Getaway Capacity of an innovation (as defined by Zaltman et. al., 
1973) may be overt and/or covert. Here, strategic projects are viewed 
as innovations and the word covert is used in the sense that the 
Gateway Capacity was unintentional and indeed may remain unrecognised 
by the innovating organisation. While the Success/Changes concept is 
designed to measure the covert Gateway Capacity of a decision, ques- 
tion 2a. 28 was included in the study to identify the overt (if any) 
Gateway Capacity of the project. Question 2b. 1 was included as a 
potential moderator in interpreting the findings, particularly with 
respect to Success/Change measures. The total duration of the project 
was determined by question 2b. 16 and anecdotal information about the 
project's implementation was obtained with question 2b. 22b, being 
prompted by consideration of question 2b. 22a. Finally, the relative 
contribution made by each stage of the project to the overall absorp- 
tion of variety (question 2b. 17) and the relative value of the Analy- 
sis, Search, Communication and Information Technology activities to 
the overall pre-approval design effort (question 2b. 18) were meas- 
ured. Questions 2b. 17 and 2b. 18 were constructed for analysis by the 
analytic hierarchy process (Saaty, 1980). The main advantages of the 
analytic hierarchy process are that it measures the consistency with 
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which items are ranked and also enables the-relative differences 
between ranked items to be determined. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 PILOT STUDY 
1. The initial instrument design was tested for comprehensibility 
by subjecting it to scrutiny by academic colleagues. Subsequently it 
was administered to two senior executives (one Managing Director, and 
a Production Director) in two different manufacturing organisations 
(Fine Chemicals and Textiles) using taped personal interviews. The 
interviews took nominally three hours and two hours respectively and 
were conducted during February and March 1989. Following analysis of 
each interview a number of changes were made 'to the questionnaire. 
These changes were then "tried out" by posting the modified questions 
to the respondent for completion and comments. After two such piloting 
and subsequent iterations, confidence in the comprehensibility of the 
instrument was sufficiently high to attempt the main study. 
The instrument resulting from the above procedure (Appendix A) 
required over 400 separate responses and took nominally 90 minutes to 
complete. No decision had been taken at this'point on the final admin- 
istration of the instrument. Two approaches were considered, personal 
interview and mailed questionnaire. 
5.3.2 RESPONSE RATE 
The mailed approach has the advantage that, being relatively 
inexpensive, a large number of respondents can be-contacted simultane- 
ously, thus a large number of responses could potentially be obtained. 
With nominally 200 responses advanced analytical techniques could be 
employed which combine Factor analysis and Path analysis in a single 
procedure (Bone et. al., 1989; Miller and Dröge, 1986). Even with 
smaller samples, confidence in the Factor and Path analysis results 
increases with increasing sample size. The negative side of the argu- 
ment is that mailed questionnaires can have very low response rates. A 
low response rate seriously effects the validity of the study and 
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prompts the use of follow-up interviews to'control for respondent bias 
(Green and Tull, 1975). It was noted in section 5.1.4 above that 
Statistical Conclusion Validity (most effected by sample size) was not 
as important-to this study as Internal validity or Construct validity. 
As Fitz-Gibbon and Morris (1987, p. 116) note, "size of your sample is 
not nearly as important as the adequacy of the design. " A low response 
rate was therefore considered unacceptable, even if a large sample 
were obtained. 
Green and Tull (1975, p. 152) note that the modal response rate to 
mailed questionnaires is often in the range 20 to 40 percent; even 
after steps to increase response rates are taken, e. g., follow-up 
mailings. Jobber et. al. (1985) note that, "Particularly low response 
can be expected from industrial populations... single figure responses 
have been obtained". They found that an effective technique for in- 
creasing the response to a mailed questionnaire was to obtain verbal 
agreement (by telephone) from respondents that they would complete the 
questionnaire. A 55 percent response rate was 'achieved in their study 
through telephone prenotification, telephone- reminder and letter and 
questionnaire follow-up. This compares with 38 percent achieved with 
letter and questionnaire follow-up only. 
Because of the size and complexity of the research instrument 
grave doubts were expressed as to the ability of a mailed survey to 
achieve a 20 percent response rate; the minimum considered acceptable. 
To test the probable response two trials were set-up. One involved a 
"blind" mailing of the questionnaire with no pre-contact, the second 
was sent only to C: E. O. 's who had previously agreed to return the 
questionnaire. Tables of Binomial distribution probabilities were 
inspected to determine the sample size yielding 95% confidence that a 
zero response to the sample would imply a less than 20% response to a 
full scale study. The sample size found to satisfy this criteria was 
fourteen, hence two sets of fourteen questionnaires were mailed out 
during March 1989 (organisation selection will be described later). 
One questionnaire was received from the blind mailed group and three 
to the prenotified group. However, one of the three prenotified re- 
sponses was judged to be unusable, hence this sample yielded two 
usable responses. It should be noted that a comparison of the response 
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rates'to the'two'groups as'2: 1 (i. e.; 2: 14 to 1: 14) is incorrect. This 
is because a total of 19 companies, were contacted in the prenotified 
group to obtain 14 companies agreeing to look at the questionnaire. 
The true, usable, prenotified response rate, 'is therefore 2: 19, i. e., 
ii%'not 14%. This 1.5: 1 (2: 19/1: 14) relative response rate to the two 
samples was in broad agreement with Jobber et. al. 's (1985) . finding 
where, without any follow-up, response rates' of 43.2% and 27% (1.6: 1) 
were reported for prenotified and blind samples respectively. Further, 
taking the actual prenotified response as 11% and applying Jobber et. 
al. 's finding for the effect of follow-up reminders etc., it was 
estimated that the most probable response to a prenotified survey with 
the research instrument would be less than 20 percent. The use of a 
mailed survey in this study was therefore rejected. 
Hickson et. al. (1986) reported a two-thirds response rate to 
their requests for personal interviews taking one to two hours (c. f. 
the maximum 55% response rate reported by Jobber et. al., 1985). 
Hickson et. al. 's response was similar to the 74% (14/19) of companies 
agreeing to complete or "have a look at" the prenotified questionnaire 
in the study reported above. 'It appeared probable, therefore, that an 
adequate response to the study would be obtained if personal inter- 
viewing was used as the data collection technique. 
5.3.3-PERSONAL INTERVIEW 
Personal interviews are relatively expensive to conduct in both 
time and money terms and so restrict the total sample. However, as 
previously noted, large samples were not necessarily viewed as being 
of prime importance to this study. Green and Tull (1975, p. 150) identi- 
fy three "advantages for the personal interview over other types of 
data gathering technique. First a better sample can be obtained, as 
non-response and question omission can be kept to a minimum. This is 
important where small samples are being studied. Secondly it gives an 
opportunity to obtain more information, particularly by recording the 
interview. Again, in an exploratory study of the type being undertaken 
here, additional anecdotal evidence could be potentially valuable when 
interpreting results. Finally, the personal interview has greater 
flexibility, offering the researcher opportunities to give extra 
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clarification concerning the information being sought. As this study 
was primarily attempting to elicit factual information such opportuni- 
ties would serve to enhance the reliability of the data obtained. 
Further, the tedium effect of multi-item questions (Cook and Campbell, 
"I 1979, p. 82-83; Peter, 1981) which threatens internal validity may be 
controlled to some extent during an interview by the use of supportive 
comments. Overall therefore, the tape recorded personal interview was 
judged to be the most appropriate data collection method for this 
study, bearing in mind the priority ordering of validity considera- 
tions specified in section 5.1.4 above. We now turn to respondent 
selection. 
5.3.4 RESPONDENT SELECTION 
The questionnaire design required a respondent familiar with all 
stages of the project, from initial goal recognition through to final 
integration into the day-to-day operations of the organisation. In 
addition the respondent would need to be familiar with all functional 
areas of the organisation. These criteria identify the organisation's 
Chief Executive Officer as being the most likely respondent. Phillips 
(1981) found that the most reliable informant within an organisation 
was not necessarily the most senior. This suggests that, once having 
familiarised the C. E. O. with the needs of the research design, they 
should be allowed to identify a more suitable respondent for the 
study. Hitt and Ireland (1985) used this approach for their mailed 
survey into corporate distinctive competence. 
The question of whether to use a single respondent for each unit 
of analysis is a methodological issue of considerable importance. 
Doing so can present a threat to construct validity due to what Cook 
and Campbell (1979) refer to as Mono-Method bias. The rationale for 
assessing convergent validity (section 5.1.3.4. above) relies on 5 
multiple respondents being used. Phillips (1981) in a multiple re- 
spondent mailed survey study of organisational measures used in mar- 
keting research found that, "key informant reports should be validated 
by the reports of other informants". However, two points need to be 
born in mind when assessing Phillips' findings. First, it was a study 
of marketing variables. Fenwick (1979) notes that: 
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"Given marketing's frequent use of search techniques 
supported by little in the way of prior hypotheses, it is 
particularly important that analyses be validated" 
Using the validity concepts outlined in figure 5.1, Fenwick's 
comment may be paraphrased by saying that research in marketing fre- 
quently does not have high a priori nomological validity. Hence, 
particular attention has to be paid to trait, validity issues, -so 
that 
construct validity is preserved. This study and, its hypotheses are 
grounded in the relatively well established theory of cybernetics, 
thus a priori nomological validity is relatively, high. A reduction in 
trait validity, through the use of a single respondent say, may there- 
fore not seriously threaten the studies overall level of construct 
validity. The second point is that Phillips' findings were based on a 
mailed survey. Hickson et. al., (1986) conducted personal interviews 
with single respondents, -asking them about, 
"what had happened". 
They 
found adequate reliability, when these responses were compared with 
case study results taken years previously (section 5.2.2.3. above). 
Phillips makes a similar observation: 
"Questions which ask` informants to report on relatively 
objective, observable phenomena... should be less demand- 
ing and less subject to distorting influences. " 
The research instrument used in this study was designed with 
objective measures in mind and so should be less 
? 
subject to single 
respondent distortions. Finally Phillips comments that multiple in- 
formant studies, "would be time-consuming and expensive and would 
require extensive presurvey contact with each organisation to select 
informants" and that the gains in terms of reliability and validity 
only "might" offset the costs. 
In summary, the use of objective measures, obtained through 
personal interview and based on a reasonably well grounded theory will 
probably achieve adequate levels of construct validity, even if single 
respondents are used. Combining these findings with the pragmatic 
consideration of greatly increased cost (financial and non-financial) 
to carry out multiple respondent research, the decision was taken to 
administer the questionnaire to a single respondent for each organisa- 
tion and capital project studied. This research strategy would neces- 
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sarily preclude the assessment of convergent validity. The question of 
organisation selection will now be considered. 
5.3.5 ORGANISATION SELECTION 
We stated previously (section 5.2.2.3. ) that this study would 
focus on `manufacturing organisations. Here we refine this specifica- 
tion so that individual manufacturing organisations can be identified 
for sample selection. Information presented here focuses specifically 
on the organisation selection procedure used for the mailed pilot 
study (see section 5.3.2 above). Only minor differences exist between 
the sample selection procedure used for the pilot and main studies. 
This section may therefore be viewed4as an introduction to. chapter 6. 
The sample frame adopted for company selection was the 26th 
edition of the KOMPASS directory (KOMPASS, 1988). This directory is 
one of the most comprehensive available, listing over 30,000 companies 
and includes fairly extensive information about those listed. In terms 
of the requirements of-this research, Volume III of the directory 
"Company Information" identifies Company name, address, telephone 
number, size (employees and turnover) a two digit industrial group 
classification, the principal officers, and positions held by them 
within the company. 0 
In selecting companies for inclusion in the sample, the follow- 
ing criteria were adopted: 
1. The company's two digit industrial group code(s) were 
in the- range 11 to 49 (Codes 10,15,17,18 and 50 do 
not exist). These codes are not the same as two digit 
SIC product codes, but do correspond approximately, 
with the addition of "Energy" industries, to the HMSO 
Annual Abstract of Statistics "Manufacturing" grouping 
(Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1989; Table 17.25). 
Companies with codes outside this range were tolerated, 
provided they were not wholly outside this range. A 
complete list and description of each product code is 
given in Appendix B. 
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2. ' The company size equalled or exceeded 100 employees. 
Size is- not an important variable within the research 
model. However, selecting this criterion proved to be 
an effective way to screen out companies engaged in 
importing and/or distribution; not manufacturing. 
3. The, C. E. O. Was identified. The C. E. O. Was usually taken 
to be the Managing Director, or, if not identified, the 
Chairman, Chief Executive or General Manager Was used. 
4. Companies. were not, subsidiaries of companies already 
selected. The motive for adopting the-"no subsidiaries" 
criterion was to preserve- the statistical independence 
of the sample, as the assumption of statistical inde- 
pendence underpins most statistical 'techniques used to 
evaluate data-of-the type being collected here. The 
selection was carried -out by inspecting the company's 
address and list of directors. If a match was found 
with an-, already selected company, then one was reject- 
ed. 
5. Use a systematic sampling procedure. Systematic sam- 
pling is a short cut method for obtaining a virtually 
random sample (Harper, 1982) and is therefore a rela- 
tively bias free sampling technique. 
Only companies satisfying all of the above criteria were select- 
ed for contact. Further analysis of the directory (see chapter 6) 
indicated that some 8500 companies satisfied these criteria, which 
therefore specifies the available sample frame. However, the composi- 
tion of the KOMPASS directory may introduce some measure of bias into 
the sample. For example, many companies operating in the unlisted 
market do not have full entries. This tends to bias the sample towards 
U. K. owned companies. Also, many large divisionalised companies only 
contain a single entry referring to the company's registered office. 
Thus individual manufacturing sites of these companies either have no 
entry, or incomplete entries in the directory. As a result the sam- 
pling procedure adopted tends to exclude "Times 1000" companies and 
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their divisions and/or subsidiaries. Some of these possible biases 
could be eliminated by cross referencing with other directories, 
notably the EXTEL unlisted companies directory, and by using personal 
contacts through the university etc. - 
Finally, a note about the organisational unit of analysis. There 
is no guarantee that the organisational unit of analysis chosen by the 
compilers of the KOMPASS directory corresponds with that of the organ- 
isation itself, or, more importantly, the individual-respondents con- 
tacted for the study. For this reason no attempt was made to precisely 
predefine the organisational unit of analysis for individual cases. 
This was left to the discretion of individual respondents to define in 
a way most suited to their experience. 
This chapter has sought to identify indicators for the theoreti- 
cal concepts defined in chapter 4. It has also sought to determine. the 
sample frame and units of analysis for use in the study, and discussed 
methodological issues pertinent to its administration. In the next 
chapter we focus on the data collection carried out with the research 
instrument and the determination of construct validity. 
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6 CHAPTER 
CONSTRUCT MEASUREMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop measures for each of 
the principal theoretical constructs identified in chapter 4 and is 
structured into four broad areas. The first describes the sample on 
which this study is based. The second assesses how representative this 
sample is. The third analyses the study data 'to establish the con- 
struct validity of the research instrument developed in chapter 5, and 
the last generates measures of the theoretical constructs. 
6.1 THE SAMPLE 
The sample on which the findings of this study are based is, in 
fact, two samples. These samples will be referred to as the main 
sample and the pilot sample. Together they constitute the study sam- 
ple. 
The origin of the 5 pilot sample cases was described in'chapter 
5. It is composed of; 2- cases from personal interviews, 1 case from 
the blind mailed' questionnaire study and' 2 from the pre-notified 
mailed questionnaire study. A third response from the pre-notified 
mailed questionnaire was, as previously noted, adjudged to be unreli- 
able and therefore discarded. This was because of a lack of variation 
in the way some questions, notably -the later ones, were answered. We 
have described the methods used to collect the 5 pilot sample cases in 
chapter 5 and will not be referring to them again here. Instead, we 
focus on the main sample and the combined study sample, only. 
6.1.1 THE MAIN SAMPLE 
This section describes the major data collection stage of this 
research. In total 40 companies were able to assist in the study and 
these constitute the main sample. 
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6.1.1.1 Sample Size Determination 
A common heuristic used by researchers when determining the 
number of-cases to be included within a study was found; by Sawyer and 
Ball (1981) to be 30 subjects per cell. This heuristic probably, de- 
rives from the Central Limit,. Theorem in statistical. sampling theory. 
Some authors suggest that a sample of 30 cases is sufficient to satis- 
fy the Central Limit Theory condition of a statistically "large" 
sample. Mendenhall et. al. (1986, p. 263) indicate that this is not 
always the case and suggest that the-sample size to apply the theorem 
should be determined according to the specific application. A review 
of research in the Business Policy area indicated that a sample of 
approximately 30 cases would be appropriate. (Glueck and Jauch, 1984, 
provide excellent summaries of large areas of business policy research 
and the above conclusion is based on these summaries for non-mailed 
survey research. ) To these observations can be added the comment that 
statistical conclusion validity generally increases, as the sample 
size on which the analysis is based increases. (The word 'generally' 
is used above, because with very large samples, statistically signifi- 
cant associations can be found purely by chance. Cattell (1966) ob- 
served that in nature most things are associated to some extent and 
that sampling errors alone can prevent a precisely zero correlation 
from occurring.. Very large samples, therefore, can be a source of 
spurious results if the researcher attaches too-great an importance to 
chance but statistically significant associations. ) 
In summary, the number of cases to be obtained for the main 
sample was determined by the requirement to obtain as many as possi- 
ble, but at. least 30, within budgetary constraints. It was anticipated 
that the pilot cases would be included in the study sample, but that 
the main sample should be large enough to allow meaningful analysis of 
the data in the event of excluding the pilot cases from the data base. 
Within-the constraint of the above heuristic, 40 cases were obtained. 
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6.1.1.2 Case Selection 
In discussing'methods of case selection the'issue of concern is 
that of bias, i. e. allowing a particular influence to have more impor- 
tance than it really warrants. Sources of bias should be eliminated as 
far as practical, as failing to do so will invalidate the findings. 
The sample frame used for the main sample was the same as that used 
for the mailed pilot studies reported in chapter 5; namely the 1988 
KOMPASS directory. Chapter 5 commented on the appropriateness of 
KOMPASS as a sample frame and possible sources of bias introduced by 
its use. In addition, five organisation selection criteria'were speci- 
fied for identifying organisations for inclusion within the mailed 
pilot studies. The first four of these criteria were adopted, without 
modification, for selecting the main sample. The"final criteria speci- 
fied the sampling-procedure used. The discussion here will focus 
specifically upon this potential'"source of bias, i. e., that due to the 
method of sample selection' within a given sample frame: 
One of the least biased methods of sample selection is to select 
randomly from the sample frame. This method does not necessarily yield 
a sample free of bias; it is the sampling method that is free of bias 
(Harper, 1982). In random sampling there is a finite probability that 
the same organisation would be selected more than once. This possibil- 
ity was specifically excluded in this study, the sampling procedures 
adopted were therefore, non-random. For the mailed pilot studies 
reported in chapter '5'a systematic sampling procedure was adopted. 
This yields a virtually random sample (Harper, 1982). For a study 
based on personal interviews this sampling procedure was impractical. 
This is because the procedure would disperse cases throughout the 
country and the cost of travel etc., would be prohibitive. A sampling 
technique that is useful where cost is a major constraint is Multi- 
stage sampling. This sampling procedure was adopted when selecting 
cases for the main sample. 
The sampling procedure adopted, consisted of selecting towns 
from the directory and taking those manufacturing companies satisfying 
the four criteria noted in chapter 5 as possible candidates for study. 
However, the target areas to be sampled needed, for budgetary rea- 
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sons, to be close to Bradford. Therefore, not all the requirements of 
the Multi-stage sampling technique were adhered to. In particular, as 
the Leeds/Bradford area contains a major-concentration of the British 
Wool Textiles industry, it is possible the sample would be biased 
through over representation of this industrial sector. This issue will 
be discussed'"later. 
Besides possible biases inherent within a sampling procedure and 
the sample frame, a further possible source of bias is due to the 
sample frame being finite. Most statistical methods assume the parent 
population is infinite and when it is not, the estimators of the popu- 
lation mean need to be adjusted by the finite population correction 
factor (Mendenhall et. al., 1986). If the sample is random this cor- 
rection can be ignored, for all practical purposes, if the sample size 
is less than one twentieth of the population size. A systematic sample 
drawn from the KOMPASS directory indicated a population of companies 
(satisfying the number of employee and product group criteria used in 
this study) to be in the order of 8500. The sample of 45 cases used in 
this study is therefore about 10 times smaller than would be required 
for the finite correction factor to apply. In summary, possible biases 
introduced into the study by the sample frame were not judged to be 
serious. Bias' due to sampling procedures will be attended to later. 
6.1.1.3 Access 
Selected companies were initially contacted by telephone, pri- 
marily to establish the accuracy of the KOMPASS data with respect to 
the named chief executive officer (CEO) and also any change of busi- 
ness that may have occurred, e. g. from manufacturer to distributor. 
The KOMPASS data was inaccurate with respect to CEO's name in about 
30% of the companies contacted: in one instance the named CEO had been 
dead for over two years! After verifying the basic information (tele- 
phonists were most helpful here) an attempt to speak with the CEO was 
made. More often than not this initial telephone contact was unsuc- 
cessful, usually he (no female CEO's were identified in the sample) 
was unavailable. If the CEO's secretary was available, then it was 
established whether a letter summarising the research objectives would 
be a more appropriate form of contact. If so, a letter was posted; see 
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appendix C. (The secretaries' cooperation in ensuring that a letter 
would bypass the companies "junk mail" screening procedures was re- 
quired in this instance. Such screening procedures' extend in some 
cases to telephone calls. On one occasion it was necessary to convince 
the company's switchboard that the 'call was not aimed at selling a 
product or service before being put through to the secretary. ) If it 
appeared reasonable that the CEO would prefer a telephone contact, 
appropriate times for a recall were established. `Alternatively the 
secretary could pass messages. 
As explained in chapter 5 it was not automatically assumed that 
the CEO would be the most appropriate informant for the research. The 
purpose of contacting the CEO was therefore to establish the name of 
the person best able to provide the required information. For this 
reason it was not always necessary to speak with the CEO and subse- 
quent contacts with the company could be directed towards the pre- 
ferred informant. Care was taken during any contact with a company to 
stress that any information given to the researcher would be treated 
in strict confidence; using a form of words similar to that used in 
Appendix C. If cooperation from the company was obtained a: ' time and 
date for an interview was arranged and confirmed by letter. Two con- 
firmatory letters were used, the format depending upon whether the 
letter in appendix C had previously been posted. Attempts to arrange 
interviews continued up until the 10 July 1989. This was the last 
practical date for arranging an interview if data collection was to be 
completed by 31 July. 
6.1.2 SAMPLE STATISTICS 
Sample statistics are presented here on the geographical distri- 
bution of the sample, the size etc. of individual companies, the key 
informants within the companies and for the projects studied. These 
statistics will be presented for the main sample (N=40) and the study 
sample (N=45) i. e., the main and pilot samples. The results are pre- 
sented as a series of tables, and comments on the tables will be kept 
to a minimum. It should be noted that here the data is taken directly 
from the information supplied by the informants. The correspondence 
between the data to be presented here and the secondary data derived 
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from KOMPASS is not very close, on occasions, for principally one or 
both of two reasons. These are firstly inaccuracies within the KOMPASS 
directory and secondly (and more substantively) because the unit of 
analysis in the study does not necessarily correspond with that used 
within KOMPASS. The methodology discussion in chapter 5 explains this 
point and the basis for selecting the unit of analysis. Note in par- 
ticular that the number of employees within several of the companies 
is less than the 100 used to select the company in the first instance. 
Also note that one non-manufacturing company was included. This compa- 
ny was in fact principally involved in electrical contract work. 
6.1.2.1 When and Where Collected 
Data for the pilot sample was collected during February and 
March 1989, and for the main sample between April and August 1989 
inclusive. The initially budgeted interview schedule had aimed to 
finish data collection in July, the August interviews were interviews 
postponed from July. 
The monthly frequency distribution of main sample interviews is 
reported in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Interview Dates 
MONTH No. OF 
INTERVIEWS 
February 2p 
March 3p 
April 6 
May 11 
June 7 
July 14 
August 2 
Total 45 
p- Pilot study 
All companies responding to the study (pilot and main samples) 
were based in England only; no Scottish or Welsh companies were con- 
tacted and/or responded. The distribution of localities within England 
is illustrated on Figure 6.1. 
Page 155 
Figure 6.1: Geographic Distribution of Cases 
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The concentration of interviews within the' Leeds/Bradford area 
of West Yorkshire is clearly seen from inspection of figure 6.1. In an 
attempt to broaden the geographic and industry base of the sample, 5 
interviews were held in the Greater London/Sussex area and 4 inter- 
views in the Newcastle-Upon-Tyne area. Budgetary constraints prevented 
substantially broadening the geographical base of the sample. Using 
postal town as the basis for categorisation (i. e. the first two let- 
ters of the British Royal Mail Post Code) the geographical distribu- 
tion of companies in the sample may be represented; table 6.2. Note 
that in table 6.2 three samples are defined. The main and study sam- 
ples have previously been defined. The non-participants sample refers 
to 37 companies contacted as part of the main sample, but which de- 
clined to be interviewed. We will discuss this group later. 
Table 6.2: Distribution-of Sample Companies by Post Town 
NON- 
CODE POSTAL TOWN MAIN STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
SAMPLE SAMPLE SAMPLE 
LS Leeds 15 15 16 
BD Bradford 899 
RH Redhill 444 
NE Newcastle-Upon-Tyne 442 
HG Harrogate 334 
HX Halifax 330 
BB Blackburn 222 
UB Uxbridge 110 
OL Oldham 010 
CW Crewe 010 
London 010 
Missing data 010 
Totals 40 45 37 
6.1.2.2 Summary Company Statistics 
Summary statistics relating to company size, type and perceived 
performance relative to major competitors, are presented in tables 
6.3a, 6.3b and 6.3c. 
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Table 6.3a: Company Size Statistics 
ITEM MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM. MAXIMUM 
Study Sample: (N=45) 
Number of Employees 438 280 25 3000 
Annual Turnover (£m) 23.3 14.0 1.20 127.0 
Cap. Exp. (11000)p. a. 1408 500 20 '15000 
Main Sample: (N=40) 
Number of Employees 429 267' 25 ^3000 
Annual turnover (£m) 23.7 14.5 1.20 127.0 
Cap. Exp. (£1000)p. a. 1466 500 20 15000 
Table 6.3b: Company Type statistics 
ITEM STUDY SAMPLE MAIN SAMPLE 
(N=45) (N=40) 
Company Ownership: 
United Kingdom 40 37 
North American 32 
West European 21 
Independence of 'company: 
Fully Independent 14 13 
Subsidiary 17 15 
Division 87- 
Subsidiary of Divis'n 65 
Industry Sector: 
Commercial Services .10 
Capital Goods 12 11 
Consumer Durable 99 
Consumer non-dVrable 86 
Producer Goods 15 13 
Product Diversity: 2 
Single-Product 66 
Single-Business 27 23 
Multi-Business 12 11 
1. Goods bought to assist in the manufacture of some other 
product. 
2. These three items were defined as follows: 
Single-Product: Dependent on one product for at least 
95% of total company sales. 
Single-Business: Dependent on one major area of related 
products (similar technology and markets) accounting 
for at least 70% of total company sales. 
Multi-Business: Diversified into more than one major 
product area so that no single business accounts for 
70% or more of total company sales. 
Page 158 
Company performance was assessed by a four item question cover- 
ing growth of, profits, sales volume, market share and return on 
investment, relative to each companies major competitors. The inform- 
ant was asked to rate their company as being better, the same, worse 
or don't know, for each question. Each of these four responses was 
scored as +1,0, -1 and 0 respectively and these scores summed to 
produce a nine point scale of perceived company performance ranging 
from -4 to +4. A company with an overall average performance would be 
expected to achieve a score of zero on this scale. The mean score for 
the companies in the total sample (after eliminating 4 cases giving 
two or more "Don't Know" responses) was 2.00 and the standard error 
0.26. A t-test (N=41) to, compare this observed mean score with a 
hypothesised zero mean is highly significant (p(0.01). This indicates 
that the companies within the sample perceive themselves to be better 
than their competitors, on average. This could possibly explain the 
companies willingness to participate in the study. Phillips (1981) 
observed a similar effect in a mailed questionnaire study of 506 
wholesale distribution companies in the USA. Phillips found that 
companies participating in the study had, on average, higher sales 
volumes than the non-participating companies. However, commercial 
success was not a parameter of significant interest to the study, any 
bias from this source was not therefore judged to be a threat to the 
study. 
The observed distributions of this study's overall company 
performance score is given'in table 6.3c. 
Table 6.3c: Overall Company Performances 
SCORE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 
STUDY SAMPLE MAIN SAMPLE 
(N=41) (N=36) 
-4 00 
-3 11 
-2 11 
-1 11 
033 
+1 76 
+2 11 10 
+3 97 
+4 87 
Missing 44 
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6.1.2.3 Summary Informant Statistics 
Summary statistics on the status and functional responsibilities 
of the informants within the companies is given in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Respondent Status and Responsibility 
ITEM STUDY SAMPLE MAIN SAMPLE 
No. % No. % 
Respondent Status: 
Director 32 71.1 27 67.5 
Manager 13 28.9 13 32.5 
Functioial Responsibility: 
C. E. O. 23 51.1 19 47.5 
Productio 2 13 28.9 12 30.0 
Techn4cal 6 13.3 6 15.0 
Other 3 6.7 3 7.5 
Notes to table 6.4: 
1- Chairman, Chief Executive, Managing Director, 
General Manager. 
2-e. g. Production Director, Service Director, 
Plant Manager, Works Manager. 
3-e. g. Technical Services Director, Development 
Director, Project Engineer, Production Engineer. 
4-e. g. Director Computer Services, D. P. Manager. 
6.1.2.4 Sunmary Project Statistics 
Financial statistics on the projects covered by the study are 
given in table 6.5a. Categorisations of the projects are presented in 
tables 6.5b and 6.5c. Note, the definition of a capital project used 
within this study was any project which increased the company's fixed 
assets. 
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Table 6.5a: Project Costs. (fx1000) 
ITEM MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Study Sample: 
Fixed Assets. 922 240 5 8000 
Working Capital. 323 20 0 4000 
Goodwill. 116 01 0 5200 
Total. 
, 
1361 250 20 11000 
Main Sample: 
Fixed Assets. 968 210 5 8000 
Working Capital. 356 18 0 4000 
. Goodwill. 130 00 
5200 
Total. 1453 235 20 11000 
Projects were categorised according to the nature of the inputs 
into the decision giving rise to the project. This is the "Decision 
Topic" categorisation used by Hickson et. al. (1986) in "Top Deci- 
sions" (see chapter 3). Dr. R. J. Butler, the originator of this scheme 
and co-author of "Top Decisions", acted as an independent judge to 
assist the author in categorising the projects according to this 
scheme. This categorisation was made using the description of the 
project supplied by the respondents in answer to the project title 
question in section 2 of the questionnaire (appendix A). In addition, 
question 2.7 of the questionnaire was constructed using the same 
decision topic categories. Each respondent was asked to identify the 
category that accounted for the major expenditure during the project. 
For the study sample only, the frequency of responses to each of these 
categories is also presented in table 6.5b. 
Table 6.5b: Project Topic Categorisation 
SAMPLE 
TOPIC STUDY MAIN 
Technology 22 19 
Reorganisation 11 
Control 66 
Domain 11 
Product 33 
Boundary 22 
Input 44 
Location 54 
Missing Data. 10 
Q2.7 
STUDY 
29 
2 
4 
1 
2 
2 
0 
5 
0 
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By comparing the study sample results, it will be observed from 
table 6.5b, that the project topic categorisation based on expenditure 
(Q2.7) is very similar to the categorisation based on project descrip- 
tion. The notable exception is the Input category. In addition, we may 
use this data to test the correspondence between topic categories and 
the taxonomy of strategic decisions (Entity, Relational, Interface), 
developed in chapter 3. There it was asserted that Entity change deci- 
sions would tend to result in capital investment projects. All of the 
decisions studied here were capital investment projects, therefore 
only Entity change topics (Technology, Product, Boundary and Location) 
should be identified. The data in table 6.5b shows that, based on 
project description, 73% of the projects in the study sample were of 
the Entity type. This increases to 84% if the classification based on 
expenditure is used. The statistics for Relational and Interface 
topics are 16% and 11% respectively, based on project description and 
13% and 2% based on expenditure. These statistics appear to provide 
further tentative evidence for the associations identified in chapter 
3. Furthermore, most of the discrepancy with respect to the Relational 
categorisation occurs because five of the six Control topic projects 
involved the purchase-of computer equipment. 
In addition to the above an ad hoc categorisation of each 
project was made by the author. This categorisation scheme describes 
the aim or purpose of the project and is given in table 6.5c. These 
categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, product and process 
developments can, and do, occur simultaneously. 
Table 6.5c: Project Description Categories 
CATEGORY STUDY SAMPLE MAIN SAMPLE 
Process Development 18 14 
Product Development 88 
Market Development 33 
Rationalisation 21 
Expansion/Contraction 66 
Managerial Information 77 
Missing Data 11 
Having summarised the sample on which the findings of this study 
are to be based, we now address the question of sampling bias. 
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6.2 SAMPLING BIASES 
The issue we are addressing here is whether there is evidence 
(or not) to support the assertion that the study sample is free of 
bias. In other words, is the sample representative. This issue has two 
aspects. First, were those organisations participating in the study 
different from those that declined to participate? Second, what evi- 
dence is there that the study sample is representative of the U. K. 
manufacturing industry as a whole? Through necessity our arguments 
here will be based largely on secondary data drawn from the KOMPASS 
directory. The number of dimensions that we may use to draw compari- 
sons between samples is therefore limited. In particular, we will use 
this secondary data to characterise the main and study samples. This 
secondary data can differ significantly from that obtained first hand, 
for the reasons stated previously. 
6.2.1 PARTICIPANT AND NON-PARTICIPANT BIAS 
The low response and sample size of the mailed pilot studies 
preclude their use for our current purposes. We focus therefore, 
solely on the participants and non-participants to the main study. 
That is, those 40 organisations that agreed and 37 that did not agree, 
to a request by the author for a 90 minute personal interview with a 
senior executive of that organisation. 
In total 77 companies were contacted during the main study 
resulting in 40 interviews, a response rate of 52%. This response rate 
is misleading as an indicator of the willingness of companies to 
cooperate in the study. Ten companies failed to satisfy the basic 
criteria of having fully implemented a recent strategic capital 
project, or of having a suitable key informant. Most of these would 
have participated in the research if these criteria had been met. A 
more representative estimate of the response rate to the study is 
therefore in the order of 60%, a figure comparable to the two thirds 
response reported by Hickson et. a1. (1986) in their study of strate- 
gic decision-making. 
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Table 6.6 below summarises reasons why 37 of the organisations 
contacted did not feel able to participate in this study. Note that 
where contact was made, these reasons were given by the CEO's of the 
organisations. 
Table 6.6: Non-participation summary 
REASON GIVEN NUMBER 
Failed to satisfy sampling requirements: 
No recent completed strategic capital projects. 6 
Insufficient knowledge about projects. (Due to 
recent take over or reorganisation. ) 4 
Too busy: 
No time or not prepared to spend 90 minutes. 10 
Cancellation: 
Interview arranged, subsequently cancelled. 5 
Logistical: 
Unable to contact the CEO. 3 
Interview schedule filled. * 2 
Policy: 
Unable to assist for reasons of commercial 
confidentiality. 3 
Company policy not to participate in surveys. 1 
Miscellaneous: 
Did not wish to be involved. 2 
Unconvinced about the worth of the research. 1 
TOTAL: 37 
*- This reason was applicable to the Newcastle and 
Sussex samples, where the interview had to fit 
within a five day period. 
6.2.1.1 Ease of Contact 
In terms of the number of telephone contacts made between par- 
ticipating and non-participating companies the following statistics 
are available. Participating companies (N=40), mean number of calls 
per company, 5.15, standard deviation, 2.81, modal number of calls, 5, 
range 1 to 14. Non-participating companies (N=34), mean number of 
calls per company, 4.15, standard deviation 3.15, modal number of 
calls, 1, range 1 to 14. A Chi-squared contingency test did not indi- 
cate a statistical difference in the number of calls between the two 
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samples (p*)0.05). In assessing the non-participating group, the three 
companies listed in table 6.3 under the "logistical" heading as, 
"unable to contact the CEO" were excluded. These three cases bias the 
statistics for this group, as the average number of calls made to each 
company was 17.3, range 16 to 22. In assessing whether a letter plus 
telephone approach was more (or less) effective than the telephone 
only approach, the following statistics are available. Seventeen 
participating companies (42.5% of this group) and thirteen non-partic- 
ipating companies (35.1% of this group) were sent request letters 
(Appendix C). The difference between these two proportions is not signif- 
icant (p>0.05). 
Overall therefore, the conclusion of this analysis is. that, with 
the exception of a small proportion of companies (3 companies in 77, 
i. e. 4%) there is no evidence that the participating group of compa- 
nies differs from the non-participating group in terms of ease (or 
difficulty) of contact. The one extra telephone call required on 
average to reach the participating companies (although not statisti- 
cally significant) is explained by noting that in many instances the 
CEO was not the final person to be contacted in this group. Finally, 
the time required to make contact with a targeted person within a 
company was typically of the order of one week. However, it was not 
unusual to be attempting contact for a month or two. All of the aban- 
doned group of companies were abandoned after more than two months of 
attempting contact. 
6.2.1.2 Company Profiles 
Here we compare the participating and non-participating groups 
of companies using secondary data taken directly from the KOMPASS 
directory. Note that for either groups to be included in the study 
they both must have satisfied the selection criteria described previ- 
ously. Statistics on the two groups are summarised below in table 6.7. 
* The p-value is the value of the test significance level (a) at 
which the null hypothesis would be rejected (Mandenhall et. al., 
1986). 
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Table 6.7: KOMPASS Data on Responding, Non-responding Companies 
Participated Non-Participated5 
(N=40) (N=35) 
Company size1* 339 297 
Overall business diversity2 2.0 3.2 
Manufacturing diversity' 1.7 2.3 
% CBI members4 54 38 
1- Antilog of mean log., number of employees. 
2- 
, 
Mean number of two digit product codes. listed for 
each company. 
-3 - Mean number of two digit product codes listed in 
, 
the range 11 to 49 for each company. 
4- The Confederation of British Industry. An indus- 
trial pressure group. 
5- The two companies identified in table 6.3 as non- 
participants due to the interview schedule being 
full were excluded from this analyses. Justified 
because these companies were not given an opportu- 
nity to participate in the sample. 
*- These items were used to select. companies for 
inclusion in the study. 
Analysis of variance comparisons between the two groups on the 
first three criteria in. the above table indicated no significant 
differences between the two samples (p>0.05). Note that the comparison 
of mean company sizes were performed using the logarithm of company 
size. This data transformation was made in order to satisfy the normal 
distribution assumption underlying the test method. A Chi-Squared test 
applied to the CBI membership data indicated no statistically signifi- 
cant differences between the two samples also (p>0.05). In addition, 
an ANOVA applied to the geographical distribution data in table 6.2 
(excluding the pilot study sample) likewise showed no significant 
difference between the two groups. We again conclude, based on the 
above analyses, that the non-responding companies are not substantive- 
ly different to the responding group of companies in the main sample. 
6.2.2 STUDY SAMPLE AND NATIONAL INDUSTRY BIAS 
Here we are concerned with a possible bias between all the 
organisations participating in this research (N=45) and U. K. manufac- 
turing industry as defined in this study. The comparisons in this 
section are between the study sample and a national sample drawn from 
the KOMPASS directory. 
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We previously noted that practical considerations tended to 
result in an over representation within the study sample of companies 
within West Yorkshire. In an attempt- to estimate the effect of this 
bias on the U. K. as a whole, a systematic sample was drawn manually 
from KOMPASS, by listing all manufacturing companies on every tenth 
page of the directory. This represented a sample of approximately 250 
pages comprising 2343 separate companies with at least one two digit 
product code in the range 11 to 49. Of these 2343 companies, 857 
(36.6%) were listed as employing 100 or more people. Some of these 
companies may have been distributors, not manufacturers. No attempt 
was made to identify and separate these companies from the sample. 
Comparisons between the number of employees and number of 
product codes for 'the study sample (i. e., main and pilot studies) and 
the "national" sample are reported in table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Study and National Sample Comparisons of Means 
STUDY SAMPLE NATIONAL SAMPLE 
(N=43)+ (N=857) 
Company size* 337 284 
Manufacturing diversity* 1.72 2.17 
+- Missing data on two cases. 
*- See table 6.7 for explanation. 
A statistical comparison of the means of the above quantities 
(one way analysis of variance) indicated no difference between the two 
samples (p>0.05) for the logarithmic mean of number of employees or 
average number of manufacturing product categories covered by the 
firms. 
Besides comparing the mean manufacturing diversity of the study 
and national samples, a Chi-Squared test was also used to compare the 
distribution of two digit manufacturing product codes. This comparison 
was based on data extracted from KOMPASS, not that obtained from the 
study. The distributions of manufacturing product codes between the 
study sample and the national sample are reported in table 6.9. 
Page 167 
: 
Table 6.9: Manufacturing, Code Distributions between Study 
and National Samples 
RANGE OF CODES STUDY SAMPLE NATIONAL SAMPLE 
(N=43) (N=857) 
Actual Frequency() Frequency() 
11... 19 000.4 
20... 24 12 16.2 11.8 
25... 29 11 14.9 11.6 
30... 34 10 13.5 17.2 
35... 39 23 31.1 36.3 
40... 44 8 10.8 10.3 
45... 49 10 13: 5 12.5 
The national sample figures were used to calculate the expected 
frequency of product codes within a. hypothetical representative sample 
of 43 companies. A Chi-squared analysis of the two distributions 
showed no statistically significant differences between the study 
sample and the national sample (p)0.05). Note that the expected fre- 
quency of observations within the 11 to 19 range of codes was less 
than 5. These codes were therefore excluded in the analysis, i. e., the 
degrees of freedom used in the analysis was 5 not 6. 
6.2.3 CONCLUSIONS ON SAMPLE BIASES 
In this section on sampling biases we have been able (using 
mainly secondary published data) to demonstrate that the responding 
and non-responding groups of companies contacted did not differ in 
terms of company size (mean number of. employees) product diversity 
(mean number of all product codes covered, by the company) manufactur- 
ing diversity (mean number of product codes in the range 11 to 49) or 
membership of a national industrial grouping (the CBI). In addition, 
it was shown that there were no significant differences between these 
two groups in terms of accessibility (number of calls per contact, use 
of letters etc. ). Similarly, it was demonstrated that the study sample 
and a much larger (nominally 10%) national sample of U. K. manufactur- 
ing companies satisfying the sample selection criteria, did not differ 
in terms of company size or manufacturing diversity. Also, the study 
sample was comparable in terms of its distribution of manufacturing 
product codes to the national sample. The only evidence that exists 
for a bias within the study sample is that identified earlier as 
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implying that the organisations studied performed better than their 
major competitors (section 6.1.2.2). The validity of assessing company 
performance by the method employed here has been supported by Dess and 
Robinson (1984). In addition, it is possible to control for the ef- 
fects of industry-related factors on performance through the use of 
perceptual measures. In a cross industry study of the type reported 
here perceptual measures of performance may therefore be superior to 
objective measures. However, as we note previously, company perform- 
ance was not a variable of interest to this study. Bias introduced 
from this source should not influence the validity of the findings, 
and we conclude that for-the purpose of this study, the sample is 
representative of U. K. manufacturing companies. 
6.3 THE ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRUCT VALIDITY 
When discussing 'validity-in chapter 5 it was noted that this 
chapter would be concerned with assessing the construct validity of 
the research instrument. In particular, the aspect"of construct valid- 
ity of concern was shown to be trait validity. (Domain validity was 
the concern of chapter 5, and nomological validity was not to be 
addressed explicitly as this is an exploratory study. ) The particular 
items of trait validity to be assessed here are; (1) Factorial compo- 
sition (2) Internal consistency and (3) 'Discriminant validity. (The 
research design-precludes the assessment of convergent validity, as 
explained in chapter 5. ) In addition, the statistical technique of 
factor analysis was identified as being capable of assessing factorial 
composition and internal consistency. We will therefore initiate our 
assessment of trait validity by reviewing factor analysis methodolo- 
gies. 
6.3.1 FACTOR ANALYSIS 
6.3.1.1 Methods of Factor Extraction 
The term "Factor Analysis" is used here to mean both principal 
components analysis and common factor analysis; some authors use the 
term to refer only to the common factor model. The models are similar 
in that they both allow for data reduction. They differ in that prin- 
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cipal components analysis attempts to explain the variance structure 
of the data in terms of a linear combination of the observed data, 
whereas the common factor model accounts for the co-variance structure 
in terms of a hypothesised causal model (Kim and Mueller, 1978). The 
two models differ in another respect, which for our purposes is more 
important. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the aim here 
is to construct measuring scales of the theoretical constructs. Factor 
analysis can produce such scales, called factor scores. Scores pro- 
duced by the principal components model are exact, whereas scores 
produced by the common factor model are only estimates. The reason is 
that the common factor model is based on estimating more unobserved 
parameters than there are observed data points (Wilkinson,, 1987) 
hence, there is insufficient information to directly compute the 
scores (Susmilch and Johnson, 1975). (This issue relates to the factor 
indeterminacy problem, see Rozeboom, 1982, for a general view of this 
issue. ) For the common factor model there is no generally admissible 
statistical procedure for estimating the factor scores. Several proce- 
dures exist, each with its merits and demerits (see, Kim and Mueller, 
1978; Susmilch and Johnson, 1975). However, within the principal 
components model this issue need not concern us as there is only one, 
exact, method for estimating the scores on subjects of the factors 
(Norusis, 1985, p. 148-150). In analysing the factor structure of the 
data, principal components factoring was therefore employed; primarily 
because it produces exact factor scores, and also, to quote Wilkinson 
(1987, p. FACTOR-2) because, "principal component and common factor 
solutions for real data rarely differ enough to matter". 
6.3.1.2 Factor Analytic Approach 
Factor analysis can be applied to a data matrix in either a 
confirmatory or exploratory sense. Van De Ven and Ferry (1980, p. 77) 
criticise the use of exploratory factor analysis for assessing trait 
validity (their Intrinsic Validity) in the following passage: 
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"Factor, analysis is commonly used in test and instrument 
construction as a heuristic procedure for identifying 
orthogonal scales, selecting the best items within each 
scale, and thus imputing a post hoc theoretical meaning 
and definition to each scale. Although such a procedure 
is intuitively useful for identifying constructs and 
selecting items, it magnifies chance error and promotes a 
post hoc interpretation of the data. " 
Here the confirmatory approach adopted by Van De Ven and Ferry 
(1980) has been adopted. This involves deciding whether the observed 
data structure deviates "significantly" from that hypothesised. This 
is a matter of degree, ranging from simply specifying the number of 
factors to specifying the number, the variables which will load on 
each factor and the magnitude of these loadings (Kim and Mueller, 
1978). In this study an intermediate hypothesis is used which only 
specifies the number of common factors and the variables which will 
load predominantly on these factors. The reason for adopting this 
level of hypothesis was that, in the absence of previous research 
results investigating the factor structure of the constructs used, no 
a priori estimates of factor loadings could be made. This approach 
also has the practical advantage of using essentially the same tech- 
niques and heuristics as are used in an exploratory factor analysis. 
Thus, general purpose factor analysis computer packages may be used, 
without recourse to the specialist software required to test more 
rigorous confirmatory hypotheses. In this study the FACTOR procedure 
within the SPSS-X V2.2 computer package running on a CDC CYBER main 
frame computer was employed. 
A final technical issue within the subject of factor analysis 
concerns factor rotation. In this study, in order to aid the interpre- 
tation of the factor structures produced, the initial factor solution 
was rotated using the oblimin procedure. Oblique rotation was selected 
in preference to orthogonal rotation principally because the indices 
included in each factor analysis are hypothesised to be interrelated 
(Van De Ven and Ferry, 1980). Cattell (1966, p. 211) identifies several 
other reasons why oblique rotation should be preferred to orthogonal 
rotations, one of which is, "that any oblique rotational resolution 
will permit orthogonality as a special case, but the converse is not 
true. " Following oblique rotation the factor structure was interpreted 
from the structure matrix. 
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6.3.1.3 Possible Objections to the Factor Analysis Approach 
6.3.1.3.1: Number of Cases 
When performing factor analysis an heuristic commonly employed 
(due to Cattell circa. 1950) is the 4 to 1 rule of Cases to Variables 
in the data matrix being analysed. As far as the mathematics of factor 
analysis are concerned, the analysis will work provided the number of 
cases is not less than the number of factors hypothesised to exist 
within the data. Rummel (1970) suggests therefore, that, provided the 
approach adopted by the researcher is confirmatory, factor analysis 
can be performed on a data matrix in which the number of variables 
exceeds the number of cases. (Rummel cites several published analyses 
in which this has been the-case; the. most extreme being a study-in 
which 236 variables were analysed on =just 86 cases. ) Where the re- 
searchers approach is-exploratory the 4 to 1 rule should be adopted as 
a minimum, in order to mitigate against the risk of chance occurrences 
(random error) biasing the results and hence the inferences made. In 
terms of this study, a confirmatory approach using 45 cases will be 
sufficient to identify the factors hypothesised to exist within the 
data. 
6.3.1.3.2 Type of Data 
This issue was discussed in chapter 5 relating to the choice of 
scale metric to be used within the questionnaire. These arguments will 
not be reiterated here. 
6.3.1.4 Heuristics for Assessing Factor Structures 
' Factor analysis can, to some extent, be referred to as more of 
an art than a science. In this-sense one is guided by "best practice" 
rather than analytical rigour. What is thought of as best practice 
appears to be embodied within a number of heuristics; those used in 
the subsequent analysis are identified and explained here. 
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6.3.1.4.1 Number-of Variables 
Kim and Mueller (1978, p. 77) address this problem with the fol- 
lowing passage: 
"Thurstone suggests as least three variables for each 
factor, but this requirement need not be met if confirma- 
tory factor analysis. is used. In general, researchers 
seem to agree that one should have at least twice as many 
variables as factors. " 
6.3.1.4.2 Eigenvalue Criterion 
Two criteria were used to identify the number of meaningful 
factors within the data matrix. 'The first of these is referred to as 
the Eigenvalue criterion. This criterion simply states that factors 
with Eigenvalues less than unity should not be interpreted as meaning- 
ful "when the correlational (not adjusted) matrix is used" (Kim and 
Mueller, 1978, p. 43). The correlational matrix is used in the principal 
components factor model. The logic underpinning this heuristic is that 
a factor with an Eigenvalue less than unity is contributing less to an 
explanation of the variance in the data than that of a single varia- 
ble. In this study, this criterion was used to establish a maximum 
value for the number of factors in the data. 
6.3.1.4.3 Scree Plot 
A further criterion used to establish the number of factors 
within the data is that of the scree test. This technique is based 
purely on observation and has no substantive theoretical basis. The 
heuristic operates on a plot of the Eigenvalue for each factor against 
the order in which the factor was extracted. The researcher then 
inspects this plot for a discontinuity. This discontinuity can be of 
two forms, either it appears as a bend in the plot separating it into 
two relatively smooth curves (Kim and Mueller, 1978; Rummel, 1970) or 
it appears as a step in what otherwise would be a smooth curve (Rum- 
mel, 1970). These discontinuities were only interpreted for factors 
satisfying the Eigenvalue criterion given above. 
Note that the Eigenvalue and scree test heuristics are applied 
to the initial (un-rotated) factors. 
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6.3.1.4.4 Variable Loadings 
In order to assess which variables are being-associated with 
which factor'some criterion for determining a "significant" loading is 
required. As the - structure matrix loadings are correlation coeffi- 
cients, no variable can load higher than 11.0*. In addition the 
higher the"loading the more significant that variable is to the inter- 
pretation of the factor. The problem arises'in setting a minimum value 
for the loadings, bearing in mind that a loading of exactly zero is 
unlikely to be realised with real data. If one reviews the, minimum 
values used by researchers when determining "significant" factor load- 
ings, a wide range of values emerge. For example, Miller and Dröge 
(1986) selected 10.61, Straub (1989) 10.51, Van De Ven and Ferry 
(1980) 10.41 and Dess and Beard (1984) 10.31. Carmines and Zeller 
(1979) viewed a loading of 0.376 as not significant, whereas in a 
second factor from the same analysis, 0.356 was viewed as significant. 
Clearly what constitutes "common practice" allows for a fair degree of 
leeway. In this study, minimum factor loadings from 10.31 to 10.51 
were interpreted as significant, the actual value being selected to 
produce'the clearest factor structure for the analysis in hand. 
Note that generally it is the rotated factors that are being 
interpreted in this instance, not the initial factors. 
6.3.1.4.5 Bartlett Test 
Two statistical parameters can be calculated from the initial 
correlation matrix of variables to test whether the factor model is 
appropriate. The first of these is Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
(Norusis, 1985). This tests the hypothesis that the correlation matrix 
is a unitary matrix, i. e. all diagonal elements are unity, all off- 
diagonal elements are zero. If the test statistic is small (insignifi- 
cant) then the correlation matrix is close to being unitary, i. e. all 
the variables are uncorrelated with each other and each would be 
extracted as a separate factor. For factor analysis to be appropriate, 
the statistic needs to be large and significant. 
* The notation Ixl means "the absolute value of x", i. e. the numeri- 
cal value of x ignoring its sign. 
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6.3.1.4.6 Sampling Adequacy 
The second parameter is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin "measure of 
sampling adequacy" (Norusis, 1985). The issue of sampling adequacy 
originates from the question "Is the given data (subset of-variables) 
adequate for factor analysis"? (Kim and Mueller, 1978, p. 53). More 
specifically, to what extent can differences between-the observed data 
and hypothesised model be attributed to sampling variability? The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure is a heuristic index which ranges between 0 
and 1. In interpreting the index, values below 0.50 are generally 
viewed as unacceptable. 
6.3.2 TRAIT VALIDITY 
It was noted earlier that trait validity would be assessed in 
this study in terms of factorial composition, internal consistency and 
discriminant validity. The techniques for assessing factorial composi- 
tion are indistinguishable from those of factor analysis and will not 
be discussed further here. Techniques for assessing internal consist- 
ency and discriminant validity are described below. 
6.3.2.1 Internal Consistency 
The assessment of internal consistency requires the appraisal of 
two parameters. The first is unidimensionality; the second, reliabili- 
ty. Carmines and Zeller (1979) suggest that the unidimensionality of a 
set of indicators may be determined if the first unrotated factor, 
extracted by principal components analysis, satisfies the following 
criteria: 
1. The first extracted component should explain a large 
proportion of the variance in the items (say > 40%). 
2. Subsequent components should explain fairly equal 
proportions of the remaining variance except for a 
gradual decline. 
3. All or most of the items should have substantial load- 
ings on the first component (say ) 0.3). 
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4. All or most of the items should have higher loadings on 
the first component than on subsequent components. 
For establishing the reliability of a set of indicators the most 
popular measure is Cronbach's alpha (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Van De 
Ven and Ferry, 1980). Van De Ven and Ferry (1980) cite the following 
formula for calculating coefficient alpha: 
a= 
k. r 
1+ (k-1) i 
Where r is the average of the off diagonal elements in the 
correlation matrix of indicators, and k is the number of indicators in 
the matrix. For an interpretation of the meaning of the coefficient, 
see Carmines and Zeller (1979). For a unidimensional construct, Van De 
Ven and Ferry (1980) recommend that Coefficient alpha should have a 
value of between 0.7 and 0.9. Nunnally (1978) sets a less demanding 
criterion and suggested 0.6 as appropriate for exploratory research. 
One of the assumptions underlying the assessment of reliabili- 
ties based on Coefficient alpha (and several other techniques, e. g. 
Alternative-Form, Split-Halves) is that the items in the scale are 
parallel. The Parallel-Measures model implies that each item in the 
scale measures a phenomenon equally. If the items measure a single 
phenomena unequally, or the items measure more than one concept, 
reliability assessments will be decreased. A technique designed to 
explicitly cope with both these violations of the parallel measures 
assumption is factor analysis (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Hence, 
reliability coefficients based on factor analysis are not as restric- 
tive as those methods assuming parallel measures. For factor scales 
produced using principal components analysis (as used in this study) 
the appropriate reliability coefficient for the scale is coefficient 
theta. This is calculated using the following formula: 
9= kkl. 
fl- Lil 
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Where k is the number of items in the scale and L1 is the first 
(i. e., the largest) Eigenvalue. Carmines and Zeller (1979, p. 61) sug- 
gest an interpretation of coefficient theta as follows: 
"... theta is the alpha coefficient for a scale in which 
the weighting vector has been chosen so as to make alpha 
a maximum. In other words, theta may be considered a 
maximised alpha coefficient". 
It follows, therefore, that alpha will be smaller than theta. In 
this study theta is used to establish the reliabilities of the factor 
scales of the theoretical constructs. 
6.3.2.2 Discriminant Validities 
The approach used in this study to assess discriminant validity 
is median correlation (Van De Yen and Ferry, 1980). The median corre- 
lation is obtained by measuring the median off-diagonal correlation 
between "(a) items composing a given scale and (b) all of the other 
items which are scored on different scales" (Hackman and Oldham, 
1975). An indication of discriminant validity for the given index is 
then shown when the median off-diagonal correlation of items in that 
index with items in other indices is low and smaller than the average 
inter correlation of items within the index. 
6.3.3 METHODOLOGY 
6.3.3.1 Post Coding and Data Aggregation 
The first stage in any data analysis of this type is to post 
code the questionnaire data so that it is suitable for computer analy- 
sis. Post coding in this study was restricted to categorising re- 
sponses to questions which listed an "Other" option, categorising 
question 1.1 "What is your job title? " and categorising the project 
description given at the beginning of section 2 of the questionnaire. 
The coding of the project title/description has been used to construct 
tables 6.5b and 6.5c. The coding of job title has been used in table 
6.4. Of the 11 questions in the questionnaire offering an "Other" 
category, questions 2a. 16,2a. 20,2a. 33,2a. 38 and 2b. 20 had no re- 
sponses to this category. Questions 2.6,2.7 and 2a. 28 had only one 
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response in this category, and this response was therefore used in its 
place. The "Other" response to Question 1.2, was accommodated by a 
minor change to, the original categorisation scheme and used in table 
6.3b. The two responses to the "Other" category of question 2a. 26b 
(referring to the use of contingency allowances when specifying the 
project) were seen as fall-back, or safety-net provisions and coded as 
such. Finally question 2.5 (referring to the stimuli giving rise to 
the project) had easily the largest number of "Other" responses. After 
eliminating those responses more accurately viewed as aims or goals of 
the project (i. e., question 2.6) and those appearing to be alternative 
forms of other categories within question 2.5, four responses re- 
mained. The common element to these four items appeared to be that the 
project was forced upon the company by its parent organisation. These 
responses were coded as "Strategic move/policy of parent 
organisation". The best example of this encountered during the study 
was the company forced to relocate, or cease trading, because its 
parent organisation sold the site it was currently occupying. 
Subsequent to post-coding, the next operation was coding the 
questionnaires for input into the SPSS-X statistical package. Concur- 
rent with this operation was scale reflection, for example the items 
within the Success/Expectations construct used to measure the Ease 
construct were coded to measure Difficulty. These items were therefore 
reflected to be congruent with the Accuracy and Satisfaction con- 
structs. Similarly, those questions dealing with change were coded to 
yield a score ranging from -2 to +2, with the "no change" situation 
being represented by a score of zero. In addition variables defined in 
terms of other variables were computed and included in the data base. 
A number of methods were employed for computing new variables. The 
simplest method (applicable to interval scaled data) was to perform a 
simple arithmetic operation on the variables, for example, relative 
project cost was defined as the ratio of total project cost to the 
company's annual turnover at the time of project approval. Another 
technique used was to aggregate items, usually simply by summing 
several scales together. The overall measure of company performance 
defined previously and reported in table 6.3c is an example of this 
technique. When applying this technique it is important that each item 
to be aggregated is measured using the same scale. If not those items 
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measured on extensive scales will dominate, those on less extensive 
scales. If this is likely to be a problem it can be handled by stan- 
dardising each item prior to aggregation. This is achieved by applying 
the transform: 
(xi - i) la 
to each data point of each variable (xi) to be aggregated. The trans- 
formed variables then have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
unity across the sample (Manly, 1986). 
6.3.3.2 Analytical Procedure 
Following the necessary coding and aggregation of the data, the 
procedure outlined below was adopted. 
1. Analyse the raw data (using the coefficient alpha 
model) to eliminate "noisy" variables from the data 
set. 
2. Use principal components factor analysis to identify 
(if it exists) the hypothesised dimensionality of the 
theoretical constructs. This is a confirmatory ap- 
proach. 
3. Use median correlations to assess the discriminant 
validity of the constructs. 
4. Calculate factor scores from step 2 for the theoretical 
constructs and assess the reliability of the construct- 
ed factor scales via the theta reliability model. 
5. Assess the normality of the factor scales produced from 
step 4. Where significant deviations occur, transform 
scale items and iterate steps 1 to 4 until deviations 
are acceptable. 
Step 5 of the above procedure was necessary to maximise the fit 
between the data and the mathematical assumptions and requirements of 
the analytical techniques employed. Rummel (1970, p. 272) notes that 
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failure to satisfy these requirements may produce substantive inter- 
pretations of the results at variance with their actual meaning "In 
order to realistically relate the empirical findings to the initial 
research question, the data and method have to be matched as perfectly 
as possible". A basic assumption of the factor model employed in this 
study is linearity in the bivariate interrelationships of the data 
(Rummel, 1970, p. 275). The likelihood that two variables are linearly 
related is increased when the variables have univariate normal distri- 
butions. Hence the inclusion of step 5 in the above procedure. Rummel 
identifies a number of other reasons why transforming variable distri- 
butions to that of the normal distribution is desirable in factor 
analysis. 
The major objection to the use of transformed data is that it 
weakens the correspondence between the analysis and the raw data. 
There is also the problem of interpreting the transformed variable. In 
deference to these objections the policy adopted here was that only 
generally accepted transformations would be used, and then only where 
the departure from the normal distribution appeared to be significant. 
Of the possible transformations suggested by Rummel only the logarith- 
mic transformation was used. (This transformation was used earlier to 
transform company size data and is commonly employed for this purpose, 
see for example Miller and Dröge, 1986). The logarithmic transforma- 
tion was applied to positively skewed scale items. The transformation 
applied to negatively skewed scale items consisted of reflecting the 
scale (to turn the negative skew into a positive skew) applying the 
log transformation and re-reflecting. 
A further question was to determine the criterion by which a 
scale's distribution may be judged to be satisfactory, i. e., near 
enough to normal. One method would have been to use Lilliefors modifi- 
cation* of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test (Wilkinson, 1987). 
This was a severe criteria and required (in some instances) several 
transforms to be applied, thus distancing the scales from the raw 
data. In the event, it was determined that typically, a single loga- 
* The Lilliefors modification is necessary because factor scores are 
standardised variables. 
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rithmic transformation of selected scale items would reduce the level 
of skewness to less than ±1. Applying further transforms to reduce 
Skewness values below this level did not appear to significantly 
affect the correlation coefficients between scales. An individual 
scale was therefore Judged to be "satisfactory" when further itera- 
tions through the steps outlined above did not significantly change 
its correlations with other scales. Thus no more than a single trans- 
formation of selected scale items was used. 
In the remainder of this chapter sub-section we will present 
results from the final iteration of steps 1,2 and 3. Step 4 will be 
treated separately in section 6.4. Appendix D lists correlation coef- 
ficients and skewness data for scales produced from transformed and 
untransformed (raw) data items. (The reader is advised to review 
chapter 7 before perusing this appendix as several of the scales 
presented have not yet been defined. ) 
6.3.3.3 Elimination of "Noisy" Variables 
A "noisy" variable is defined in this study as a variable likely 
to reduce the reliability of a scale containing the variable. To 
identify such variables the RELIABILITY procedure within the SPSS-X 
computer programme was used. This procedure is capable of constructing 
scales of parallel measures and calculating the alpha reliability of 
the scale. In addition, it estimates the effect on the scale's alpha 
reliability if each item in the scale is deleted in turn. If deletion 
of a single variable increased the alpha reliability of the scale (an 
increase over the scale's alpha when containing the variable) then 
this variable was viewed as being "noisy" and eliminated from further 
analysis. In addition to the scale reliabilities this procedure also 
produces a correlation matrix for the items in the scale. Inspection 
of this matrix on rare occasions suggested items that should be placed 
in an alternative scale. 
In summary this procedure was used to add and delete items to 
maximise the alpha reliability of the scale and the empirical discrim- 
ination among scales. However, the pursuit of reliability alone could 
generally only be achieved at the expense of the scales heterogeneity 
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and "richness". This approach was not adopted, and efforts were made 
to keep the content of the items tapping a given construct consistent 
with the original theoretical basis of the scale (as outlined in 
chapters 4 and 5) thus preserving its heterogeneity and therefore the 
"richness" of the measures. 
The, scales and 'items relating to those scales, are outlined in 
the following tables. Note, the tables are given for secondary and 
tertiary constructs only (Chapter 4, tables 4.4,4.5 and 4.6). Where 
quaternary etc. constructs are involved, the derivation of the con- 
struct and its alpha reliability (if appropriate) is given. The items 
composing a scale are summarised in the column headed "Questions". 
This column gives the number of the question from the questionnaire 
summarised in the form "Section. Number". In addition the symbol 'E' is 
used to denote the summation or averaging of the items within the 
question. The symbol 'Elxxxxl' indicates the summation or averaging of 
the module of the items within the scale; and where used refers only 
to items measuring a change. (Using the modulus focuses attention upon 
whether or not a change occurred, not upon the direction of any 
change. ) Finally, an L placed before a question indicates that a 
logarithmic transform of the original data has been applied. 
Note, the alpha reliability of individual sub-scales are given 
for interest only. These sub-scales are not used elsewhere within this 
analysis. In addition the overall reliabilities are presented princi- 
pally for the purpose of comparison with the theta reliabilities of 
the factor scores to be presented later. They do however give an 
indication of the unidimensionality of the scales. 
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Table 6.10a: Uncertainty/Scope Construct 
Variable 
Code Description 
Questions a 
SIZE: 
USSO1 Total project cost LE2a. 1 
USS02 Cost relative to annual turnover L 2a. l+2a. 2 
USSO3 Cost relative to annual capital budget L 2a. 1-1. lla 
SKILL, USE: 
USKO1 Canparative use of technical etc. skills 2b. 14 
STRATDGICALITY: 
USTO1 Consequentiality note 1 
UST02 Relative use of PCA techniques note 2 
UST03 Number of goals set for project E 2.6 
UST04 Normal fraction of capital projects approved 1.9 
Alpha reliability of 8 item Uncertainty/Scope scale = 0.677. 
Note 1: A sum of Endurance, Seriousness, Radicality and Diffusion (Hickson 
et. a1., 1986). Operationalised from questions 2a. 11,2b. 36,2c. 1 
and E12.41. (Coefficient alpha is 0.391, adequate for a con- 
struct composed of three or more distinct terms; Van De Ven and 
Ferry, 1980. ) 
Note 2: This variable was constructed from questions 1.8 and 2.8 to pro- 
duce a nine point scale ranging from -4 to +4. A score of -4 implied 
that Post-Completion Audit (PCA) techniques were normally used, but 
not for the particular project under consideration. A score of +4 
implied PCA techniques were not normally used, but were used in this 
particular instance. An intermediate score could be produced if PCA 
techniques were normally used and used in this instance, or, not 
normally used and not used in this instance. 
Table 6.10b: Uncertainty/Novelty Construct 
Variable Questions a 
Code Description 
t XO1 The type of site for the project 2.2 
UNX02 Changes to canpany products 2a. 15 
U 03 Source of the technology for the project 2a. 16 
LNX04 Type of market to be served by the project note 1 
UNX05 Process fit between project and department L note 2 
Uncertainty/Novelty scale not constructed using parallel-measures model. 
Note 1: The item was scored from question 2a. 14 in a manner similar to 
Miandwalla's (1974) mass-production orientation construct. 
Note 2: This single score was produced as the difference between the 
departmental and project mass-production orientations. In the case 
of a single department not being involved in the project, then the 
mass-production orientation of the whole firm was used. Khandwal- 
la's (1974) scoring system was used on questions 2a. 29a, 2a. 29b and 
2a. 29c to produce the scale. The variable UNXO5 is the modulus of 
the difference in the mass-production orientation scores. 
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Table 6.10c: Uncertainty/Urgency Construct 
Variable Questions a 
Code Description 
PRIORITY: 
WPO1 Relative time taken for project approval 2b. 7 
UUPO2 Rescheduling of other projects 2a. 5 
UUP03. Opposition to project rescheduling 2a. 9 
WP04 Priority relative to other expenditures 2a. 6 
SURVIVAL: 
WU01 Project's importance to firm's continuation 2a. 13 
SIKULTANEITY: 
WS01 Time available for decision making 2b. 8 
WINDOW: 
UUWO1 Effect of project delays on viability 2a. 12 
PRESSURE: 
UURO1 Ease of completing project on time 2a. 7 
UUR02 Driven by technical/market considerations 2a. 8 
FINANCIAL ATTRACTIVE NESS: 
UUFO1 Yield of project relative to firm's standards 2a. 18 
UUFO2 Sponsoring managers acceptance of lower yield 2a. 25 
WF03 Approving authorities acceptance of lower yield 2a. 25 
Alpha reliability of 12 item Uncertainty/Urgency scale - 0.421. 
Table 6.10d: Uncertainty/Complexity Construct 
Variable 
Code Descriptim 
Questions a 
PERCEIVED CCKLElüTY: 
U0001 Technical complexity of the project 2a. 27 
U0002 Organisational oanplexity of the project 2a. 27 
U0003 Diversity of options for the project 2a. 3 
PERCEIVED RISK: 
UCR01 Financial risk 2a. 26a 
UCR02 Technical risk 2a. 26a 
UCR03 Organisational risk 2a. 26a 
Alpha reliability of 6 item Uncertainty/Canplexity scale = 0.746. 
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The secondary information construct, Flexibility, was measured 
using an 11 item scale (question 1.13). The alpha reliability of this 
scale was found to be unacceptably low at 0.164. To improve this 
reliability four of the eleven items were used to form a new scale, 
the remaining items being discarded. These four items were identical 
to four items of a five item Organicity measure used in a study by 
Covin and Slevin (1988). Their fifth item was not included in the 
original 11 item measure used here. 
Table 6.11a: Information/Flexibility Construct 
Variable Questions a 
Code Description 
ORGANICITY: 
IFXO1 Item 2 1.13 
IFX02 Item 4 1.13 
IFX03 Item 5 1.13 
IFX04 Item 7 1.13 
Alpha reliability of 4 item Information/Flexibility scale = 0.6351. 
1- Covin and Slevin (1988) reported a reliability of 0.79 for their five 
item scale. This implies an average inter item correlation of 0.43 for 
their study; scmewhat higher than the 0.30 observed here. 
Table 6.11b: Information/Range Construct' 
Variable 
Code Description 
FAMILSARITY: 
IRF01 Standard capital project evaluation methods 
IRF02 Use of PCA techniques 
IRF03 New product/process capital expenditure 
IRF04 New product/process revenue expenditure 
IRF05 Approach to new product development 
IRF06 Diversity of product base 
IRF07 Frequency of similar types of project 
IRF08 Frequency of similar sizes of projects 
IRF09 Rapidity/intensity of industry change 
ABflZI'Y: 
IRA01 Ability to managing complex projects 
SIZE: 
IRS01 Number of full time employees 
Questions a 
1.7 
1.8 
1. ilaxl. llc(i) 
1. lläx1.11c(ii) 
1.5 
1.6 
2.1(i) 
2.1(ii) 
E 1.12 0.646 
E2c. 52 
L 1.14 
Alpha reliability of 11 item Information/Range scale = 0.586. 
1- Note, the single item measuring the Delegation dimension was eliminated 
as too noisy. 
2- This item not constructed using the parallel-measures model. 
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Table 6.11c: Information/Lubrication Construct 
Variable Questions a 
Code Description 
UNFREEZING: 
IUJ01 Positive (6 items) 2b. 6 0.371 
ILU02 Negative (6 items) 2b. 6 0.641 
MVING: 
IIM01 Positive (7 items) 2b. 6 0.410 
IIM02 Negative (5 items) 2b. 6 0.574 
REFRRIZfl : 
ILR01 Positive (7 items) 2b. 6 0.430 
ILRO2 Negative (7 items) 2b. 6 0.603 
Alpha reliability of 6 item In formation/Lubrication scale = 0.790. 
Table 6.11d: Information/Activity Construct 
Variable Questions a 
Code Description 
ANALYSIS: 
IAA01 Sophistication of risk analysis procedures L 2a. 20 
IAA02 Sophistication of financial analysis E 2a. 24 0.801 
IAA03 Extent of documentation produced E 2a. 36 0.666 
INFOMTICN TECFIIdOLOGY: 
IAI03 Extent of computer use LE2a. 38 0.773 
COHMUNICATICN: 
IAC01 Extent of support building 2a. 4 
IAC02 Extent of formal discussion L 2a. 21x2a. 22 
IAC03 Extent of informal discussion 2a. 23 
IAC04 Use of communication methods E 2a. 34 0.623 
SEARCH: 
IASO1 Effort in collecting data LE2a. 30 0.900 
IAS02 Internal information E 2a. 32 0.537 
IAS03 External information E 2a. 33 0.550 
IASO4 Data supplied from single person 2a. 35 
IAS05 Data supplied from several people L" 
IAS06 Data supplied from internal records 
IAS07 Data supplied from external records of 
IASO8 Data supplied from tours/visits " 
IAS09 Data supplied from survey/experiment/R&D of 
DESIGN RESOURCES: 
IAR01 Money spent on consultants 2a. 31 
IAR02 Money spent on development, internally 2a. 31 
IAR03 Managerial effort/time expended E 2.7 0.543 
CONTINGENCIES: 
IANO1 Safety net provisions LE2a. 26b 0.672 
Alpha reliability of 21 item Information/Activity scale = 0.824. 
Its used to construct scales IAC04, IAS03 and IAR03 were drawn from a 
reduced set of items in the referred to questions. Items were deleted 
from the scales to improve reliability, commonly those items with low 
variance across the sample. 
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Table 6.12a: Success/Expectation Construct 
Variable 
Code Description 
Questions a 
EASE: 
SEE01 Overall problems with implementation r 2b. 20 0.844 
SEE02 Unanticipated technical problems 2b. 33 
SEE03 Unanticipated organisational problems 2b. 34 
SEE04 Overall ease of implementation 2b. 31 
SEE05 Extent of re-skilling, training etc. 2b. 28 
ACCURACY: 
SEA01 Time taken to reach expected performance 2b. 39 
SEA02 Project completed to target E 2b. 3 
SEA03 Extent f post-approval changes 2b. 322 
SEA04 Adequacy of contingencies 2b. 21 
SATISFACflCt: 
SESO1 'Willingness to repeat the project_ 2c. 4 
SES02 Satisfaction overall L 2b. 9 
SES03 Satisfaction technically L 2b. 12 
SESO4 Satisfaction organisationally L 2b. 13 
SES05 A valid solution to the original stimulus L 2b. 10 
SES06 Achieving the financial returns expected L 2b. 11 
Alpha reliability of 15 item Success/Expectation scale = 0.836. 
1- This variable scored high for a mid score, low for an extreme. 
2- This item not constructed using the parallel-measures model. 
Table 6.12b: Success/Changes Construct) 
Variable 
Code Description 
Questions a 
CULTURE: 
SCUO1 Changes in behaviour E12b. 41 0.7462 
SCUO2 Changes in organicity E 2b. 5 0.8112 
CCHPE`r NCY: 
SCCOl Ability to handle complex projects E 2c. 63 
S0002 Time taken to handle complex projects 2b. 29 
SKILM: 
SCS01 Changes to departmental procedures E 2b. 15 0.889 
SCSO2 Inadequacy of existing procedures 2b. 35 
SCSO3 Changes in the ways of doing business 2c. 1 
Alpha reliability of 7 item Success/Changes scale = 0.634. 
1- The secondary concept of Applicability was eliminated as too noisy. 
2- Calculated using the Kuder-Richardson formula number 20. This is the 
appropriate form for coefficient alpha when using dichotanous data 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1979). 
3- This item not constructed using the parallel-measures model. 
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6.3.4 FACTORIAL COMPOSITION 
6.3.4.1 Factor Composition of Secondary Constructs 
In this stage of the analysis principal components factor analy- 
sis was used in a confirmatory sense to investigate the dimensionality 
of the scales identified in tables 6.10a to 6.12b above. The findings 
are reported in tables 6.13a to 6.15b below, and figure 6.2. 
With reference to the summary statistics table contained on 
figure 6.2 it is observed that, with the exception of the 
Information/Range construct, all of the constructs have sampling 
adequacy values in excess of 0.5. Similarly the Bartlett sphericity 
tests are satisfactory, with the exception of the Uncertainty/Novelty 
construct. The value of 0.38 for this construct is evidence that the 
items constituting this scale are, as hypothesised, orthogonal. Factor 
analysis of this construct has not been attempted for this reason. 
Inspection of the scree plots presented in figure 6.2, together 
with the Eigenvalue data on the summary statistics table, indicate the 
dimensionality of the constructs. Note, the following observations are 
derived from the original computer printouts reproduced in figure 6.2, 
not from inspection of figure 6.2 itself. 
D- 100 
Figure 6.2: Factor Analysis Summary 
ý 
Summary Statistics 
Construct KMO BART EIGEN 
" UNCERTAINTY: 
Scope 0.675 0.000 3 
Novelty 0.688 (1380 - 
Urgency 0.660 0.000 6 
Complexity 0.831 0.000 2 
" INFORMATION: 
Activity 0.646 0.000 8 
Lubrication 0.804 0.000 1 
Range 0.409 0.000 5 
Flexibaillty 0.824 0.000 1 
" SUCCESS: 
Expectation 0.882 0.000 5 
Changes 0.825 0.000 3 
KMO - Kalser-Meyer -Oikin measure of 
sampling adequacy. 
BART - Bartlett test of sphericity, 
significance level. 
EIGEN - Number of factors extracted with 
Elgenvaluee greater than or equal 
to unity. 
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6.3.4.1.1 Uncertainty Constructs 
As noted above, the factorial composition of the Uncertainty/ 
Novelty construct cannot be investigated as this item is not composed 
of items which are parallel measures to each other. This is demon- 
strated through the Bartlett Test of Sphericity being insignificant 
(figure 6.2). The remaining discussion therefore focuses only on 
Scope, Urgency and Complexity constructs. 
T 
The Uncertainty/Scope construct was originally hypothesised to 
be composed of three dimensions, Size, Skill Use and Strategicality. 
Factor analysis extracted three factors with Eigenvalues greater than 
unity. Table 6.13a below reproduces the structure matrix after oblique 
rotation of the first three factors. Note, correlations below 10.31 
are not reproduced in the table. Correlations greater than 10.51 are 
entered in bold type and are the items principally used to interpret 
the factor structure; this convention will be followed in subsequent 
tables. The un-rotated Eigenvalue and cumulative percentage variance 
explained by each factor is presented at the base of the table. 
Table 6.13a: Uncertainty/Scope Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
USSO1 0.813 
USSO2 0.943 
USS03 0.974 0.307 
USKO1 0.701 0.481 
UST01 0.635 
UST02 -0.784 
UST03 0.406 -0.688 
UST04" -0.764 
Eigenvalue. 2.904 1.297 1.059 
Cum. % var. 36.3 52.5 65.8 
1- See table 6.10a for a description of the items listed. 
The factorial composition of the Scope construct as revealed in 
table 6.13a, provides satisfactory confirmation of the hypothesised 
structure. Factor 1 is the Size construct, together with Consequenti- 
ality. Factor 2 is Skill Use together with "Normal fraction of capital 
projects approved". Factor 3 is the remaining Strategicality items. 
Factors 1 and 3 are negatively correlated (-0.212). Factors 1 and 2 
and, 2 and 3 are uncorrelated (0.054 and -0.024 respectively). 
The Uncertainty/Urgency construct was originally hypothesised to 
be composed of six dimensions; Priority, Survival, Simultaneity, 
Window, 
-Pressure and 
Financial Attractiveness. Five factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than unity were extracted. Inspection-of the 
Eigenvalue scree plot however suggests a three-dimensional construct. 
Table-6.13b below reproduces the structure matrix after oblique rota- 
tion of the first=three factors. The interpretation of the table is 
the same as for table 6.13a above. 
Table 6.13b: Uncertainty/Urgency Structure Matrix 
ITEM' FACTOR 1 FACTOR'2 FACTOR 3 
UUPO1 0.481 0.441 
UUPO2 0.794 
UUP03 -0.500 0.474 
UUPO4 0.315 
UUUO1 -0.796 
UUSO1 0.432 -0.501 
UUW01 -0.370 -0.436 
UURO1 0.352 -0.511 
UUR02 0.594 
UUFO1 0.609 
UUFO2 0.879 
UUFO3 0.890 
Eigenvalue. 2.662 1.815 1.428 
Cum. % var. 22.2 37.3 49.2 
-1- See table 6.10c for a description of the items listed. 
The factor structure illustrated in table 6.13b identifies 
Factor 1 as the Financial Attractiveness dimension. Factor 2 can be 
interpreted as principally the Priority dimension, combined with 
Pressure. Factor 3 is a combination of the remaining dimensions, 
Survival, Simultaneity and Window together with item UUR01, the 
"perceived ease of completing the project on time" and appears to be 
associated with time aspects of the project. Regarding the inter- 
correlation between items, Factor 1 is uncorrelated with either of the 
other factors, correlation coefficients of -. 059 and -0.003 with 
factors 2 and 3 respectively. Factors 2 and 3 are inter-correlated to 
the extent of -0.151. In summary this structure is a reasonable 
confirmation of the construct and its theoretical basis. 
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The Uncertainty/Complexity' construct was originally hypothesised 
to be composed of two dimensions; Perceived Complexity and Perceived 
Risk. Factor analysis extracted two factors with Eigenvalues greater 
than unity and inspection of the Eigenvalue scree plot'also suggests a 
two-dimensional construct. Table 6.13c below reproduces the structure 
matrix after oblique rotation of the first two factors. The interpre- 
tation of the table is the same as for table 6.13a above. 
Table 6.13c: Uncertainty/Complexity Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 
UCCO1 0.790 
U0002 0.355 0.821 
U0003 0.691 0.345 
UCR01 0.786 
UCR02 0.721 0.438 
UCR03 0.901 
Eigenvalue. 2.657 1.184 
Cum. % var. 44.3 64.0 
1- See table 6.10d for a description of the items listed. 
The structure illustrated in table 6.13c does not correspond 
with the anticipated structure. However, inspection suggests inter- 
preting Factor 1 as a dimension of "perceived uncertainty surrounding 
financial and technical aspects/consequences of the project". Factor 
2 may be interpreted as "perceived uncertainty surrounding organisa- 
tional aspects/consequences of the project". The observed structure 
therefore represents social and technical dimensions of project com- 
plexity, not the anticipated Complexity - Risk dimensions. However, 
socio-technical considerations were used to construct the scale items. 
The lack of correspondence with the Risk and Complexity structure is 
therefore not viewed as serious, because the analysis identified an 
alternative existing structure within the construct. 
6.3.4.1.2 Information Constructs 
Inspection of figure 6.2 indicates that both Lubrication and 
Flexibility constructs are uni-dimensional. It is not proposed there- 
fore to investigate these constructs further at this stage. Here we 
focus only on the Range and Activity constructs. 
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The Information/Range construct was hypothesised to consist of 
three dimensions; Familiarity, Ability and Size, after eliminating 
Delegation (see the footnote to table 6.11b). Factor analysis extract- 
ed five factors with Eigenvalues grater than unity. Inspection of the 
Eigenvalue scree plot was less conclusive but showed a tendency to a 
three-dimensional construct. Table 6.14a below reproduces the struc- 
ture matrix after oblique rotation of the first three factors. The 
interpretation of the table is the same as that for table 6.13a above. 
Table 6.14a: Information/Range Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
IRF01 0.360 0.617 
IRF02 0.770 
IRF03 0.650 
IRF04 0.518 0.374 
IRF05 0.600 0.330 
IRF06 0.682 
IRF07 0.865 
IRF08 0.869 
IRF09 0.831 
IRA01 
IRSO1 0.492 0.581 
Eigenvalue. 2.377 1.983 1.478 
Cum. % var. 21.6 39.6 53.1 
1- See table 6. llb for a description of the items listed. 
Inspection of table 6.14a does not indicate close agreement with 
the hypothesised structure. In particular the nine items measuring 
Familiarity have factored into three separate dimensions. While ac- 
knowledging the philosophy of the current analysis is confirmatory, an 
exploratory approach could be justified here as there is a satisfacto- 
ry ratio between the number of the cases and variables of 5.4: 1, i. e., 
greater than the 4: 1 ratio usually considered to be acceptable. Howev- 
er, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is unaccept- 
able at 0.421, suggesting that differences between the factor model 
produced here and that hypothesised to underlie the construct can be 
attributed to sampling variability. From the available evidence it is 
not possible to produce a definitive explanation for this observation. 
Even a tentative explanation is difficult, although one such explana- 
tion may relate to Phillips' (1981) finding, that the use of multiple 
informants is preferable when investigating organisational concepts. 
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In conclusion, the theory requires that the Range construct be 
retained. The overall alpha reliability of the construct is low at 
0.586, but close to the 0.6 considered adequate by Nunnally (1978). We 
will therefore retain the concept and accept as a limitation of the 
study the lack of congruence between the observed and theoretical 
factor structures. 
The Information/Activity construct was hypothesised to consist 
of six dimensions; Analysis, Communication, Search, Information Activ- 
ity, Design Resources and Contingencies. It was not claimed that the 
dimensions were mutually exclusive. For example, many of the Search 
items could equally well be defined as Analysis. Factor analysis 
extracted eight factors with Eigenvalues greater than unity. Inspec- 
tion of the Eigenvalue scree plot indicated two factors'underlying the 
construct. Table 6.14b below reproduces the structure matrix after 
oblique rotation of the first two factors. The interpretation of the 
table is the same as that for table 6.13a above. 
Table 6.14b: Information/Activity Structure Matrix 
ITEM FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 
IAA01 -0.672 
IAA02 0.731 -0.527 
IAA03 0.579 -0.662 
IAI01 -0.767 
IACO1 0.498 
IAC02 0.389 
IAC03 0.565 -0.313 
IAC04 0.539 
IASO1 -0.705 
IAS02 -0.605 
IAS03 0.714 
IASO4 
IAS05 -0.364 
IAS06 -0.398 
IAS07 0.442 
IAS08 
IAS09 0.391 
IARO1 0.505 
IAR02 -0.474 
IAR03 0.595 
IANO1 0.601 -0.517 
Eigenvalue. 5.134 1.860 
Cum % var. 24.4 33.3 
1- See table 6.11d for a description of the items listed. 
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Inspection of table 6.14b'shows Factor 1 to be'the Communication 
and Resources dimensions. Factor 2 is principally Analysis and a 
majority of the Search indicators. The documentation (IAA03) and 
Contingencies dimension (IAN01) are significantly correlated with both 
Factors 1 and 2. We may therefore identify Factor 1 as a Communication 
/Resources dimension and Factor 2 as an Analysis/Search dimension. The 
correlation between Factors 1 and 2 is -0.255. 
An explanation of this factor structure is-supplied by the study 
of Sharp et. al. (1989) (see also Sharp, 1991) into capital investment 
decisions. This study identified two principal dimensions subsuming 
the capital investment process and were labelled by them as Design and 
Support. The Analysis/Search dimension identified here (Factor 2) can 
be viewed as a dimension of Design, in a manner similar to the way 
this term was conceived by Sharp et. al. Similarly, the 
Communication/Resources dimension (Factor 1) is congruent with Sharp 
et. al. 's Support dimension. Indeed the specific item included within 
the questionnaire to measure Support (item IAC01) correlates signifi- 
cantly with Factor 1. 
In summary, the factor structure of the Information/Activity 
construct is broadly in line with the hypothesised structure and is 
congruent with concepts existing in the literature describing key 
dimensions of the capital investment evaluation process. Where it is 
found to be convenient to refer to these two dimensions of the Infor- 
mation/Activity construct they will be referred to as the Design and 
Support dimensions. 
6.3.4.1.3 Success Construct 
The Success/Expectation construct was originally hypothesised to 
be composed of three dimensions; Ease, Accuracy and Satisfaction. 
Factor analysis extracted five factors with Eigenvalues greater than 
unity. Inspection of the Eigenvalue scree plot suggested a two-dimen- 
sional construct. The structure matrix produced after oblique rotation 
of the first two factors is reproduced in table 6.15a below. The 
interpretation of the table is the same as for table 6.13a above. 
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Table 6.15a: Success/Expectation Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1' FACTOR 2 
SEE01 0.822 
SEE02 0.493- 0.552 
SEE03 0.548 
SEE04 0.590 0.704 
SEE05 0.736 
SEA01 0.470 0.492 
SEA02 0.419 0.411 
SEA03 0.660 
SEA04 0.526 
SESO1 0.517 
SES02 0.872 
SES03 0.576 
SESO4 0.645 0.410 
SES05 0.772 0.349 
SESO 6 0.655 
Eigenvalue 4.818 2.197 
Cum. % var. 32.1 46.8 
1- See table 6.12a for a description of the items listed. 
Inspection of table 6.13a suggests an interpretation of the 
factor structure in line with the hypothesised structure. Factor 1 is 
congruent with the hypothesised Satisfaction dimension (items SES01 to 
SES06) Factor 2 is a merged Ease (items SEE01 to SEE05) and`Accuracy 
(items SEA01 to SEA04) dimension. The correlation between factors 1 
and 2 is 0.244. This structure is a satisfactory confirmation of the 
construct and its theoretical basis. 
The Success/Changes construct was originally hypothesised to be 
composed of three dimensions; Culture, Capability and Skills. Factor 
analysis extracted three factors with Eigenvalues grater than unity. 
Inspection of the Eigenvalue scree plot also suggests a three- 
dimensional construct. However, counter to previous practice, the 
factor matrix in table 6.15b below, reproduces the first three princi- 
pal components of the data. This was done because the principal compo- 
nents were simpler to interpret than the rotated structure matrix. As 
oblique rotation of the factor solution was not attempted, the factors 
in table 6.15b are orthogonal. 
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Table 6.15b: Success/Changes Structure Matrix 
ITEM' FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
SCU01 0.838 
SCUO2 0.472 -0.538 0.378 
SCCO1 0.598 0.397 0.341 
S0002 0.864 
SCSO1 0.923 
SCS02 0.732' -0.365 
. 
SCS03 0.770 
Eigenvalue. 2.587 1.358 1.168 
Cum. % var. 37.0 56.4 73.0 
1- See table 6.12b for a description of the items listed. 
Interpreting the above factor structure suggests that Factor 1 
is' congruent with the hypothesised Skill dimension (items SCSO1 to 
SCS03). Factor 3 is dominated by the "changes in behaviour" scale 
(SCUO1). Factor 2 is a polar construct contrasting "changes in the 
time taken to complete complex projects" with "changes to the organi- 
sation's culture" (SCUO2). 
Further investigation of the SCUO1 scale dominating Factor 3 
shows that most of the variance within this item is associated with 
three manufacturing process changes (machine downtime; net product 
rejects; under standard production). In addition these changes are 
predominantly positive; i. e., downtime etc., was reduced. Factor 3 is 
therefore interpreted as measuring "improvements to the manufacturing 
operations of the organisation" and not "extent of social/behavioural 
change" which this item was intended to capture. 
Factor 2 is principally (55% of the factor's variance) associat- 
ed with item S0002, the "time taken to implement complex capital 
projects"; this item scored high if the time taken was low. 21% of 
Factor 2's variance is'accounted for by item SCUO2; "extent of cultur- 
al'change associated with the project's implementation". That these 
two items are negatively associated is not surprising from a practical 
viewpoint, as the greater the cultural change required, the longer 
implementation will take. Factor 2 is therefore interpreted as an 
"ease of cultural change" measure; negative values implying difficul- 
ty. The Success/Change construct was designed to measure the extent of 
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procedural Change. Factor 2 and item S0002 is not therefore congruent 
with the theoretical basis of the Change construct. 
In summary, while the hypothesised three dimensional structure 
to this construct is supported by the Eigenvalue and scree plot evi- 
dence, a closer inspection shows the two minor factors to be detrimen- 
tal to the theoretical purity of the measure. The two items principal- 
ly defining these two factors, items SCUO1 and 50002, were therefore 
discarded. Factoring the now five item Success/Changes scale yielded a 
solution with one Eigenvalue greater than unity and accounting for 
51.5% of the variance; evidence of a unidimensional construct. Analy- 
sing the first three factors yielded a structure congruent with theo- 
retical expectations, namely item SCUO2, SCCO1 and items SCSO1.. 03 
loaded as separate factors. The inter-correlations between factors was 
high, ranging from 0.169 to 0.336. 
6.3.4.2 Factor Composition of Primary Constructs 
It is only necessary here to demonstrate the composition of the 
Uncertainty and Information constructs, as the overall Success con- 
struct alone does not form part of the hypotheses. 
6.3.4.2.1 Uncertainty Construct 
The 31 items composing this scale were hypothesised to measure 
the four dimensions; Scope, Novelty, Urgency and Complexity. Factor 
analysis extracted 11 factors with Eigenvalues greater than unity. 
Inspection of the Eigenvalue scree plot suggests a three-dimensional 
construct. Table 6.16a below reproduces the factor loading matrix 
after oblique rotation of the first three factors. Note, the five 
Uncertainty/Novelty items are included here as they are hypothesises 
to be parallel to the overall Urgency construct; this does not contra- 
dict the previous assertion that the Uncertainty/Novelty indicators 
are orthogonal to each other. The interpretation of the table is the 
same as for table 6.13a above, with the addition that Factor/Item 
correlations between 10.21 and 10.31 are indicated with a period and a 
colon thus ".: " and correlations between 10.11 and 10.21 are indicated 
with a single period thus ". ". Sign is indicated normally. 
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Table 6.16a: Uncertainty Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
USS01 0.708 
USS02 0.848 
USS03 0.742 . USKO1 0.310 
UST01 0.635 
UST02 
. 0.336 0.306 UST03 0.491 0.318 
UST04 ; =. 
UNX01 0.579 .. UNX02 0.590 
UNX03-0.377 .: UNX04 
UNX05 0.331 
UUPO1 0.422 -0.327 
UUPO2 0.425 0.470 
UUPO3 .:.: -0.505 UUPO4 .. " UUU01 .: -. UUSO1 .:.: 0.357 UUWO1 ...: -0.487 UUR01 
, .:..: UUR02 0.635 -. 
UUFO1 . -.: 0.556 
UUFO2 .: 0.829 UUFO3 0.849 
UCCO1 0.361 0.617 -. 
U0002 0.677 
U0003 0.697 . 
UCR01 0.356 0.600 
UCR02 0.684 
UCR03 -.: 0.560 
Eigenvalue. 5.218 3.363 2.797 
Cum. % var. 16.8 27.7 36.7 
1- See tables 6.10a, b, c and d for descriptions of the 
scale items. 
The Bartlett Test of Sphericity for this analysis was satisfac- 
tory. Sampling adequacy was suspect at 0.454, this value possibly 
reflects the low ratio of cases to variables in the analysis, i. e., 
1.45: 1. Accepting these limitations the above factor structure pro- 
vides reasonable confirmation of the hypothesised structure. Factor 1 
is composed of Scope and Novelty items, US? O? and UNXO?. Factor 2 is 
primarily the Complexity construct, items UC? 0?. Interestingly, Factor 
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3 is not the Urgency construct but the Financial Attractiveness dimen- 
sion of the Urgency construct, i. e., items UUFO1 to UUF03. These three 
items account for 60% of Factor 3's variance. The remaining 9 Urgency 
indicators are distributed approximately evenly between Factors 1 and 
2, typically with average loadings of 0.28 on Factor 1 and 0.22 on 
Factor 2. The correlations between the factors is reproduced below as 
table 6.16b. 
Table 6.16b: Factor Correlation Matrix 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
FACTOR 1 1.000 
FACTOR 2 0.079 1.000 
FACTOR 3 0.037 -0.031 1.000 
This table shows that all three Factor 3 are approximately or- 
thogonal to each other. 
6.3.4.2.2 Information Construct 
For purposes of hypothesis testing the Information construct was 
subdivided into Experience and Process dimensions. We will therefore 
look initially at the factor structure of the Experience dimension, 
defined by Flexibility and Range indicators. 
Factor analysis of the 15 combined Flexibility and Range indica- 
tors extracted 6 factors with Eigenvalues greater than unity. To test 
the presumed dimensionality of the Experience construct the first two 
factors were extracted. The structure matrix produced by oblique 
rotation of these factors is reproduced in table 6.17a below. The 
interpretation of the table is the same as for table 6.16a. 
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Table 6.17a: Information/Experience Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 
IRF01 0.535 
IRF02 0.727 
IRF03 -. .: 
IRF04 0.336 0.601 
IRF05 0.417 
IRF06 0.633 
IRF07 -. 0.690 
IRF08 -. 0.736 
IRF09 . 0.477 IRA01 
IRSO1 .: 0.684 
IF$01 -0.373 -0.492 
IFX02 
IFX03 -0.705 
IFX04 -0.650 -0.403 
Eigenvalue. 2.975 2.235 
Cum. % var. 19.8 34.7 
1- See tables 6.11a and b for descriptions of the scale items. 
The Bartlett, test of sphericity for this analysis was satisfac- 
tory, sampling adequacy was disappointing at 0.454, and the correla- 
tion between the two factors was 0.116. The factor structure illus- 
trated-in table 6.17a is not the simple structure anticipated, i. e., 
Flexibility items loading only on factor 2 say, and Range items on 
factor 1. It is also noted that the Flexibility indicators are nega- 
tively correlated with the Range indicators. As the Flexibility indi- 
cators were derived from Burns and Stalker's (1961) Organic - Mecha- 
nistic polar organisational taxonomy, we may deduce that Organicity is 
negatively associated with procedural Range. In other words its polar 
opposite, Mechanicity, is positively associated with Range. It was 
noted in chapter 4 that, conceptually, procedural Flexibility and 
Range are orthogonal dimensions. The above factor structure indicate 
that the organicity - Mechanicity dimension is not orthogonal to Range 
but in fact, Mechanicity is a measure of Range. The possible relation- 
ship of Burns and Stalker's organic-Mechanistic forms to the procedur- 
al Range and Flexibility dimensions accounting for the observed factor 
structure is illustrated in figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Range, Flexibility and Organicity Dimensions 
High 
Procedural 
Flexibility 
Low 
. 
Low 
, 
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Procedural Range 
In terms of the cybernetic arguments developed in chapter 4 the 
interpretation illustrated in figure 6.3 of the association between 
Range, Flexibility and Organicity is reasonable. Both Range and Flexi- 
bility refer to ways in which an organisation can develop sufficient 
internal variety to match the environmental variety it is subjected 
to. This, it was argued, could be achieved through either a relatively 
small number of flexible procedures, or a larger number of more rigid 
procedures. Both solutions to the organisational design problem are 
cybernetically equally valid and satisfactory. Organic - Mechanistic 
forms therefore represent two successful organisational designs, but 
we conclude that the Organicity construct does not accurately measure 
Flexibility. 
From this description it appears reasonable to argue that the 
Organicity measure used in this study was not a valid measure of the 
Flexibility concept. By reflecting the Organicity measure and describ- 
ing it as a measure of Mechanicity, we have an indicator of the Range 
concept. These reflected Organicity measures will be referenced using 
the labels IMXO1 to IMX04 and will replace IFXO1 to IFX04 in the 
remainder of the thesis. Where it is necessary to refer to a combined 
Range - Mechanicity construct it will be identified as Information 
CAPACITY. Using Capacity in place of the previously defined Experience 
label highlights the notion that the full breadth of the procedural 
Flexibility construct has not been captured in this study. We now turn 
to the Information Process constructs. 
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'Factor analysis of the 27 combined Lubrication and Activity 
indicators extracted 10 factors-with Eigenvalues greater than unity. 
Scree plot inspection indicated three factors underlying the indica- 
tors. These were extracted and the structure matrix produced by 
oblique rotation of the three factor solution is reproduced in table 
6.17b below. The interpretation of the table is-the. same as for table 
6.16a. 41 - 
Table 6.17b: Information Process Structure Matrix 
ITEM1 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 
ILU01 0.460 0.575 
ILU02 0.839 
ILMO1 . .: 0.561 
ILM02 .. 0.745 
ILRO1 0.357 -0.434 0.505'' 
ILRO2 0.525 0.614 
IAA01 0.774 " 
IAA02 0.595 0.631 0.371 
IAA03 0.697 0.501 
IAI03 0.667 
IACO1 .: 0.475 
IAC02 0.407 
IAC03 .: 0.609 0: 323 IAC04 0.309 0.513 
IASO1 0.599 ": 
IAS02 0.673 
IAS03 0.371 0.603 -. 
IASO4 0.220 
IAS05 .`. `0.476 
IAS06 .. t.: 
IAS07 0.541 
IAS08 0.354 
IAS09 0.326 . 
IARO1 0.454 
IAR02 0.422 . .. 
IAR03 0.497 0.383 
IANO1 0.556 0.584 
Eigenvalue. 5.795 2.968 1.827 
Cum. % var. 21.5 32.5 39.2 
The Bartlett test of sphericity for this analysis was satisfac- 
tory. Sampling adequacy was acceptable at 0.494, particularly in view 
of the low cases to variables ratio of 1.7: 1. The above factor struc- 
ture provides reasonable confirmation of the hypothesised Process 
construct. Factor 3 is the Lubrication construct. The Activity con- 
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struct separates into Factors 1 and 2. Factor 1 may be interpreted as 
the Design dimension of Information/Activity, while Factor 2 is the 
Support dimension. These two sub dimensions were noted previously 
during the discussion surrounding table 6.14b. Finally we note that 
factors 2 and 3 are effectively uncorrelated (correlation coefficient 
0.037). Factor 1 (Design) is correlated with Factor 2 (Support, 
r=0.207) and Factor 3 (Lubrication, r=0.248). 
6.3.4.3 Summary 
To summarise the above analysis and discussion it is seen that 
generally the data supports the factorial composition of the primary 
and secondary constructs suggested in chapter 4. Where analysis does 
not clearly support the theoretical structures the discrepancies were 
typically due to two sets of indicators defining a single dimension 
rather than one. Alternatively, explanations for the observed struc- 
tures were found in terms of other structures. within the construct. 
The main exception to this rule is the procedural Flexibility con- 
struct. This, it was argued, appears not to havebeen, fully measured. 
It was therefore replaced by a Nechanicity construct. which is posi- 
tively associated with procedural Range. A new construct was defined 
consisting of Range and Mechanicity indicators and called Capacity. 
Capacity partially captures the Experience concept defined in. chapter 
4. Having established factorial composition (with minor modifications 
in places) we now look at the discriminant validity of the constructs. 
6.3.5 DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY 
, 
Establishing the factorial composition of the primary constructs 
has established the discriminant validity within these constructs. 
Here, we are interested in the discriminant validity between the pri- 
mary constructs. As, explained earlier, the method selected for this 
analysis was Median Correlation. However, medians are tedious to 
calculate (hand computation was necessary and several thousand data 
items are involved) and as the data scales were made to be approxi- 
mately normal, the median will not differ greatly from the mean. The 
results presented below in table 6.18 therefore refer to mean correla- 
tions. 
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Table 6.18: Mean Inter--and Intra=scale Correlations 
SCALE1, 'INTER-2 INTRA-3 
UXX 0.034 0.112 
ICX 0.033 0.113 
IPX 0.052 0.141 
SEX -0.044 0.254 
SCX 0.085 0.368 
1. The scale items are: - 
UXX - Uncertainty 
ICX - Information Capacity 
IPX - Information Process 
SEX - Success Expectation 
SCX -, Success Changes 
2. Mean off-diagonal inter- 
scale correlation. 
3. Mean intra-scale correlation. 
The data in. table 6.18 above presents satisfactory evidence of 
the discriminant validity of the constructs. All inter-scale correla- 
tions are small and less than the intra-scale correlations. 
The remaining trait validity topic to be addressed here is 
internal consistency (i. e., unidimensionality and reliability). This 
topic is closely associated with the overall aim of this chapter to 
construct factor scales of the theoretical constructs. Hence, we will 
address this topic as part of the factor scale. construction issue. 
6.4 FACTOR SCALES CONSTRUCTION 
The basis for constructing factor scales and assessing their 
unidimensionality and reliability has been set out in section 6.3.2.1 
above. Briefly, this involves extracting the first factor from the 
principal components analysis, determining the extent to which it 
satisfies the criteria for uni-dimensionality specified by Carmines 
and Zeller (1979) and evaluating its theta reliability. As single 
factors cannot be rotated the factor weights presented here will 
differ from those presented previously during the discussion of facto- 
rial composition (Section 6.3.4). Interpretation of the weights is the 
same however, namely the contribution to the overall factor of a given 
scale item can be assessed from the magnitude of its weighting. Factor 
scales produced by this procedure are standardised. That is, each 
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factor scale has. a mean value of zero and unit variance across the 
sample of cases for which it was constructed. It should also be noted 
that factor scales are not constructed from factor loadings (which are 
correlation coefficients) but by regressing the factor with the scale 
items., These regression weights (or ß$ coefficients) are not presented 
here as they are not particularly meaningful due to high multicollin- 
iearity between, variables. 
In the, tables that follow, factor loadings for each scale are 
presented. In addition the Eigenvalue of the factor, the number of 
items in the scale and hence the theta reliability of the scale is 
given (based on the formula in section 6.3.2.1). For interest, alpha 
reliabilities are also indicated and placed in brackets. Finally, the 
variance explained by the factor is indicated. 
The uni-dimensionality of a scale was assessed using the four 
criteria suggested by Carmines and Zeller (1979) (section 6.3.2.1). 
One problem when interpreting these criteria is in defining the word 
"most" (criteria 3 and 4). This word is interpreted here as meaning a 
simple majority, i. e., more than 50%. No doubt more demanding inter- 
pretations could be specified. A further problem stems from the re- 
quirement that 40% or more of the variance in the data should be 
explained by the first factor (criterion 1). While this may be a 
reasonable criterion for scales with fewer than 8 or 9 items, for 
scales with substantially more items it becomes unacceptably onerous. 
The policy adopted here has therefore been to reject this criterion if 
the scale achieves satisfactory theta reliability values, of say, 
greater than 0.7. Finally, this study has applied a policy of conser- 
vatism regarding the deletion or retention of scale items. In practice 
this means that if an indicator has survived all previous screening 
processes it will be retained in the final scales, unless there is a 
sound theoretical justification for deleting the item(s). This policy 
is derived from a desire to retain the "richness" of the data, and 
hence the scales. Factor loadings are shown in the following tables 
using the conventions developed in table 6.16a. Initially we look at 
the Uncertainty construct. 
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6.4.1 UNCERTAINTY SCALES 
. Four Uncertainty construct scales-, are presented in table 6.19 
over. These are the overall Uncertainty scale (UXX) the Uncer- 
tainty/Scope (USX) Uncertainty/Urgency (UUX) and Uncertainty/Complex- 
ity (UCX) scales. Note that the Uncertainty/Novelty scale cannot be 
generated by this procedure and was generated by summing the five 
scale items and standardising across the sample. No reliability as- 
sessment for this measure can be made using the available data. 
Table 6.19 indicates an adequate reliability for the overall 
Uncertainty scale UXX. The most notable feature of the scale is the 
effective exclusion of Financial Attractiveness (items UUFO1 to UUFO3) 
from its construction. This implies that considerations of future 
returns from the project were not contributing to the Uncertainty 
(variety) of the project in general and the Urgency of the project in 
particular. It was noted previously that Financial Attractiveness 
contributed substantially to the Uncertainty/Urgency scale (UUX). If 
this scale was to reflect the overall Uncertainty construct it was 
necessary to explicitly exclude items UUFO1 to UUFO3 from the scale's 
construction; as indicated in table 6.19. This change results in an 
Uncertainty/Urgency scale with a reliability indicative of a bi- 
dimensional construct. This supposition is supported by the earlier 
discussion on factorial composition, which identified three factors 
describing the Urgency construct, one of which was Financial Attrac- 
tiveness. Hence, although the reliability of the Uncertainty/Urgency 
construct is relatively low, it is satisfactory for a moderately broad 
construct of two terms (Van De Ven. and Ferry, 1980). Reliabilities of 
both the Uncertainty/Scope (USX) and Uncertainty/Complexity (UCX) 
scales are satisfactory. 
Accepting the above discussion the unidimensionalities of the 
scales are satisfactory. Scale UUX has been discussed above and scale 
UCX unequivocally satisfies all of the criteria for unidimensionality. 
The reliability and unidimensionality of the Scope scale (USX) can be 
improved by explicitly omitting item UST04 (probability of approving a 
capital investment proposal). Retaining the item effectively means the 
calculated reliabilities are conservative. 
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Table 6.19: Uncertainty Scales 
ITEM1 UXX USX UUX UCX 
USS01 0.634 0.788 
USSO2 0.759 0.913 
USS03 0.721 0.802 
USKO1 ., " USTO1 0.520 0.578 
UST02 0.302 0.317 
UST03 0.557 0.562 
UST04 
UNXO1 0.547 
UNX02 0.501 
UNX03 
UNX04 
UNX05 ., 
UUPO1 .,  UUPO2 0.568 0.649 
UUPO3 0.356 0.556 
UUPO4 .. 0.309 UUU01 0.363 
UUSOi 0.323 - 0.315- 
UUW01 0.404 0.434 
UURO1 0.333,0.516 
UUR02 0.585 0.590 
UUFO1 Omitted 
UUFO2 Omitted 
UUFO3 Omitted 
UCCO1 0.601 0.655 
U0002 0.389 0.629 
U0003 0.688 
UCR01 0.584 0.700 
UCR02 0.333 0.751 
UCR03 0.552 
Eigenvalue 5.218 2.904 1.905 2.657 
No. items 31 896 
Reliability 0.835 0.749 0.535 0.748 
(0 and (a)) (0.773) (0.677) (0.505) (0.746) 
% variance 16.8 36.3 21.2 44.3 
1- See tables 6.10a, b, c and d for item descriptions. 
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6.4.2 INFORXATION SCALES 
The overall Information Capacity (ICX) scale is presented in 
table 6.20a together with the individual Range (IRX), and Mechanicity 
(IMX) sub scales. Range items are labelled as in table 6.11b. Mecha- 
nicity items are reflections of the Flexibility items identified in 
table 6.11a. In terms of mechanicity these items are: 
IMX01 Insistence on a uniform managerial style throughout the 
firm. 
IMX02 Emphasis on holding fast to true and tried management 
practices, procedures or principles. 
IMX03 Emphasis on getting line staff personnel-to adhere closely 
ýto; formal job descriptions. 
IMX04 Strict, hierarchy of control and authority using sophisti- 
cated information systems. 
Table 6.20a: Information Capacity Scales 
ITEM ICX IRX IMX 
IRF01 0.477 0.431 
IRF02 0.512 .: 
IRF03 .. IRF04 0.608 0.654 
IRF05 0.399 0.411 
IRF06 0.404 
IRF07 0.304 0.580 
IRF08 0.331 0.636 
IRF09 0.372 0.444 
IRA01 
IRSO1 0.574 0.704 
IMX01 0.569 0.769 
IMX02 0.564 
IMX03 0. . 501 0.662 IMX04 0.719 0.758 
Eigenvalue 2.975 2.377 1.923 
No. items 15 11 4 
Reliability 0.711 0.637 0.640 
(6 and (a)) (0.657) (0.586) (0.635) 
% variance 19.8 21.6 48.1 
Table 6.20a shows that the unidimensionality of the Kechanicity 
scale is satisfactory and reliability is acceptable using Nunnally's 
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(1978) 'criterion. The reliability of the Range scale (IRX) is similar 
to that of Mechanicity, but the unidimensionality is poor. Indeed, of 
the four criteria for assessing unidimensionality, this scale only 
satisfies one; i. e., most of the item loadings are substantial. 
Accepting these observations, it is the author's judgment that in 
order to preserve the breadth of the Range construct, its original 
definition will be retained. Finally we note that the above comments 
about the Range scale also apply to the overall Information Capacity 
scale, although its-reliability is more acceptable. 
The overall' Information Process (IPX) scale is presented in 
table 6.20b together with the individual Lubrication (ILX) and Activi- 
ty (IAX) scales. Lubrication and Activity items are labelled as in 
tables 6.11c and 6.11d. 
Table 6.20b: Information Process Scales 
ITEM IPX ILX IAX 
ILU01 0.535 0.680 
ILU02 0.353 0.765 
ILM01 0.446 0.548 
ILM02 0.403 0.764 
ILRO1 0.682 
ILRO2 0.503 0.746 
IAA01 
IAA02 
IAA03 
IAI01 
IACO1 
0.604 0.567 
0.787 0.800 
0.735 0.780 
0.578 0.591 
0.390 0.433 
IAC02 
IAC03 0.532 0.562 
IAC04 0.465 0.519 
IASO1 0.504 0.470 
IAS02 0.603 0.542 
IAS03 0.437 0.552 
IASO4 
IAS05 .: ": IAS06 : 
IAS07 0.350 0.376 
IAS08 : 
IAS09 0.300 0.342 
IARO1 . IAR02 0.455 0.457 
IAR03 0.485 0.544 
IANO1 0.622 0.705 
Eigenvalue 5.795 2.952 5.134 
No. items 27 6 21 
Reliability 0.859 0.794 0.845 
(e and (a)} (0.815) (0.790) (0.793) 
% variance 21.5 49.2 24.4 
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Table 6.20b provides satisfactory evidence of the reliability 
and unidimensionality of the Lubrication scale (ILX) the Activity 
scale (IAX) and the overall Process scale (IPX). We note also that it 
is the Design dimension of Activity that isýprimarily been highlighted 
in both the Activity'and Process scales. 
6.4.3 SUCCESS SCALE 
Two Success construct scales are presented in table 6.21. These 
are'the Success/Expectations scale, (SEX) and the Success/Changes (SCX) 
scale. Individual scale items are'labelled as in tables 6.12a and 
6.12b. 
Table 6.21: Success Scales 
ITEM SEX 
SEE01 0.597 
SEE02 0.661 
SEE03 0.434 
SEE04 0.819 
SEE05 0.509 
SEA01 0.609 
SEA02 0.526 
SEA03 0.388 
SEA04 0.440 
SES01 0.345 
SES02 0.699 
SES03 0.432 
SESO4 0.671 
SES05 0.715 
SES06 0.396 
SCUO2 
SCC01 
SCS01 
SCSO2 
SCSO3 
scx 
0.472 
0.578 
0.926 
0.737 
0.784 
Eigenvalue 4.818 2.573 
No. items 15 5 
Reliability 0.849 0.764 
(0 and (a)) (0.836) (0.708) 
% variance 32.1 51.5 
, Table 
6.21 indicates adequate reliability and unidimensionality 
of the Expectation (SEX) and Changes (SCX) scales. 
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6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has been concerned with the generation of valid and 
reliable measures of the theoretical constructs outlined in chapter 4, 
for use in hypothesis testing. 
, ý. 
In section 6.1ua simple statistical summary of . 
the data collect- 
ed, for analysis was presented., In section 6.2 focus was placed on 
sampling bias as a threat to the study's internal validity. In this 
discussion contrasts were made between companies participating in the 
study and those contacted but declining to-participate. These two 
groups were compared using primary and secondary data and no statisti- 
cally significant differences between the two groups were found at the 
5% level. Next, the study sample was compared with a representative 
national sample of companies, - again using secondary data. No statisti- 
cally significant differences were identified at the 5% level between 
these two samples in terms of size (number of employees) industry 
sector, or in terms, of diversity, of manufacturing activities. Some 
primary evidence pointed to the possibility that the study sample 
companies perceived themselves to be better than, their major competi- 
tors. This would not however be a threat to the validity of the study 
and overall it was concluded that the study sample was representative 
of all companies contacted as part of the, research and representative 
of companies on a national scale. 
In section'6.3 the question of construct validity and its rele- 
vance to construct measurement was highlighted. Techniques for assess- 
ing trait validity in terms' of factorial composition, discriminant 
validity, reliability and unidimensionality were discussed. Subse- 
quently the factorial composition and discriminant validity of the 
primary' and secondary constructs were investigated. Scale items were 
included or deleted if sound reasons could be proposed for such empir- 
ical adjustments. Factorial compositions were generally found to 
support the theoretical basis of the scales. One major change made 
here was to replace the Information Experience construct with an 
Information Capacity construct. This change was made because the 
Flexibility construct was not adequately captured using the Organicity 
measures employed in the study. Reflection of these measures defined a 
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new construct, Mechanicity. Range and Mechanicity define Capacity. 
Finally discriminant validities we're found to be satisfactory. 
In section 6.4 the reliabilities and"unidimensionalities of the 
primary and secondary constructs were determined. Again some modifica- 
tions were required to the constructs, principally the exclusion of 
Financial Attractiveness from the Uncertainty and Uncertainty/Urgency 
constructs. Following such empirical adjustments to the scales reli- 
abilities and unidimensionalities for the constructs were determined 
to be satisfactory, ' as all theta and alpha reliabilities are within 
ranges reported in the literature and claimed to be "satisfactory" 
(e. g., Miller and Dröge, 1986; Jenkins et. al., 1975; Hackman and 
Oldham, 1975). 
It could be argued that some of the scales reported here achieve 
their reliabilities more by the number of items composing the scale 
than by the inter-correlation between items. To some extent this is 
true but in defence of the study it is observed that many commonly 
used psychometric scale frequently employ tens of scale items. The 
most, extreme case identified was a study by Lundstrom and Lamont 
(cited by Peter, 1981)'t'o reduce a-173 item "Consumer discontent" 
scale to 82 items! It would have been possible in a number of in- 
stances to improve scale reliabilities and unidimensionalities further 
by deleting items. This approach has been avoided however, as the 
automatic pursuit of maximising reliability (beyond a reasonable 
minimum) can only be achieved by reducing the "richness" of the meas- 
ures and therefore the breadth of the construct. How the researcher 
optimises this trade-off is largely a matter of personal preference. 
In this study the tendency was to preserve the "richness" of the data. 
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the study 
sample is representative of the total sample of companies contacted 
for interview and representative of manufacturing companies within the 
U. K. employing 100 or more people. In addition the scales developed 
for the theoretical concepts have satisfactory trait validities. The 
next chapter will use these scales to test the hypotheses developed in 
chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 7' 
DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter aims to utilise measures of the theoretical con- 
structs developed in chapter 6 to investigate the hypotheses developed 
in chapter 4. It is broadly structured into two parts. Part one is 
methodological and sets out the chosen method of statistical analysis 
(Causal modelling) and discusses the issue of statistical- conclusion 
validity. -Part two, the bulk- of the chapter, investigates the rela- 
tionships between the constructs. 
7.1 STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
7.1.1 CAUSAL MODELLING 
Causal modelling is a method consisting of two related tech- 
niques. The first of these is the Simon-Blalock technique, the second 
is Path Analysis. Path analysis in turn is subdivided into Recursive 
and Non-recursive path estimation techniques. The Simon-Blalock tech- 
nique is based on correlational methods, and Partial correlation in 
particular. Path analysis is based on the method of multivariate 
regression. However, the predictions of the Simon-Blalock technique 
also rest upon a regression justification (Asher, 1983). 
7.1.1.1 Comparison with Other Techniques 
Causal modelling differs from other multivariate techniques in 
that it assumes an ordering of the variables in a set (Van de Geer, 
1971). This ordering, represents, causation. Most multivariate tech- 
niques assume independence between the individual explanatory varia- 
bles (xl, x2, etc. ) i. e., x1 and x2 say, are assumed to be orthogonal. 
Any observed association between xl and x2 is therefore assumed to be 
due to some common association with an explained variable (regression) 
or latent variable (factor analysis, canonical correlation). In causal 
analysis this-restriction is removed. By way of illustration, the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 4 predict that Change is dependent 
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upon Uncertainty (Hypothesis 1) and Information Process (Hypothesis 
7). If this was the extent of the hypotheses, Change could be re- 
gressed on Uncertainty and Information to establish the model. Howev- 
er, Hypothesis 3 posits' that Information Process is in its turn also 
determined by Uncertainty. Therefore the assumption of no causal 
relation between the independent explanatory variables is violated for 
regression. Causal analysis enables this type of model to be tested. 
As with any statistical technique, confidence in the results is 
dependent upon the reliability' and validity of the indicators used 
(Asher, 1983). Causal modelling is, however, also dependent upon the 
use of sound theorising in order that the ordering of the variables 
can be attempted. As Asher (1983, p. 10) states: 
"Probably the best advice that one could offer to someone 
contemplating the use of causal modelling is to begin 
with a model in which one has substantial confidence.... 
If one has some confidence in the basic model, then the 
admissible revisions in the model when the data analysis 
is not fully confirmatory (and, it seldom is) are 
limited... One should not allow the testing and revision 
of models to become an enterprise completely determined 
by statistical results devoid of theoretical underpin- 
nings. " 
Asher's comment would therefore indicate that Causal modelling 
is not a technique amenable to data exploration. 
7.1.1.2 The Notion of Causality 
Some of the philosophical problems associated with the word 
"Causality" were addressed in chapter 5 in relation to the discussion 
of validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979; Nunnally, 1967; Green and Tull, 
1970). Similar comments are made by authors writing about the inter- 
pretation of statistical associations. For example, Van de Geer 
(1971, p. 112) comments: 
"... let us state explicitly that correlations never prove 
causal relations. All they can do is to be consistent 
with some causal theory. ... formal analysis of data is 
only one way to arrive at an understanding of the real 
world, and formal analysis is not sufficient by itself. 
It should be guided by what is reasonably known about the 
content to which the data refer. " 
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As the above quotation shows, demonstrating a statistical asso- 
ciation (concomitant variation or co-variation) does not prove causal- 
ity. Further evidence can be accrued if a temporal ordering between 
variables can be demonstrated, although Simon (1957, p. 5) argues that 
the essential aspect of a causal relationship is that it is asymmetri- 
cal in nature and not that it always involves temporal sequences. A 
further condition requires the elimination of other possible causes. 
This condition can be problematical especially as there is a "poten- 
tially infinite universe of such variables and there is no statistical 
test or coefficient that can tell us whether we have made the correct 
decision" (Asher, 1983). The remainder of this study will proceed on 
an "as if" basis, i. e., as if no such confounding variables exist. 
7.1.1.3 Assumptions 
As justification of both the Simon-Blalock technique and Path 
Analysis rests, on the basic regression model, the use of these tech- 
niques requires satisfaction of the assumptions of regression analy- 
sis. Asher (1983) discusses and summarises these assumptions, together 
with the assumption of a linear relationship between the variables and 
the assumption of data measured at the interval level. The last two 
assumptions are important to the use of the Simon-Blalock technique as 
they affect the computation of the Pearson product moment coefficient, 
"r".. Asher advocates the use of scatter plots to visually inspect the 
nature of the associations between variables. This procedure was 
adopted here and indicated no noticeable non-linear associations to 
exist between variables used in the causal analysis. 
We addressed the question of interval vs. ordinal level measur- 
ing scales in chapter 5. The conclusion was that the use of ordinal 
data in place of interval data to compute product moment coefficients 
would not be a serious problem. This is particularly true when, as in 
this study, scales are constructed by aggregating several ordinal 
measures together. Such scales will approach the interval measure 
assumption. A test of this assumption is provided by comparing the 
correlation matrix between major theoretical constructs calculated 
using Pearson's product-moment coefficient with the matrix of Spearman 
rank-order correlations; table 7.1. Pearson's coefficient assumes data 
Page 216 
measured at the, interval level; Spearman is a non-parametric coeffi- 
cient requiring only ordinal level data., If the two sets of - coeff i- 
cients are similar, then'similar conclusions are likely regarding 
associations implied by the data (Sorensen and Zand, 1975). 
Table 7.1: Comparison of Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
SEMI-MATRIX , SEMI-MATRIX OF SPEARMAW CORRELATICN COEFFICIENTS 
OF PEARSCV (Above diagonal) 
CORRELATIONS uxx IRX DIC ILX IAX SIX 
(Below diagonal) 
Uncertainty - 0.622 0.615 -0.504 
Range - 0.296 0.112 0.190 
Mechanisity 0.282 - 0.159 0.363 
Lubrication 0.130 0.161 - 0.208 0.297 
Activity 0.640 0.157 0.348 0.321 - 0.448 -0.242 
Change .. 0.648 0.442 - 
Ecpectation -0.433 0.149 -0.254 - 
^ NIMIDIIt OF OBSERVATIONS: 45 
Note: All correlation of ±0.10 or less have been omitted from the 
table. 
Minimum size for Pearson coefficient to be significant at 
p=0.10 is ±0.25. 
Inspection of table 7.1 indicates similar signs and magnitudes 
for the majority of significant elements, hence it is concluded that 
the use of ordinal level data would not influence the analytical 
results. The linearity and interval level data assumptions of the 
analysis are therefore not violated to any significant extent. 
With respect to the assumptions of regression analysis Asher 
(1983) concludes that the technique is "adequately robust" to the 
problems of heteroscedasticity and non-normality. In chapter 6 data 
transformations were used to minimise violations of the normality 
assumption. Asher further discusses the problem of multicollinearity, 
noting that this is not viewed as a problem by some analysts if the 
correlation level between variables does not exceed the 0.7 or 0.8 
level. Finally, the t-test used within this study to test the signifi- 
cance of a correlation is also known to be robust, particularly for 
sample sizes of 20 or more (Manly, 1986). 
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In conclusion, the assumptions underpinning the causal modelling 
techniques and significance tests to be used in this study should not 
present serious problems to its validity. 
7.1.1.4 Overview of Techniques 
7.1.1.4.1 The Simon-Blalock Technique 
This technique is based in Simon's work into spurious correla- 
tions. Specifically, what are the conditions under which a non zero 
correlation between two variables provides evidence for inferring the 
existence of a causal relationship between, the two (Asher, 1983). 
Starting from a postulated causal model the researcher identifies the 
partial correlations which should vanish and which should not. In 
determining these partial correlations the researcher controls for 
"all variables which are either antecedent to, or intervening between, 
the particular variables being related, but they do not involve con- 
trols for variables taken to be dependent upon both of these varia- 
bles" (Blalock, 1972, p. 23). I- 
Consider the formula for a first-order partial correlation 
between variables a and b controlling for variable c, viz., 
r= (r -rr )/T((1 - r2). (1 - rT) ) ab. c ab ac* bc ac bc 
For the partial to vanish rab-must equal the product of rac and 
rbc and be smaller in magnitude than either rac or rbc. This relation- 
ship provides a quick test of the model and can be extended to higher 
order partial correlations. The major advantage, therefore, of the 
Simon-Blalock technique over Path Analysis, is that it provides a 
fairly rapid way of testing alternative models in order that those 
most compatible with the data may be selected (Blalock, 1972). The 
magnitudes of the correlation coefficients also provide data on the 
size of the associations between variables. The method is, however, 
restricted to recursive models only, i. e., models with no reciprocal 
association between variables. It also provides "very meagre" informa- 
tion about the strength of a linkage (Asher, 1983). Asher therefore 
recommends the use of path analysis to investigate the magnitude of 
the linkages between variables. 
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7.1.1.4.2 Path Analysis 
The basis of Path Analysis is regression. For recursive models 
the simplest approach is to use ordinary least squares. For non-recur- 
sive models techniques such as two stage least squares are required. 
One of the debates surrounding the technique is whether or not to use 
standardised coefficients in the regression models. Asher (1983) 
summarises this debate and concludes that it is more appropriate to 
use standardised coefficients "if one wants to make statements about 
the relative importance of independent variables within populations". 
As this summarises the aim of this study, it justifies the use of 
scales derived'from standardised factor scores. 
The basic aim of Path Analysis is to specify a set of linear 
equations that are equivalent to a postulated causal diagram. The 
dependent variable in an equation is one of the variables in the 
model. If a variable is not determined by any other variable in the 
model it is referred to as an exogenous variable. If determined by 
other variables it is called an endogenous variable. The regression 
coefficients (ß weights if the variables are in standardised form) are 
called path coefficients. The equations themselves are called struc- 
tural equations. However, a model defined solely in terms of exogenous 
and endogenous variables is unrealistic as it implies complete deter- 
mination of the whole model by only the exogenous variables (Van de 
Geer, 1971). Therefore, an unobserved or 'residual factor is included 
representing items not actually measured but which impinge upon the 
endogenous variables (Asher, 1983). The principal assumptions on which 
the Path Analysis technique is based (besides those mentioned previ- 
ously as common to regression analysis in general) centre upon the 
residual terms. There are three such assumptions: 
1. No residuals are attached to exogenous variables. 
2. Residual terms are uncorrelated with each other. 
3. Residuals are uncorrelated with any other variables 
in the model. 
Solving a particular system of structural equations produces 
estimates for the path coefficients. These can be used to calculate 
the correlations between variables in the model by the application of 
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what, Duncan (1966) termed the "basic theorem of path analysis", i. e., 
I 
r1ý 
q 
AQ 1Q 
Dý 
where i and j, denote two variables in the system and q runs over 
all variables from, which paths lead directly to variable i. 'p' are 
the estimated path coefficients and 'r' product moment coefficients. 
In addition the magnitudes of the path coefficients yield information 
on the change produced in one, variable by a specified change in anoth- 
er (Asher, 1983). 
In summary, this study will use (where appropriate) the Simon- 
Blalock technique to investigate the causal structure of a model and 
path analysis to investigate the magnitude of the linkages between 
variables. 
7.1.2 STATISTICAL CONCLUSION VALIDITY 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 39) identify three questions associat- 
ed with the statistical analysis 
, 
of. covariance structures. These were 
mentioned in section 5.1.1 and concern the issues of statistical 
power, statistical significance and Effect Size. While Cook and Camp- 
bell viewed statistical conclusion validity primarily in terms of 
statistical significance, a number of authors in the 1980's have 
focused attention on the issues of power and effect size; see Sawyer 
and Ball (1981) Mazen et. al. (1987) Baroudi and Orlikowski' (1989). 
The principal comment made by these authors is that neglect of these 
issues has given rise to spurious and contradictory findings within 
their disciplines. In addition, many of these contradictory findings 
can'be attributed to some of the studies having inadequate statistical 
power and by focusing only on the studies with adequate power levels, 
many of the contradictions disappear. 
Briefly the "power" of a statistical test is the probability 
that the test will correctly reject the null hypothesis. This is given 
by (1 - ß) where ß is the Type II error rate. The "significance" of a 
statistical test is the probability that the test will incorrectly 
reject the null hypothesis. This is given by a where a is the Type I 
error rate. Type I and Type II errors are discussed in most introduc- 
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tory'statistical texts, e. g;, Mendenhall et. al. (1986). Finally, 
"Effect Size" is a measure of-the "degree to which the phenomenon 
under study is manifested and is an "index of 'degree of departure 
from the null hypothesis" (Cohen, 1969, p. 10). This statement is usual- 
ly interpreted as meaning the proportion of variance explained by the 
proposed association. In, the above discussion of causal modelling it 
was indicated that the product moment coefficient (r) was to be used 
to demonstrate causal associations. In this instance the effect size 
is simply determined by-the value of r2. (Methods for determining the 
effect size of other types of statistical test are given by Cohen, 
1969 and 1977). 
Effect size is a property of the particular relationship under 
investigation; it, is not determined by the size of the sample. The 
attained level of'statistical significance is determined by the sample 
size and is not-indicative of Effect Size (Sawyer and Ball, 1981). The 
statistical power attained is determined positively by the Effect Size 
and sample size and negatively by the chosen significance level. Cohen 
(1969, p. 5) commenting on this last point, says: 
"An investigator can set the risk of false null hypothesis 
rejection at a vanishingly small level, say a=0.001, but 
in so doing, he may reduce-the power of his test to 0.10" 
(i. e., ß=0.90). 
In this example the ß/a_ratio is 900 to 1. In other words this 
investigator is implicitly stating that a Type I error (mistakenly 
rejecting the null hypothesis) is 900 times more serious than a Type 
II error (mistakenly accepting the null hypothesis). While there is a 
case to be made in favour of the seriousness of the Type I error over 
the Type II error, Cohen suggests this should typically be in the 
order of 4 to 1 and recommends that experimental designs should aim to 
achieve an a level of 0.05 and aß level of 0.20, i. e., a power of 
0.80. Using a less stringent significance level criteria than the 
"conventional" 0.05 can be justified, if so doing improves the power 
of the analysis. Sawyer and Ball (1981) for example, cite a study in 
which a significance level of 0.25 was adopted in order to mitigate 
the effects of low power. In addition these authors recommend that an 
investigator should aim for higher power in basic theoretical research 
than in applied research. It is not therefore necessarily detrimental 
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to the conclusions of a study if a minimum significance level of 0.10 
is adopted for these reasons. In the analysis that follows, a minimum 
significance criteria ofri0.10 has been adopted. Finally, it is noted 
that a one-tailed significance test is more powerful than a two-tailed 
test. In terms of causal modelling, which aims to test directional 
hypotheses, one-tailed tests are justified. 
The final question to be addressed in this section is, what 
Effect Size can this study measure? To assist with answering this 
question Cohen (1969) introduced a heuristic method of categorising 
Effect Size as being either Large, Medium or Small. A Large Effect 
Size is an association explaining approximately 25% of the variance. A 
Medium Effect Size accounts for approximately 9% and a Small Effect 
Size 1% of the variance. In terms of the product moment coefficient 
(r) these Effect Sizes translate as: 
Table 7.2: Effect Size and Pearson's "r" 
Effect Size r 
Large 0.50 
Medium 0.30 
Small 0.10 
Cohen demonstrates that interpreting. Effect Size in this way is 
meaningful in terms of the, types of associations found within the 
behavioural sciences, and views the Medium Effects Size as a "very 
important" level as "Many of the correlation coefficients encountered 
in behavioural science are of this order of magnitude... ". 
7.1.2.1 Statistical Power Analysis 
So what Effect Sizes can this study detect? The sample size is 
fixed at 45 cases. With reference to the tables presented by Cohen 
(1969, pp. 81-92) for the significance of product moments the following 
data has been extracted. Table 7.3 indicates the product moment coef- 
ficients corresponding to three levels of Effect Size at three levels 
of statistical significance (p=0.10,0.05 and 0.01) for both 1-tailed 
(a') and 2-tailed (a") tests. 
Page 222 
Table 7.3:. Power (%) of t-test of Product Moment r 
Effect Equivalent CL' (N=45) a" 
Size r 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.01 
LARGE 0.50 99 97 90 97 94 84 
MEDIUM 0.30 77 65 38 65 53 29 
SMALL 0.10 26 16 5 17 10 3 
. 
Inspection of Table 7.3 indicates that 
, 
the current study is 
capable of detecting "Strong" Effect Sizes with satisfactory power at 
significance levels of. 1% and better. Medium Effect Sizes can be 
detected with satisfactory power at a significance level of 10% using 
a 1-tailed test and with reasonable power using a 2-tailed test. Small 
Effect Sizes cannot be detected with any confidence by this study. 
It. is possible using tables presented by Cohen to determine the 
sample size-required to detect a specified Effect Size. Based on 
Cohen's recommendation of a=0.05 and Power (170=0.80 the sample size 
required to detect a small Effect is 618 for a 1-tailed test and 783 
for a 2-tailed. test. A comparison. between the significance (a) and 
power (1-ß) of the t-test to detect the hypothesis r#0 is presented 
in table 7.4 below for 1- and 2-tailed tests and a sample size of 45 
cases. In table 7.4 a single prime (') indicates a 1-tailed test, a 
double prime (") a 2-tailed test. 
Table 7.4: Significance and Power of t-test. 
Critical r% Power at critical r 
a r' r" 1- ß' 1- ß" 
0.10 0.19 0.25 53 51 
0.05 0.25 0.30 51 53 
0.01 0.35 0.38 48 50 
The most striking feature of table 7.4 is that (within the accu- 
racy of interpolation of the tables) the power of the t-test is con- 
stant at about 51% at the critical r value, irrespective of the sig- 
nificance level or direction of the test. Hence the minimum power 
achieved by any statistically significant correlation coefficient 
presented in this study will be better than 50%. 
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The-above analysis has been based on the full sample size of 45 
cases. This sample size is equivalent to'performing a t-test with 43 
degrees of freedom (d. f. ). This in turn isý equivalent to testing, a 
zero order partial correlation coefficient. A-first order partial 
correlation using this sample -will have, 42 d. f., with one d. f. being 
removed for each successively higher order of partial correlation. A 
fifth order partial correlation- will therefore be-performed with 38 
d. f., which is-equivalent to testing a zero-order partial with a 
sample size, of-40; cases. A significant part of the following data 
analysis is based on partial correlations, hence it is necessary to 
determine the effect-on the above power analysis of testing these 
higher order cases. Arbitrarily selecting a sample size of 40, then 
(with reference to table 7.1 above) the powers of the t-test is de- 
creased for large effects by 1 to 2 percentage points for a=0.05 and 
0.10, and by 5 to 6 points for a=0.01, irrespective of direction. For 
medium effects the decrease in power is of the order of 4 to 5 per- 
centage points and for weak effects one percentage point, irrespective 
of test a or direction. It is concluded, therefore, that the above 
analysis is robustito the use of partial correlations (up to order 5) 
and that the power of the analysis is satisfactory. 
Finally it should be noted that power, significance and Effect 
Size are all basic aspects of statistical conclusion validity (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979). The above analysis indicates that this study will 
have satisfactory statistical conclusion validity for correlations of 
about 0.30 and above. Cook and Campbell (1979) identify a number of 
other threats to statistical conclusion validity, notably using meas- 
ures of low reliability and violating the assumptions of statistical 
tests. Both of these issues were-addressed and resolved in chapter 6. 
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7.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
The starting point'for this analysis is the system of hypotheses 
developed in chapter 4. Hypotheses -1 to 8 can be represented using a 
"path diagram". This path diagram, referred to as Model I, is illus- 
trated in figure 7.1. In this diagram 'boxes represent primary con- 
structs and hypotheses are represented by lines. The direction of the 
hypothesis (line) is indicated by the direction of the arrow. A-posi- 
tive association is represented by a "+", a negative association by a 
"-" symbol. The scales used to measure each primary construct are also 
indicated. These scales are defined in chapter 6. Note that figure 7.1 
differs from figure 4.2 in that the Information Experience construct 
is replaced by an Information Capacity construct, and procedural 
Flexibility (IFX) is replaced by Mechanicity (IMX). The reason for 
these changes was given in chapter 6 as being 'due to the Flexibility 
construct-not been fully measured. Note, however, that the hypothe- 
sised relationships involving Experience developed in chapter 4 also 
apply, without modification, to the Capacity construct. This change in 
definition does not therefore substantively effect any previous argu- 
ments. ' 
Figure 7.1: Initial Hypotheses Path Diagram. (Model I) 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 are implicit in figure 7.1 through the 
absence of paths between Uncertainty and Capacity, and between Change 
and Expectation. 
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7.2.1 MODEL I 
The model illustrated in figure 7. l-was investigated using the 
Simon-Blalock- technique. The specific predictions of the model are 
that the correlation between Uncertainty and Capacity and the third 
order partial correlation coefficient between Change and Expectation, 
controlling for -- Uncertainty, Capacity and' Process (hypotheses 9 and 
10) should be zero. The product moment andýthird, order partial corre- 
lations for this model are presented below in tables 7.5a and 7.5b. 
In tables 7.5a and b, and in subsequent tables, correlations in 
bold type are significant at 'the. 0.01 level, in normal type at the 
0.05-level and in italic type at the 0.10 level. Non significant 
correlations are enclosed in parentheses. If the correlation refers to 
a directional hypothesis the significance levels refer to one-tailed 
tests, else they refer to two-tailed tests. Note also that as Uncer- 
tainty and Capacity are both exogenous variables, their zero order 
correlations are also univariate ß regression weights, i. e., standar- 
dised path coefficients. The correlations in table 7.5a therefore 
provide direct evidence for or'against hypotheses 1 to 6 and 9. 
Table 7.5a: Zero order partial correlations*, 'Model I. 
Scale UXX ICX IPX SEX SCX 
UXX 1.000 
ICX (0.008) 1.000 
IPX 0.550 0.387 1.000 
SEX -0.433 (0.052) (-0.172) 1.000 
SCX 0.648 (0.025) 0.343 (-0.037) 1.000 
Table 7.5b: Third order partial correlations, Model I. 
Controlling for UXX, ICX and IPX 
Scale SEX SCX 
SEX 1.000 
SCX 0.356 1.000 
* The zero order partial correlation coefficient is the same as the 
Pearson product moment coefficient (r) between the two variables. 
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Focussing on associations with Uncertainty, inspection of table 
7.5a provides confirmation of hypotheses one, . two and three, namely 
that uncertainty is positively causal to Change, negatively causal to 
Expectation and positively causal to Information Process. Looking at 
the associations with Capacity, table 7.5a provides evidence in 
support of hypothesis 6 (accepting that hypotheses formulated in terms 
of Experience are the same when formulated in terms of Capacity). 
Table 7.5a also supports hypothesis, 9, that Uncertainty and Capacity 
are uncorrelated (r=0.008). The correlations do not provide evidence 
in, support of hypotheses 4 and 5 however. Indeed the association 
between- Capacity and Change is not only statistically insignificant, 
but is in the opposite direction to that expected, i. e., positive 
instead of negative. This observation may be due to random error, so 
in future analyses we will dispense with Capacity and treat Mechanici- 
ty and Range as two separate exogenous variables. Note that the asso- 
ciation between Capacity and Expectation is in the anticipated direc- 
tion but is also statistically insignificant. 
Superficially the correlation between Process and Change appears 
to confirm hypothesis 7. -However, the correlation of 0.343 is approxi- 
mately equal to the product of the correlation between Uncertainty and 
Process-(0.550) and Uncertainty and Change (0.648) i. e., 0.356. Like- 
wise the correlation between Process and Expectation is approximately 
equal to the product 0.550x(-0.433) i. e., '-0.238. This indicates that 
both of °these correlations are spurious, and that the second order 
partial correlation, controlling for Uncertainty and Capacity would 
vanish. Further analysis confirms this supposition. Finally, inspec- 
tion of table 7.3b indicates that the third order partial between the 
two success indicators is significant at the 5% level and not negligi- 
ble as predicted by hypothesis 10. 
In summary, the basic causal model (Model I) satisfactorily 
accounts for the effect of Uncertainty on the system and Information 
Capacity on Process. The model however indicates a negligible influ- 
ence for Capacity or Process on either Success measure, contrary to 
prediction. Uncertainty and Capacity are uncorrelated as expected, 
but the two success measures are positively associated, contrary to 
expectation. Next we'will attempt to understand the failure of some of 
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the hypothesised associations to be demonstrated, initially by focus- 
ing on hypothesis 10, the association between Change and Expectation. 
7.2.2 MODEL II 
Change and Expectation were conceptualised as orthogonal dimen- 
sions of implementation Success because they relate to two mutually 
exclusive forms of organisational adaptation or change. These two 
types of adaptation were illustrated in figure 4.1 and represent 
adaptation through extension of an existing procedure or creation of a 
new procedure. A single project would influence many of the organisa- 
tion's essential variables and therefore both types of adaptation 
would occur. However, there is no basis for assuming that the extent 
of one type of adaptation would influence the extent of the other 
type. The constructs designed to measure these two types of adapta- 
tion, Change and Expectation, are therefore logically independent. 
Hence, the association observed above is likely to be a feature of the 
reification of these constructs. 
A further review of the items composing the Change and Expecta- 
tion scales, together with the evidence accrued from the factor analy- 
sis in chapter 6, suggests that the Expectation construct could be 
dichotomised into an Ease/Accuracy measure and a Satisfaction measure. 
. 
This, -is demonstrated by the factor analysis presented in table 6.15a. 
This dichotomisation is further supported on substantive grounds by 
noting that the scale items loading predominately on factor 2 
(Ease/Accuracy) are measuring technical aspects of success. Items on 
factor 1 (Satisfaction) could be interpreted as managerial measures of 
success (e. g., valid solution to the original stimulus for the 
project; achieved expected financial returns). To investigate the 
effect of dichotomising Expectation two new factor scales were con- 
structed. These were a9 item Success/Ease scale (SEE) and a6 item 
Success/Satisfaction scale (SES). Ease was composed of the Ease/Accu- 
racy items SEE01 to SEA04 (see table 6.12a) and Satisfaction from 
items SESO1 to SES06. The factor loadings etc., for these two scales 
are presented in table 7.6. In table 7.6 the Eigenvalue and % variance 
refer to the first unrotated factor. 
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Table 7.6: Ease (SEE). and Satisfaction (SES) Scales. 
ITEM SEE 
SEE01 0.751 
SEE02 0.603 
SEE03 0.567 
SEE04 0.795 
SEE05 0.716 
SEA01 0.606 
SEA02 0.516 
SEA03' 0.556 
SEA04 0.532, 
SESO1 
SES02 
SES03 
-SESO4 
SES05 
SES06 
SES 
0.475 
0.885 
0.608 
0.713 
0.823 
0.593 
Eigenvalue 3.620 2.915 
No. items 96 
9 Reliability 0.814 0.788 
% variance 40.2 48.6 
Skewness -0.295 -1.526 
It will be noted that the skewness of the Satisfaction scale is 
greater than unity. However, as the items composing the scale had been 
transformed once (the skewness of a Satisfaction scale based upon the 
raw data is -2.513) it was decided not to apply further transforms. In 
addition the pattern and magnitude of correlations involving the scale 
is not substantially effected by the transformation (appendix D) 
suggesting, further transformation is unnecessary. 
Having dichotomised the Expectation scale it is reasonable to 
expect the Ease and Satisfaction scales to be positively associated. 
It is also reasonable for Ease to take on the theoretical interpreta- 
tion previously ascribed to Expectation, hence we expect Ease and 
Change to be uncorrelated. Change must be positively associated with 
Satisfaction to account for the observed correlation presented in 
table 7.5b above. This proposition appears to be plausible on the 
grounds that managerial satisfaction is likely to reflect the essen- 
tially technical criteria of Ease and also the social aspects of 
Change. In addition it is reasonable to presume that Satisfaction is 
causally dependent upon Ease and Change and not vice-versa. 
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- The specific' test of interest at, this stage is that the fifth 
order partial correlation between Change and Ease controlling for 
Uncertainty, Range, Mechanicity, Process and Satisfaction, should 
vanish. However, as Satisfaction is dependent upon Ease and Change 
this partial cannot be calculated as the Simon-Blalock technique does 
not allow for the control of variables dependent upon the particular 
variables being related. Instead the fourth order partial between 
Change, Ease and Satisfaction, controlling for Uncertainty, Mechanici- 
ty, Range and Process, -'will be calculated and inspected to see if the 
correlation between Change and Ease is spurious. The correlation 
matrix-is presented in Table 7.7a below. 
Table 7.7a: Fourth order partial correlations, Model II; 
Controlling for UXX, IMX, IRX and IPX 
Scale SCX SEE SES 
Scx 1.000 
SEE (0.226) 1.000 
SES 0.394 0.527 1.000 
The correlation between Change and Ease (0.226) is approximately 
equal to 0.394x0.527, i. e., 0.208 and we conclude that the association 
between Change and Ease is spurious. Thus, accepting that Ease re- 
places Expectation, hypothesis 10 is demonstrated. 
Having established the causal path between the (now) three 
Success constructs it is necessary to revise the paths between these 
constructs and Uncertainty and Information constructs. Substantively 
the only modification made to model I is to separate Satisfaction from 
Expectation. Hence the model I hypotheses still apply if Ease is 
substituted for Expectation. The question is then reduced to whether 
Uncertainty and Information constructs are causally related to Satis- 
faction. The Satisfaction concept was developed in chapter 4 as being 
related to a willingness to repeat the project and an overall sense of 
"a-job-well-done" (section 4.3.6). It appears reasonable to assume 
therefore, that Satisfaction will be influenced by what the organisa- 
tion did. In other words by the Information Process constructs not by 
the exogenous constructs Uncertainty, Mechanicity and Range which 
represent what the organisation or project is. On the basis of this 
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argument it is - predicted that the exogenous variables Uncertainty, 
Mechanicity and procedural Range, will have no direct influence upon 
Satisfaction. Information Process, being behaviourally determined, 
would be expected to directly and causally, influence Satisfaction. In 
addition, Zand and Sorensen (1975) found that items subsumed within 
the secondary Process construct, - Lubrication, were associated with 
success measures such as Satisfaction. In fact their success measures 
were used here as the basis for constructing Satisfaction (see chapter 
5). Thus, we would expect there to be an association between Informa- 
tion and Satisfaction. These arguments lead us to the final form of 
Model II, which is illustrated in figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: Revised Causal Model. (Model II) 
For simplicity we have retained the Capacity construct in figure 
7.2. In subsequent evaluations we will use the Range and Mechanicity 
constructs. Paths p4, p5 and P6-will therefore be evaluated using 
subscripts 'r' and 'm' to denote Range and Mechanicity. 
Using the Simon-Blalock technique the specific prediction of 
Model II is that the third order partial correlations between Uncer- 
tainty, Range, Mechanicity and Satisfaction, controlling for Process, 
Change and Ease, will vanish. The value calculated for these partial 
correlations are, 0.003 between Uncertainty and Satisfaction, -0.003 
between Mechanicity and Satisfaction and 0.136 between Range and 
Satisfaction. These correlations are sufficiently close to zero to 
support the hypothesis of the non-existence of these paths. 
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The recursive causal model illustrated in figure 7.2 can be ex- 
pressed-in terms of the following structural equation system: - 
IPX = p3. UXX + p6r'IRX +. p6m. IMX + pPeP 
SCX = p1"UXX ± P4r'IRX + p4m. IMX + p7. IPX + pCeC 
SEE = p2. UXX + p5r. IRX + p5m. IMX + p8. IPX + pEeE 
SES = p9. IPX + p10-. SCX + p11. SES + pSeS 
Where ei are standardised residuals and Pi (i = P, C, E and S) 
are path coefficients for the residuals. These residual path coeffi- 
cients are not calculated as regression weights but are estimated 
from: - 
pi =J(1-Ri8) 
Where Rig is the square of the appropriate multiple correlation coef- 
ficient (Asher, 1983). 
The above system of structural equations was solved using the 
MGLH procedure within the SYSTAT computer package. The path coeffi- 
cients are reported below in table 7.7d. Significance levels of the t- 
values for the coefficients are indicated as for table 6.5a. 
Table 7.7b: Path coefficients, Model II. 
tüoC IRR fl IPX SIX SEE SES 
LüIX 
IRX -- 
IrlX --- 
IPX , 0.586 (0.103) 0.359 - 
SIX 0.667 (0.022) (0.011) (-0.031) - 
SEE -0.669 (-0.023) (-0.038) (0.074) -- 
SES --- (0.117) 0.383 0.577 
Residual ---0.679 0.762 0.780 
A '-' indicates a non existent path. 
0.799 
Page 232 
Inspection of figure 7.7b indicates no major departure from the 
significant paths previously identified using partial correlations. 
Specifically we note that dichotomising Expectation has strengthened 
the association between Uncertainty and Ease. The association between 
Information Process and Capacity (Hypothesis 6) is due almost entirely 
to Mechanicity. Finally, the associations between Information and 
Success measures are, as noted for Model I, not statistically signifi- 
cant; although there is weak evidence for the hypothesised link be- 
tween Process and Satisfaction. Note that it is quite typical for 
residual path coefficients to be of the magnitude reported (see Asher, 
1983; Blalock, 1972; Duncan, 1966). 
Having amassed two items of evidence against the existence of 
'direct causal links between exogenous Information variables and Suc- 
cess variables, a further test for these links was made using the 
technique of moderated regression analysis. This technique is summa- 
rised by Covin and Slevin (1988) as: 
"moderated regression analysis is an appropriate technique 
for testing hypothesised contingency relationships since 
it allows interaction effects, which are implied in all 
contingency relationships, to be directly examined. In 
moderated regression analysis, the statistical signifi- 
cance of interaction effects is tested by regressing the 
dependent variable on two (or more) main variables (one 
being the independent variable, the other the hypothe- 
sised moderator variable) and the cross-product of those 
main variables. " 
Specifically we will test to see if the exogenous Information 
variables Range and Mechanicity influences the relationship between 
Uncertainty and Success. As Uncertainty, Range and Mechanicity are all 
exogenous variables they do not violate the assumption of the regres- 
sion model of independent regressors. The regression equations to be 
solved are: 
(1) Y=a+b1. U 
(2) Y=a+ b1. U + b2. X 
(3) Y=a+ bl. U + b2. X + b3. U. X 
Where, in equations (1) to (3) above, Y refers to Change or 
Ease, U to Uncertainty and X is Range or Mechanicity or Capacity. As 
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we are using standardised variables the regression constants 'a' will 
all be zero and regression coefficients -will be ß's. We know from 
table 7.7b that the regression coefficients for U (Al) are significant 
and that those for X alone (ß2) are not. The specific question being 
addressed here is whether the cross-product coefficients (03) are 
significant, or not. If they are significant, then this is evidence that 
exogenous Information variables do influence Success. If not, we are 
forced to conclude that exogenous Information constructs do not effect 
Success. Performing the moderated, regression analyses, failed to iden- 
tify any significant cross-product coefficients. 
In summary, Model II appears to provide a satisfactory explana- 
tion of the Expectation - Change association identified in Model I but 
still no evidence to support the hypothesised Information - Success 
paths. In particular there is no evidence in support of the exogenous 
Information - Success paths. This is not to say such paths do not 
exist, but that this study does not have sufficient power to detect 
them. We conclude therefore that hypotheses 4 and 5 of chapter 4 are 
spurious and we will not actively pursue them further. However, it is 
unreasonable to assume that there are no associations between Informa- 
tion constructs and Success. We therefore focus our attention on 
possible reasons for not having detected evidence to support hypothe- 
ses 7 and, 8, i. e., associations between Information Process and Suc- 
cess. .. 
7.2.3 MODEL III 
Before attempting to identify reasons for the absence of the 
hypothesised Information Process - Success paths, it will be instruc- 
tive, to review the assumptions underpinning the construction of the 
Information Process scale and see what evidence exists to indicate the 
strengths of likely associations. 
7.2.3.1 Strength of Association 
The basic idea underpinning the construction of the Information 
Process measure was, what activities did the organisation perform that 
would have contributed to variety reduction? As such, the construct 
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was divided into two secondary constructs. First was Lubrication, a 
measure relating to the management and social/behavioural interaction 
carried out during the project. This measure was based in the Lewin- 
Schein theory of change and covered all stages of the project from 
pre-approval planning to final operation. Second was Activity. This 
measure was based upon indicators designed to capture the extent of 
formal analysis, the interaction or communication occurring and the 
search for information, from both' internal and-external sources. In 
order to preserve a temporal asymmetry and thereby preserve a causal 
direction, the Activity measures were restricted to the pre-approval 
planning phase of the project. These two secondary constructs were 
aggregated using factor analysis to generate an overall Information 
Process measure which, it turns out, is dominated by the Activity 
construct and the Design dimension of Activity in particular. (See 
discussion of table 6.20b, chapter 6). Before elaborating on this 
observation it will be instructive to review some additional data 
collected in the study and not used so far. 
One of the questionnaire items was designed to measure (in 
relative terms) the stage of the project when maximum organisational 
learning occurred. The actual wording is "which [stage] made the 
greatest contribution to the reduction of uncertainty or resolution 
and identification of problemstetc., with the project". The project 
was divided into the four stages (defined in chapter 5) of, Pre- 
approval, Installation, Commissioning and Operation. The question 
design was based upon the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980) and 
was able to yield a ranking in terms of the relative importance of 
each stage. That is, not simply that A is greater than B, but what 
fraction of the total learning a particular stage accounted for. The 
learning contributed by all of the project stages was therefore unity. 
It should be noted that not all of the capital projects investigated 
conformed to this four stage model of a project; one for example never 
came into operation. If a stage was omitted, then it was simply as- 
signed a value of zero. The analysis of this question is summarised in 
the Box plot illustrated in figure 7.3 below. For a description of the 
Box plot see Velleman and Hoaglin (1981). The Box plot in figure 7.3 
differs slightly from the standard form in two respects. First, an "X" 
has been used to represent the mean of the data. Second, the paren- 
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theses indicate "notches" which define a simultaneous confidence 
interval around the median. If the intervals of two boxes do not 
overlap, then the two population medians are different, at about the 
95% level of confidence. Finally grouping Box plots in-the manner used 
in figure 7.3 provides a graphical analogue to the one way analysis of 
variance, using rank order statistics instead of means (Wilkinson, 
1987). 
Figure: 7.3: Box chart for project Learning 
Fraction of learning (variety reduction). 
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The major conclusion of this analysis is that organisational 
learning (as defined in this study, chapter 4) predominantly occurs 
after the project's planning- or design stage. The two "hands-on" 
stages, commissioning and operation, contribute nominally two thirds 
of the organisational learning associated with the project. This 
finding is compatible with the finding of Burglman (1988) that organ- 
isations "learn by doing". Importantly, for the discussion at hand, 
the pre-approval stage learning (that measured by the Information 
Activity construct) accounts for less than 20% of the total project 
learning. This may be a fairly crude method of measurement but it 
suggests that in terms of variety reduction, the pre-approval stage 
only accounts for a small proportion of the total. This finding, taken 
together with the observation that Information Activity dominates the 
Information Process scale and only refers to the pre-approval stage of 
the project, would suggest that associations between Success and 
Information Process are more likely to be weak than strong. The Lubri- 
cation concept on the other hand was measured over the entire project, 
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and-the Refreezing stage refers specifically to the later commission- 
ing and 'early operational stages. If strong- associations are to be 
found between the Information Process and Success constructs, then 
perhaps-the Lubrication concept in general, and the Refreezing stage 
in particular, would be most likely to yield significant associa- 
tions. 
The above argument suggests that the Information Process scale 
developed in chapter 6 (IPX)ais too restrictive (crude! ) a measure. "It 
therefore appears reasonable to disaggregate this measure into Second- 
ary and possibly tertiary constructs if significant associations are 
to be identified between Process and Success. 
7.2.3.2 Secondary Levels 
If the two. secondary- Information Process constructs are to be 
used to understand the effect of Information Process on Success, then 
a causal model of their individual effects is required. We hypothe- 
sised that Activity will influence Lubrication and vice versa. in "4 ' 
other words Activity and Lubrication are reciprocally associated. It 
also appears reasonable from hypotheses 3 and 6 that the exogenous 
variables will influence both Activity and Lubrication. Substantive 
reasoning therefore enables a causal model like that illustrated in 
figure 7.4a to be drawn. Paths between Success constructs and residu- 
als have been omitted for clarity. 
Figure 7.4a: 'Preliminary Information causal model. 
Uncertainty LActivity 
Mechanicity 
ýi 
I 
Range Lubrication 
The model illustrated in figure 7.4a is underidentified (see 
Asher, 1983 for a fuller description of the identification problem in 
non-recursive structural models). In other words the model has more 
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unknown-path coefficients than structural equations to solve for them. 
Hence, an analytical solution of the above model is not possible; The 
model can be just identified. if each endogenous variable is independ- 
ent of one but not the same, exogenous variable, 'i. e., the six paths 
between the exogenous and endogenous variables are reduced to four 
paths. Alternatively eliminating one of the non-recursive paths will 
identify'the equations. If more than two exogenous-endogenous variable 
paths are eliminated the solution will be overidentified. Substantive- 
ly there are no grounds for making these eliminations, hence a purely 
empirical, exploratory approach was adopted. 
By inspection of correlation matrices, use of the instrumental 
variable* procedure (to solve just identified non-recursive structural 
equation systems; Asher, 1983) and regression (to solve for recursive 
equations systems) the most consistent causal path structure connect- 
ing-the constructs in figure 7.5a was found to be that illustrated in 
figure 7.4b below (using the same simplification as for figure 7.4a). 
Note, this model is only partially based upon substantive theory. 
Figure 7.4b: Final Information causal model 
The only consistent result to emerge from the exploratory analy- 
sis summarised in figure 7.4b. is the absence of a path between Uncer- 
tainty and Lubrication. Hence, There is reasonable confidence in the 
statement that Uncertainty only acts upon Activity. The path coeffi- 
* An instrumental variable is a variable uncorrelated with the 
residual terms in the equations in which they are used. Exogenous 
variables are instrumental variables, endogenous variables may also 
be, see Asher, 1983. To produce path coefficients which are regres- 
sion coefficients the instrumental variables used should also appear 
in the structural equation for the dependent variable. 
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cient for this association is consistently determined to be about the 
same as that of the zero order-partial correlation between the two 
constructs. A further finding of this analysis is that there is a so 
called "unanalysed correlation" between Mechanicity and Capability of 
magnitude 0.282. This correlation is to be expected as both concepts 
are measures of Capacity. A correlation of this magnitude will not 
cause multicollinearity problems in earlier regression analyses. 
'The remaining paths in figure 7.4b are quite tentative and their 
path coefficients are sensitive to changes in the model's definition. 
This sensitivity to model definition is well known, see for example 
Asher (1983, p. 51) Duncan et. al. (1971, p. 228). Finally, no path coef- 
ficients are given on the model because they cannot be simultaneously 
determined, as the model in figure 7.4b is also underidentified. This 
comes about because no exogenous variable is directly associated with 
Lubrication. By way of support for the above model, the zero order 
correlation matrix between the above constructs is reproduced in-table 
7.8. 
Table 7.8: Information Construct Zero Order Correlations 
Scale UXX IMX IRX IAX ILX 
UXX 1.000 
IMX (-0.079) 1.000 
IRX (-0.072) 0.282.1.000 
IAX 0.640 0.348 (0.157) 1.000 
, ILX (0.006) (0.161) (0.130) 0.321 1.000 
SCX 0.648 (-0.046) (-0.028) 
SEE -0.624 (0.034) (0.026) 
SES (-0.046) (0.039) (0.130) 
(0.048) (-0.116) 
(0.005) (0.128) 
(0.042) (0.174) 
Inspection of table 7.8 indicates that Range (IRX) is, at best, 
only weakly associated with the dependent constructs. The only signif- 
icant associations are therefore the ones between Uncertainty (UXX) 
and Activity (IAX) Mechanicity (IMX) and Activity, and Activity and 
Lubrication (ILX). 
Finally, inspection of the third order partial correlations 
(controlling for Uncertainty, Mechanicity and Range) between Success, 
Activity and Lubrication (the lower right hand box in table 7.8) do 
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not yield significant associations between these constructs. There- 
fore, at the secondary construct level, no-statistical evidence exists 
in support of hypotheses 7 and 8. For this reason associations at the 
tertiary construct level were investigated. 
7.2.3.3 Tertiary Levels 
Associations between tertiary level Information Process con- 
structs, the exogenous constructs (Uncertainty, Mechanicity and Range) 
and three Success constructs were investigated using partial correla- 
tions. The tertiary constructs investigated are those identified in 
tables 6.11c (Lubrication) and 6.11d (Activity) the correlations are 
summarised in table 7.9a and 7.9b; note, the negative Lubrication 
constructs ILU02, ILM02 and ILR02 have been reflected and therefore 
represent the absence of these influences., The correlations associated 
with Uncertainty (UXX) Range (IRX) and Mechanicity (IMX) are zero 
order, those with Change (SCX) and Ease (SEE) are third order and 
those with Satisfaction (SES) fifth order partial correlations. 
Table 7.9a: Tertiary Lubrication Constructs, Partial Correlations. 
Control ýOC IRX IlMDC + SCX SEE 
D. F. 43 40 38 
Item DaOC IRX DýC SF3", SCX SES 
IIuJ01 0.227 (-0.125) (0.034) (0.113) -0.243 (0.126) 
IIA02 (-0.071) (0.164) (0.085) (-0.006) -0.299 (0.163) 
IIM01 (0.179) (-0.149) (0.012) (-0.098) (-0.043) (-0.063) 
II102 (-0.049) 0.225 (0.104) (-0.056) (-0.100) (-0.035) 
ILROl (-0.181) 0.225 (0.122) 0.300 (0.197) 0.477 
IIR02 (-0.025) (0.134) 0.294 0.279 (0.024) (0.152) 
D. F. - Degrees of Freedom. 
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. Table 
7.9b: Tertiary. Information Activity Constructs, 
Partial Correlations. 
Cantrol IüCX IRX IlDC + SC% SEE 
D. F. 43 40 38 
Item LOClC IRX D4C SEE SCX SES 
IAA01 0.232 (0.089) 0.420 0.268 (-0.110) (0.066) 
IAA02 0.466 (0.085) 0.270 (0.130) (0.052) (-0.050) 
-. IAA01 - 0.448' , (0.191) 0.320- (0.095) (-0.011) ý" (0.119) 
IAI03 0.383 (0.145) 0.204 (0.085) (0.051) (0.040) 
IAN01 0.511 (0.030) 0.271 (-0.019) (-0.010) (0.004) 
IACO1 0.318 (0.017) (0.085) (-0.089) (0.129) -0.315 
IAC02 0.236 (0.098) (-0.097) (0.062) (0.092) (-0.092) 
IAC03 0.503 (0.126) (0.051) -0.358 -0.235 -0.228 
IAC04 0.370 0.256 (0.122) -0.213 -0.234 (0.121) 
IA501 (0.145) (0.107) 0.279 0.393 (-0.007) (0.094) 
IAS02 0.379 (0.005) (0.137) (0.094) (-0.001) 0.366 
IAS03 (0.423) - (-0.160) (0.167) (0.026) 0.361 (0.169) 
IAS04 (0.109) (-0.043) 0.277 (-0.183) (-0.106) (0.034) 
IAS05 0.221 (0.062) (-0.061) (0.063) -0.264 (-0.040) 
IAS06 (-0.092) (0.179) 0.276 (0.035) (0.040) (0.010) 
IAS07' (0.113) (0.077) (0.011) -0.260 0.239 (-0.206) 
IAS08 0.195 (-0.001) (0.072): (-0.035) 
, 
(0.103) (-0.191) 
IAS09 -(0.031) 0.275 0.527 -0.280 (0.091) (-0.086) 
IARO1 0.227 (-0.063) (0.050) (-0.184) (0.118) (0.193) 
IAR02 0.195 0.266 (0.014) (-0.125) (-0.041) 0.061 
IAR03 0.674 (-0.002)" (0.122) (0.115) 0.230 (0.040) 
D. F. - degrees of freedom. 
Page 241 
7.2.3.3.1 Tertiary Lubrication Constructs- 
With reference to table 7.9a (Lubrication correlations) we ob- 
serve that the. three exogenous constructs (Uncertainty, Mechanicity 
and Range) are generally not-associated with tertiary Lubrication 
indicators. To qualify this observation, there does appear to be a 
moderate association between Mechanicity and the absence of negative 
Refreezing behaviour (ILR02). However, these correlations are, in 
general agreement with previous-findings based on secondary con- 
structs. Focusing on the associations with the three Success con- 
structs, we observe that both Unfreezing indicators (ILU01 and ILU02) 
are moderately negatively associated with Change. That MovingIILMO1 
and ILM02) is unassociated with Success and that Refreezing is moder- 
ately associated with Ease and positive Refreezing is strongly associ- 
ated with Satisfaction. 
Partial corroboration of the observed Satisfaction associations 
comes from the-study by Zand and Sorensen (1975) if we assume that the 
Satisfaction measure used here is equivalent to their "Level of Suc- 
cess Index", the LSI. This is a reasonable assumption as both indica- 
tors are substantially based upon measures of satisfaction, although 
here we are measuring satisfaction with the implementation of a capi- 
tal project, 'they were interested in the implementation of management 
science projects. 
Using fifth-order partial correlations Zand and Sorensen inves- 
tigated the associations between the six change measures (subsumed 
here under the name of Lubrication) and their LSI. With a sample of 
280 cases they were able to claim statistical significance for partial 
correlations as low as 0.10, i. e., "weak" effects. However, even with 
this sample size they only had adequate power to detect correlations 
of about 0.16. Furthermore they only identified three "strong" ef- 
fects. These were between positive Unfreezing and positive Moving 
(partial r=0.51) between negative Unfreezing and negative Moving 
(partial r=0.46) and between positive Refreezing and LSI (r=0.67). The 
next largest correlation identified in their study was -0.23 between 
positive and negative Unfreezing. They reported a further two correla- 
tions of 0.23 and -0.21 and seven below 0.2 in magnitude. The lowest 
correlation was 0.08 between positive moving and positive Refreezing. 
Page 242 
"Duplicating Zand and Sorensen's (1975) method of analysis with 
the data reported here (i. e., the six positive and negative Lubrica- 
tion measures and' Satisfaction) we find generally similar results are 
obtained. The strongest association is between positive Refreezing and 
Satisfaction (r=0.58, -c. f: 0.67 in Zand and Sorensen's study). The 
correlation between negative Unfreezing and negative Moving is 0.38 
(c. f., 0.46). In this study the next largest correlation is 0.29 
between positive and negative Unfreezing (c. f., -0.23; the change in 
sign is due to the use in this study of reflected negative scales). 
The major difference between this study and Zand and Sorensen's is the 
absence of an effect between positive Unfreezing and-positive moving, 
0.06 compared to their 0.51. Most of the remaining associations are 
comparable, and too weak to be detected with confidence by this study. 
To summarise this discussion, associations between the tertiary 
Lubrication concepts and other exogenous constructs are in agreement 
with the associations identified for the secondary constructs. Only 
positive Refreezing is strongly associated with a success construct, 
this being Satisfaction; a finding in agreement with that of Zand and 
Sorensen (1975). A moderate association is also identified between 
positive and negative Refreezing and Ease and a moderate negative 
association between positive and negative Unfreezing and Change. 
7.2.3.3.2 Tertiary Activity Constructs 
We now consider the associations between the tertiary Informa- 
tion Activity constructs given in table 7.9b. Inspecting these corre- 
lations suggests that a focus on the success associations alone is 
most instructive. Furthermore, there appear to be nominally four 
patterns of association. These are defined below. 
Pattern 1. Activity item exhibits little or no significant 
association with success measures. This pattern 
is typified by the Analysis indicators IAA02 
and IAA03, the Information Technology (IAI01) 
and Contingencies (IAN01) indicators. 
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Pattern 2. Activity item primarily exhibits negative 
associations with Success indicators. The 
strongest item of this type is IAC03, -the 
Informal discussion indicator. Other indicators 
of, the Communication concept, exhibit similar 
patterns. This pattern of association is also 
exhibited by the Unfreezing measures of Lubri- 
cation. , 
Pattern 3. Activity item primarily exhibits positive 
associations with Ease and Satisfaction meas- 
ures. Only two items exhibit this pattern, 
items IASO1 and IAS02. Both are associated with 
the collection of information, IAS02 specifi- 
cally with information from within the organi- 
sation. This pattern is also exhibited by the 
Refreezing measures of Lubrication. 
Pattern 4. Activity item primarily exhibits a positive 
association with the Change measure. This 
pattern is typified by item IAS03, a measure of 
the extent of information collected from 
sources external to the organisation. 
comparing the items exhibiting these four patterns of associa- 
tion with the factor analysis of all Activity items reported in table 
6.14b, suggests that the above patterns could have been obtained 
simply by dichotomising each of the previously identified Design and 
Support factors. Specifically the Design factor is dichotomised into 
pattern 1 and 3 items; Support into pattern 2 and 4 items. 
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7.2.3.4 Information Process Sub-Scales 
Analysis of the tertiary Information Process items suggests that 
the information contained in the construct will be better utilised if 
Lubrication is disaggregated into its three constituent sub-scales and 
Activity into four new sub-scales. The 38 items of the Lubrication 
construct were subdivided in accordance with the original construction 
of the concept (see Appendix A, question 2b. 6). Items measuring a 
negative attribute were reflected. Factor scales of each set of items 
were then produced using the methodology of chapter 6. The resulting 
scales were, Unfreezing (ILU) Moving (ILM) and Refreezing (ILR). 
Factor loadings of items on these scales are reported in table 7.10a, 
together with Eigenvalues, % variance explained of the first unrotated 
factor and theta reliabilities for the scales. Guided by a factor 
interpretation and with reference to the original conceptual framework 
of the Activity construct, the tertiary Information Activity items 
were placed into four groups, each representing nominally one of the 
four patterns of association identified above. The final categorisa- 
tion of items and factor loadings of the four scales is reported in 
table 7.10b, together with the usual statistics. The factor scales 
were labelled in accordance with the author's interpretation of each 
set of items as follows: 
IAF - Information Activity Formal analysis. 
IAM - Information Activity Meetings. 
IASI - Information Activity Search Internal information. 
IASE - Information Activity Search External information. 
Scales IAF, IAM and IASE are constructed using the tertiary 
Activity items. This yields scales based on 9,6 and 4 items respec- 
tively. Scale IASI constructed using the two tertiary items had a low 
theta reliability of 0.45. The final scale was based upon the 9 qua- 
ternary items used to construct scales IAS01 (2 items) and IAS02 (7 
items). 
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Table, 7.10a: 
_ 
Information Lubrication Sub-Scale 
ITEM1 Scale: ILU2 
TM initiated -0.385 
TM did not feel too big 0.308 
TM became involved 0.322 
TM & UM felt important 0.614 
TM & UM open and candid 0.603 
UM revised assumptions -. 
UN could state problems 0.689 
UM recognised need 0.746 
UM did not feel threatened 0.751 
UM not resentful 0.786 
UM not able to do design 
UM confident in E 0.634 
TM helped develop design 
TM advised of options 
UM helped develop design 
UM reviewed alternatives 
UM understood project 
UM &E gathered data jointly 
E felt had enough time 
E could educate the UM 
Alternative forms devised 
Designs improved sequentially 
Needed data available 
Data was accessible 
TM encouraged adoption 
TM accepted recommendations of E 
UM operated project 
UM were satisfied 
E. initiated positive feedback 
E supported new behaviour 
E helped after commissioning 
project accepted 
Performance of unit increased 
Project successful 
Results measurable 
Standards for evaluation existed 
Similar projects proposed 
Compatible with needs of unit 
Eigenvalue 3.776 
No. items 12 
e Reliability 0.802 
% variance 31.5 
ILM3 ILR4 
0.350 
0.679 
0.722 
0.776 
0.836 
0.530 
0.444 
0.401 
0.509 
0.518 
0.539 
0.373 
0.584 
0.397 
0.605 
0.576 
0.577 
0.679 
3.145 3.092 
12 14 
0.744 0.729 
26.2 22.1 
1- See appendix A question 2b. 6 for a full description 
of individual items. Note that here negative items 
(and their descriptions) have been reversed. 
2- Unfreezing. 
3- Moving. 
4- Refreezing 
TM - Top Managers; UM - Unit Managers; E- Engineers. 
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Table-7.10b: Information Activity Sub-Scale 
ITEMl Scale: -IAF2 
IAA01 0.633 
IAA02 0.716 
IAA03 0.721 
IAI01 0.689 
IANO1 0.769 
IASO4 
IAS06 0.371 
IAS08 
IAR02 0.547 
IAC01 
IAC02 
IAC03 
IAC04 
IAS05 
IAS09 
-IAM3 IASI4 IASE5 
0.541 
0.496 
0.723 
0.647 
0.492 
IAS01(Collection) 0.815 
IAS01(Välidation) 0.777 
IAS02(Marketing) 0.349 
IAS02(Personnel) 0.321 
IAS02(Production) 0.639 
IAS02(Technical) 0.378 
_IAS02(Planning) 
0.600 
IAS02(Accounting) 0.463 
IAS02(Board) .: 
IAS03 0.837 
IAS07 0.413 
IARO1 0.532 
IAR03 0.747 
Eigenvalue 3.239 1.794 2.665 1.712 
No. items 9694 
6 Reliability 0.778 0.532 0.703 0.554 
% variance 36.0 29.9 29.6 42.8 
1- See tables 6.1ld for item descriptions. For IAS01 
see appendix A questions 2a. 30 and for IAS02 
question 2a. 32. 
2- Information Activity Formal analysis. 
3- Information Activity Meetings. 
4- Information Activity Search Internal information. 
5- Information Activity Search External information. 
Having redefined the Lubrication construct in terms of its 
constituent concepts and Activity in terms of four new sub-scales, it 
now remains to more explicitly define the interaction between these 
constructs and the Model II constructs of Uncertainty, Range, Mecha- 
nicity, Change, Ease and Satisfaction. 
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7.2.3.4 A Definitive Model 
Having disaggregated Information Process into seven sub-scales 
presents problems in handling this number of variables. This complex- 
ity together with the lack of any substantive theory as to how many of 
the Process sub-scales are causally related and, if reciprocal rela- 
tions are assumed the lack of methods for estimating the resulting 
underidentified model, all contributed to the decision to abandon 
formal path analysis as the technique for analysing the current prob- 
lem. Instead, a combination of partial correlation and multivariate 
linear regression was used. Specifically partial correlation was used 
to investigate the associations between Information constructs and 
regression to investigate the relationships with success. At each 
stage the results of the analysis were checked for consistency against 
previous findings and discussions of likely associations (or lack of 
association) between constructs. In other words the models needed to 
be plausible and consistent with previous findings. 
7.2.3.5.1 Information Process Associations 
Ginzberg's (1978) description of the Lewin-Schein model present- 
ed in chapter 4 suggests a correspondence between the three stages of 
the model and the four stages of the project model identified in 
chapter 5. Specifically, Unfreezing is associated with the pre-approval 
stage of the project model, Moving with Installation and Refreezing 
with commissioning and Operation. Because the Activity constructs were 
measured during the pre-approval stage of -the project we may infer 
that Activity and Unfreezing are coincident, whilst Moving and Re- 
freezing are both associated with the post-approval stages of the 
project. Substantively therefore, Moving and Refreezing are causally 
dependent upon Unfreezing and Activity. The pattern of associations 
between the four Activity and Unfreezing constructs may be determined 
using third order partial correlations; controlling for Uncertainty, 
Range and Mechanicity. These third order partial correlations, togeth- 
er with the zero order partial correlations between exogenous varia- 
bles and the pre-approval Process constructs, are reported in table 
7.11. Interpretation of the significance levels of these correlations 
are the same as for table 7.5a. 
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Table 7.11: Information Construct Associations 
tDIX IRX Dmx IAF IAM IASI IASE 
IAF 0.513 (0.171) 0.391 1.000 
IAM 0.560 (0.223) (0.118) 0.280 1.000 
IASI 0.259 (0.122) 0.271 0.378 (0.100) 1.000 
IASE 0.599 (-0.080) (0.153) (0.102) (0.227) (0.050) 1.000 
ILÜ (-0.065) (0.168) (0.028) (0.109) 0.337 0.270 (-0.083) 
IIM (0.009) (0.222) (0.118) 
-II, R (-0.075) (0.129) 0.295 
D. F. 43 40 
D. F. - Degrees of Freedom. 
The correlations reported in Table 7.11 are largely consistent 
with previous findings. The three exogenous variables are by and large 
not associated with Lubrication, although there is tentative evidence 
that Mechanicity is associated with Refreezing. Uncertainty is associ- 
ated with all Activity sub-scales, although the link with Internal 
information is tentative. Mechanicity is strongly associated with 
Formal analysis and tentatively associated with Internal information. 
Range just fails to be tentatively associated with Meetings. Focusing 
on the third order partial correlations we identify a moderate associ- 
ation between Formal analysis and Internal information, a result 
consistent with factor analysis of the Activity construct. Based on 
the same factor analysis we would anticipate an association between 
Meetings and External information. In fact this correlation just falls 
below the 0.25 figure required for statistical significance at the 10% 
level. The other associations worthy of note are a moderate one be- 
tween Meetings and Unfreezing and two tentative associations, one 
between Formal analysis and Meetings, the other between Unfreezing and 
Internal information. These partial correlations are stable at higher 
orders, such as those obtained by applying additional controls for 
Meetings, Formal analysis etc. 
With respect to estimating the associations between Moving and 
Refreezing (which follow Unfreezing and Activity) we would, on sub- 
stantive grounds, anticipate that Unfreezing was a determinator of 
Moving, and Moving and Unfreezing were determinators of Refreezing. 
However, as the four Activity sub-scales are co-incident with the 
Unfreezing process, it is probable that these are also determinants of 
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Moving and Refreezing. 
To estimate these influences, 'stepwise- regression followed by 
multivariate regression on the selected predictors was used. The 
regression approach was considered appropriate as none of the correla- 
tions observed in table 7.11 exceeds 0.6 and Asher (1983) notes that 
multicolliniarity is unlikely to be a problem provided correlations 
between independent variables are less than 0.7 to O. S. The stepwise 
regression technique employed was that implemented in the SYSTAT com- 
puter package (Wilkinson, 1987). This package estimates the predictor 
set of variables independently of the parameter estimates. The parame- 
ters are estimated by a separate multiple regression procedure. If the 
t-test of a predictor's coefficient (or 'ß') in the initial multivari- 
ate model had low significance, the model was reestimated without this 
predictor and the process iterated until only those predictors with 
coefficients significant at, or better than, 10% remained. Predictors 
were also excluded (or retained) if their retention (or exclusion) 
violated a previously established theoretical or substantiated model 
of the data. Wilkinson (1987, p. MGLH-20) also sounds a further caution- 
ary note when he writes: 
"For a given set of data, an automatic stepwise programme 
cannot necessarily find a) the "best" fitting model, b) 
the "real" model, or c) alternative "plausible" models. 
Furthermore, the order variables enter or leave a step- 
wise programme is usually of no theoretical 
significance... It should never be used without cross 
validation". 
In this study the cross validation methods used were substantive 
reasoning and partial correlation. It was found that the stepwise 
regression procedure just described tended to produce more parsimoni- 
ous models than those produced by partial correlation. 
The first model tested regressed Moving (ILM) on the exogenous 
variables (UXX, IMX, IRX) the Activity variables (IAF, IAM, IASI, 
IASE) and Unfreezing (ILU). The selected predictors of Moving were 
Unfreezing and Formal analysis (IAF). The regression model using these 
two predictors of Moving is presented in table 7.12 below. Note that 
the convention established for representing the significance of corre- 
lation coefficients is also used in table 7.12 and subsequent tables. 
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Namely, coefficients significant at or above the 1% level are in bold 
type, significant at or above the 5%-level, in normal type and signif- 
icant at or above the 10% level, in italic type. 
Table 7.12: Regression Analysis for Moving 
N: 45 MULTIPLE R: 0.739 MULTIPLE R2: 0.546 
ADJUSTED MULTIPLE R2: 0.535 STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.682 
NO CONSTANT ESTIMATED 
. 
F-RATIO: 25.827 (p=0.000) 
STANDARDISED 
VARIABLE -COEFFICIENT STD - TOLERANCE T P(2 TAIL) 
(ß) ERROR 
IAF 0.206 0.103 . 995 2.002 0.052 
ILU 0.695 0.103 . 995 6.744 0.000 
DURBIN-WATSON, D STATISTIC : 1.994 
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV ONE SAMPLE TEST: 0.084 (LILLIEFORS) 
Inspection of table 7.12 indicates that both Formal analysis 
(IAF) and Unfreezing are predictors of Refreezing. The high tolerance 
values (i. e., close to unity), indicate little multicollinearity be- 
tween the predictors and is-calculated as one minus the squared multi- 
ple correlation between each predictor and the remaining predictors in 
the equation. Values close to zero are problematical (Wilkinson, 
1987). The remaining statistics show that the model does not violate 
assumptions concerning the distribution of the residual terms and 
therefore it is appropriate to use the regression model. The Durbin- 
Watson statistic indicates how independent the cases are from one 
another. Values in the range 1.5 to 2.5 are generally viewed as ac- 
ceptable (McLagan, 1973). The Lilliefors probability of the Kolmogo- 
rov-Smirnov test indicates that the residuals are normally distribut- 
ed, at the 95% confidence level.. 
The second model regressed Refreezing (ILR) on the eight varia- 
ble noted above, plus Moving. The stepwise procedure extracted three 
predictors of Refreezing, which were Meetings (IAM) Internal informa- 
tion (IASI) and Moving (ILM). Statistics on this model are presented 
in table 7.13 above. Note that the above stepwise regression does not 
corroborate the tentative correlation between Mechanicity and Refreez- 
ing found in table 7.11. 
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Table 7.13: Regression Analysis for Refreezing 
N: 45 MULTIPLE R.: 0.613 MULTIPLE R2: 0.376 
ADJUSTED MULTIPLE R2: 0.347 STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.808 
NO CONSTANT ESTIMATED F-RATIO: 8.448 (p=0.000) 
STANDARDISED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD TOLERANCE T P(2 TAIL) 
(ß) ERROR. _ IAH -0.250 0.128 . 908 -1.953 0.058 
IASI 0.469 0.129 . 895 3.637 0.001 
ILK 0.347 0.126 . 940 2.762 0.008 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC : 1.718 
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV ONE SAMPLE TEST: 0.133 (LILLIEFORS) 
Having estimated the most significant associations between 
Information Process construct measures, the remaining task is to 
estimate how these interact with the success measures and thereby 
determine the influence of Information Process on Success. 
7.2.3.5.2 Predictors of Success 
The same stepwise regression procedure just described was used 
to determine the predictors of implementation success. In this model 
there are three success measures to be estimated (Change, Ease and 
Satisfaction) and ten possible predictor variables, three exogenous 
variables, four Activity variables and three Lubrication variables. In 
addition, based on arguments that lead to the determination of Model 
II, Satisfaction is also predicted by Change and Ease and therefore 
there are twelve possible predictors for this concept. Previous analy- 
sis has indicated certain "allowed" predictors of each success meas- 
ure. It has also indicated certain disallowed predictors. The result 
of each stepwise procedure were therefore compared with results of 
prior analyses and adjusted if necessary. 
The variables "retained by the three stepwise regression proce- 
dures (from ten predictors for Change and Ease, twelve for Satisfac- 
tion) are listed below. 
SCX = f(UXX, IMX, IASE, ILU, ILR) 
SEE = f(UXX, IAM, ILR) 
SES = f(SCX, SEE, ILM, ILR) 
Page 252 
Initially it is observed that the above models" are consistent 
with-earlier models of the data with respect to the appropriate inclu- 
sions of Uncertainty, Change,, and Ease. With reference to the earlier 
discussion concerning which stage of the project organisational learn- 
ing occurred, the above models appear reasonable in including Refreez- 
ing. The models are-also consistent with respect to the exclusion of 
procedural Range. The inclusion of Mechanicity as a predictor of 
Change is interesting and is the only evidence so far obtained for the 
efficacy of hypothesis 4. The inclusion of the remaining variables 
also appears reasonable based upon the analysis of partial correla- 
tions reported in tables 7.9a and 7.9b. However, this same analysis 
would indicate that Moving should not be retained as a predictor of 
Satisfaction. Moving was therefore explicitly excluded from the step- 
wise procedure and the model for Satisfaction reestimated. No substi- 
tute variable was added, hence the final model for Satisfaction used 
Change, Ease and Refreezing only as predictors. The results of the 
analyses are reported in tables 7.14,7.15 and 7.16. 
Table 7.14: Regression Analysis for Change 
N: 45 MULTIPLE R: 0.834 MULTIPLE R2: 0.695 
ADJUSTED MULTIPLE R2: 0.665 STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.579 
MODEL CONTAINS NO CONSTANT. F-RATIO: 18.254 (p=0.000) 
STANDARDISED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD TOLERANCE T P(2 TAIL) 
(ß) ERROR 
UXX 0.413 0.112 . 611 3.701 0.001 
IMX -0.169 0.095 . 846 -1.776 0.083 
IASE 0.371 0.113 . 595 3.282 0.002 
ILU -0.408 0.095 . 845 -4.291 0.000 
ILR "0.371 0.099 . 778 3.747 0.001 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC : 1.610 
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV ONE SAMPLE TEST: 0.468 (LILLIEFORS) 
The analysis of table 14 appears to provide tentative evidence 
in support of hypothesis 4, namely that an organisation with a large 
range of procedures (Mechanicity was identified as a measure of proce- 
dural range in chapter 6) can absorb variety without Change. In other 
words, Change does not occur because the organisation does not need 
to. However, the association is weak. Also, the specific variable 
measuring procedural Range (IRX) is not extracted, nor is the Capacity 
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construct if substituted in place -of" Mechanicity and Range. In addi- 
tion Mechanicity could-be removed from the- predictor variable set by 
excluding certain single cases from the data, five of the 45 cases 
caused this effect. The remaining 4 variables were not so effected by 
single cases. 
Table 7.15: Regression Analysis for Ease 
N: 45 MULTIPLE R: 0.721 MULTIPLE R2: 0.520 
ADJUSTED MULTIPLE R2: 0.497 STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.709 
MODEL CONTAINS NO CONSTANT. F-RATIO: 15.186 (p=0.000) 
STANDARDISED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD TOLERANCE T P(2 TAIL) 
(ß) ERROR 
UXX -0.459 0.129 . 684 -3.552 0.001 
IAN -0.255 0.129 . 686 -1.977 0.055 
ILR 0.291 0.107' . 994 2.717 0.010 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC : 1.856 
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV ONE SAMPLE TEST: 0.414 (LILLIEFORS) 
Table 7.16: Regression Analysis for Satisfaction 
N: 45 ° MULTIPLE R: 0.660 MULTIPLE R2: 0.436 
ADJUSTED MULTIPLE R2: 0.409 STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE: 0.769 
MODEL CONTAINS NO CONSTANT. F-RATIO: 10.817 (p=0.000) 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD TOLERANCE T P(2 TAIL) 
(ß) ERROR 
SC% 0.340 0.124 . 872 2.739 0.009 
SEE 0.421 0.131 . 784 3.213 0.003 
ILR 0.319 0.127 . 832 2.514 0.016 
DURBIN-WATSON D STATISTIC : 2.101 
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV ONE SAMPLE TEST: 0.331 (LILLIEFORS) 
Based upon the above analysis Model III can be defined and is 
illustrated here in figure 7.6a and 7,6b. Figure 7.6a shows the corre- 
lations between Range, Mechanicity, the four Activity variables and 
three Lubrication variables. Figure 7.6b illustrates the associations 
between the three Success variables, Uncertainty, Mechanicity and 
Information Process variables. It was felt that subdividing the over- 
all model in this way would make clearer the associations between 
constructs. 
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In figures 7.6a and 7.6b a two headed arrow signifies an associ- 
ation between two variables. The magnitude and direction of this 
association is indicated by the attached (partial) correlation coeffi- 
cient. These coefficients are taken from table 7.11. Single headed 
arrows indicate presumed causal relationships, the arrow indicating 
the direction of causation. The magnitude and sign of the relationship 
is taken from the regression analyses summarised in tables 7.12 
through 7.16. The weight of a line (correlation or path) signifies the 
statistical significance of the association, not Effect Size. Light 
lines represent tentative associations and are (generally) significant 
at or above the 10% level. In figure 7.6a the third order partial 
correlation between Meetings and External Information is not signifi- 
cant at the 10% level. It has been included in the figure because of 
the evidence provided by factor analysis of the Activity construct, 
that items composing the Meetings and External Information constructs 
are indicators of Support. A heavy line indicates correlations or 
paths significant at or above the 5% level. In fact the majority of 
these associations are significant above the 1% level. Finally figure 
7.5 summarises the stages of disaggregation of the Information Process 
construct carried out during the development of Model III, and is 
given to assist the reader in interpreting figure 7.6a. In arriving at 
the Information Activity measures identified in figure 7.5 it was 
necessary to redefine several of the measures originally envisaged as 
constituting this construct. Hence, the correspondence between the 
dimensions of the Information Activity construct illustrated in figure 
7.5 with those of table 4.5 is not great. 
Figure 7.5: Information Process Construct Disaggregation 
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Figure 7.6a: MODEL III -. Information Construct Associations 
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Figure 7.6b: MODEL III - Determinators of Implementation Success 
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7.3 CHAPTER"SUMMARY 
Scales developed in chapter 6 were initially used to test the 
evidence in support of the ten hypotheses developed in chapter 4. This 
original set of hypotheses, after replacing the exogenous Information 
Experience construct by Information Capacity to'reflect the incomplete 
capture of the Experience construct by the research instrument, was 
referred'to as Model I. Initial analysis supported hypotheses 1,2 and 
3, namely that Uncertainty gave rise to Change, was detrimental to 
Expectation and stimulated Information Process. Support was also found 
for hypothesis 6, that Information Capacity is a causal determinant of 
Information Process, and hypothesis 9, that Uncertainty and Capacity 
are orthogonal. The initial analysis did not however find evidence in 
support of hypotheses 4 and 5, that Information Capacity influenced 
Change and Expectation. Nor was evidence found in support of hypothe- 
ses 7 and 8, that Information Process influenced Change and Expecta- 
tion. Finally, the evidence did not support hypothesis 10, that Change 
and Expectation were orthogonal. 
In an attempt to account for the absence' of the Change - Expec- 
tation orthogonality hypothesis, Model II was developed. This dichoto- 
mised Expectation Success into Ease and Satisfaction constructs, thus 
generating three implementation Success measures. Analysis showed that 
Change and Ease were orthogonal, thus demonstrating the efficacy of 
hypothesis 10. Analysis further demonstrated that Change and Ease were 
causal determinants of Satisfaction. The interpretation being that 
successful social/procedural Change, together with technical Ease of 
implementation lead 'to managerial Satisfaction with the project. 
Positive associations between the success constructs adequately ac- 
counted for the observed association between Change and Expectation 
identified in Model I. However Model II still did not account for the 
failure to detect hypotheses 4,5,7 and 8. In an attempt to detect 
evidence in support of hypotheses 4 and 5 the Capacity construct was 
disaggregated into its component Mechanicity and Range constructs. 
Still no associations between Success and these measures could be 
detected, either by the use of path analysis or moderated regression 
analysis. It was therefore concluded that the exogenous Information 
constructs of Mechanicity and procedural Range did not directly influ- 
Page 258 
ence implementation Success. Their influence would be indirect and 
operate -through the observed association with Information Process, 
assuming evidence could be found to connect Information Process with 
Success. 
To understand the influence of Information Process upon'Success, 
it was first demonstrated that the final stages of the project were 
most likely to yield significant associations. Only the tertiary 
concept of Refreezing within the secondary concept of Lubrication was 
associated 'with' these stages of the project. The bulk of the Informa- 
tion Process measure developed in chapter 6 was associated with the 
earliest stages of the project and it was reasoned that these were 
unlikely to yield strong associations with Success. By analysing the 
associations between individual indicators of the Information Process 
measures (Activity and Lubrication) a number of patterns were identi- 
fied. These patterns were found to be congruent with other analyses of 
the data and indicated that Activity is subsumed by four interacting 
processes labelled, Formal Analysis, Meetings, Internal Information 
search and External Information search. The original conceptual struc- 
ture of the Activity construct came from a taxonomy of information 
occupations within the U. S. information industry sectors. For the 
purpose of this study these "occupations" were labelled, Analysis, 
Communication, Search and Information Technology. Two further compo- 
nents, Design Resources and Contingencies, ' were included for reasons 
given in chapter 4. The correspondence between the four Information 
Activity constructs identified in this chapter and the six constructs 
identified in chapter 4 is as follows. The Formal Analysis construct 
incorporates the' Analysis, Information Technology and Contingencies 
dimensions of chapter 4, together with some indicators of the Search 
and Design Resources dimensions. The Meetings construct incorporates 
the communication dimension of chapter 4, together with some of the 
Search indicators. Internal Information search is composed of two 
multi-item measures of Search, and External Information search is 
composed of a third multi-item measure of Search, together with the 
bulk of the'Design Resources dimension indicators. Besides sub-divid- 
ing Activity in the way outlined above, Lubrication was also sub- 
divided into its three component stages of Unfreezing, Moving and 
Refreezing. Using these seven (four Activity and three Lubrication) 
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Information Process variables significant associations with the Suc- 
cess constructs were identified. These are summarised as Model III, 
figures 7.6a and 7.6b. 
Model. III provides - support' f or hypotheses 7 and 8, primarily 
through the Refreezing construct but with respect to Change, also 
through the External Information search construct. However, the Ease 
and Change success constructs were also negatively influenced by the 
variables, Meetings and Unfreezing. ' Failure to detect associations 
between Success and Information Process constructs in earlier models 
can therefore be attributed to two causes. Firstly, the Refreezing and 
External Information constructs were "swamped" by other measures in 
the highly aggregated Information Process construct used when testing 
these models. Secondly, the'existence of negative paths or correla- 
tions between the Information Process and Success constructs will tend 
to cancel the positive associations resulting in weak net associa- 
tions., 
The correlation and regression coefficients shown in figure 7.6a 
and 7.6b are indicative of the relative influence of one variable on 
the other. Considering the associations with Success variables, in- 
spection of figure 7.6b shows that Uncertainty has the greatest posi- 
tive effect on Change, the greatest' negative effect on Ease and no 
direct effect on Satisfaction. The next largest influence on Change 
is the negative effect due to Unfreezing. Unfreezing also indirectly 
positively influences Change through its influence on Refreezing via 
Moving. Refreezing is positively related to all three Success measures 
and is in its turn principally determined by Internal Information 
search, Moving and negatively by the Meetings construct. The Meetings 
construct also has a direct negative effect on Ease. Negative Informa- 
tion Process - Success influences were not anticipated from the theo- 
retical formulation of chapter 4. We therefore require further evi- 
dence in support of these phenomena if they are not to be viewed as 
just artifacts of the data, or method of analysis. This evidence and 
other topics will be discussed next in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8 
-DISCUSSION AND LIäITATIONS` 
This chapter addresses a number of-unresolved issues within the 
thesis to present. Initially we-seek to identify explanations of the 
unanticipated negative associations identified in Chapter 7 between 
Meetings, - Refreezing and Ease,, and between Unfreezing and Change. 
Next,, certain limitations of the methodological approach adopted will 
be discussed. Finally, a model will be developed illustrating how some 
of the ideas underpinning this thesis may be expanded with a view to 
identifying sources of strategic advantage for an organisation. 
8.1 UNANTICIPATED ASSOCIATIONS 
Analysis of the experimental data reported in chapter 7 identi- 
fied two unanticipated and negative associations between Information 
Process and Success constructs not predicted by the theoretical devel- 
opment of chapter 4. A third negative association within the Informa- 
tion Process construct was also identified. These associations imply 
that certain activities performed during the pre-approval stage of the 
project were detrimental to the outcome of the project. That organisa- 
tions should undertake actions whose effects are counter to the aim of 
the organisation, namely to-implement a capital project, appears to be 
non-rational; nor was it predicted by the cybernetic theory used. We 
propose to consider explanations of `these associations under three 
headings. First, are the associations simply artifacts of the method 
of analysis, and therefore not due to any causal phenomena. Second, 
are they artifacts of the data, and finally does their existence imply 
that the theory adopted is not able to provide an explanation of the 
implementation phenomena. The theory, therefore, may requires modifi- 
cation or replacement. A number of alternative explanations and theo- 
ries existing within the literature will be reviewed to determine 
whether they are better able to account for the observed phenomena. 
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8.1.1 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Initially we seek to account for the unanticipated associations 
identified in Model III as due to the violation of -an assumption of 
the statistical techniques employed. ' Standardised regression weights 
for the associations were evaluated as -0.41 between Unfreezing and 
Change (table 7.14) -0.26 between Meetings and Ease (table 7.15) and 
-0.25 between Meetings and Refreezing (Table 7.13). All of these 
associations are statistically significant at or above the 6% level 
and the analysis had sufficient statistical power (at least 51%, table 
7.4) to detect effect sizes of this magnitude. In addition, assump- 
tions"underlying the stepwise regression analysis technique used were 
not violated. In particular, tolerances for the predictors were high 
hence muilticollinearity is not implicated. The Durbin-Watson statis- 
tics were also within acceptable ranges (as would be expected for this 
type of data) hence autocorrelation is not implicated either. In 
conclusion, assumptions of the regression technique were satisfied and 
the associations are unlikely to be due to sampling theory type I and 
II errors. We therefore preclude the associations from being spurious 
for-analytical reasons. 
8.1.2 RELIABILITY 
If the unanticipated associations are not artifacts of the 
method of analysis, then are they artifacts of the method of measure- 
ment? In other words, were the theoretical concepts measured with 
adequate validity. We will return to the question of validity later in 
this discussion. Here we focus on the related issue of reliability, as 
noted in chapter 5, reliable measures are not necessarily valid but 
valid measures need to be reliable. The question we address here is 
therefore, were the measures of Meetings, Unfreezing, Refreezing, Ease 
and Change, sufficiently reliable to enable the analysis to reasonably 
detect the reported negative influences? The reliability of the Change 
construct was established in chapter 6 as 0.76. Reliabilities of 
Unfreezing (0.80) Refreezing (0.73) Meetings (0.53) and Ease (0.81) 
constructs were established in chapter 7. With the possible exception 
of the Meetings construct, all reliabilities are adequate for an 
exploratory study of this type (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). There- 
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fore, could the observed negative association between Meetings and 
Ease be attributable to the use of a Meetings measure of low reliabil- 
ity and be spurious? This does not appear to be the case. It is, for 
example, possible to construct a ten item Support measure using items 
from the Meetings and External Information scales (the actual items 
are defined as Factor 1 in table 6.14b, excluding items IAA03 and 
IAN01 which load heavily on both the Design and Support factors). The 
theta reliability of this Support scale is a satisfactory-0.76, yet a 
statistically significant (p(O. 10) negative association between Sup- 
port and Ease exists. This suggests a certain stability to the nega- 
tive association between Ease and a social dimension of Information 
Process incorporating the Meetings construct items. We therefore 
conclude, -that the reliability of measures issue is not implicated as 
a possible explanation of the observed negative associations. 
8.1.3 ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
In view of the above discussion it appears that questions of 
analysis and measurement reliability do not account for the unantici- 
pated associations identified in chapter 7. Accepting that the associ- 
ations are real, a substantive finding of the study is, that while the 
cybernetic theory adopted was successful at predicting many of the 
observed associations, it does not provide a complete explanation of 
the observed phenomena. The theory, therefore, requires modification 
or replacement. A large number of possible explanations, models and 
theories exist within the management literature and need to be re- 
viewed. To help focus the discussion and reduce the size of this 
initial candidate set of theories, a closer look at the component 
constructs of Information Process is justified. 
First we note that the two Information Process constructs from 
which the negative associations are presumed to emanate are themselves 
positively associated, the third order partial correlation being +0.34 
(Table 7.10). This implies some common basis for the negative associa- 
tions. Inspection of the Meetings construct shows it to be tapping 
into the extent of formal and informal (toing and froing) interaction 
and communication between people and the reliance of the decision on 
data gathered from several people. Unfreezing is associated principal- 
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ly with measures of unit manager involvement /commitment (e. g., "Top 
and Unit managers were open and candid", "Unit managers [did not] 
resent having to deal with the project"). In relation to other pre- 
approval stage Process variables identified in chapter 7 (Formal 
Analysis, Internal and External Search) the two constructs Meetings 
and Unfreezing appear to be related to a social dimension associated 
with pre-approval stage processes. Thus, it appears reasonable to 
identify the observed negative associations with social, behavioural, 
aspects or effects of the project. 
In an attempt to gain further insight into the characteristics 
of this' social dimension a number of the tape recordings made during 
the data collection interviews were selected for analysis. The cases 
investigated were chosen on the basis'of exhibiting extreme scores on 
the Unfreezing, Meetings, Change or Ease scales. It must be remembered 
that the data collection interviews were highly structured and fur- 
thermore, the information being sought here was not part of the formal 
research design. Any information to be gleaned from the interview 
tapes would therefore be unsolicited and serendipitous, hence meagre 
and anecdotal. The information obtained will be reported where appro- 
priate. We now review a number of possible explanations for the 
unanticipated negative associations identified from the literature. 
8.1.3.1 Politicality 
' if we identify the pre-approval stage of the project as a deci- 
sion making stage, then perhaps decision theory is capable of provid- 
ing an explanation of 'the observed correlations. One of the most 
recent and comprehensive studies into organisational decision making 
is that reported by Hickson et. al. (1986). When identifying an 
"explanatory theory" of their three fold taxonomy of decision making 
processes (see Chapter 3 for a fuller description of this study) 
Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 241) write: 
"Decision-making processes are therefore explicable first 
and foremost by the complexity and politicality to which 
they are a response. " 
This statement identifies two dimensions of interest, a Complex- 
ity dimension and a Politicality dimension. Complexity may be equated 
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with the. Uncertainty concept used in this study (several of Hickson 
et. al. 's Complexity indicators were used as indicators of item UST01 
within, the Uncertainty/Scope construct). 
, 
Politicality was identified 
by Sharp et-al. (1989) with their Support dimension. Support in turn 
was identified as one of two factors accounting for the factor struc- 
ture of the Information Activity construct, - the other factor being 
Design (table 6.14b). As., the Meetings construct, is formed by effec- 
tively dichotomising the Support dimension (the other component being 
External information, see-chapter 7) -then Meetings may represent a 
partial capture of a Politicality dimension.,, 
The question we need to address here is whether.. ýthere is evi- 
dence to. suppose. that Politicality, or political action, is functional 
or dysfunctional to the decision making process. On this latter point 
Hickson et. al. (1986, p. 256) report that there is just a "slight 
inclination. to be less content", with decisions typified by high com- 
plexity and politicality. This description does not convey a strong 
sense of politicality having been dysfunctional to the decision-making 
process. Unfortunately, as far as this study is concerned, no mention 
is made as to whether politicality is dysfunctional to the implementa- 
tion process; although it would appear. reasonable to assume that the 
research methodology adopted by Hickson et. al. would have identified 
such effects if managers had perceived them to have been present. The 
study by Sharp et. al., (1989) into managerial behaviour during capital 
investment decisions provides a further perspective on the dysfunc- 
tionality, or not, of political action., (Note that a third activity, 
Authorisation, is also included in the model developed by Sharp et. 
al. This variable is of less interest to us here and will not be 
considered further. ) By assuming that managerial time spent upon 
Design and/or Support will increase project value (directly or by 
reducing project uncertainty) incur costs and decrease project Net 
Present Value (due to delay) Sharp et. al. found that the decision- 
making process is optimised if: _ 
"effort ' expended on the Design, Support Generation and 
Authorisation activities ... is either the maximum per- 
mitted by staff constraints or no effort is expended on 
an activity at all. " 
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Now, consider the implications of this finding for a project in 
which the required Design effort is initially underestimated. Using 
the above finding we reason that such an underestimation would be 
reinforced, with the result that only minimal design effort is under- 
taken for the project. This lack of design effort would then reasona- 
bly lead to problems during the post-approval, stages of the project. 
Furthermore, if some Support activity is perceived as necessary, then, 
if managers optimise their time in the way suggested by Sharp et. al. 
this activity would be reinforced and be carried out with' maximal 
effort. In other words, we are considering a situation in which Sup- 
port activity drives out Design activity due to the extent of Design 
activity required being initially underestimated. Such a mechanism 
could account for the negative association between Design and Support 
factors reported in chapter 6, (correlation coefficient -0.26). Hence, 
we have a mechanism by which political action during a project (Sup- 
port) drives out design effort, resulting in a low Ease score for the 
project. 
8.1.3.2 Underestimating Design Effort 
It was argued above that effective managers, seeking to optimise 
their time and minimise opportunity costs, could find themselves in a 
situation in which political action reinforces an initial underestima- 
tion of the Design effort required on a project. This lack of early 
Design effort will become evident later on in the project leading to 
unanticipated difficulties and thus lowering the Ease score for the 
project. This argument suggests a mechanism where Politicality (meas- 
ured to some extent in this study by the Meetings construct) acts as 
an "amplifier" to an initial mistake of underestimating the Design 
effort required on a project. Politicality is not, however, an expla- 
nation of how or why such a mistake came to be made in the first in- 
stance. Before seeking to address these how and why questions though, 
we need to review the evidence that underestimating Design effort is a 
plausible explanation of the observed negative associations between 
Ease and Meetings. 
Investigating cases with very low Ease scores did identify 
failure to preplan, through a tendency to oversimplify, as an identi- 
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fiable cause of implementation problems in two instances. Quotations 
from the interviews illustrating this point are given below. 
"We could have substantially preplanned the project more 
effectively, which would have greatly assisted in the 
installation and commissioning after. ... Really it was a 
lack of understanding of new technology and a new manu- 
facturing technique and its complexities. A tendency to 
oversimplify. " 
"We took an optimistic view and expected too much and 
failed to achieve what we expected. " 
This second example was,, nevertheless, judged to have been 
successful, "We achieved 90% of what we expected to achieve by the 
time we. expected to achieve it. - it was a very good performance. " 
In contrast to these examples other explanations of low Ease 
scores are not difficult to find. For example, the project in which a 
dramatic change in the target market for a new product occurred which 
was outside the company's control and the instance where new equipment 
failed to meetits agreed. performance specification. However, as the 
informants to these two examples noted during the interviews, a more 
rigorous sensitivity analysis in the first example and more equipment 
trials in the second, could have ameliorated the later problems. 
Further evidence in support of the "underestimation of Design 
effort" hypothesis comes directly from the study. Question 2b. 20 of 
the questionnaire (Appendix A) was ,a 
20 part question designed to 
measure the extent and type of problem encountered during the 
project's implementation. (This question was used to construct the 
Ease indicator SEE01. ) Each question was scored on a1 to 5 scale, 
with 1 representing "Little or none". The first item of this question 
was, "Underestimating the complexity of completing the project... " and 
achieved a score of 2 or more in over 70% of the cases studied. Its 
mean score of 2.444 was the highest of any single indicator in the 
question. Underestimating project, complexity was seen, therefore, as 
the most frequent and serious threat to ease of project implementa- 
tion. 
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The above discussion suggests that the underestimation of design 
effort is a plausible reason why projects achieve low Ease scores. How 
and why might this situation come about? It was suggested above that 
political action was not a direct. cause of underestimation, but that 
it may act to moderate the effect of more direct causal influences. 
The first quotation above suggests one causal reason as the "lack of 
understanding". We will refer to this as "Lack of Prior Knowledge". As 
we are investigating strategic decisions and these are defined in 
terms of concepts such as "novelty", then it follows that a "lack of 
prior knowledge" is a feature of such decisions which has to be taken 
as given. A more interesting question is therefore, what can an organ- 
isation do to counter its lack of prior knowledge? Again, it was noted 
from one of the interviews that a more rigorous sensitivity analysis 
might have better prepared the organisation to deal with subsequent 
implementation problems. This suggests that quality of the organisa- 
tion's planning system is another potential factor. Evidence for this 
supposition is supplied by analysis of the 20 items in question 2b. 20. 
An exploratory factor analysis of the 20 items measuring prob- 
lems encountered during implementation was made to gain insight into 
underlying causes of the reported difficulties. As this question was 
only one indicator of implementation Ease its factor structure was not 
investigated in chapter 6, only its alpha reliability; a satisfactory 
0.844. It must be noted that factoring 20 variables with only 45 cases 
in an exploratory analysis is technically a dubious procedure. The 
relatively small number of cases to variables precludes the use of 
split half confirmation of the factor structure for example. However, 
the results appear to make sense and so have been used in this discus- 
sion. Principal components factor extraction was used and inspection 
of the resulting Eigenvalue scree plot indicated an underlying struc- 
ture consisting of four factors. The varimax rotated loadings of the 
items on these four factors is reproduced in table 8.1 below. As has 
been the convention in this study, loadings above 0.5 are in bold 
type, loadings less than 0.3 are not recorded. 
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Table 8.1: Implementation Difficulties Factor Structure 
ITEM FACTOR 1234 
Underestimate complexity 0.592 0.453 
Lack of confidence 0.595 
Uncoordinated responses 0.836 
Inexperience in planning 0.681 0.371 
No learning system 0.651 0.529 
Objectives not defined 0.724 
No commitment to plan 0.733 
Sub-contractor control 0.640 -0.352 
Management controls 0.772 
Unrecorded knowledge 0.618 0.353 
Lack of training 0.405 0.494 
Role definition poor 0.651 
Late changes 0.709 
Not allowing for changes 0.797 
Authority in wrong hands 0.609 0.379 
Other crises 0.319 0.674 
Insufficient support 0.659 
Insufficient finance 0.656 
Reluctance to use 
specialists 0.773 
Assuming designs work 0.472 
Eigenvalue (unrotated) 5.508 2.424 1.804 -1.744- 
% variance explained 27.5 39.7 48.7 57.4 
Interpreting factors in terms of those'items with loadings above 
0.47 it is seen that all items in the question contribute to a factor. 
Only the item "Not having a system' for learning from experience... " 
contributes significantly to more than one factor. In addition, as- 
signing a rank to each item based on its overall mean score and aver- 
aging the resulting ranks for each factor, identifies factor 1 as the 
most important factor. Factor 3 ranks second in overall importance, 
followed by factor 4 and finally factor 2. The same importance order- 
ing is obtained if actual means are used in place of ranks. Factor 3 
refers to training and also making, or having to make, late changes to 
the project. This factor is strongly correlated with the overall 
effort and time expended by management on the project (item IAR03 of 
the Design Resources dimension of Information Activity, table 6. llb; 
r=0.465, p(0.01). Factor 4 appears to be a collection of items signi- 
fying a lack of support or priority being given to the project. Factor 
2 refers to a lack of project control systems, both technical (infor- 
mation systems) and human (not having the correct people in charge). 
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Finally, factor 1 is seen to'contain the "underestimation'; of complex- 
ity" item, and also items referring to a lack of confidence in plan- 
ning, inexperience in planning, not gaining commitment to the plan and 
the most dominant single item in the factor, failure to define key 
tasks and set objectives. These items (and others) point to an associ- 
ation between poor planning and the underestimation of project com- 
plexity. Thus, quality of-the organisation's planning system is impli- 
cated as a probable cause of underestimating design effort. 
Finally we note structural explanations of how design effort is 
underestimated. March (1981) comments, on a number of these. One such 
structural factor of particular relevance here is investigated by 
Harrison and March (1984). They observe that the technique of assess- 
inQ'capital projects as the difference between a high income and low 
cost requires two stochastic estimates to be made. Although each 
estimate may be unbiased, because the final chöice'is likely to be 
made for the project with the highest difference between these two 
estimates, the effect of statistical regression to the mean results in 
a biased estimate of net return. Thus the expected return is optimis- 
tic and the project fails to achieve target. Such an effect would 
directly influence Ease as the Accuracy concept within'Ease related to 
the achievement of anticipated, targeted returns. 
To summarise the above arguments, we started from the need to 
account for'the observed negative association between the Meetings and 
Ease constructs. This became a question of understanding the reasons 
why the Design effort required on a project may be underestimated. It 
was suggested that such an underestimation could be the result of a 
lack of prior knowledge, inadequate planning and structural properties 
of the way projects are evaluated. In addition, the political action 
surrounding a project would act to "crowd out" Design effort following 
an initial underestimation of Design needs. Furthermore, we note that 
political action was probably measured in this study by the Meetings 
construct. This sequence of arguments is summarised in the causal 
model illustrated in figure 8.1 below: 
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Figurex8.1: Causality Underlying the Meetings - Ease Association 
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The effect of the relationships identified in figure 8.1 is a 
spurious negative association between Meetings and Ease. The above 
model could therefore account for one of the associations identified 
in chapter 7. A further negative association was noted in chapter 7 
involving the Meetings construct. This was internal to the Process 
measure and involved Refreezing. Refreezing entails the stabilisation 
of social change and some of the indicators of this measure refer to 
the success of the project. The negative association-between Meetings 
and Refreezing is therefore possibly due to the same causal processes 
that influence Ease and Meetings. 
Could the arguments used so far be reversed and thereby account 
for the negative association between Unfreezing and Change? It appears 
reasonable that a low Success/Change score could be attributable to a 
failure to devote sufficient resources to the political aspects of a 
project. However, it does not seem reasonable that "over designing" a 
project could be associated with the essentially social process of 
Unfreezing. Indeed we would'expect any such negative association to be 
between Design items, such as Formal-analysis (IAF)'or Internal Infor- 
mation Search (IASI). No such negative associations were identified in 
the data analysis. Hence, we conclude that over designing, at the 
expense of Support generation, is an inadequate explanation of the 
negative association between Unfreezing and Change. However, an alter- 
native explanation for this association is available from a secondary 
analysis of the interview tape recordings. We review this evidence 
below. 
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8.1.3.3 Resistance to Change 
I 
In the preceding discussion the academic notion of politicality 
was discussed. Only in one of the interview tapes studied was politi- 
cality mentioned. The following comments were made during questions 
about problems encountered during implementation and specifically 
reasons why one individual, the Shop Manager, was. resistant to the 
project., An extract of the interview transcript is reported here: 
"Basically he didn't want to know until it was properly 
commissioned. You have to. know the organisation. It was a 
very political organisation and they were all suspicious 
of anything research and development did, both in manage 
ment and in the shop floor... I think, previously. [new 
technology] had been thrust upon them without any consul- 
tation what so ever. 'Here is a new piece of plant, this 
is what it will do, get on with it. ' which isn't the 
proper way to introduce it. That's probably why there was 
the scepticism and reluctance... They knew we were doing 
something but they didn't know-what and we. weren't al- 
lowed to tell them what. " 
This extract associates the "political organisation" with ideas 
of "suspicion" and "secrecy", and is similar to MacMillan's (1978) 
definition of political action as the action taken by an actor against 
other actors "to ensure that its own goals are achieved" ("actor" is 
synonymous with Hickson et. al. 's (1986) "interest unit"). This is not 
the implicit interpretation of politicality used in this study. Here, 
politicality was equated with ideas of developing consensus. Indeed 
the question specifically measuring consensus building in the ques- 
tionnaire (question 2a. 4, item IAC01) only scored 1 (little or none) 
for this particular project and the overall Meetings score for the 
project was the sixth lowest in the entire study. In addition the 
organisation was viewed as having a "highly restricted access to 
information", item 1 of the organicity measure, question 1.13. The 
picture of this "political organisation" is of a rather paternalistic 
organisation. This may be accounted for by noting that the company was 
owned by its founder. However, the~major conclusion of this evidence 
is that resistance came from a single individual, the Shop Manager, 
and reflected a lack of prior consultation and involvement of this 
individual in the earlier pre-approval stages of the project. Indeed 
the respondent noted that involvement of the line management at the 
pre-approval and design stage of the project would have been a good 
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thing. ' It is interesting, therefore, that the only place in which 
politicality is mentioned by (in this instance) a'senior manager, is 
in connection with the failure of the organisation to use procedures 
involving line management in the pre-approval decision-making stage of 
the project. 
The study included a number of indicators designed to assess the 
use of procedures to involve line management in the project from its 
earliest stages. These measures were subsumed within the Behavioural 
Lubrication construct, the Unfreezing and Moving items of this measure 
being particularly relevant to unit (or line) management involvement. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the above case had a very low Un- 
freezing score. The Lubrication construct was included in the ques- 
tionnaire in recognition of the "resistance to change" phenomenon; the 
existence of which, its behavioural and/or organisational basis and 
methods for circumventing or minimising its effects has been document- 
ed in the strategy and other literatures since the 1960's and earlier 
(see for example Ansoff, 1984; Steiner and Cannon, 1966). The precise 
formulation of the Lubrication concept was adapted from the study of 
Zand and Sorenson (1975) who in turn based their conceptualisation of 
the measures on the Lewin-Schein theory of change. Superficially the 
measures looked adequate. Measures relating to Unfreezing, for exam- 
ple, measured aspects of senior manager commitment and unit manager 
involvement during the pre-approval stage of the project. Both aspects 
have been identified within the strategy literature as making major 
contributions to overcoming the resistance to change phenomenon. It is 
interesting, therefore, that the scale constructed from these measures 
is the source of the direct negative (dysfunctional) association with 
the Success/Change construct. (Note, Unfreezing has a beneficial 
indirect effect on Change through the association with Refreezing. ) 
The Lewin-Schein theory of change is described in Sorensen and 
Zand (1975, p. 218). The Unfreezing stage is associated with: - 
"... encouraging dissatisfaction with current behaviour in 
order to unlearn this current behaviour and create a 
desire to learn new behaviour. " 
Thus, Unfreezing aims to create a sense of the need for change. 
if we look at the variables associated with Unfreezing we observe 
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positive associations _with, 
Meetings, Moving and Internal information 
search. The association with Moving is expected, as both are compo- 
nents, within the Lubrication concept. However, the association with 
Internal information and Meetings suggests the possibility that 
Unfreezing may have measured the mechanism by which information was 
collected, from within the organisation, rather than the intended 
generation of commitment to the project. 
A feature of some of the projects studied was that resistance to 
the project was identified as coming from a single individual. The 
instance cited above of the Shop Manager is a case in point. Here 
resistance was due to a lack of prior involvement of the manager 
during the early stages of the project. Another case in point comes 
from the pilot study reported in chapter 4. Here a major problem with 
the implementation of the project (from the managers perspective, not 
the engineers) was the need for close liaison with the customer. This 
was a new (to this company) requirement and the problem was only 
solved when the individual responsible for operating the liaison 
procedures was replaced. No formal , 
measurement of the Unfreezing 
construct was made during the pilot study. However, judging from the 
interviews and the detail contained within the Capital Application 
document, the author's assessment is that most of the Unfreezing 
procedures would have been followed in this instance. Two further 
examples of single individual resistance can be cited. In one instance 
the introduction of a, computer controlled (CNC) machine was resisted 
by the skilled craftsman who would be responsible for operating the 
new equipment. The motive behind the craftsman's resistance was, the 
de-skilling of his job, loss .. of 
bonuses etc., resulting from the 
introduction of the new technology. However, this was not seen as a 
major obstacle to the project's implementation. We "managed around 
him" was the respondents' comment. Eventually the craftsman left the 
company. This project achieved a quite large negative Unfreezing 
score. The last case for which data of specific resistance exists also 
relates to the first introduction of CNC machinery. Here the resist- 
ance came from the works engineer. The precise nature of the resist- 
ance was to do with the engineer's perception of how long it would 
take to commission and integrate the new machine into the factory's 
operations., Essentially the engineer took a very pessimistic view as 
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compared to the' CEO. The CEO's problem was solved, rather tragically; 
when the engineer died. The project was'then successfully completed to 
the CEO's schedule. In contrast'-to the previous case, this project 
achieved a quite large positive Unfreezing score. 
It would`be dangerous to read too much into an analysis of these 
cases, ' particularly as they represent only some ten percent of the 
total sample. However, they do represent instances in which "resist- 
ance to change" can be clearly identified and therefore supports a 
"resistance to change" hypothesis. One feature of these examples is 
that the "power" of the individual to resist the project affects the 
perception of the severity of the resistance; ' in the absence of a 
measure of "power" it is equated here with "authority". For example, 
the craftsman was in a less powerful position than the 'Shop Manager 
and appears to have had less of an impact on the project. A second 
tentative observation is the lack of, correspondence between the Un- 
freezing measure and the existence 'of resistance. This lack of'corre- 
spondence may be further illustrated with a case also involving the 
first introduction of CNC machinery. This project obtained the lowest 
Unfreezing score of any project studied; "didn't bother" was the 
response to some of the questions used to assess Unfreezing. However, 
the project had a quite large Change effect on the organisation. It 
also achieved the second highest Ease of implementation score and the 
lowest'Meetings score. In other words the project was successful, yet 
very little consultation occurred, as measured by Meetings and Un- 
freezing. The only implementation problem identified was 'a slight 
increase in grievances due to shop'floor workers wanting an increase 
in pay to operate the machine. This grievance'was dismissed as a minor 
irritation; nor was it equated with resistance to the project. 
To attempt a summary of'the arguments presented above to account 
for the negative association between Unfreezing and Change we note the 
following. Firstly, Unfreezing is a measure associated with the beha- 
vioural, social phenomenon of "resistance to change". Secondly, Un- 
freezing could be measuring a "collection of internal information" 
process, as well as the intended "generating commitment" process. 
Thirdly, "resistance to change" by individuals was identified within a 
number of the cases studied. Fourthly, the "Power" of the individual 
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could affect the severity of the resistance offered'and finally, there 
was little correspondence between the incidence of these cases and the 
Unfreezing measure. From these arguments it is concluded that the a 
possible explanation of the . observed negative association 
between 
Unfreezing and Change is "resistance to change". We also conclude that 
the measurement of "resistance to change" must take into account the 
power of individual actors to offer effective resistance. 
Looking at the evidence available from the study to account for 
observed cases of resistance we identify a lack of involvement in the 
decision (i. e., 'poor Unfreezing) inability (or unwillingness) to learn 
new working procedures, beliefs about what was feasible, and negative 
effects on personal skills and pay. The importance of personal issues 
in determining resistance to change was noted by Woodward (1965). 
Indeed Woodward notes that resistance to change was almost completely 
lacking from the cases they studied and that where it did occur it was 
associated'with threats to pay levels or employment'. We may also posit 
that training would assist in overcoming resistance based on the need 
to learn new working procedures. Indeed the specific item measuring 
lack of training in question 2b. 20 (see discussion associated with 
table 8.1) had the highest mean (1.933) of any item not significantly 
associated with the "quality of planning" factor. Thus, lack of train- 
ing is identified as an important cause of implementation difficul- 
ties. The issue of beliefs about feasibility raises an interesting 
point relating to the discussion in chapter 4 about contingency allow- 
ances. Adapting arguments proposed by Galbraith (1969) it was noted 
that slack resources reduce the need to process information and are 
therefore a method of variety absorption. In the context of a project, 
slack resources were equated with contingencies. The resistance of the 
works engineer to the new CNC machine could be interpreted as a desire 
to generate a time contingency sufficient to cover any imagined diffi- 
culties. This accords with Ansoff's (1987, p. 239) view that resistance 
is inversely proportional to the time for implementation. 
To summarise the above reasoning, it is suggested that the level 
of organisational resistance to a project may be determined by summing 
over all interest units (N) involved in or influenced by the project, 
the net negative personal effect (P- - P+) of the project on the 
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interest unit, weighted by the interest Unit's power. In symbolic 
form, Resistance may be defined as follows: 
I 
Resistance = EPoweri. (Pi - Pi) 
i=1 
Resistance may be reduced through Contingency allowances, Train- 
ing and Involvement. Involvement was measured in this study by Un- 
freezing. Finally we suggest that organisational change will tend to 
generate more negative personal threats (P) than positive personal 
benefits (P+) and that the level of both will be determined by the 
Uncertainty associated with the project. In other words, Uncertainty 
will be positively associated with organisational Resistance. It has 
been demonstrated in this study that uncertainty is positively associ- 
ated with procedural Change. Hence, we are able to account for a 
spurious negative association between Change and Unfreezing operating 
because of the pattern of associations between Change, Unfreezing, 
Uncertainty and an unmeasured concept, organisational Resistance. This 
pattern is illustrated in figure 8.2 below. 
Figure 8.2: Causality Underlying the Unfreezing - Change Association 
Training 
Contingencies ---.. Resistance Uncertainty 
UNFREEZING CHANGE 
The above model suggests that the observed unanticipated associ- 
ation between Unfreezing and Change is spurious, and originates 
through a presumed association with the unmeasured concept Resistance. 
However, this association is the strongest observed in the study 
between any of the Information Process and Success measures. It is 
judged unlikely therefore, that this model fully accounts for the 
association. It was noted previously that the Unfreezing measure was 
suspect at measuring what was intended (generating commitment to the 
project) and may have also measured a process by which information and 
I-. 
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data were collected from within the organisation. That is, the partic- 
ular construction of the Unfreezing measure may not have measured the 
success of generating commitment, just the presence or absence of some 
consultation process. In other words, the validity of the Unfreezing 
construct is suspect. Such an explanation may also help to account for 
the observed unanticipated association between the Unfreezing and 
Change constructs. 
8.1.3.4 Summary 
The cybernetic theory developed in chapter 4 identified organi- 
sational procedures as the proper focus for the study of the implemen- 
tation phenomenon. In particular the theory identified two modes of 
organisational adaptation as the outcome or "Success" of the implemen- 
tation effort, and. identified the contingent dimensions of the imple- 
mentation question as Uncertainty and Information. From this perspec- 
tive hypotheses were developed and tested. Of ten hypotheses, six were 
successfully demonstrated after making only minor changes to the 
operationalisation of one of the Success constructs. In particular the 
hypotheses linking Uncertainty to Success and Information constructs 
were found to be strong. The four hypotheses not demonstrated related 
Information constructs to Success. Two related dimensions of organisa- 
tional structure to Success, the, others related processes used during 
the pre-approval design stage of the project to Success. In the final 
analysis tentative evidence was found in support of one of the hypoth- 
eses connecting a dimension of organisational structure to one of the 
Success concepts. The inability to identify an association between 
Information Process and Success constructs implies that these associa- 
tions are weak. In other words, pre-approval design and decision 
making does not assist the, subsequent post-approval implementation 
effort to any great extent. In fact, to demonstrate any link between 
the two stages required a close examination of each separate indicator 
used to operationalise the Information Process concept. Under such 
close scrutiny evidence was found to support the two original hypothe- 
ses linking Information Process and Success. However, unanticipated, 
significant and negative associations were also identified. It has 
been suggested here that these associations may be explicable in terms 
of a social or behavioural theory of information processing. 
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The question posed at the beginning of this discussion of alter- 
native theories was, are these theories as good or better at account- 
ing for all of the observed associations? In view of, the success of 
the cybernetic approach at providing a coherent framework and perspec- 
tive-for this study, and the successful demonstration of the majority 
of the anticipated associations, then the authors judgment is that the 
cybernetic theory should, by an large, be accepted and retained. . In 
addition, it is not obvious to this author how some of the behavioural 
explanations posed above could be adapted. to account for the associa- 
tions most clearly explained by the cybernetic model. In other words, 
the cybernetic approach used in this study, was quite successful at 
predicting what happens during implementation, but to predict process, 
or how it happens, an explicitly social or behavioural dimension is 
also required. This suggests that adaptation, not rejection, of the 
cybernetic approach is in order. One possible adaptation or extension 
to the theory which may prove beneficial in future studies is based on 
cognitive theory, and will be reviewed next. 
8.1.4 COGNITIVE THEORY 
The following discussion is based on, Steinbruner (1974). Trained 
as a Psychologist but writing as a Political Scientist about the 
nuclear sharing issue among NATO allies in the period 1954 to 1964, 
Steinbruner argues that many of the issues surrounding this complex 
decision cannot readily be explained by a rational, analytic theory of 
decision-making. Steinbruner then argues that a cybernetic theory of 
decision-making is able , to readily account for many of the issues 
found to, be most perplexing when viewed from a rational perspective. 
However, he identifies certain limitations to current cybernetic 
theory when applied to complex decision situations. At the risk of 
over simplification, for cybernetic principles to operate constraints 
have to be established for the decision. In the case of simple deci- 
sions these constraints will be identifiable within the decision's 
environment. However, for complex decisions in complex environments 
explaining how these constraints are established poses a major problem 
and is one not addressed by cybernetic theory. Steinbruner argues that 
an appropriate source of supplementary information regarding the 
source of decision-making constraints can be found within cognitive 
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theory. 
.< 
Steinbruner continues by elaborating four axiomatic principles 
of cognitive theory. Two of these are the "Consistency" and "Economy" 
principles, Economy being subdivided into "Simplicity" and "Stability" 
principles. Consistency refers to the mind's tendency to keep internal 
belief relationships consistent with one another. It influences both 
how memory is organised and how new information is processed. Economy 
refers to the fact that "perception and attention are selective", that 
is "the mind remembers some things of importance but forgets a great 
deal and never even attends to most of the information it physically 
receives". This selection is achieved through the operation of the 
simplicity principle - keeping beliefs simple - and the stability 
principle - resisting change to the core structure of beliefs. 
Steinbruner's contribution is interesting from the perspective 
of the present study. It suggests modifications to cybernetic theory 
which introduces an explicitly human dimension into the theory. Fur- 
ther, it achieves this in a highly consistent manner; the economy 
principle for example is "in accord with a fundamental proposition of 
the cybernetic paradigm". This extension could therefore provide a 
basis for explaining the nature of the behavioural dimension identi- 
fied as the source of the unanticipated associations between Informa- 
tion Process and Success constructs. The stability principle is con- 
sistent with a "resistance to change" effect, and consistency and sim- 
plicity principles may help account for the "underestimation of design 
effort" issue discussed above. Cognitive theory, therefore, provides a 
basis and explanation of the two concepts identified here as being 
potentially responsible for the observed negative associations between 
Information Process and Success measures. 
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8.2" LIMITATIONS 
8.2.1 EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
It-was noted in chapter 5 that a, discussion of external, validity 
would be deferred until this chapter. It was. also noted in section 
5.1.4 that external validity was the least important validity type in 
the current study. 
Broadly, external validity is concerned with the extent to which 
a particular study's results may be generalised to other-times, set- 
tings, people etc. There is no objective measure of external validity, 
it has to be established by deduction, (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Two 
broadly based threats. to the external validity of a study can be 
identified. The first comes from the specificity of the theory. used 
and the second from the operationalisation of this theory. The theo- 
retical perspective of= this study was developed in chapters 2,3 and 
4. This development and the hypotheses derived from it, was not re- 
stricted to particular times, settings etc. and was therefore entirely 
general; within the overall constraint that the study applied to the 
implementation,,. phenomenon. Subsequent results indicated anomalies 
between theory, and findings. To account for these anomalies, Cognitive 
theory was proposed as an extension to the Cybernetic perspective 
adopted. The extensions proposed using Cognitive theory are, in turn, 
non specific to times, settings etc. Hence, - we conclude that the 
theoretical perspective adopted in the study and the proposed modifi- 
cation to this perspective, does not present a threat to the external 
validity of the study. 
Operationalisation of the theoretical perspective adopted was 
the subject of chapter 5. This process was based on two major con- 
straints. These, constraints determined the breadth of study being 
undertaken and related to the type of organisation and decision to be 
investigated. The rationale for selecting these two constraints was 
derived from arguments presented in chapter 3 and resulted in the 
selection of capital investment projects (because they were seen as 
the most strategic) within manufacturing organisations (because capi- 
tal investments were most frequent within such organisations). This 
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selection represented one of nine possible selections derived'from the 
three fold categorisation of organisations (Manufacturing, Commercial 
Service and Non-commercial Service) and projects'(Capital, Revenue and 
Social) identified in that chapter. Arguments used to derive the 
threefold taxonomy of project types were entirely general and should 
not-pose a threat to external validity. The organisational taxonomy 
was. empirically derived and will reflect limitations of the data used. 
As noted in chapter 3, this data, although very broadly based, did not 
include, for example, decisions'-from within construction companies, -or 
voluntary organisations. The organisational taxonomy is therefore 
restricted to a subset of organisations and is probably incomplete. 
In the light of the constraints imposed, two questions are 
pertinent to a discussion of the effect of operationalisation upon 
external validity. Can the study's results be extended to other 
project types? Can the results be reasonably extended to other, non- 
manufacturing organisations? If we are more focused in our question- 
ing, two further questions can be addressed. How representative was 
the sample of manufacturing organisations studied? How representative 
was the sample of capital investments? It will be convenient to ad- 
dress these four questions in reverse order. The data required to 
address the second pair of questions is contained in chapter 6. In 
table 6.5b projects were categorised using Hickson et. -, al. 's (1986) 
"Decision Topic" scheme. Of the ten categories in this scheme the, 
current study identified projects in eight of them. In addition Tech- 
nology topics dominated the sample, a finding in broad agreement with 
Hickson et. al. 's study. Product classification data was presented in 
Table 6.9. This data showed the sample companies to be distributed in 
a manner similar to the national distribution. In summary, the find- 
ings of chapter 6 present reasonable evidence for the external validi- 
ty of the study in terms of types of capital projects and manufactur- 
ing organisations studied. 
Turning to the first pair of questions asked above, we consider 
the applicability of the study to non-manufacturing organisations. As 
the study did not address the question of implementation within non- 
manufacturing organisations little can be stated concerning this 
question. One commercial service company did enter the sample and the 
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project studied was a Control-topic decision. The implementation of 
this topic was not noticeably different to similar decisions in manu- 
facturing companies. This may indicate- that capital investment 
projects are treated similarly in different organisational types. 
However, this conclusion is highly tentative and the most appropriate 
conclusion would be that the external validity of the study with 
respect to non-manufacturing organisations is indeterminate from the 
available data. The situation concerning the first question (extension 
of findings to other project types) is a little more certain. To see 
why we need to reiterate some of the conclusions of chapter 3. 
8.2.1.1 Extension to Otber'Project Categories 
Viewing the capital project as a surrogate for an'Entity change 
decision and noting that an Entity change cannot be a pure type as an 
Entity change also requires a Relational change (see chapter 3, sec- 
tion 3.1.1.2) it is reasoned that capital projects are likely to also 
include elements of social and possibly revenue projects. Strictly, 
therefore, the unit of analysis used within the study was probably a 
programme of projects with a predominantly capital project component. 
From the internal validity perspective this 'lack of purity' repre- 
sents a threat, it is however beneficial to the' study's external 
validity. During a number of interviews it appeared to the author that 
the projects being described, and previously identified as being 
capital', were more akin to social projects. Two such cases were iden- 
tified, a project to implement BS 5750 Part 2 and a project to reorga- 
nise the shop floor work flow arrangement. The first project was 
subsequently categorised as-a Control topic, the second as a Reorgani- 
sation topic in table 6.5b. Both topic categories were identified with 
Social projects in chapter 3. A, further interesting observation re- 
garding these cases relates to, the analysis of question 2b. 17 of the 
questionnaire. This question was analysed in chapter 7 (see Figure 
7.3) and ' captured the relative 'learning' or 'variety reduction' 
occurring during the project. The finding summarised in chapter 7 was 
that learning occurred predominantly during the project's final Opera- 
tion stage. Indeed, on the average nearly as much learning occurred 
during this stage as occurred during the other three stages (Design, 
Installation and Commissioning) combined. The interesting feature of 
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the two cases quoted above was that the initial Design stage accounted 
for most of the "learning". Two other cases were identified from the 
main sample which exhibited a similar pattern, both were control topic 
decisions and of three other Control topic decisions within the sam- 
ple, all ranked Design or Installation as contributing the most or 
second most to Learning. This indicates that cases associated with 
social project topics tend to exhibit a markedly different "Learning" 
pattern than do the vast majority of capital investment projects 
studied. 
A further comparison between revenue and capital project types 
is possible by comparing this study with those of Ginzberg (1978) and 
Zand and Sorensen (1975). These studies looked at the implementation 
of Management Science/OR projects (e. g. the implementation of a new 
stock control model) and provide examples of what we call revenue 
project. In addition, the two studies cited above both employed the 
Lewin-Schein model as their basic theoretical perspective. This ena- 
bles a reasonably direct comparison between their findings and some of 
this study's to be made. Importantly, both of the above studies found 
that Refreezing contributed most to project success; where success was 
measured as user satisfaction, a concept similar to our managerial 
Satisfaction. This finding is similar to one of our findings. "However, 
a point of departure between this study's findings and those of Zand 
and Sorensen (1975) concerns the important interconnections between 
the Unfreezing, Moving and Refreezing stages of the Lewin-Schein 
model. In particular Zand and Sorensen found a strong association 
between positive Unfreezing and positive Moving constructs. This study 
identified only a weak association, a result pointing to a possible 
difference between capital and revenue project types. Other associa- 
tions identified by Zand and Sorensen (using fifth order partial 
correlations, see next chapter section) were similar. 
Thus, in terms of the stages of the Lewin-Schein change model we 
observe'that for capital and revenue projects it is the final Refreez- 
ing stage that is primarily determining satisfaction. Observing that 
the Unfreezing stage of the Lewin-Schein model is associated with the 
pre-approval stage of a project, our earlier discussion provides 
evidence to suppose that the Unfreezing stage primarily predicts 
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project satisfaction for 'social' projects. 'Finally, this study indi- 
cates that the' pattern of associations between the three precepts of 
the Lewin-Schein model are different for capital and-revenue projects. 
An important rider to these speculations is' that a different 'set of 
indicators would bey used to measure the, theoretical constructs of an 
instrument specifically designed for Social or Revenue projects. This 
may also affect the pattern of associations-between constructs. In 
summary, the-evidence is that the findings" and` conclusions of this 
study-do not readily apply to projects other than capital investment 
projects. 
8.2.1.2 A Methodological Note on the Zand and Sorensen Study 
This note represents a digression from the main issues of this 
chapter but is necessary to account for an apparent contradiction in 
the argument of the previous section. In discussing Zand and Soren- 
sen's (1975)"' findings it was noted that they identified a° strong 
association between their positive unfreezing and positive moving 
constructs, whereas this study identified only a weak association 
between these constructs. Both these findings are derived from an 
analysis using fifth order partial correlations. That is the correla- 
tion"between'positive Unfreezing and positive Moving say, controlling 
for negative Unfreezing, negative Moving, positive and negative Re- 
freezing and success (the LSI in Zand and Sorensen; Satisfaction, SES 
in this study). This discrepancy is unlikely to be due to the opera- 
tionalisation of these-constructs' as this study used a'parsimonious 
set of Zand and Sorensen's indicators. 
The 'regression results reported in chapter 7 (table 7.12) iden- 
tifies a strong association between Unfreezing and Moving, 'a result in 
apparent contradiction with the 'weak association noted above based on 
partial correlation. The reason for this apparent contradiction is not 
due to the aggregation of positive and negative indicators of Unfreez- 
ing etc., but because it is not appropriate to use fifth order partial 
correlations to explicate the key associations between constructs in 
which causal order can be established. This is the essence of Bla- 
lock's' (1972) statement reported in chapter 7, that in using the 
Simon-Blalock technique in causal 'modelling one does not control for 
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variables that are dependent upon the 'variables' being analysed. ' De- 
pendent variables cannot be influencing the association being studied 
and therefore should not be controlled. In the case of the 'Lewin- 
Schein change model a causal order'can be established. This runs from 
Unfreezing through Moving and Refreezing to success and was noted in 
chapter 7. It'is therefore inadmissible to control'for Refreezing and 
success when'analysing the association between Unfreezing and Moving. 
If such controls are applied, the results are frequently misleading 
and contradictory. ' 
In conclusion, the difference in the pattern- of fifth order 
partial correlations reported for this study and Zand and Sorensen's 
is indicative of a true difference between the two sets of findings. 
The actual values reported however are likely to be artifacts of the 
analytical technique (fifth order partial correlation) and not repre- 
sent real associations. So, of the associations reported by Zand -and 
Sorensen (1975) it is only the correlations between the two refreezing 
constructs and their level of success index (the LSI) that represent 
"real" associations, the other reported associations are likely to be 
artifacts of the analysis'. 
8.2.2 INFERRED CAUSALITY 
In chapter5 (section'5.2.3) we noted that three criteria needed 
to be established for causation to be inferred. These were (1) associ- 
ative variation, (2)' sequence of events and (3) absence of other 
possible causal factors (Green and Tull, - 1970). 'There are a number of 
points within this study where associative variation has been estab- 
lished but where the other two criteria have been assumed; not demon- 
strated: 'In this section'we will specifically investigate the evidence 
in support of criteria 2 and 3 above. 
The negative associations between Meetings and Unfreezing, and 
Change, Ease and Refreezing identified in chapter 7 were assumed in 
the construction of figures 7.6a and 7.6b, to be causal. Because 
Meetings and Unfreezing relate to the pre-approval stage of the 
project it- is possible to establish a sequence of 'events from these 
constructs to Change, Ease and Refreezing. However, the discussion in 
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the first part of this chapter attempted to explain these negative 
associations in terms-of other-possible causal factors. Accepting the 
existence,, of these factors means that the negative associations re- 
ferred to above are spurious, -not causal. 
To represent this using the 
constructs identified in chapter 7, -figures 7.6a-and 7.6b need to be 
corrected by replacing the single headed paths with, double headed 
arrows showing association. - 
The Process construct-principally associated with - Success was 
Refreezing. This association is unlikely to be spurious based on, the 
evidence presented within this study. However, Refreezing refers to 
late stages of the project just as do the Success constructs. Is it 
reasonable to-argue-that this represents a sequence of events? Inspec- 
tion of the items composing the Refreezing measure (table-7.10a) shows 
it to contain a measure of project success which accounts for about 
11% of the variance of the scale. As managerial Satisfaction (SES) 
also was composed of items measuring project success, some of the 
association between these, two items is to be-expected. These comments 
accepted, the remaining 89% of the Refreezing measure's variance is 
composed of items measuring aspects of Engineering support, objectivi- 
ty and, availability of performance standards and top management en- 
couragement of adoption. The vast majority of the Refreezing indica- 
tors are not dependent upon success, and we conclude that the inferred 
causal order between Refreezing and Success constructs is valid. -. 
The research instrument was specifically designed to generate a 
sequence of events between Uncertainty and Information constructs and 
Success constructs (chapter 5). With the exception of the associations 
noted above there is-no difficulty inferring causality between these 
constructs. -There 
is a potential problem with the inference of causal- 
ity between the Uncertainty and Information constructs. Specifically, 
hypotheses 3 and 6 in chapter 4 stated that Uncertainty and Informa- 
tion Experience caused Information Process. There is little difficulty 
with the causal order between Experience and Process measures, as 
Experience relates to parameters determined by the pre-project history 
of the organisation. The causal order between Uncertainty and Informa- 
tion Process is more problematical however. For example, an important 
indicator of Uncertainty was project cost. This would not be known 
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until some design effort had been expended in determining cost. Design 
effort is associated with the pre-approval stage of the project, which 
in turn was measured by Process. ' Therefore, if many of the Process 
measures were temporally precedent to the Uncertainty measures, how 
can causality be inferred as being from Uncertainty to Information and 
not vice versa? At the very least it would appear that a reciprocal 
(non-recursive)- relationship would-exist between the two constructs. 
The fallacy of the foregoing argument is the presumption that an 
indicator is the concept. This is not so. In measurement theory an 
indicator is caused by a concept (figure 5.3) and in this, instance it 
is the Uncertainty associated with a project that causes the cost. The 
concept underpinning both Uncertainty and Information is Variety. 
Variety was defined in Chapter 3 and conceptualised in chapter 4 as a 
property of a project. Models developed in chapter 2 identified the 
inception of a project with "Goal recognition" (Goals originate in 
response to a changed strategic objective of the organisation). 
Therefore, as a goal defines a project and a property of the project 
is variety, it follows that the goal must also determine variety. 
Hence, we are able to equate a project's variety (i. e., Uncertainty) 
with the very start of the- implementation process and consequently 
Uncertainty, must precede all project specific Information. In other 
words, Information Process is a response to Uncertainty, as stated in 
hypothesis 3 of chapter 4. Furthermore, Uncertainty is an exogenous 
variable, as-assumed throughout the study. 
Following from the above discussion an interesting question is, 
can project information affect the goals and objectives which created 
the project? The answer must, be, yes. -For example, it is not difficult 
to-imagine a scenario in which subsequent information, on cost say, 
leads to a project being abandoned. In terms of the logical models 
used above this implies a redefinition of an organisation's strategic 
objectives. However, as the change in critical success factors that 
stimulated the changed objective will still be present, the organisa- 
tion is still constrained to implement a change of some type. One way 
could be by redefining-its business environment, effectively replacing 
a capital project by a revenue project. This study did not investigate 
scenarios of this type, although they were observed to occur by Hick- 
Page 288 
son et. al. (1986) and have been commented on in chapter 3. 
8.2.3 LEARNING AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
In chapter 2 we noted that the focus of this thesis would be on 
strategic change. In figure 2.10 we indicated that such change would 
influence an organisation's internal resources directly, where inter- 
nal resources is taken to include procedural techniques. The basis for 
this assertion was identified in chapter 4-through-, the argument that 
strategic change represented changes to an organisation's standard 
operating procedures and this reflected "Organisational Learning"., It 
was further argued in chapter 4 that such changes could represent a 
source of competitive advantage to an organisation in a manner similar 
to the Gateway Capacity concept identified by Zaltman et. al. (1973). 
Gateway Capacity was defined by Zaltman et. al. as the-"extent that 
the adoption of an innovation can open avenues to the adoption-of 
other innovations". Such Gateway Capacity effects may be overt or 
covert; covert in the sense that the project may spin-off unintention- 
al benefits. Question 2a. 28 of the questionnaire (Appendix A) was de- 
signed to measure a projects overt Gateway Capacity. Projects under- 
taken for these reasons typically involved the purchase of computer 
controlled machinery (see chapter 9 for a fuller discussion). Here, 
our aim is to discuss and develop the covert Gateway Capacity argu- 
ments, to identify how these may- enable an organisation to develop 
competitive advantages and to identify limitations to this competitive 
advantage argument. 
It will be instructive in developing the following arguments to 
view implementation as a simple process with inputs and outputs. In 
chapter 3 we identified change as the output of implementation. March 
(1981) argues that organisational change follows from organisational 
action and comments that "Action can be seen as stemming from past 
learning". This statement serves two purposes, first it identifies 
action with a learning concept and secondly it implies that learning 
is cyclical through time. In other words, learning involves feedback. 
An initial model of organisational learning"would be as follows. 
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Figure 8.3:. Organisational Learning,. - Initial Model. 
Input Process 
ACTION 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Output 
-CHANGE 
L --------------------------j 
Feedback 
To extend the above model"a process-is required whose output is 
action. Mintzberg et. al. (1976) define a decision as a commitment, to 
action, and in' chapter 2 it was noted that planning and decision- 
making are synonymous in a managerial context. Thus, =we see planning 
as a precursor to action. In -turn, internal and `external data or 
information was identified in chapter 2 as inputs to the planning 
process (e. g., figure 2.1). -There is-however a problem with this view 
andýit-relates to the use of the word or. Data is not information and 
the input to planning has to be one or the other. Computer scientists 
and accountants (Higgins, 1985) draw a distinction between the two. 
Woodhouse et. al. (1982) for example define data as "unorganised facts 
which appear as a collection of numeric and/or alphabetic and/or other 
characters in some representation". Information, on the other hand, is 
defined as "the meaning attached to data". This definition of informa- 
tion implies an inferential process which converts data into informa- 
tion (Tsichritzis'and Lochovsky (1982). We will refer to this process 
as "analysis". However, the word Information has been used elsewhere 
in this thesis to refer to Variety Reduction and to avoid confusion 
with this meaning the word "knowledge" will be used in the current 
context. Analysis is therefore a process which converts data into 
knowledge. 
To complete the connection between data and. action a second 
process is required that converts knowledge into action. We will refer 
to this process as "design". Planning is therefore a combined analysis 
and design process. Analysis is concerned with "what" questions (what 
does this data mean? ) and design with "how" questions (how do we use 
this knowledge? ) (Cane and Sarson, 1979).. This description of planning 
is in reasonable agreement with Anthony's (1965) definition as "decid- 
ing what to do". Finally we note that planning is identified by some 
authors with learning (e. g., De Geus, 1988). 
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By splitting' planning into a two stage process two dimensions 
appear. One is associated with data and action. It is associated with 
concrete, specific items, such' as facts and objectives. This could be 
referred to as a "Hard" dimension. The other dimension, in contrast, 
is associated with items like knowledge and with reference to figure 
8.3 above, 'change. These items define a "Soft" dimension, in the sense 
that knowledge and change items have less clearly defined attributes, 
such' as time and place, whereas data and action have more clearly 
definable attributes. These Hard and Soft dimensions provide a struc- 
ture on which an extended version of the model in figure 8.3 above can 
be constructed. This model is illustrated in figure 8.4, and is' a 
model' of experiential organisational learning. It is experiential 
because' it includes an'implementation'stage and'is therefore a model 
of "learning by doing". Note that the-focuses of this model is on the 
standard operating procedures of an organisation: 
Figure 8.4: A Model of Organisational Learning 
DATA 
ANALYSIS 
IMPLEMENTATION 
8.2.3.1 Implications of the Organisational Learning Model 
As previously stated, implementation in this study is seen as a 
process which changed standard operating procedures. Chapter 4 identi- 
fied the standard operating procedures of an organisation with its 
skills. A change to these procedures is therefore equated with an 
adaptation, or extension, of the organisation's skills/distinctive 
competency. Thus, the process connecting change to data in figure 8.2 
is a process leading to the recognition and identification of these 
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skills. To, paraphrase Theodore Levitt's seminal contribution,,, the 
question being asked-during this process is "What organisational 
skills do we really have? ". For this reason the process connecting 
change to, data in figure 8.2 will be referred to as "Organisational 
Cognition". The questions then being addressed during the planning 
stages of the model relate to "What new or additional opportunities do 
these skills open up? " and subsequently "How can we capitalise on 
these opportunities? ". 
With this interpretation of organisational learning we are able 
to understand how implementation can lead to-. competitive advantage. 
Implementation leads to competitive advantage (in a not directly 
economic sense) if the skills the organisation acquires as a result of 
the implementation can be recognised and subsequently used. Implemen- 
tation drives the organisational learning process but of itself is not 
sufficient for the full benef its, if any, to be realised.. That, such 
"spin-off" can occur was demonstrated in the case study described in 
chapter 4. This concluded that a procedural change adopted to elimi- 
nate a liaison problem encountered during the project was in fact a 
core skill required by any organisation wishing to become a Just-In- 
Time supplier. At the time of the study there was no indication that 
the organisation wished to., capitalise on this skill.. An example of 
where spin-off effects may have directly lead to new business opportu- 
nities for an organisation is found within the. Mail Order catalogue 
industry. Many companies within this industry possess subsidiary 
companies providing credit worthiness information to lending institu- 
tions, e. g., -Grattan, Empire Stores. The data required by these sub- 
sidiary companies is provided by the core business which supply goods 
on credit to a large number of households within the U. K. 
Adopting this perspective indicates that the best time for an 
organisation to review its competitive skills is following the imple- 
mentation of a strategic decision. Such a review suggests the idea of 
a formal "organisational Skills Audit". This idea appears to be super- 
ficially similar to certain procedures already used by some organisa- 
tions, e. g., the-Personal Skills Audit, the Post Completion Audit. The 
Personal Skills Audit focus on such skills as fluency in a foreign 
language, or ability to use a PC. The Post Completion Audit seeks to 
Page 292 
identify improvements to capital expenditure planning and budgeting 
procedures (Neale and Holmes, 1988) in order to improve the quality of 
existing and future investment decisions (Pike, 1988). These two 
examples would need considerable modification if they were to fulfil 
the aims of the proposed Organisational Skills Audit, which is to 
identify organisational skills with potential for creating future 
innovative opportunities. Such an audit could start by asking the 
question "What skill do we really have? ", a question initiating the 
Organisational Cognition process of figure 8.2 above. However, to ask 
the next question proposed above, namely "What opportunities do these 
skills present? ", requires access to data that will probably be exter- 
nal to the organisation. This point was noted above and is supported 
by many studies into the innovation process, whether at the national, 
industry or organisational level (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; for a 
review). It is also suggested by the findings of this study. Model III 
in chapter 7 identified a statistically significant path between 
External Information (IASE) and Success/Change (SCX) constructs. 
Indeed this was the only significant and positive association identi- 
fied between pre-approval and success variables. 
The paper by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) cited above, is relevant 
to the present discussion of how an organisation may identify and 
further utilise skill changes that "spin-off" from strategic projects. 
They argue that the level of prior related knowledge possessed by a 
firm is critical to its ability to exploit new, external knowledge and 
thus its innovative capability. Their thesis focuses on a firm's 
ability to recognise new information, assimilate and apply it. They 
identify this ability with the concept of "Absorptive Capacity". The 
concept of Absorptive Capacity appears to be congruent with the three 
processes " of figure 8.4 identified here as, "organisational 
cognition", "analysis" and "design". A further point of congruence 
between this study and Cohen and Levinthal's relates to the sources of 
Absorptive Capacity. They note that it may be a by-product or spin-off 
from R&D investment, a firm's manufacturing operations or more 
directly through sending staff on training programmes. The congruence 
is suggested by noting that R&D investment is frequently -ongoing, 
budgeted revenue expenditure and the Absorptive Capacity spin off may 
therefore be equated with spin off from Revenue projects as defined in 
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chapter 3. Similarly, spin off' from' manufacturing operations is simi- 
lar to the arguments proposed here, that Capital projects have poten- 
tially beneficial side effects. Finally, their personnel' training 
programme is an example of a Social project. Thus, we identify an 
organisation's Absorptive capacity as a major constraint on its abili- 
ty to identify covert Gateway Capacity benefits. *Absorptive capacity 
is in turn, according to Cohen and Levinthal, determined by the level 
of prior related knowledge, the Absorptive Capacity of individual 
members of the organisation, the communication structure (both inter- 
nal and'external) and the path or history of the organisation. These 
factors are therefore even more basic constraints on the ability of an 
organisation to reap the incidental-benefits resulting from the imple- 
mentation of a strategic decision. 
`8.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has sought to`address a number of issues. The first 
was to elicit possible explanations for the negative associations 
identified in chapter 7 between Information Process and Success con- 
structs. Initially we discussed Politicality as a possible explanation 
but found little evidence for supposing this to be directly dysfunc- 
tional to the implementation process. However, Politicality was indi- 
rectly implicated as an "amplifier" of underestimating the design 
effort required on a project. This argument suggests that the negative 
association between Meetings and Ease (and also Meetings and Refreez- 
ing) could be due to an initial underestimation of the true complexity 
of the project. Possible reasons how such underestimation might occur 
were identified as, quality of the organisations planning system, lack 
of'prior knowledge and structural factors relating to the method of 
project assessment. It was then proposed that the observed association 
between Meetings and Ease (and also Refreezing) was spurious and due 
to the pattern of associations illustrated in figure 8.1. 
Turning to the association between Unfreezing and Change, the 
phenomenon of resistance to change was considered. By assessing possi- 
ble causes and effects of this phenomenon it was proposed that associ- 
ations between Unfreezing, Resistance to change, Uncertainty and 
Change could result in the observed association being spurious. Howev- 
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er, --this was viewed as, only a partial explanation, and a validity 
argument based on the inadequacy of the Unfreezing measure was also 
invoked. - Theoretically the Unfreezing construct was intended to 
measure the effectiveness with which the need for the project was 
instilled into various, organisational actors. It was suggested that 
the Unfreezing measure used may have measured a process by., which 
internal information was obtained for use in designing the project, 
not the effectiveness of reducing social resistance to the project. 
The next major issue addressed in this chapter was the question 
of external validity. Here it was argued that the theoretical basis of 
the study (and subsequently proposed modification of this theory) 
would not threaten external validity. In addition the study covered a 
wide range of Capital project and its findings should be quite gener- 
al. However, there is tentative evidence to suggest that these conclu- 
sions will not be applicable to projects other than Capital invest- 
ments. Finally, there is the question of the study's applicability to 
non-manufacturing organisations. A wide range of manufacturers were 
covered in the study and shown to be representative of the national 
distribution. The study's finding are therefore probably representa- 
tive of most of the U. K. 's manufacturing sector. Whether the implemen- 
tation of Capital projects in manufacturing organisations is any 
different to their implementation in Service organisations this study 
cannot say. 
Following the discussion on external validity we reviewed issues 
of inferred causality. With some minor provisos, assumptions made 
during the study were held to be valid. Finally, we sought to identify 
some limitations to the theoretical assertion made in chapter 4 that 
implementing strategic decisions would lead to unintentional, or 
indirect, competitive advantages for an organisation. It was proposed 
that, following the final implementation of a strategic project, an 
"Organisational Skills Audit" should be performed to identify any new 
skills capable of being used as a basis for future innovative develop- 
ments. The key questions to be asked during such an audit were identi- 
fied as "What skills do we really have? " and "What opportunities do 
these skills present? ". The answers to these questions probably depend 
upon access to relevant external information and the organisation's 
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Absorptive Capacity. This in turn will be a function of the organisa- 
tion's prior related knowledge, communication structure and history 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
This, and the previous two chapters, have been concerned with 
analysing the experimental data on implementing capital'projects col- 
lected from 45 U. K. based manufacturing organisations. In the remain- 
ing chapter we aim to summarise the study's findings, present its 
conclusions and address its further implications. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The previous chapters have detailed the theory, methodology and 
analysis of the data employed in this study. This concluding chapter 
presents a summary of the research, its findings and their implica- 
tions. It also discusses the limitations of the research and recom- 
mends, areas for further research directed towards a greater under- 
standing of the implementation of strategic decisions and the imple- 
mentation of strategy in general. 
9.1 OVERVIEW 
9.1.1 AIMS AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
This study did not, set out to solve a particular practical 
problem in the implementation of strategy. -The study is therefore not 
of the Evaluation, Applied or Action research forms. It-is of the 
Basic objective research form, which is concerned with tackling a 
general problem of the application of knowledge (Bennett, 1986). This 
is not to say that the findings of this study are of no or little 
practical benefit to practising managers (such benefits are addressed 
in section 9.3) but that consideration of the practical application of 
any findings did not form part of the research approach or methodology 
adopted during the study. 
In keeping with this research approach the questions addressed 
by. this study are of a general nature, seeking to investigate the 
broad structure of the phenomenon in the context of the individual 
organisation. These. questions aim to clarify and explain. Examples 
are; What is implementation? What are the principal contingent dimen- 
sions of the phenomenon? What happens to an organisation when a 
strategic decision is implemented? What is implementation success? 
Answers provided to these questions and other questions raised by 
these answers, will be discussed and summarised here. 
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Literature in the Business Policy/Strategic Management area 
dealing with the topic of strategy implementation is not, as yet, very 
extensive; certainly in comparison with the writings on strategic 
analysis, planning and formulation. What has been written in the 
strategy literature primarily dates from the early 1980's. One reason 
for this lack of interest is, that many, aspects of implementation 
(e. g., control) were seen as the domain of other subjects (e. g., Man- 
agement Accounting). In addition, prior to the 1980's much of the 
strategy literature took the view that decision making was more impor- 
tant than implementation. Make the right decisions and implementation 
will follow automatically, was one of the underlying assumptions of 
strategy formulation (Ansoff, 1984; Stonich, 1982). However, by the 
early 1980's this assumption was no longer held as tenable, prompting 
interest in the subject over the last decade. 
While the strategy literature has been relatively silent on the 
implementation question, other subjects have a longer history of 
research in areas which can contribute to its study. The economic 
literature dealing with technological change and innovation (stemming 
principally from the work of Schumpeter, circa 1940) is relevant. 
Another important 
, 
source is the organisational theory literature 
dealing with organisational change (dating from the work of Trist and 
Bamforth; see Trist et. al., 1963) decision making (e. g., March and 
Simon, 1958) and in particular studies of strategic decision making 
(e. g., Hickson et. al., 1986; Mumford and Pettigrew, 1975). The 
"Project Management" and some psychological literatures are also of 
value in. providing concepts and perspectives on the phenomenon. Howev- 
er, these literatures tend to address questions different to those 
asked of this study, nor do they provide a coherent theoretical struc- 
ture from which to start an investigation of strategy implementation. 
In this study such a coherent theoretical framework was provided by 
the systems theory and cybernetics literatures. 
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9.1.2 REVIEW OF PERSPECTIVE AND THEORY 
The first question asked of this study was "What' is implementa- 
tion? In point of fact several alternative, but complementary, defini- 
tions were identified. The first of these was developed in chapter 2 
by consideration of the "classic" (or at least common) model of 
strategy implementation as a process intermediate between strategic 
planning and control. If implementation is intermediate then it should 
be possible to identify a start and an end to the process, thus logi- 
cally separating it from the planning and control activities. By 
reviewing the meanings attached to strategy, ` strategic planning and 
operational planning, a model of organisational information flows was 
developed. Strategic planning was viewed as a process of continuous 
monitoring of various strategic variables against the predetermined 
set-points, or objectives, for these variables. Using this model it 
was determined that implementation started' when objectives were 
changed, i. e., strategic decisions were made. This change in organisa- 
tional objectives generated short term goals, the purpose of which was 
to achieve the new objective. The* start of the implementation process 
was' therefore referred to in the study as "goal recognition". By 
considering the operational planning/control function of an organisa- 
tion (centring on the budgeting activities) it was determined that 
implementation ended with task definition. These 'were the day-to-day 
tasks that the organisation would have to perform in order to accommo- 
date,: or satisfy, the changed objective. 
This model leads to the view that 'strategy implementation is a 
temporary bridge joining the strategic and operational activities of 
the organisation. From a decision making perspective' implementation 
was defined as "Programming", viz: 
"Implementation is the process of interfacing an 'unpro- 
grammed' decision making process to the organisation's 
'programmed' decision making processes. "_. 
, 
Viewing implementation as a temporary phenomenon causes the 
study to concentrate on the implementation of strategic decisions. As 
a result the concept of organisational change is important in develop- 
ing the study. Through a combination of arguments derived from systems 
theory and cybernetics, together with a secondary data analysis of a 
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major U. K. study into strategic decision making (Hickson et. `a1., 
1986) a framework for categorising strategic decisions was developed. 
This framework was further developed to argue that strategic decisions 
are implemented through a programme of projects. Projects are there- 
fore the atomic unit of analysis for studying implementation. 'Further- 
more it was determined that projects are principally of three kinds. 
These were labelled the Capital project, the Revenue project and the 
Social project. Of these the Capital project was found to be the most 
consequential, on average, for an organisation. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the conceptualisations 
just described. Some are practical, some theoretical. The practical 
considerations are that the study should focus on Capital investment 
projects. It was further concluded that, ' as this type of project is 
most common within manufacturing organisations, this class of organi- 
sation should be the basic type of organisation studied. Together 
these two considerations determine the sub title of this thesis. In 
relation to the question "What happens to an organisation when a 
strategic decision is 'implemented? " the substantive answer is that it 
is changed. The framework for categorising strategic decisions was 
based on the idea of change in the structure of the organisation. This 
idea was subsequently developed to mean changes in the repertoire of 
standard operating procedures employed by the organisation in its day- 
to-day activities. From this perspective such change is seen as being 
indicative of organisational learning, in the sense that extensions of 
this repertoire' confer on 'the organisation the` ability to absorb a 
greater degree of environmental variety. This in its turn represents a 
strategic advantage for the organisation over and above the specific 
financial or marketing advantage anticipated for a project in the 
first instance. 
In adopting this approach the question "What is implementation 
success? " is interpreted as organisational learning, i. e., the ability 
of the organisation to absorb a greater degree of environmental varie- 
ty, or uncertainty. The principal contingent dimensions of the imple- 
mentation phenomenon are therefore external variety injection (Uncer- 
tainty) and internal variety absorption (Information). Uncertainty is 
a property of the particular project being implemented and as such is 
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determined by the strategic goal and changed objective initiating the 
project. Programming is therefore a process for absorbing a project's 
(or strategic decision's) variety by changing the organisation's 
standard operating procedures by task definition. It was convenient to 
subdivide the Information construct into Experience and Process dimen- 
sions. Experience referred to preexisting organisational procedures 
that would give the organisation an innate capacity for variety- ab- 
sorption. Process referred to the activities performed by the organi- 
sation to absorb the variety injected by the project. Implementation 
success, seen in terms of organisational learning, also has two compo- 
nents. One of these views success as-the ability of the organisation 
to achieve the intended aims of the project. This view of success 
looks at the ability- of existing procedures to absorb the variety 
injected into the organisation by the project and is reflected in the 
absence of problems etc., during implementation. This concept was 
referred to during the thesis as Ease. The other dimension of success 
refers to the extent of adaptation of-, procedures required to finally 
implement the project. This concept was referred to as Change. Change 
is associated with organisational learning and success. because it may 
confer "Gateway Capacity" (Zaltman et. al., 1973) benefits on an 
organisation. Gateway Capacity is, the extent to which the adoption of 
one innovation can open up avenues to the adoption of other innova- 
tions. The utility of this approach and conceptualisation was illus- 
trated by the analysis of a case study conducted as part of the re- 
search. This study indicated how unanticipated problems encountered 
during the implementation of a capital project gave rise to procedural 
changes of potential future strategic advantage. 
The five concepts outlined above of Uncertainty, Information 
Experience, Information Process, Ease and procedural Change and ten 
hypotheses connecting them, constitute the principal structure de- 
scribing the implementation phenomenon and investigated in this study. 
We now turn to a summary of these investigations. 
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9.2` ýSUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
9.2.1 METHODOLOGY 
The theoretical variables outlined above were investigated'using 
a highly structured questionnaire instrument , consisting of closed 
questions (Appendix A). Questions were asked retrospectively about 
objective events relating to two units of analysis; a particular 
strategically important capital investment project and the organisa- 
tion. The instrument had to be amenable to numerical analysis and 
consisted, in the main, of questions scored on a five point scale 
ranging from "Little or none" to "A great deal". The actual instrument 
required some 400 separate responses for completion and was adminis- 
tered during a personal interview- lasting nominally 90 minutes. This 
interview was frequently tape recorded. 
This research methodology was adopted following'a pilot study to 
test response rates to a mailed survey. This pilot study indicated a 
probable response rate to a mailed survey of less than a minimally ac- 
ceptable 20 per cent. Through the' use of personal interviews a re- 
sponse of 52% was achieved, -considerably increasing'the study's inter- 
nal validity. Whilst the interviewing approach substantially restrict- 
ed the distribution and number of cases-for analysis, reducing to some 
extent the study's external and statistical conclusion validities, it 
was possible to control for certain biases, e. g., non-response bias. 
In addition, for an exploratory theoretical' study of the type reported 
here, threats to internalývalidity-were seen as being the most serious 
to the study's overall validity. 
9.2.2 THE SAMPLE 
Interviews were conducted with single key informants from U. K. 
based manufacturing companies. These informants needed knowledge of 
the project from its initial goal recognition phase, through authori- 
sation to final operational integration into the day-to-day activities 
of the organisation. In addition the informant needed to possess 
knowledge of the organisational parameters of interest. Informants 
were therefore directors or senior managers of the organisations 
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studied. Chief executive officers comprised the largest single group- 
ing, at 51% of the total sample. 
Manufacturing organisations for inclusion in the study were 
selected from the 1988 KOMPASS directory. Companies were selected, 
principally, on the basis of number of employees (100 or more) and 
product area (two digit product group classifications 11 to 49, see 
Appendix B). From nominally 30,000 companies listed in the KOMPASS 
directory, these criteria reduced the available sample frame to an 
estimated 8500 companies. 
The results reported in this thesis are based on a sample of 45 
cases obtained between March and August 1989. The majority of the 
sample consists of 40 main study cases obtained by personal interview 
and are mainly concentrated in the West Yorkshire area of England. 
The remaining 5 cases came from early pilot study work on the research 
instrument. Attempts using secondary published data and data obtained 
directly from the study, failed to identify bias between the main 
sample and-37 non-responding organisations contacted, or between the 
study sample and a nationally representative sample of 857 U. K. manu- 
facturing companies drawn from the KOMPASS directory. 
One statistic derived from the study was the informants' percep- 
tion of the position of their organisation relative to their major 
competitors. This measure indicated that the participating companies 
were better than expected for an average organisation. Interpretation 
of this finding is problematical however, as it is not objective and 
comparable data could not be obtained from non-participating organisa- 
tions., Whether the result is due to bias in the sample, or bias in the 
response to the question cannot therefore be ascertained. However, 
commercial success was not a parameter of significant interest to the 
study, hence, any bias from this source was not judged to threaten the 
study. 
Eight of the ten strategic decision "Topic" categories used by 
Hickson et. al. (1986) were investigated during the study. These were 
concentrated in those topic categories anticipated to be typical of 
strategic capital investments. The investments studied are therefore 
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judged to be representative of strategic capital investment decisions 
in general. 
9.2.3 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY 
Construct validity was determined in the study through the 
assessment of trait validity, using the technique of principal compo- 
nents factor analysis. Factor analysis was used to assess both the 
reliability of composite multi-item scales and the factorial composi- 
tion of these scales. After elimination of a number of "noisy" indica- 
tors the multi item scales of the theoretical constructs were adjudged 
to be satisfactory with theta reliabilities in the range 0.66 to 0.86. 
Results of the factorial composition analysis of the scales were 
generally satisfactory. Where the factor structure did not correspond 
with the theoretically anticipated structure, alternative plausible 
explanations for the observations were relatively easy to identify. 
These came either from the literature or from other theoretical struc- 
tures underlying the scales. Finally, discriminant validities were as- 
sessed using the technique of median correlation. These were also 
judged to be satisfactory. 
9.2.4 HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Ten hypotheses were identified from the theoretical discussion 
of chapter 4. These may be summarised as: 
1. Uncertainty and Change will be positively associated. 
2. Uncertainty and Ease will be negatively associated. 
3.. Uncertainty and Process will be positively associated. 
4. Capacity and Change will be negatively associated. 
5. Capacity and Ease will be positively associated. 
6. Capacity and Process will be positively associated. 
7. Process and Change will be positively associated. 
8. Process and Ease will be positively associated. 
9. Uncertainty and Capacity will not be associated. 
10. Change and Ease will not be associated. 
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The hypotheses summarised above are those tested in chapter 7 of 
this thesis. ' They differ from those formulated in chapter 4 in two 
respects. First, Information Capacity was used in place of Experience 
because-of a failure to adequately measure one of the dimensions of 
the Experience concept'. Capacity and Experience have the same inter- 
pretation within the hypotheses. The motivation for and discussion of 
this adaptation is contained in chapter 6. The second change to the 
above hypothesis summary is that the original formulation of the 
hypotheses involved a success concept entitled Expectation. During 
analysis (chapter 7) this concept was dichotomised into two of its 
component dimensions, Ease and Managerial Satisfaction. Here we have 
only referred to the Ease concept, as this encapsulates the original 
interpretation of Expectation. In the discussion that follows we will 
consider the analysis from the point at which Satisfaction was identi- 
fied as a third dimension of implementation success. 
The above hypotheses were investigated (initially) using the 
causal modelling techniques of partial correlation and path analysis. 
With a sample of 45 cases the power of the analysis enabled large 
effect sizes (Pearson and or partial correlations of about 0.50) to be 
satisfactorily identified (power 0.84 at a significance level of 
0.01). Moderate effect sizes '(r about 0.30) could also be detected 
with' reasonable power at a significance level of 0.10. 
The analyses presented in chapter 7 identified strong effects 
supporting hypotheses 1,2,3,6,9 and 10 above. No evidence in sup- 
port of hypotheses 4,5,7 and 8 could be found at the high level of 
construct aggregation used. Moderated regression analysis also failed 
to provide evidence in support of hypotheses 4 and 5. It was therefore 
concluded that Information Capacity only affected implementation 
success indirectly through its influence on Process. In subsequent 
analyses the single Capacity measure was replaced by its two constitu- 
ent measures, procedural Range and Mechanicity. 
In order to explain the lack of statistical support for hypothe- 
ses 7 and 8, the Information Process construct was disaggregated into 
a total of seven sub scales. Three of these (Unfreezing, Moving, Re- 
freezing) corresponded to the three stages in the Lewin-Schein change 
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model used to construct a social measure of Information Process la- 
belled Lubrication. The remaining four measures were constructed from 
the second Information Process dimension labelled Activity. Under 
factor analysis the indicators of the Activity construct formed a two 
factor structure, the factors being interpreted as Design and Support. 
The four scales were then produced by dichotomising the Design factor 
items into Formal Analysis and Internal. Information search measures 
and the, Support factor items into Meetings and External Information 
search measures. The items, contained in each of these four Activity 
sub-scales were characterised by exhibiting a distinctive, and differ- 
ent, association with the three implementation Success measures. 
Causal modelling is not suited to exploratory analysis of the 
associations between variables. The disaggregation of the Process con- 
struct into a large number of separate variables (with no clear theo- 
retical basis for determining which of a large number of possible 
paths would be the significant ones) required the causal modelling 
approach to be abandoned. As none of the associations determined by 
causal modelling had exceeded 0.7, multicollinearity between varia- 
bles was not likely to be a serious problem. Hence an exploratory 
approach based on stepwise regression was adopted for this stage of 
the analysis. The investigation of the relationships between Uncer- 
tainty, the two Capacity measures of Range and Mechanicity, the seven 
Information Process variables and the three Success variables was 
based on this technique. However, a further analytical problem re- 
mained in identifying the associations between the four Information 
Activity measures; Analysis, Meetings, Internal and External informa- 
tion search and the first stage of the Lubrication concept, Unfreez- 
ing. Because these five variables all referred to the pre-approval 
stage of the project, no variable was obviously dependent upon the 
others. Investigation of the structure of associations between these 
five variables was therefore based on partial correlation. Wherever 
possible the results obtained by stepwise regression or partial corre- 
lation were compared with the results of other analyses. If contradic- 
tions occurred then the substantive or causal modelling results were 
used as the final arbiter. 
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Results of the analyses will be summarised here using the fol- 
lowing nomenclature. Firstly, no association or path with a standar- 
dised regression coefficient, or p coefficient of less than 0.2 was 
considered. As stated above, weak associations could not be detected 
by'this study. A regression or p coefficient in the range 0.2 to 0.4 
is referred to here as a "Moderate" association. Strictly, correla- 
tions below 0.25 are not' statistically significant on a 2-tailed t- 
test, although 0.20 is significant at the 10% level using a 1-tailed 
test. Partial correlations below 0.25 were not therefore included 
unless supported by either substantive reasoning or alternative analy- 
ses. Regression P's below 0.25 were included if significant at the 10% 
level. Associations or path coefficients above 0.40 are referred to as 
"Strong". This nomenclature is based on Effect Size, not statistical 
significance (see chapter 7 for a discussion of Effect Size). 
9.2.4.1 Associations Between Information Measures 
Here we will summarise the associations between the nine Infor- 
mation measures. These are the two Information Capacity measures, the 
four Information Activity measures and the three Information Lubrica- 
tion measures. In total thirteen substantive associations or paths 
were identified. All were of Moderate strength, except for two Strong 
associations, one between Unfreezing and Moving, the other between 
Internal information search and Refreezing. The associations are 
summarised diagrammatically in figure 7.6a. Note that in figure 7.6a, 
and 7.6b, correlations or paths significant at or above the 5% level 
are shown using heavy lines, those significant between the 10% and 5% 
level are shown by light lines. 
Apart from a moderate association between the two Experience 
measures of Mechanicity and Range, the only other associations between 
Capacity and other Information variables in the study were moderate 
paths between Formal Analysis, Internal Information Search and Mecha- 
nicity. Formal Analysis was itself moderately associated with the 
Activity measures of Internal Information Search and Meetings and with 
the Lubrication measure, Moving. Moving refers to the action phase of 
a change effort and requires the presentation of information necessary 
for the change (Ginzberg, 1978). It was reasonable therefore to assume 
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that Formal Analysis would be a likely source of such information. 
Another determinant of Moving was a strong path with Unfreezing. 
Unfreezing refers to a process congruent with the four Information 
Activity measures and is concerned with establishing a "felt need" for 
change. It was moderately associated with Meetings and Internal infor- 
mation search. Refreezing refers to the stabilisation phase of a 
social change and was strongly associated with the Internal informa- 
tion search variable. Refreezing was also moderately negatively asso- 
ciated with Meetings. One other association remains and this is be- 
tween the Activity variables, Meetings and External information 
search. This association was not statistically significant but was 
justified on the basis that these two variables combined constituted 
Support. Support was identified as one of the two factors describing 
the structure of the Information Activity construct, the other factor 
being Design. 
9.2.4.2. Associations between Uncertainty, Information and Success 
Here we will summarise the associations between Uncertainty, the 
four Information Process measures exhibiting associations with Success 
and the three Success constructs of Change, Ease and Satisfaction. 
Fifteen statistically significant (p(0.10) regression ß's were identi- 
fied. Eight were of Moderate strength, seven were Strong. The associa- 
tions are summarised diagrammatically in figure 7.6b. 
Of seven Information Process measures, Uncertainty was only 
associated with the four Information Activity measures, not the Lubri- 
cation measures. Three regression coefficients were strong, the one 
between Uncertainty and Internal Information, moderate. The overall 
path coefficient between Uncertainty and Activity was strong, thus 
supporting hypothesis 3. As anticipated, Uncertainty was not associat- 
ed with any of the Information Capacity measures. Path analysis had 
confirmed and stepwise regression also indicated, that Uncertainty was 
positively and strongly associated with Change and strongly negatively 
associated with Ease. These results confirm hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Using causal modelling techniques we were unable to find evi- 
dence in support of the hypothesised association between Capacity, or 
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its components, and success (hypotheses, 4 and 5). However, stepwise 
regression did provide tentative evidence in support of hypothesis 4. 
Specifically, a weak (but statistically significant at the 10% level) 
path was identified between Mechanicity and Change. This association 
was negative, as anticipated, but relatively unstable, i. e., deleting 
certain single cases from the study's data base caused the association 
to disappear. 
Of seven Information Process sub-measures, four were found to be 
associated, strongly or moderately, with success measures. Refreezing 
was moderately associated with all three success measures and this 
result is similar to the findings of Sorensen and Zand (1975) and 
Ginzberg (1978); two studies investigating the implementation of 
Management Science/OR projects. External information search was moder- 
ately associated with procedural Change. Taken together these findings 
appear to confirm hypotheses 7 and 8. A possible explanation as to why 
these associations did not appear when using the more aggregated 
Information Process construct would be that the relatively small 
number of indicators within this overall measure which exhibited 
significant associations were "swamped" by those showing no or little 
association of the anticipated kind. A further reason however is 
supplied by noting that the Unfreezing and Meetings measures both 
exhibit negative associations with Success. Specifically, Unfreezing 
was strongly negatively associated with Change, and Meetings moderate- 
ly negatively associated with Ease. Negative associations between 
success measures of these indicators would act to cancel out the 
positive associations just noted. The net effect was the observed very 
weak associations between Information Process and Success. 
The appearance of negative associations between certain Informa- 
tion Process indicators and Success constructs was not anticipated by 
the theoretical development underpinning this study. We how summarise 
the speculative arguments accounting for this observation. 
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9.3 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The implications of this study will be discussed here under two 
main headings. Those implications derived directly from the theoreti- 
cal model and those from observations not conforming to the theoreti- 
cal model. This last section basically summarises and discusses the 
material contained in chapter 8 of this thesis. In both instances, it 
will be the practical managerial consequences that are emphasised. 
9.3.1 THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
9.3.1.1 Change and Ease 
The concept of implementation success developed during this 
study was based on the concept of organisational learning. This was 
contrary to a more "conventional" approach based on financial criteria 
of success, e. g., profitability. The reasons for rejecting this ap- 
proach were twofold. First, many financial measures of project success 
are likely to depend upon the planning and formulation stages prior to 
project implementation, not just upon the implementation stage and 
methodologically it is difficult to separate the two effects. The 
second reason is that profitability is an aggregated surrogate measure 
of a large number of processes and activities performed by an organi- 
sation, the focus of this study was upon these basic activities, not 
their aggregate. 
Implementation success was shown to have three components, Ease, 
measuring the achievement of expected outcomes, goals, lack of prob- 
lems etc. Procedural Change, which may (if made explicit) form a basis 
of future strategies and projects, and finally, Managerial Satisfac- 
tion. Satisfaction was shown to be dependent upon Ease, Change and 
Refreezing. Satisfaction will therefore tend to be high where Ease and 
Change are high and need not concern us further. 
The strongest relationships identified in the theoretical model 
were between Uncertainty, Ease and Change. Specifically, the greater 
the Uncertainty, or variety a project injects into an organisation 
(relative to its current experience) the greater the Change to exist- 
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ing procedures and the lower the Ease of implementation. This conclu- 
sion'may appear axiomatic stated as it is here, but note that one of 
the assumptions traditionally held of strategic planning (Stonich, 
1982; Ansoff, 1984) was that existing operations-implementation sys- 
tems and procedures would translate a plan into action. The findings 
reported-here show this not to be the case. This finding may be ex- 
panded using control theory concepts. Much of control theory is based 
on models in which it is assumed that the system under control is a 
"black box". Output levels depend only upon input levels and time. The 
processes contained within the black box are assumed to be fixed. The 
finding of this study in effect states that implementing a strategic 
decision will change the contents of the black box. Classical control 
theory is therefore not applicable to the problem of strategy imple- 
mentation in the sense of effecting strategic change. Where it is 
applicable is in the subsequent maintenance of strategy, essentially 
an operational concern. Also, the theory used here predicts how the 
black box will change; it will change so as to exhibit greater variety 
than previously. In summary, the implementation of a strategic deci- 
sion cannot be done entirely using existing operating procedures. In 
addition the final organisation will be more complex than the initial 
one, implying the need for new operational control systems. Finally, 
the magnitude of these effects directly depends upon the variety 
injected by the project, as does the extent of problems likely during 
implementation. Practising managers should recognise these effects. 
9.3.1.2 Contingency Allowances 
One possible consequence of not adequately anticipating or 
estimating the extent of problems when implementing a strategic deci- 
sion, is to overrun budgets, schedules etc. Contingencies are occa- 
sionally used to compensate for the unexpected. But are these contin- 
gencies adequate? The pilot study reported in chapter 4 investigated 
the use of contingencies in greater depth than in the main study. In 
the case of this particular organisation contingencies were officially 
only considered for certain items, such as currency fluctuations on 
imported equipment. They were not allowed to compensate for potential 
unanticipated problems with the project. (This rule did not prevent 
some unofficial contingency allowances being made, e. g., presenting 
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volume estimates believed to represent reasonable minima of what could 
be achieved. ) One informant gave the following response to a question 
probing the anticipation of problems and the use of contingencies to 
compensate: 
"We thought we would have horrendous problems. What they 
are, what form they'll take, we didn't know... except that 
we knew the return was satisfactory to cover [the risk]. " 
This quotation suggests that, provided the return on a project 
is high enough, the assessed risk associated with it will be accept- 
able. This implies that this organisation carried out some form of 
risk-benefit analysis on this project. However, because risk was seen 
in terms of unanticipated difficulties and because the extent of these 
difficulties could only be subjectively assessed, it is reasonable to 
assume that if the return had been lower, but still attractive, a 
point would have been reached where a profitable project would have 
been foregone. At the other extreme, incorrectly assessing risk too 
low may involve a company in serious financial loss. In either in- 
stance a less subjective method of risk assessment would be benefi- 
cial. It may be possible to construct such an indicator using some of 
the uncertainty indicators identified in this study. The measure so 
obtained may be valuable in setting contingencies for projects, thus 
keeping them within budget. 
9.3.1.3 organisational Structure 
Two organisational parameters were identified from the theoreti- 
cal basis of the study to be of interest in understanding implementa- 
tion. These were Procedural Flexibility and Range. We attempted to 
measure Flexibility using the Burns and Stalker (1961) Organic - 
Mechanistic dichotomy. This proved to be an unsatisfactory formulation 
as the Organic - Mechanistic dimension appeared to be measuring both 
Flexibility and Range. In particular Mechancity was identified as a 
indicator of Range. 
Mechanicity was found to be weakly and negatively associated 
with Procedural Change. This association was hypothesised (see above). 
Nechanicity was also associated with the Design activities of Informa- 
tion Process, i. e., Formal Analysis and Internal Information Search. 
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Neither of these' variables is associated directly with success varia- 
bles. Finally, Range was not associated with any variable other than 
Mechanicity. From the available evidence organisational structure 
(measured as Mechanicity and Range) does not have a significant impact 
on an organisation's ability to implement capital investment projects. 
9.3.1.4 Social Change 
We will focus here on the influence of the three stages of the 
Lewin-Schein change model on implementation success. The single varia- 
ble directly and positively associated with all three implementation 
success measures was identified by this study (and others, Sorensen 
and Zand, 1975; Ginzberg, 1978) as Refreezing. The conclusion of this 
finding is that attention to the items constituting the Refreezing 
measures will contribute to successful projects. These items are 
listed in question 2b. 6 (Appendix A) and in table 7.10a. Focusing on 
items in table 7.10a with factor loadings above 0.3 we see that Re- 
freezing is enhanced if the engineers support the project into the 
operational phase, if benefits from the project are seen quickly, and 
if standards and results for assessing the project are available. Top 
management encouragement is also seen to be important to Refreezing. 
Noting that Refreezing is directly influenced by Moving and 
indirectly by Unfreezing we see from table 7.10a that both of these 
stages are dominated by items involving the unit managers. This cen- 
tres on their involvement in the project, their recognition of the 
need for the project and their being reassured that the project is not 
a threat to them. In contrast to Refreezing we see that the engineers 
and top management have only minor influence on these stages. When 
these actors are important it is in association with the unit manag- 
ers. We specifically note that top management initiation of the 
project has a negative influence on Unfreezing. This suggests that 
projects imposed from the top are to be avoided. 
The negative effect of senior management initiation of projects 
on implementation success was also noted by Lockett and Polding 
(1978). Lockett and Polding, in a study of the implementation of 
Operations Research/Management Science projects, cite one project 
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which was initiated by a senior manager, technically solved, but never 
implemented. They noted that the senior manager "left the problem" 
once a manager and a "modeller" had apparently started to make 
progress. When the project's budget allocation was used up, the 
project was discontinued without implementation. Lockett and Polding 
attribute the failure of this project to the manager's suspicion of 
the modellers role in policy recommendation, which he felt was his 
prerogative., They finally make the observation that, "The high in- 
volvement of top management, which is often thought to be necessary 
for implementation was here, but was not sufficient to achieve suc- 
cessful implementation. " Features of the Lockett and Polding case 
support some of the findings of this study. The project was initiated 
by a senior manager. We noted above that this is negatively associated 
with Unfreezing and therefore ultimately project success. The unit 
manager involved perceived the project as a threat, again this would 
be a negative indicator of Unfreezing. Finally we note that the senior 
manager left the project in its early stages. We noted above that 
senior manager involvement is most beneficial to a project in its 
final, Refreezing stage. So, taking evidence from this study into the 
implementation of capital projects, and Lockett and Polding's (1978) 
study into the implementation of a type of revenue project, we observe 
that senior manager involvement "which is often thought to be neces- 
sary for implementation" must be of a supportive nature, not of a 
compelling nature, if it is to be of benefit to the successful 
implementation of a project. 
One final result of the study is the importance of external 
information in effecting successful procedural change. This item will 
be discussed in some detail below. 
9.3.2 EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS 
9.3.2.1 Complexity and Planning 
Turning now to the more speculative findings of the study, it is 
apparent that if implementation processes are to be improved then 
attention has to be paid to the factors giving rise to the observed 
negative associations between Success and Information Process. Three 
Page 314 
associations were observed, all from an underlying behavioural or 
social dimension to the Information Process construct. The discussion 
in chapter 8 identified the negative association between Meetings, 
Refreezing and Ease to be ultimately due to an underestimation of 
project complexity. Some experimental evidence in support of this 
hypothesis was available from the study. Question 2b. 20 listed 20 
possible problems with project implementation and the first item was 
the underestimation of project complexity. This item achieved the 
highest mean score of any of the 20 questions, identifying it to be 
the most serious cause, of implementation difficulties. 
A number of suggestions were put forward in chapter 8 as to why 
project complexity is underestimated. One possible explanation is a 
lack of prior knowledge. However, projects with a great deal of prior 
knowledge would, by definition, not be classed as strategic - they are 
programmed operational projects. This lack of prior knowledge could be 
corrected by the use of external consultants. It would also be depend- 
ent upon factors identified by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as contrib- 
uting to an organisation's "Absorptive Capacity". These are, the 
communication structure between the organisation and its external 
environment and between its internal sub-units, the absorptive capaci- 
ty of its staff, access to critical knowledge (including the awareness 
of where useful experience can be found) and the history of the organ- 
isation. Structural explanations were also noted (March, 1981; Harri- 
son and March, 1984). Finally, a third determinant was derived from a 
factor analysis of question 2b. 20 and identified as Quality Of The 
Organisation's Planning System. 
The factors identified above leads to the hypothesis that the 
negative associations with the Meetings construct were probably due to 
failure to recognise the project's true complexity. This tendency may 
be ameliorated by paying attention to the three factors identified 
here as contributing to it. For example, the structural bias identi- 
fied by Harrison and March (1984) in the method of capital project 
assessment may be overcome by the use of more sophisticated capital 
project risk assessment techniques, e. g., Monte Carlo simulation. This 
study suggests that better planning systems may also help prevent this 
problem. Finally, there is the lack of prior knowledge and Absorptive 
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Capacity explanation. Ways to help overcome this difficulty will be 
returned to later. 
9.3.2.2 Resistance and Power 
The remaining negative association identified was between un- 
freezing and Change. It was argued in chapter 8 that probably this 
association reflected a resistance to change effect not adequately 
compensated for by the Lubrication measure in general, and Unfreezing 
in particular. Notably, Unfreezing may have measured a process for 
collecting internal information for planning or evaluation purposes 
and that perhaps organisations went through the processes of Unfreez- 
ing (i. e., generating a felt need for the project) without being 
effective. Examining instances of resistance to a project identified 
no clear correlation between these instances and Unfreezing (and other 
measures). - This was accounted for, by noting that resistance came 
predominantly from an individual and that the' seriousness of this 
resistance depended on the "power" or authority of the individual. The 
axiomatic 'belief held by- several authors that resistance to change 
will be' automatic is, therefore brought into question. Woodward 
(1965: 47-48) found resistance to change to be relatively uncommon: 
"Moving from one factory to another... the research workers 
obtained an impression of the way that people reacted to 
change. The surprising thing was the almost complete lack 
of resistance. " 
Woodward goes on to note some tentative reasons for this lack of 
resistance, such as the change not been seen as a threat to employment 
or pay levels and factory manager skills in presenting the change. In 
view of Woodward's finding and those of this study, it appears to be 
questionable as to whether what appears to be resistance is in fact 
resistance, or is simply due to people not knowing what they have to 
do; in other words a lack of training. 
Lack of training was identified from question 2b. 20 as impor- 
tant. Ranking the mean scores for all 20 items in this question rated 
lack of training as the fourth most important source of implementation 
difficulties. It was also the only item in the top quartile of diffi- 
culties not associated with the poor planning quality problems noted 
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above. Therefore, next to planning system quality, lack of training is 
identified as the most serious difficulty encountered during implemen- 
tation. Summarising these findings, the available evidence suggests 
that firstly, resistance is not a priori present, what looks like re- 
sistance' may be a lack of training. Secondly, if resistance is a 
problem it is likely to come from key individuals. Therefore, identify 
those individuals (probably those with the most to lose in terms of 
increased work load, reduction in pay etc. ) and target them for spe- 
cial consideration, involvement in the decision processes etc. Final- 
ly, contingencies (i. e., slack resources) may be useful as a means of 
overcoming resistance, e. g., by giving people time to adjust. 
9.3.2.3 Dimensions of Implementation Difficulties 
We'previously noted that factor analysis of the "implementation 
difficulties" question used in the study (question 2b. 20) produced a 
four factor solution, see-table 8.1. Factor 1 was identified with the 
quality of the organisation's planning system and was the most impor- 
tant factor in determining implementation difficulties. Factor 3 
refers to training and also making, or having to make, late changes to 
the project. This factor is strongly correlated with the overall 
effort- and time expended by management on the project (r=0.465, 
p(O. 01) and is the second most important factor of implementation 
difficulties. This finding, that making late changes to the design of 
a capital project incurs considerable expense in terms of managerial 
time and effort, appears to echo a comment made by Martin (1984, p. 56). 
Martin observed that errors in the initial specification (the require- 
ments. specification) of an Information Systems project are "much more 
time consuming and expensive to correct than those in coding". This 
suggests that Factor 3 may be an important factor of implementation 
difficulties in, not only capital projects, but also revenue projects; 
to use the nomenclature of chapter 3. Factor 4 is the third most 
important factor and appears to be a collection of items signifying a 
lack of support or priority being given to the project. Finally, 
factor 2 refers to a lack of project control systems, both technical 
(information systems) and human (not having the correct people in 
charge). 
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Overall, therefore, these four factors appear to refer to spe- 
cific points noted elsewhere in this thesis. Factors 1 and 2 suggest 
that organisations with sound planning and project control systems 
will experience fewer problems than otherwise. Factor 3 says, don't 
make late changes to a project, it is very expensive in time and 
effort. In other words make allowances for the unexpected and assess 
training needs at the outset. Formal risk assessment or contingency 
planning may also help overcome problems associated with this factor. 
Finally, factor 4 echoes the need for support and priority to be given 
to the project. 
9.3.2.3 Gateway Capacity 
One of the primary deductions stemming from the theoretical 
development underpinning this thesis is the idea that implementation 
of strategic decisions changes an organisation by extending its avail- 
able set of standard operating procedures. The greater the set of 
operating procedures available to an organisation, the greater its 
ability to absorb variety from its environment and the more likely it 
is to be successful, in the long term. This mechanism was seen as 
similar to what Zaltman et. al. (1973) called Gateway Capacity. Gate- 
way capacity was defined by them as the tendency of an innovation to 
open up avenues to other innovations in the future. If these effects 
exist they raise questions of organisational attitudes to risk and 
innovation, e. g., is risk aversion necessarily a good thing? Risky 
projects were identified in this study with Uncertainty through the 
Complexity construct. So if organisations are to actively search for 
new business opportunities (i. e., innovate) and if recognition of such 
innovative opportunities depends, as Cohen and Levinthal (1990) pro- 
pose, on the level of prior knowledge, then implementing high variety 
projects, but preferably not financially risky projects, may be help- 
ful to long term organisational success. 
We identified two forms of Gateway Capacity, overt and covert. 
Overt Gateway capacity would simply be projects implemented for the 
specific reason to gain experience with a new technology etc. The 
existence of this type of Gateway Capacity was measured in the re- 
search using question 2a. 28 which asked the extent to which the 
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project was initiated for the purpose of acquiring new skills etc. 
along four dimensions of information technology, production/manufac- 
turing, marketing/Sales and technology. An "Other" category was not 
used by any respondent. In total 17 projects (45%) achieved some score 
on this question (This is out of 38 cases. Cases 1 to 7 were excluded 
as there was some doubt about how the question was interpreted by 
these respondents. ) Five of these cases (13%) achieved scores of 4 or 
more on at least one dimension. This suggests that a reasonable number 
of organisations specifically seek out opportunities for the applica- 
tion, of new technology in order to, gain experience with it. The corre- 
lation matrix between the scores for the 17 cases produced only one 
statistically significant association above the 10% level. This was 
between the production and technology dimensions (r=0.554; p(O. 05) and 
indicates that these organisations were primarily looking for produc- 
tion experience with new technology, not for marketing or information 
technology experience. 
The covert Gateway Capacity effects have not been investigated 
in this study, although this hypothesis is potentially useful as a 
topic for future research. However, this study has, shown that proce- 
dural, changes do occur when strategic decisions are implemented. Fur- 
ther, it has shown that the greater the project Uncertainty or varie- 
ty, the greater the procedural change. Having demonstrated that these 
changes occur, the next question is how can an organisation reap the 
Gateway capacity benefits, if any? In chapter 8 it was suggested that 
some process of organisational Cognition is required and this should 
be directed at answering the question "What skills do we really 
have? ". The answer to this question then feeds into an analysis proc- 
ess asking "What opportunities do these skills present? ". It was 
further suggested that these questions would be asked as part of a 
formal "organisational skills audit" carried out following the imple- 
mentation of a strategic decision, notably by focusing attention on 
the organisational changes that had occurred during project implemen- 
tation. 
The ability of an organisation to answer the two questions posed 
above was seen as dependent upon its Absorptive Capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990) and on access to suitable external information. This 
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study identified--a significant positive association between external 
information and procedural change, thus external information was 
important in achieving implementation success. Absorptive Capacity and 
the factors contributing to it have been addressed above and will not 
be reiterated here but we note that knowing where to find relevant 
external' information is an -important aspect of an organisation's 
Absorptive Capacity. 
The value of external information has been noted by several 
authors and at several junctures during this study. A principal indi- 
cator of the External information search construct was the multi item 
question '2a. 33. Analysis of-the 12 external sources listed in this 
question (no "Other" source was suggested by respondents) identified 
the most valuable source, by far, to be equipment suppliers (mean 
score 4.000 on 1 to 5 scale). This source was followed by Customers/ 
Clients, Competitors (via a comparative analysis) Technical Consult- 
ants and Material Suppliers with scores in the range 2.333 to 2.000. 
These results are interesting'as they suggest a strong technical bias 
to the external information sought, yet it was also valuable in 
achieving procedural changes with its social implications. Whereas 
equipment suppliers are demonstrably valuable to an organisation in 
assisting a given project, the extent to which this source of informa- 
tion will assist in what has been termed organisational cognition or, 
in a broader sense, Absorptive Capacity is questionable. A role for 
information systems is suggested here. Indeed Woodward (1965, p. 73-74) 
makes a related comment: 
"The fact that organisational change brought about by 
technical change resulted in modifications to structure 
in line with the results of this survey, suggests that 
facts and figures of the kind given in this report could 
help the individual manager to foresee the organisational 
results of any technical change he contemplates. Thus, no 
problems need arise from technical change to which at 
least partial solutions cannot be found from the accumu- 
lated experience of manufacturing industry. This implies, 
of course, that such experience must be adequately docu- 
mented and systematised information made available. There 
is a pressing need for more factual description of manu- 
facturing situations. Information of this kind would also 
be helpful if amalgamations or takeovers were contemplat- 
ed, enabling the parent company to understand the organi- 
sational problems of any subsidiaries that were concerned 
with production processes different from its own. " 
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-The work on which this passage was based was completed over 
three decades ago. It is. questionable how far the systemisation of 
experience has advanced in that time. Certainly today the information 
technology hardware exists to enable the extraction and dissemination 
of such knowledge. But, although such knowledge would be of value in 
designing projects to determine training needs say, of value in as- 
sessing the opportunities created in the manner suggested here by 
covert Gateway Capacity, a systemised information base of the type 
proposed by-. Woodward does not exist. We will look at implications for 
information system design next. 
9.3.2.4 Information System Implications 
This study found existing information technology use to be 
associated with internal data search only, as evidenced by the associ- 
ations of the value of computerised systems with items of analysis and 
also of, internal information-(see factor analysis findings chapter 6 
and items making up the Formal Analysis scale table 7.10b). During the 
study respondents were asked to assess the contribution to the 
project's design stage of four of the dimensions used to construct the 
Information Activity construct. The question was constructed using the 
analytical-Hierarchy process of Saaty (1980). The results are present- 
ed below in the form of box plots as used in chapter 7 figure 7.3. 
Figure 9.1: Box Chart for Information Activity 
Activity contribution to problem identification/solution 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
1'I Activity 
KEY: +- MAN; X- MEAN (Median, Mean) 
I 
X Collection 
(0.233,0.251) 
Analysis 
(0.333,0.341) 
x 
X 
*** * 0 
Cccmunicatian 
(0.267,0.283) 
Technology 
(0.102,0.126) 
Figure 9.1 indicates that information technology was generally 
seen as contributing little to the overall identification of implemen- 
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va 
tation problems or their solution during the project. There are some 
exceptions to this rule however, indicated above as outliners (* and 0 
symbols). In one case information technology contributing about half 
of the overall project difficulty identification and problem resolu- 
tion. This particular project involved the licensing of Japanese 
technology. The reason for the high score in this case was expressed 
by the respondent in the sentence, "We couldn't have done the project 
without a FAX. " The success of this project was therefore critically 
dependent upon communications technology to an outside source. 
A possible explanation of the above finding, that information 
systems are of limited benefit when implementing strategic decisions, 
follows. By definition strategic decisions are novel. Hence, the 
requisite knowledge or data is unlikely to exist 'in-house', and the 
only other source for this knowledge will be external to the organisa- 
tion. Existing information systems appear to concentrate upon internal 
information needs, witness the observed association between Formal 
Analysis (containing the Information Technology indicator) and Inter- 
nal information search. Hence, if information systems concentrate upon 
internal information, but external information is important to the 
implementation of strategic decisions (Change in particular) then it 
is not surprising that these systems are seen as being of little 
benefit. 
This discussion suggests that information systems, to be of real 
strategic benefit to an organisation, have to contain external infor- 
mation of the type proposed by Woodward. This will assist organisa- 
tions to identify the training needs and procedural changes necessary 
to implement a project and thus avoid later difficulties. In addition, 
such a system would assist organisations to critically assess the 
covert Gateway Capacity effects of new innovations and projects. The 
design of such systems no doubt presents significant problems, not 
least with schemes for codifying and systematising the required knowl- 
edge. However, the potential benefits of such a system, as outlined 
here, suggests that the effort would be worthwhile. This points to an 
area of further research and poses a major challenge to information 
system design. 
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9.4 LIMITATIONS 
Limitations to the study will be discussed here as limitations 
to the theoretical basis of the study and limitations to validity. 
Validity limitations will be discussed in terms-of the four main 
validity, types identified by Cook and Campbell (1979) of, internal 
validity, construct validity, statistical conclusion validity and 
external validity. 
9.4.1 LIMITATIONS TO THEORY 
The theoretical basis of this study was grounded in the Cyber- 
netic literature and in particular on deductions derived from the 
proof of the Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby, 1956). This law is 
entirely general in its formulation and will therefore not pose a 
limitation to this study. Furthermore the deductions made, although 
applied to business organisations, could be applied to other types of 
organisation. 
Analysis of the research data identified associations between 
constructs not anticipated from the theoretical development based on 
Cybernetic theory. It was proposed that these findings could be con- 
tained within an overall Cybernetic theory by combination with con- 
cepts derived from Cognitive theory, as suggested by Steinbruner 
(1974). Such a modification would add to the theory an explicitly 
human dimension, the dimension apparently responsible for the observed 
unanticipated negative associations. However, making this adaptation 
would only limit the theoretical basis of the study to human systems. 
In summary, Cybernetic theory (and Cognitive theory) is broadly based 
and well established. Adopting this theoretical basis would not be a 
serious limitation to the study. If limitations exist they are most 
likely to be associated with the operationalisation of the theory, not 
with the theory itself. We will discuss these below. 
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9.4.2 LIKITATIONS TO VALIDITY 
9.4.2.1 Internal Validity 
Issues of internal validity are concerned with the elimination 
of alternative causes for observed relationships. Limitations to 
internal validity therefore refers to the extent to which such alter- 
native causes were not eliminated. Cook and Campbell (1979) identified 
some 13 specific threats to internal validity. Most were not applica- 
ble to this study because they refer to test-retest research designs. 
Of the listed items the most serious to this study were selection ef- 
fects. Bernstein et. al. (1975) discuss, selection bias in research 
designs and conclude'that- "selection by expedience" (i. e., "Observa- 
tional units are chosen solely because of availability") is one of the 
least serious as far as sources of bias are concerned (c. f., self- 
selection and selection by excellence). In this study selection by 
expedience was used. However, in order to control this source of bias 
a research methodology was adopted (personal interviewing) which 
maximised response to the chosen sample. Although there was some 
evidence to infer that companies responding to the research were 
commercially more- successful than non-respondents, this `conclusion 
could not be verified from objective data and should not pose a threat 
to the study. Measures based-on objective secondary data indicated no 
differences between the two groups. Selection threats to internal 
validity are not therefore viewed as a serious limitation to this 
study. In addition the personal interviewing approach enabled a number 
of other internal validity threats to be controlled. The use of a 
questionnaire constructed of closed questions was a further control. 
The problem of inferring causation can also be a threat to 
internal validity. As this study proposed a number of specific causal 
hypotheses, threats here would be particularly problematical. Again, 
in recognition of this limitation, the research instrument was de- 
signed to minimise these problems. Success measures referred to points 
in time after the Uncertainty and Information constructs were meas- 
ured. Inferring causality between Uncertainty and Information con- 
structs was more difficult. However, it was argued, based on measure- 
ment theory, that Information Process logically followed Uncertainty. 
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This was even though the specific indicators used in the study to 
measure Uncertainty were obtained as part of the information gathering 
activities of the organisation. In summary, the substantive threats 
and therefore limitations to internal validity have been addressed in 
the-study and controlled for. 
9.4.2.2 Construct Validity 
Construct validity refers to the truth of stating that. a given 
construct measures an intended concept. Of the threats to construct 
validity identified by Cook and Campbell (1979) most were adequately 
controlled for in the research design. One threat not controlled for 
is mono-method bias. This refers to relying on a single method of data 
collection and as such refers to the issue of convergent validity. For 
reasons discussed in chapter 5 it was decided to accept the possibili- 
ty of mono-method bias as a distinct limitation on the study. This was 
principally to enable the study to collect a large enough sample so 
that statistical conclusion validity would not be too seriously 
threatened. In the study, construct validity was assessed using facto- 
rial composition and internal consistency measures, and was shown to 
be adequate. In conclusion and accepting that mono-method bias may 
limit the study's findings, the remaining evidence implies that con- 
struct validity was adequate for an exploratory study of the type 
reported here. 
9.4.2.3 Statistical Conclusion Validity 
Statistical conclusion validity was interpreted in this study as 
ensuring adequate power and significance to the statistical tests and 
in ensuring the statistical procedures used were appropriate to the 
data at hand. With a sample size of 45 cases it was shown that strong 
effects could be detected with adequate power and significance levels. 
The majority of associations identified in this study were of moderate 
effect size. The power of these associations was reasonable at a 
significance level of 10 per cent. Weak effects could not be detected 
with this size of sample. This study found only meagre evidence in 
support of the theoretical associations between Information Experience 
and Success constructs. If these associations exist at least a ten 
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fold increase in sample size will be required to detect them with 
adequate levels of statistical power and significance (see Cohen, 
1969, p. 84). 
9.4.2.4 External Validity 
External, validity concerns the confidence with which the study's 
conclusions, can be applied to other samples, times etc., The sample 
frame adopted poses one threat to external validity. Here the sample 
frame used was manufacturing companies listed in the 1988 KOMPASS 
directory with 100 or more employees. This was estimated to be some 
8500 companies. This sample frame contains several sources of bias. 
For example, it tends to exclude companies registered outside of the 
U. K., hence it contains a U. K. ownership bias. A further bias comes 
from its tendency to contain single entries for large divisionalised 
companies, or incomplete entries for their subsidiaries or divisions. 
Some attempts were made during sample selection to control for these 
biases (by using other 
'directories and 
personal contacts) and a small 
number of such subsidiaries-were sampled. However, in defence of the 
sampling procedure, it should be noted that the KOMPASS directory is 
one of the most complete and comprehensive available and its use 
should not represent a serious limitation to the study. 
As the primary objective of the study was to investigate the 
implementation of strategic decisions, the primary limitations to the 
study's external-validity come from its focus on manufacturing compa- 
nies and on capital investment projects. To a lesser extent the study 
is limited by a focus on companies of 100+ employees. This last limi- 
tation was not viewed as serious because the directory was inaccurate 
in a number of instances with respect to this criterion. Hence, a 
number of companies were included in the sample with less than 100 
employees. However, very small companies of 20 or less employees were 
not encountered and the study cannot be said to apply to them. 
Concerning the selection of manufacturing companies, it was 
shown in chapter 6 that the sample was not statistically different 
from the population satisfying the sampling criteria. However, the 
extent to which the findings of this study only apply to manufacturing 
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organisations, as opposed to non-manufacturing organisations, the 
evidence reported here cannot answer. Finally, there is the question 
of how well the study's findings may be extended to the implementation 
of strategic decisions not involving Capital investment projects, i. e. 
how applicable are the study's findings to Revenue and Social 
projects? The review of the evidence relating to this question given 
in chapter 8 indicated that different patterns of association would be 
found if other project types were investigated. The study's results 
may not therefore be applicable to Revenue and Social projects. Howev- 
er, partially countering this argument is the identification during 
the discussions in this chapter of a number of parallells between some 
of the findings of this study and findings reported in the literature 
dealing with the implementation of operations Research/Management 
Science projects (see for example, Ginzberg, 1978; Martin, 1984; 
Lockett and Polding, 1978). Such projects are examples of Revenue 
projects. Hence, the findings of this study may be applicable to 
projects in general, not just Capital projects. The extent to which 
each of the above arguments prevails cannot be determined from this 
study and must be left as a topic for further research. 
9.4.2.5 Summar 
The limitations to this study fall into two categories. Those 
surrounding the theoretical model tested and those specific to the 
particular operationalisation of the theoretical model. The theoreti- 
cal model was highly general so far as the implementation of strategic 
decisions is concerned. It is not therefore viewed as representing a 
limitation to the study. As far as the operationalisation of the 
theory is concerned, some limitations can be identified. Selection 
bias may be a problem to the internal validity of the study, but is 
not seen as serious. Indeed it is difficult to see how it could be 
further reduced as many of the commonly used alternative data collec- 
tion methodologies suffer more from this problem than the one adopted 
here. Mono-method bias may have limited construct validity but the 
instrument design attempted to control this problem and other assess- 
ments of construct validity were satisfactory. Statistical conclusion 
validity could be enhanced through the use of a larger sample, but 
some of the theoretically interesting associations would require a 
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very much larger sample if they are to be confidently established. 
Finally there is external validity. Threats to external validity 
probably represent the most serious limitations to the study, if we 
interpret it as an investigation of the implementation of strategic 
decisions, in general. However, external validity was deliberately 
given a low priority in order that internal, construct and statistical 
conclusion validities were not seriously compromised. This priority 
ordering of validity types is that recommended by Cook and Campbell 
(1979) for an exploratory study of the type reported here. Indeed, one 
of the most interesting areas for further research would be the exten- 
sion of the theory and ideas reported here to other organisational and 
project types. We will discuss this possibility and others next. 
9.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Three broad areas of further research can be identified which 
relate to ideas, questions and perspectives developed during this 
study. Firstly there are a number of questions raised, or unresolved, 
by the particular focus of this study on capital investment projects. 
secondly there are topics broadening the organisational and project 
basis of the study; that is topics to correct the accepted limitations 
to its External validity. Finally there are questions raised by the 
study which extend it beyond the confines of the implementation ques- 
tion and relate it to the pre-implementation area of decision making 
and the post-implementation area of organisational cognition and 
innovativness. We address these issues in turn. 
9.5.1 FURTHER TOPICS ON CAPITAL INVESTMIT PROJECTS 
We noted in chapter 5 that a single study cannot answer all the 
validity questions surrounding it. Replication is necessary if confi- 
dence in the findings reported here is to be increased (Bernstein et. 
al., 1975). However, replication without taking into account possible 
improvements to this study would be ill-advised. For example, if a 
replication study is to contribute to an understanding of the research 
questions, then as Sawyer and Ball (1981) have noted, the study would 
need greater statistical power than achieved here. Hence, such a study 
would have to be based on a larger sample than 45 cases and if a 
Page 328 
significant improvement in power were to be achieved some one to two 
hundred analysable cases would be required. The most practical way to 
collect, this quantity of data is by postal questionnaire. However, 
this study reported low response rates to such an approach. If low 
response were not to be seen as a serious limitation, the question- 
naire employed in the replication study would need to be less exhaus- 
tive than the one employed for this research. This consideration 
raises-a further topic, namely the, design of parsimonious and valid 
measures of the critical concepts identified in this study. 
Inspection of the factor analysis results reported in chapters 6 
and. 7 would be a reasonable starting point, for the construction of 
parsimonious measures of the constructs. For example, exclusion of the 
Complexity concept indicators within the Uncertainty construct would 
not seriously damage the construct validity of this measure. Further, 
we note that where objective indicators could not be used, then a 
multiple respondent study would be advised to improve construct valid- 
ity. A replication study would further need to take into account some 
of the conceptual issues identified in this study as possibly upset- 
ting construct validity. The dimensions underlying the Information 
Experience concept were Flexibility and Range of standard operating 
procedures. It has been noted-that Flexibility was possibly not meas- 
ured in this study, only Range. A replication study may therefore 
choose to use other validated measures of organisational structure, 
such as Integration, Formalisation or Centralisation (Miller and 
Droge, 1986) in place of Mechanicity and Range. Further work on the 
behavioural measure of Unfreezing would also be advised. In particu- 
lar, it was recommended that the power of individuals to resist a 
particular project's implementation should be explicitly measured in 
connection with, such a scale. 
Finally, the study highlighted the complexity of associations 
between various sub-scales within the Information Process construct. 
Why are so many dimensions important? Why is one of the sub-scales 
most associated with achieving a satisfactory procedural change out- 
come for the project (External Information Search) only relatively 
weakly associated with any of the other process measures? and Why is 
Refreezing so important? Answers to these questions would probably 
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only be possible if the' dynamics of the implementation process are 
investigated. This 'suggests the need for longitudinal studies of the 
processes involved during the implementation of strategic decisions to 
help explain these associations. 
9.5.2 FURTHER TOPICS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
The broad area of study addressed by this thesis was the imple- 
mentation of strategy. This was early refined to a question of the 
implementation of strategic decisions and further refined to the 
implementation of capital investment projects within manufacturing 
companies. At each stage of topic refinement a different approach 
could have been taken, leading to a different study. A natural exten- 
sion of this study is therefore to apply its theoretical basis to 
Revenue and Social projects and organisations other than manufactur- 
ers. While the theoretical basis of the study could be applied without 
adaptation, the operationalisation of the theory was relatively spe- 
cific to capital investment projects. Thus, new constructs of the 
theoretical concepts would be required to extend the study in this 
way. For example, the mass-production orientation measure used as an 
indicator of Novelty is not reliable when applied to some service 
organisations (Khandwalla, 1977, p. 661). 
Finally, it would be recommended that the theoretical basis of 
these studies should first be extended in the manner suggested by the 
application of concepts from Cognitive theory. This recommendation 
applies also to the studies suggested in the above section. However, 
we believe that this theory (adapted or not) is unlikely to be of 
great utility in a study of strategy maintenance, the other aspect of 
strategy implementation. The recommendations above are therefore 
strictly limited to a study of the implementation of strategic deci- 
sions, not strategy maintenance. 
9.5.3 BROADER ISSUES 
Whereas this study has nothing to say about strategy maintenance 
issues, it does naturally extend to the strategy formulation and 
innovativeness surrounding the implemented project. Chapter 3 outlined 
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a parsimonious classification of strategic decisions with some utility 
for predicting decision process. One of the issues identified as being 
of interest in understanding the decision making process (and we may 
view strategy formulation as decision making) was why and how a deci- 
sion changes topic, i. e., an Entity change topic can become an Inter- 
face decision. This effect was noted in the study by Hickson et. al. 
(1986). The decision framework developed in chapter 3 is associated 
with organisational change and in particular each change exhibited a 
different level of variety absorbing capability. If we accept the view 
that change is resisted (a belief held as axiomatic by some-authors, 
e. g., March, 1981; Sorensen and Zand, 1975; Ansoff, 1987) we may infer 
that the typical "decision trajectory" would be from large change 
(e. g., Entity decision) to less change (e. g., Interface decision). The 
extent to which this could occur however, would be constrained by the 
nature of the environmental threat to the organisation. The law of 
Requisite Variety would still have to be satisfied and if the threat 
was large then an Entity change may be the most effective way to meet 
it. Conversely, small environmental threats may be most effectively 
dealt with by a low change Interface decision. In truth a single 
threat would probably require a number of responses consisting possi- 
bly of Entity, Relational and Interface changes. In effect this argu- 
ment would seek to explain a decision's trajectory in terms of variety 
avoidance. This study and in particular the framework of decision 
types developed in chapter 3, was based on a variety absorption hy- 
pothesis. Studies exploring these ideas could be proposed. A further 
concept noted in chapter 3 as an explanatory variable of decision 
making process was "decision reversibility". Above we suggested that 
the motive for changing a decision topic was a desire to minimise the 
need, hence resistance, to change. An alternative explanation may be 
that decision topics change to maximise the reversibility of the 
decision. Whatever the motive for the change, the outcome would be 
variety avoidance. Again studies could be proposed to investigate 
these hypotheses. 
A further area of research identified here as important to the 
implementation issue, is in understanding why organisations intuitive- 
ly underestimate the complexity of decisions. This phenomenon was 
implicated as a possible cause of the observed negative association 
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between the Meetings, Refreezing and implementation Ease constructs. 
The development of an objective measure of project complexity may 
therefore be of some assistance to practising managers. Such a meas- 
ure,, to. be useful, would have to rely on data available at the project 
design stage. Novelty and, some of the Scope indicators used to con- 
struct the Uncertainty measure in this study, may serve as a useful 
launching platform to such a study. There is also the issue, mentioned 
above, of the design of information systems containing data on the 
types of procedural changes needed to implement certain types of 
decision., Not only would such a system assist in the, design of specif- 
ic projects, but it would also be of assistance in recognising the un- 
intentional Gateway Capacity consequences of a project. An organisa- 
tional skills audit following a project's implementation may be sub- 
stantially assisted by such an information base. The system would 
therefore be central, to the organisational cognition process necessary 
to assimilate any indirect Gateway Capacity benefits from a project 
into the organisation. 
Finally, an implication of the study was that risk aversion was 
not necessarily a good thing, as it excluded the possibility of inci- 
dentally acquiring new skills thus opening new business opportunities 
for an organisation. A testable hypothesis would be that risk averse 
organisations do less well in the long run than companies showing a 
measure of risk taking. Certainly this study identified companies 
undertaking projects to overtly acquire the Gateway capacity benefits 
of a new technology. The covert benefits proposed in this study would 
necessarily be dependent upon what Cohen and Levinthal (1990) have 
referred to as the organisations "Absorptive Capacity" a component of 
which we call Organisational Cognition. Many other constraints would 
also be identifiable in such a study. For example, the nature of the 
organisation's environment may restrict new business opportunities for 
a given organisation. It should also be noted that Gateway Capacity 
effects were hypothesised from the theory developed in this study and 
therefore should be apparent from all projects undertaken by an organ- 
isation, not just capital projects. 
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9.5.4CON'PRIBUTION 
ý 
This study has sought to explain an important aspect of strate- 
gy, namely the implementation of strategic decisions. The theoretical 
basis of this study has shown that organisations must match the com- 
plexity of change (threat or opportunity) in their environment with 
equivalent complexity of 'response. If their environment changes, they 
must change and strategic decisions are the organisational instrument 
of-change. Thus, the successful implementation of strategic decisions 
is crucial to the success and survival of an organisation. In fact, it 
has been argued that making 'the correct decision is less important 
than the satisfactory implementation of the decision (Bonoma, 1984). 
The process of implementing a strategic decision was described 
here as ' "programming". The atomic unit of a'programme was in turn 
identified as the project. Therefore, at a pragmatic level of analysis 
we determine that the vehicle (or medium) for implementing a strategic 
decision 'is the project. The importance of successfully implementing 
projects is highlighted if we adopt the view of Hawthorne 
(1978, p. 103): 
,, If we regard a firm in its totality as in a state of 
development, it may be described as being composed of a 
variety of projects with time-scales of different 
length. " 
In other words, at any one point in time, an organisation is a 
collection of projects. Hence, the perspectives and theory developed 
here on the issue of project implementation has considerable generali- 
ty and applicability top, not just Business Policy but organisational 
studies in general. 
The theory developed in this thesis related the size and com- 
plexity of a particular project, aspects of the organisation's struc- 
ture and decision making and design processes, to the magnitude of 
changes in the standard operating procedures of the organisation, and 
the ease of the project's implementation. Empirically, it was also 
found that managerial satisfaction with the project was primarily 
dependent upon the procedural change and ease outcomes mentioned 
above. The organisational structure and decision making components of 
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the theoretical model were seen as being two aspects of an Information 
construct. Specifically, the structure component (labelled Information 
Experience) was viewed as representing a pool of standard operating 
procedures at the disposal of the organisation and from which it could 
draw in order to implement the new project. The decision making compo- 
nent (labelled Information Process) represented a second pool of 
procedures used for choosing from existing procedures and or designing 
new procedures. This dichotomisation of the information concept repre- 
sents the difference between 'an organisation having a pool or reper- 
toire of procedures that it uses from day-to-day, and having a "higher 
level" set of procedures which it uses, as required, to extend or 
adapt this repertoire to new situations. 
In measuring the Information Process concept it was decided, for 
methodological reasons, to primarily restrict the measure to the stage 
of the project prior to formal authorisation or approval. This is the 
stage at which most research on decision making stops. A major finding 
of the study was that, the processes carried out during this pre- 
approval stage of a capital investment had very little influence upon 
the final project success. The only indicator from strictly this stage 
of the project that was significantly and positively associated with 
implementation success, was the measure of External Information 
search. But this was the only indicator to be loosely connected with 
any of the other Information Process measures. In other words, Exter- 
nal Information is associated with the success of a project, but is 
apparently not associated with the pre-approval decision making proc- 
ess. On the other hand, the Information Process indicator designed to 
measure the effort expended on project design was Formal Analysis. 
This indicator was strongly* associated with most other Information 
Process measures, but not directly associated with implementation 
success. An explanation for this could be, that during the pre-approv- 
al decision making stage of a capital project, the decision makers are 
preoccupied with satisfying a narrow set of procedures aimed at iden- 
tifying the financial costs and returns from the project, sufficient 
to satisfy some approval criteria. As financial success was not an 
indicator of implementation success within this study (budgeted cost 
was used as an indicator, but overall profitability was not) then the 
absence of a strong association between success and Information Proc- 
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ess measures could be accounted for. 
If the above observations-and explanations are valid, then it 
suggests that capital project pre-approval decision making is governed 
by some threshold criteria. In other words, the process continues 
until it is clear whether the threshold can, or cannot, be attained. 
Also, because of the narrow financial focus of this process, the 
actual procedural design questions that this thesis was primarily 
concerned with, will not be asked, and may not be faced by the organi- 
sation at all until problems are being encountered with the project's 
acceptance or operation. This is likely to occur late in the project's 
history, after approval and installation of the capital equipment say. 
Thus, the finding that only Refreezing (the Information Process meas- 
ure most associated with the late stages of the project) shows signif- 
icant associations with all of the implementation success' measures, is 
perhaps not surprising. In view of these findings, and speculations, 
it is recommended that future research on this topic be directed 
towards longitudinal studies" of the design and decision processes 
carried out over complete projects. 
A 'substantive finding of this study was that certain associa- 
tions involving the Information Process construct, were not success- 
fully predicted by the' cybernetic theory used. Further research in- 
volving this 'concept should therefore take into account possible 
modifications to the theory suggested in chapter 8, by including 
concepts from cognitive theory into the research design. 
A further theme of this thesis was that changes to an organisa- 
tion's procedures are indicative of organisational learning, and 
learning confers on an organisation a potential strategic advantage. 
As procedural change was demonstrated not to occur until late in a 
projects history, then learning is also primarily associated with the 
later stages of a project. Furthermore, these late stages are the time 
when action is being taken. In other words, organisations learn by 
doing. The longitudinal research strategy mentioned above could be 
used to investigate these predicted effects, based on the organisa- 
tional'learning model developed in chapter 8 (figure 8.4) and repro- 
duced over as figure 9.2. 
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Figure 9.2: A Model of Organisational Learning 
ANALYSIS 
i 
IMPLEMENTATION 
ýINTINDED 
r 
ACTION 
The time frame required to study the entire learning cycle would 
be much greater than that required for a single project. Rather than 
use a longitudinal study to investigate the entire learning cycle 
therefore, a less expensive research strategy would be to focus on the 
process in this cycle that is the most speculative, the process of 
organisational Cognition. Demonstrating that Organisational Cognition 
occurs, that it draws on the procedural changes induced in an organi- 
sation by the implementation of strategic decisions, and that it gives 
rise to new strategic opportunities for the organisation, would estab- 
lish the learning model and one of the untested theoretical predic- 
tions of this thesis. 
The contribution of this work is seen by the author primarily 
in terms of the development of a general and demonstrably effective, 
theoretical basis for the study of project implementation and strate- 
gic change. Major questions were posed at the beginning of the study; 
what is implementation? What are the principal contingent dimensions 
of the phenomenon? What happens to an organisation when a strategic 
decision is implemented? What is implementation success? These have 
been answered, at least partially and some from several perspectives. 
In addition, problems stemming from the underestimation of project 
complexity, the correct assessment of training needs, the idea of an 
organisational skills audit following project completion, and the need 
for information systems containing appropriate external information on 
procedures needed for successful implementation of new technologies, 
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point to areas and ideas of benefit to practising managers. 
The aim of this study was to help understand the. implementation 
of strategic decisions. It is hoped this thesis offers a useful step 
towards that goal. 
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APPENDIX A 
SäKPLE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
A survey 
capItal* investment proj acts 1 
]. n 
U. K. manufacturing companies_ 
`1 
UNIVERSITY OP BRADFORD 
MANA GEMENT CENTRE 
I 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
This questionnaire is being administered as part of a study of 
how British manufacturing firms implement capital investment deci- 
sions. The questionnaire is designed to gather information about your 
firm's, organisational structure, its environment, and the planning, 
installation and subsequent operation of a specific capital investment 
decision. This project should have been seen as important, that is, 
having a long-term impact on your company's goals, profitability 
and/or growth. It is further suggested that this project should have 
been in regular day-to-day operation for at least six months. 
The questionnaire is broadly, structured in two parts. Section 1, 
seeks information relating to your business as a whole. Section 2, 
seeks information specifically about the capital investment project 
that you have identified. Because of this, the questionnaire is to be 
filled out only by a senior executive who has adequate familiarity 
with your firm's operations, its business and the specific project. No 
questions of a personal nature are asked, nor is it a test; there are 
no right or wrong answers. 
The firm in this questionnaire means the entity of which you 
are a senior executive, whether-it be a division, a subsidiary, or an 
independent company. All questions, unless otherwise stated, refer to 
this entity's operations, environment, etc. The word organisation 
refers to any parent company of your firm. If you are fully independ- 
ent, then organisation refers to your firm also. 
To answer the questionnaire you, in the main, need only place a 
tick in a box or circle a number on a rating scale that seems closest 
to describing the reality as you perceive it. To correct or change 
your answer, simply place a line through the incorrect tick or circle. 
Feel free to make any additional explanatory or qualifying comments 
anywhere on the questionnaire, as, your candid opinions are very impor- 
tant to the success of the study. 
Please answer all the questions as incomplete questionnaires 
create severe problems in data analysis. After completing the ques- 
tionnaire, please check to see that no questions are left unanswered. 
The information supplied in this questionnaire will be kept in 
the strictest confidence, and will not be divulged to anyone except in 
aggregated form and for bona fide research purposes. To this end, we 
have not asked for the identification of respondents. Only those who 
are interested in further work are asked to supply their names and 
addresses in section 3 of the questionnaire. 
Thank you, your co-operation is sincerely appreciated. 
University of Bradford, 
Management Centre, 
Emm Lane, 
Bradford, 
West Yorkshire, 
DB9 4JL. 
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1. Whet is rar job title? 
2. {hat is the Principal ownership of your fin? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
United Kingdom owned 
North American owned 
Japanese owned 
European owned 
Other 
3a. at is the status of your fire? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
A fully independent/autonomous organisation 
A subsidiary of a larger organisation 
A division of a larger organisation 
A subsidiary of a division of a larger organisation 
ýý 
IF YOU ARE FULLY INDEPENDENT, DO NOT ANSWER QUESTION 3b. 
3b. In relation to your nearest parent organisation, what degree of control has the parent over your activities? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
We operate as an independent /autonomous organisation, although part of a larger group. [] 
We are effectively under the control of a larger group. [] 
4. Bich part of the manufacturing sector does your firm occupy? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
Capital Goods Manufacturing., 
Consumer Durable Good Manufacturing. 
Consumer Non-Durable Good Manufacturing. 
Producer goods (i. e. goods bought to assist in the manufacture of some other product). 
5. Which of the following best describes your firm's approach to developing and marketing new products? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
We don't do any new product development. 
We watch the competition and if their new products are successful then we imitate. 
We actively develop and market new products ahead of the competition. 
6. Which of the following best describes Your firs? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Single-Product Dominated 
(Dependent on one single product for at least 95% of total company sales. ) 
Single-Business dominated 
(Dependent on one major area of related products (similar tecty ology and markets] 
which accounts for at least 70% of total company sales. ) 
Multi-Business 
(Diversified into more then one major product area - so than no single business 
accounts for 70% or more of total company sales. ) 
III 
II 
Il 
Il 
II 
7. Are the technivues to be used in evaluating capital project proposals forralli docuwted and standardised? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Yes( ) No( 
s. Does Your organisation carry out post-completion audits of capital investment decisions? 
(Post-Completion Audit (PCA) is, primarily, an internal process for reviewing the success or failure of a 
project once it has been completed. PCA is not simply capital budget monitoring or control. ) 
TICK ONE XA. 
Routinely I) Frequently () Occasionally () Rarely () Never () 
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9. ' Wvt proportion of major capital proposals would you say are normally accepted by your fin? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
t below 10% 10-24% 2549% 50-74% 75-89% 90-100! 
(](II, I (] (I (] 
10a. 1s your C. E. O. the owner or majority share holder of your fin? 
(C. E. O. - chief executive officer, the managing director, general manger etc. Primarily responsible for the 
running of your firm. ) 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Yes (] No (I 
IF YOU ANSWERED 'NO' TO THE ABOVE QUESTION THEN. 
1Ob. Whet is the maxilla capital expenditure that can be authorised by the C. E. O. of Your firm, without making any 
reference at all to a higher internal or external authority e. g. board of directors, external owner/board? 
E( l 
{den answering these questions, please give an approximate annual figure averaged over the last three years. 
11a. What is the approximate total annual capital expenditure budget for your firm? 
Approximate annual capital expenditure f(J 
11b. What is the total revenue expenditure budget of your firm on R&D and/or Development and/or Design and/or 
Technical and/or Engineering? (Exclude expenditure on plant maintenance. ) 
Approximate annual revenue expenditure. f(J 
11c. Considering the above two figures, then, what percentage of each figure is directed towards developing entirely 
new (to your firm) products or processes? 
(Note. minor or routine technical or design changes are not seen here as new. ) 
Percentage of capital spent on new products or processes (Jt 
Percentage of revenue spent on new products or processes (Jt 
Please answer the following questions for the industry that accounts for the largest t of the sales of your fin (in 
other words your principal industry as defined by Your major competitors). 
12. How rapid or Intense is each of the following in your rain industry? 
NTS REHE 
SiOTHMSTATEM THE IRAM))CCIRCLING 
ONE MMBER ONLY FOR EACH SCALE. (1 REPRESENTS THE STATEMENT ON THE LEFT AND 5 
Our firm rarely has to change 12345 Our firm rust change its 
its marketing practices to marketing practices extreme- 
keep up with the market and ly frequently (e. g. semi- 
competitors. Molly). 
The rate at which products 1235 The rate of obsolescence is 
services are getting very high as in some fashion 
obsolete in the industry is goods. 
very slow (e. g., basic 
metals like copper). 
Actions of competitors are 1235 Actions of competitors are 
quite easy to predict (as unpredictable. 
in some Primary industries). 
Demand and consumer tastes 1235 Demand and tastes are almost 
are fairly easy to forecast unpredictable (e. g., high- 
(e. g., for milk companies). fashion goods). 
The Production technology 123L5 The modes of production 
is not subject to very much change often and in a major 
change and is well establi- way (e. g., semi-annually). 
shed (e. g., in steel 
production). 
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The following questions refer to the operating management style and philosophy of senior management within your 
firm. It does not refer to any one person's style, but to the general atmosphere within your firm. 
13. An operating top management philosophy of: 
READ BOTH STATEMENTS AND CIRCLING ONE NIMER ONLY FOR EACH SCALE. (1 REPRESENTS THE STATEMENT ON THE LEFT 
AND 5 THE STATEMENT IN THE RIGHT. ) 
(MECHANISTIC TYPE) (ORGANIC TYPE) 
A highly restricted access 123 
to important financial and 
operating information. 
Strom insistence on a12 
uniform managerial style 
tlroughout the firm. 
Strong emphasis on giving 12 
the most say in decision- 
making to formal line 
managers. 
A strong ewhasis on holding 1 -2 -- 3 
fast to true and tried man- 
agement practices, procedur- 
es or principles despite any 
changes in business 
conditions. 
Strong ., eaphasis on getting 
1 
line staff personnel to 
adhere closely to formal Job 
descriptions. 
15 Imortant financial and 
S Broader acceptance of re- 
sponsibility and coeuiteent 
to the fire that goes beyond 
individual's functional 
role. 
c5A strong emphasis on adapt- 
ing freely to changing 
circumstances without too 
much concern for past 
practices, procedures or 
principles. 
l5 Strong tendency to let the 
requirements of the situa- 
tion and the individual's 
personality define proper 
on-job behaviour. 
Specific definition of I23 
responsibility that. is 
attached to individual's 
functional role only. 
Strict hierarchy of control 123 
and authority using sophist- 
icated information systems. 
Personal communication is 123 
through highly structured 
channels and is mainly 
vertical between superiors 
and subordinates. 
Content of communication is 123 
instructions and decisions. 
loyalty and obedience to 123 
fir. and superiors is 
highly valued. 
Importance and prestige 123 
attached to identification 
with fire itself. 
operating information flow 
quite freely throughout the 
firm. 
, 
5 Managers' operating style 
allowed to range freely from 
the very formal to the very 
informal. 
S Strong tendency to let the 
expert in a given situation 
have the most say in decis- 
ion-making, even if this 
means temporary by-passing 
of formal line authority. 
S Loose informal control; 
heavy dependence on informal 
relationships and norm of 
co-operation for getting 
work done. 
S Communication is through 
open charnels and lateral, 
between people of different 
ranks and resembles consult- 
ation rather than command. 
45 Content of communication is 
information and advice. 
45 Co. mitment to tasks and 
progress and expansion of 
the firm is highly valued. 
45 Importance and prestige 
attached to affiliations 
and expertise in larger 
environment. 
U. Approximately how many full time employees we there in your fin? 
Full time employees. 
Page 342 
15. tat was the approximate turnover of your fin in the last financial year? 
Arrwml twYaver. . £ý 
16. In the last financial Year how did Yar fin perform relative to your major competitors? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
In growth of profit tens. 
In growth of sales volue tens. 
In growth of market share tens. 
In tens of return on investment. 
SECTION 2. THE PROJECT 
The Don't Better fete Worse know 
123l 
123 
123t 
12S 
i Please focus on a CAPITAL INVESTMENT project that is now fully commissioned and an integrated part of your everyday 
activities. In addition, this project would have been seen at the time of it's inception by those involved as 
playing a bigger rather than a smaller part in shaping at happens within your organisation for a long time 
afterwards, i. e., it was seen as being IMPORTANT to the future course of your organisation. Important may be defined 
in terms of the amount of expenditure involved, or that new businesses, markets or new products or new technologies 
were being sought, developed or used. 
Please indicate, if you wish, a simple title for the capital project. 
Title: 
1. How often do investment decisions for projects of this size and type arise? 
PLEASE INDICATE THE NUMBER PER YEAR (USE FRACTIONS IF NECESSARY). 
frequency of decisions of similar size (in expenditure terms) per year 
Frequency of decisions of similar type per year. 
Il 
[l 
2. Where was the project (plant, equipment etc. ) physically located within your fin? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Installed on a new site. 
Became the primary business area of the existing site. 
Integrated into the primary business area of the existing site. 
Became a new smaller business area or department on the existing site. 
Integrated into an existing smaller business area or department on the existing site. 
I 
II 3a. Was the project entirely self contained, or part of a larger program of activities, perhaps involving other 
projects, or organisational changes? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Self contained/independent. 
Part of larger prograaae. 
IF PART OF A LARGER PROGRAMME THEN ANSWER PART 7b BELOW. 
3b. Approximately at percentage of the total expenditure (capital and revenue) involved in the programme did this 
project account for? 
Approximate t of prograne due to project t 
J. Which of the following were effected (positively or negatively) by the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER QNLT PER LINt. 
Positive Not Negative 
effect affected effect Profit 123- -"5-- 
Quality 1235 
output volume 1235 
Costs 12345 
Service rendered 1235 
Morale 1235 
Personnel benefits 123[5 
Image 123l5 
Sales 12345 
Market Share 12345 
Return on investment 12345 
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5. To what extent did the original stimulus for the project come from? 
CIRCLE ONE NU18ER ONLY PER LINE. 
Need to acquire new skills. 
A market opportunity or customer enquiry. 
Worker, shareholder or other stakeholder pressure. 
The action of competitors. 
Governmental or Social action. 
New external technological development. 
New internal technological development. 
A need to protect sources of supply. 
Increase loyalty of existing customers. 
A need to preserve a market position or presence. 
Other (specify) 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
1235 
1235 
1235 
1235 
1235 
123l5 
123L5 
1235 
123l5 
123l5 
12345 
6. To at extent was the project undertaken to achieve the following specific pools/ei. s/p. rposes? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
To reduce the variable costs of manufacture. 
To reduce the fixed costs of manufacture. 
To increase the volume of manufacture. 
To improve the quality of manufacture. 
To improve worker skills, morale, environment. 
To simplify the manufacturing process. 
To satisfy statutory requirements (Safety, pollution etc. ). 
To enter a new market. 
To foster or omote a company image. 
Other(specify) 
1. 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lr a lot deal 
123t5 
123t5 
123t5 
1- 23t5 
123t5 
123t5 
12315 
123t5 
123t5 
12345 
To achieve the goals identified above, how much effort was required/expended on the following activities? In 
addition, tick the activity which best accounts for the capital expenditure. 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE, AND PLACE ONE TICK ONLY IN THE COLUMN OF BOXES TO REPRESENT THE MAIN CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE ITEM. 
Expenditure little 
item or none 
Obtaining/developing new technologies, equipment ()1 
and/or premises. 
Internal restructuring/reorganisation. 1 
Developing new business plan or budget, or 1 
data-processing equipment facilities. 
Develop new Marketing and/or distribution ()1 
capabilities. 
Developing new products. (j1 
Improving personnel facilities and/or training. Lt JJ 1 
Purchasing and/or merging with organisations 1 
belonging to your parent. 
Purchasing and/or merging with organisations other ()1 
than your parent. 
Obtaining finance and/or other supplies, ()1 
e. g. raw materials. 
Developing or disposing of a new or existing site. 1 
other (specify) 1 
Some Slight- Quite A great 
lr a lot deal 
2345 
23ý5 
23l5 
235 
23S 
235 
235 
235 
23lS 
23l5 
235 
8. Was a post-completion audit carried out for this project? 
(Post-Completion Audit (PCA) is, primarily, an internal process for reviewing the success or failure of a project 
once it has been completed. PCA is not simply capital budget monitoring or control. ) 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Yes () No () Don't Know [) In progress () 
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SECTION 2a. THE PROJECT - From inception to approval. 
Considering the time then final approval for the capital expenditure to implement the project was received, then: 
1. What was the anticipated capital expenditure for the project? 
Fixed assets (Equipment) 
Working capital (Store items etc. ) 
Goodwill 
2. {Mt was the amual tirnover of vow organisation at this time? 
krx, el T/0 at the of authorisation 
f[ 
tI ) 
EI l 
tI l 
3. To at extent was there a clear design or option for the project from its inception, (e. g. a single 
supplier only being available, extensive R&D already done)? 
CIRCLE ONE *11BER ONLY. 
Few options avail- 123L5 Many options avail- 
able or few able and considered. 
considered. 
1. To at extent did various people need convincing that the project was worthwhile? 
CIRCLE ONE MISER ONLY. 
Very little effort 123i5 Considerable consensus 
required, seen as building had to take 
the 'right thing place. 
to do'. 
5. To what extent were other projects and activities re-scheduled to accommodate this project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
Little or none 12345 Extensive re-scheduling 
6. on a hypothetical priority list, what was the priority given to this project at the 
time of approval against 
other expenditures? 
CIRCLE ONE Ma16ER ONLY. 
Average 
Very low 123t5 Very Nigh 
7. Was the agreed project capletion date stated in the capital application document seen by most parties as being 
difficult or easy to achieve? 
CIRCLE ONE MMER ONLY. 
Very difficult 1234 5- Very easy 
roduct 8. es ethd iýl/ppt 
duction 
considerations, or marketing/sales considerations seen as primarily determining the 
CIRCLE ONE NUIBER ONLY. Both 
equal 
Technical 12345 Marketing 
9. How much opposition to project re-scheduling was there/would there have been? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
A 
Little Some lot 
No opposition 12345 Great opposition 
10. To what extent were external agencies (e. g. customers, equipment suppliers) responsible for setting the 
anticipated final completion date? 
CIRCLE ONE NU16ER ONLY. 
Little Some loA t 
No extent 123j5 Great extent 
11. Nhat was the project's planning horizon, i. e. how far ahead did people look when evaluating the project? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Less than 1 year 
1 to 2 years 
2 to 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
More than 10 years 
I 
i 
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12. For how long could implesentation of the project have been delayed without any significant effect (other than 
inflationary effects) on the project's viability? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Less than 1- year 
1 to 2 years 
2 to 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
Yore than 10 years 
13. How long would your organisation have remained in business if it had done nothing at the time final approval for 
this project was sought? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Less than I year 
1 to 2 years 
2 to 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
More than 10 years 
II 
U. Please indicate on the following grid the type of MARKET and CUSTOMER being served by the project? 
TICK AS MANY BOXES AS REQUIRED. 
MARKET(S) 
Existing. 
New related. 
New unrelated. 
CUSTOMER(S) 
Existing New 
II II 
15. Which of the following best describes how the project affected or related to the PRODUCT(S) produced by your 
fin? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Introduced no change (effect). 
Introduced a minor improvement or modifications. 
Introduced a major enhancement. 
Introduced a new but related product. 
Introduced a new unrelated product or invention. 
16. Which of the following best describes the source of the TECHNOLOGY employed in the project? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Own Research and Development. 
Own research. 
Own development. 
Licence or patent agreement - own implementation. 
Contractor supplied technology, few similar products in existence. 
Contractor supplied technology, many similar products (i. e. a well proven 
off-the-shelf technology. ) 
Not a technical project. 
other (specify) 
17. At at level was final authorisation sought for approval to spend the rewired capital and to proceed with the 
project? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Below divisional level or equivalent. 
Divisional level or equivalent. 
Chief executive. 
Chief executive and ratified by board. 
Board or equivalent top governing body. 
Board and ratified at higher external level. 
Outside and above your firm. 
18. In relation to the standard payback, NPV, yield or other financial criteria used by your firm in assessing 
capital investment decisions where on the following scale was this project thought to fall at the time 
formal approval was given? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Much worse than standard 
Worse than standard 
Same as standard 
Better than standard 
Much better than standard 
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19. Two definitions of project risk we given below. Nov was the risk of this capital investment project defined? 
has it: TIC( ONE OR BOTH BOXES. 
Defined as 'potential variations in key assumptions/outcomes'. 
Defined as 'potential negative outcomes', e. g. the chance of the project 
making a financial loss. 
20. How was the risk of this project assessed? 
TICK AS MANY BOXES AS REQUIRED. 
a. Ignored or not assessed explicitly 
b. Assessed subjectively as Low, Medium, High, etc. 
c. Assessed in terns of what-could-go-wrong and contingency plans. 
d. Analysed via formal 'Ilat-If' sensitivity analysis by 
giving a% change of each key factor one at a time. 
e. Other (specify) 
II 
II 
Il 
21. How many formally arranged meetings per month, on average, were there during the pre-approval stage of the 
project? 
Maber of pre-arranged meetings per month 
22. Nov many people would there have been at these meetings? 
Typical number of people at a pre-arranged meeting 
I 
II 
23. How much discussion, toing and froing, or argument took place during the pre-approval stage of the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lY a lot deal 
Extent of discussion etc. 12345 
24, How many times were separate estimates/analyses made of each of the following during the pre-approval stage of 
the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
Nora Once Feu Several Many 
Capital cost of project. 123t5 
Simple Payback Period. 123t5 
Expected Productive life. 123t5 
Discounted Net Present Value of all Returns and/or Expected 123t5 
Rate of Return. 
Cost and Risk of failure. 123t5 
Risk in not making the investment, or deferring it. 12345 
opportunity cost. (ie., Possible failure to make profits etc. 123t5 
from alternative projects as a result of using resources on 
this project. ) 
25. To at extent at the time, could a worse payback, NPV etc. have been accepted without the project undergoing a 
substantial chance, or cancellation? 
CIRCLE OF[ NUMBER PER LINE. Extent of worse payback etc. 
Little Minor nod- sub- Major or none erate stantial 
By the sponsoring managers 12345 
By the approving authority 12345 
26a. dring the pre-approval stage, how risky, or difficult to iaplesent, was this project perceived as being, in the 
following terns? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER OILY PER LINE. Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lr a lot deal 
Financially risky 123 -5-- 
Technical ly risky 12315 
Oroanisationally risky iie. effects on working arrangements, 123l5 
management systems etc. ) 
IF YOU CIRCLED 010 TO ALL PARTS OF THE ABOVE QUESTION, THEN DO NOT ANSWER 26b BELOW. 
26b. To what extent were contingencies of time, money etc. allowed in the pre-approval of the project to compensate 
for any perceived risk with the project? 
CIRCLE ONE P& ER ONLY PER LINE. 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
Contingencies of money. 12345 
Contingencies of time. 12345 
Other (specify) 12345 
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27. To at extent was the project seen as being of a technical and/or organisational complexity? 
(Organisational complexity refers to the projects effects on working arrangements, management systems etc. ) 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
Little Minor Mod- Sub- Major 
or none erate stantial 
Teth ical Complexity 123l5 
Organisational Complexity 12345 
28. To what extent was this project initiated for the purpose of acquiring new skills (ianagerial, operational etc. ) 
in the following areas? 
CIRCLE ONE MJM6ER PER LINE. 
Little Sae Slight- Dutte A great 
or none lr a lot deal Information processing/handling 123L5 
Production/Planufectiring 123L5 
harketin9/Sales 123L5 
Teth ology 123L5 
Other (specify) 12345 
The three parts to this question refer to the type of manufacturing processes used within your firm. The item 
'Custom' to 'Continuous process' technology refers to the degree of production continuity, i. e. the frequency with 
which plant or machinery is stopped/started, reset etc. dring its normal operation. 'Custom' technology requires 
very many stop/starts, resets; Continuous process' technology requires very few. 
29a. Before the project case into operation, then, to what extent did the following production techniques contribute 
to the value added by operations within the major part of yourlIRM? 
CIRCLE c*( NUMBER PER SCALE. Little Sore Slight- Quite Over 
or none ly a lot 70t 
'Custom' technology. (e. g. prototypes) 12345 
'$aall batch job shop' technology. (e. g. tools, dies). 12345 
'Large batch technology. (e. g. drugs, chemicals, parts, cans). 12345 
'Mass production' technology. (e.. cars standard textiles). 12345 
'Continuous process' technology. (e. g. oil refining). 12345 
29b. To at extent do the following production techniques contribute to the value added by operations within the 
PROJECT? 
CIRCLE OfC NUMBER PER SCALE. 
Little Sae Slight- Dutte Over 
or none ly e lot 70% 
'Custom' technology. (e. g. prototypes) 123t5 
Small batch, job shop' technology. (e. g. tools, dies). 123t5 
large batch technology. (e. g. drugs, chemicals, parts cans). 123t5 
'Mass production' technology. (e. g. cars, standard textiles). 123t5 
'Continuous process' technology. (e. g. oil refining). 12345 
IF THE PROJECT WAS INSTALLED OR INTEGRATED INTO AN ALREADY EXISTING SMALLER PART OR DEPARTMENT WITHIN YOUR FIRM THEN 
ANSWER QUESTION 29c. BELOW. ELSE TICK AS NOT APPLICABLE' HERE ----------------)(l 
29c. Before the project cane into operation, then, to what extent did the following production techniques contribute 
to the value added by operations witnin me mrmintNit 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER SCALE. 
'Custom' technology. (e. g. prototypes) 1 
Small batch, job shop' technology. (e. g. tools, dies). 1 
Large batch technology. (e. g. drugs, chemicals, parts, cans). 1 
'Mass production' technology. (e. 9. cars standard textiles). 1 
'Continuous process' technology. (e. g. oil refining). 1 
23 
23 
23 
23 
IS 
ýS 
lS 
L5 
30. During the pre-approval stage of the project, how such effort was expended on collecting and checking the 
information used? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE (CIRCLE '1' IF DON'T KNOW). 
Collation of infonation 
Checking/Validation of infonation 
Some Slight- Ouite over 
ly a lot 70% 
2345 
Little 
or none 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lr a lot deal 12345 
12315 
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31. Relative to similar projects, how much money was spent by Your fire during the pre-approval stage of the 
project? 
CIRCLE ONE MJ ER PER LINE. 
Much About Much 
less Less same More more 
Paid to external agents e. g. consultants. 12345 
Spent on internal development budgets salaries etc. 123l5 
of own personnel. 
The next few questions ask you to estimate the VALUE, as you see it, of the information used dring the pre-approval 
stage of the project. We are not interested in the extent of the use of information. we are only interested in its 
value or contribution in helping to solve probless or in selecting T particular course of action or enquiry. 
32. How would you rate the value of the information etc. supplied from within the following functional areas of your 
fire during the pre-approval stage of the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUIBER ONLY PER LINE. 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
Marketing/Sales. 12345 
Personnel/Training. 1235 
Production/Manufacturing/Operations. 1235 
Technical/Engineering/R & D/Design. 1235 
Planring/Scheduling/Purchasing/Stores and other 12345 
'Operational Support' activities. 
Accounting/Finance/Data Processing/legal and 12345 
other 'Senior Manageaent Support' activities. 
Board/General Manager/Head Office. 12345 
33. How would you rate the value of the intonation etc. supplied to your fin by people or agencies from outside 
your organisation during the pre-approval stage of the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE (CIRCLE T IF THE AGENCY WAS NOT INVOLVED). 
Auditors 
Trade associations 
Shareholders 
Trade Unions 
suppliers of materials 
Suppliers of finance 
Suppliers of equipment 
Competitors (comparative performance) 
Customers/clients 
Government departments and agencies 
Business consultants 
Technical consultants 
Others (Specify) 
Little 
or cane 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Some Slight- Quite A great 
lY a lot deal 
345 
345 
3 
3l 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
ý 
( 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
ý 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
36. During the pre-approval stage of the project, how valuable were each of the following communication methods? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE (CIRCLE '1' IF DON'T KNOW). 
Informal meetings 
Formal Meetings 
Post office Mail 
Telephone 
Fax or Telex 
Video conference systems 
Electronic Mailing systems 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
12345 
123l5 
123l5 
123l5 
12345 
123l5 
12345 
35. During the pre-approval stage of the project, how valuable were each of the following information gathering 
methods? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE (CIRCLE '1' IF DON'T KNOW). 
Judgment of one person 
Judgment of several people 
Searching internally available data 
Searching externally available data 
Observational tours/visits 
survey/Experiment/R&D 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lr a lot deal 12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
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36. During the pre-approval stage of the project, how valuable was the production of written documentation, in the 
form of: 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE (CIRCLE '1' IF DON'T KNOU). 
Minutes of meetings 
Internally produced reports/memos. 
Reports etc. from external agencies 
Standard computer generated reports 
Non-standard computer reports from 
specific analysis or enquiries. 
111111 
37. Were cowuters used at all by Your fin dring the pre-approval stage of the project? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Computers were not used. 
Computers were used. 
IF COPIPUTERS WERE NOT USED THEN GO TO SECTION 2b. OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
23l5 
38. What type of computer was used, and how valuable were each of the following types of computer programme 
(software) to you during the pre-approval stage of the project? 
(NOTE: Information value is seen here as the contribution it made in solving identified problems, or in helping 
to select a particular course of actiontenquiry. ) 
TICK AS MANY BOXES AS REQUIRES AND CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
Type of Computer. 
Micro- Mini- Main- Little 
frame or none 
Word/Text processing/publishing. 
Spreadsheet. 
Dedicated Graphics package. 
Critical path analysis I Project 
management. 
Data storage and retrieval systems. 
(i. e. Data Bases. ) 
Other (specify) 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
123l5 
12345 
123l5 
123l5 
12315 
Value of use. 
Sole Slight- Quite A great 
12 
12 
12 
12 
C] C] C) 1 
C] C] C) 1 
ly a lot deal 
3'5 
3l5 
3i5 
345 
II 
23l5 
39. During the pre-approval stage of the project, which of the following types of information were drawn from 
computer based files, and what was it's source? 
In relation to data sources, the following definitions are made: 
Local - from a department or personal data base. 
Central - from a central source within your firm, e. g. the data processing department. 
orporate - from the D. P. department of a parent or subsidiary company. 
External - from an external, public data source, e. g. PRESTEL, EXSTAT etc. 
TICK NE MAR PER LINE. 
Scientific/Technical/laboratory Information 
Planring information (schedules, forecasts etc. ) 
Marketing Information 
Financial (Accounting) Information 
Production Information 
Personnel Information 
Top management Information (e. g. Share prices, 
exchange rates) 
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Source of data files. 
Not Used Local Cent. Corp. Ext. 
123l5 
12345 
123i 
123l 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3l 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
SECTION 2b. THE PROJECT-From approval. up to the present 
1. How many other major and important projects have there been in the department since this project was brought 
into operation? 
(Note: 'department'. refers to the area of the site in which the project was installed, whether seen as a 
department or not. ) 
Number of projects 1l 
2. How adequately did contingencies of money, time etc. (if any) compensate for actual cost and time overruns (if 
any) experienced with the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY 
Wholly inadequate 12 
About 
3 
right 
15 Far too generous 
To what extent was the project completed to budget and to schedule, and has it achieved the specification 
originally given in the capital application documentation in terms of product quality and/or volume? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
Much About Much 
below Below Same Above above 
2345 
Schedule (time) (time) 
1123l5 
Specification 12315 
4. Since the project caoe_intooperation, to what extent have you experienced changes in the area or departaent 
where the protect was Installed, in the following listed items? 
CIRCLE ONE ITEM PER LINE. (CIRCLE 3 IF YOU DON'T KNOW). 
Absenteeism 123t5 
Staff /worker turnover 123t5 
Grievances 123t5 
Accidents/illnesses 123t5 
Machine downtime 123t5 
Net product rejects 123t5 
Under standard production (i. e. lower quality than 123t5 
desired but nor rejected). 
As a result of this project some relatively subtle changes may have occurred within your firm. Please read the 
following statements and indicate whether, as a result of this project only, you are able to agree or disagree with 
the statement. 
Note. Some of these questions require you to think in terms of double negatives. 
S. With hindsight, to what extent can you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Decreased No Increased 
(improved) change (worsened) 
NIA or Dis- 
Agree Neither Agree 
o Important financial and operating information has become less 12345 
accessible. 
o Managers are freer to adopt their own individual management style. 123l5 
o Expertise rather than formal authority is now more recognised and 12345 
used for decision-making. 
o Past practice is now more of a barrier to adopting new Ideas etc. 123l5 
o Getting things done is now more important than following the book'. 123t5 
o Informal relationships and controls are now more widely used for 123t5 
getting the Job done. 
o The individual now has less of a say in how they get their work 12345 
done. 
o Individual responsibility is now more orientated towards the firm 12315 
as a whole than to functional role. 
o Tasks are now more rigidly defined, 123t5 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
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6. While considering only the project in question, decide to at extent you are able to agree or disagree with 
each of the following statement. 
The following terminology is defined to better understand these statements. 
Top management - C. E. O., Chairman, 6. M., M. D., Board etc. of the firs. 
Unit manager - person in charge of the day-to-day running of the department in which the project was installed. 
Engineers - the person or people most directly responsible for the design, installation and 
commissioning of the project. 
Use the scoring system explained in the Qrevious question. 
CIRCLE ONE MIMBER ONLY PER LINE (CIRCLE 3' Of YOU DON'T KNOW). 
Dis- 
Unfreezing, 'Favourable. 
Agree Neither agree 
Top managers initiated the project. 123l5 
Top managers became involved with the project. 12345 
Top and unit managers felt the project was important to the company. 12345 
Top and unit managers were open, candid. 12345 
Unit managers revised some of their assumptions. 123l5 
Unit managers recognised the need for the project. 12345 
Unfreezing, Unfavourable 
Top managers felt the project was too big. 123l5 
Unit managers could not state their problems clearly. 123S 
Unit managers felt threatened by the project. 123l5 
Unit managers resented having to deal with the project. 123(5 
Unit managers felt they could do the project design study alone. 1235 
Unit managers lacked confidence in the engineers. 1235 
Moving, Favourable 
Top managers helped develop the project design. 1235 
Top managers were advised of options. 1235 
Unit managers reviewed and evaluated alternatives. 1235 
unit managers and engineers gathered data jointly. 1235 
Alternative ways to carry out the project were devised. 1235 
Designs were improved sequentially. 123l5 
Relevant data were accessible, available. 123l5 
Moving, Unfavourable 
Unit managers did not help develop the project design. 123l5 
Unit managers did not understand the project as proposed by the 12345 
engineers. 
Engineers felt the design study was concluded too quickly. 1235 
Engineers could not educate the unit managers. 1235 
Needed data were not made available. 1235 
Refreezing, Favourable 
Unit managers operated the project. 12345 
Unit managers were satisfied. 123t5 
Engineers initiated positive feedback after early use. 1235 
Project was widely accepted after initial success. 1235 
The project improved the performance of the unit. 1235 
Operation showed the success of the project. 1234S 
Similar projects have/are been proposed for other areas. 123l5 
Refreezing, Unfavourable 
Top managers did not encourage other units to adopt similar projects. 123l5 
Top management ignored the solution recommended by the engineers. 123l5 
Engineers did not try to support new managerial behaviour after the 1235 
project was in operation. 
Engineer did not try to re-establish stable operations after the 12315 
project was commissioned. 
Results were difficult to measure. 123S 
Standards for evaluating results were lacking. 123(5 
The project was incompatible with the needs and resources of the unit. 12345 
7. How such to e, 
_relative 
to projects of similar size (if any) did final approve] for this project take? 
CIRCLE ONE PJ ER ONLY. 
Average 
Much less 12345 Much more 
8. To what extent did this project require: 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
Decisions and activities being 123l5 Decisions and activities being 
performed at the same Use. performed one after the other. 
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9. Overall, at is your cirrent opinion of the success of the project? 
CIRCLE ONE MISER ONLY. 
Highly 1234,5 Highly 
unsatisfactory satisfactory 
10. Is the protect seen as a valid solution to the original stimulus/opportunity that arose? 
CIRCLE ONE Mi16ER ONLY. 
Highly 123l5, Highly 
unsatisfactory satisfactory 
11. Is the project no achieving the financial returns expected from it? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
Highly 1 
.23l5 
Highly 
unsatisfactory satisfactory 
12. From a purely technical/engineering perspective, how satisfactory was the project? 
CIRCLE ONE MIPIBER ONLY. 
Highly 123l5 Highly 
unsatisfactory satisfactory 
13. From a managerial/organisational perspective, how satisfactory was the project? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
Highly 123lS Highly 
unsatisfactory satisfactory 
U. To what extent did this crolect's use of previous experience, technical and other skills, compare to other 
capital projects carried out within your organisation? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
Average 
Much less 12345 Much bore 
15. To what extent have new skills, ways of working or doing business been introduced or developed as a result of 
this project in the following functional areas of your firs? (We are not interested in whether you are now doing 
more or less of an activity, but_the. extent_to. which your fire now performs these activities differently. ) 
CIRCLE ONE MJMBER PER LINE. LCIRCLE "I- IF DON'T KNOW). 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or tone lY a lot deal 
Marketing 12345 
Sales 12365 
Advertising/Public Relations/Promotion 12365 
Market research 12345 
Customer relations/Complaints/liaison 12345 
Personnel 12345 
Training 12345 
Welfare/Security/Social services 12345 
Production 12345 
Production engineering 12345 
Maintenance/Engineering 12345 
Planning/Scheduling 12345 
Quality Control/Inspection 12345 
Work Study/Operations Study 12345 
Design 12365 
Research and/or Development 12345 
Transport/Distribution 12345 
Purchasing/Pros relent/Stock Control 12365 
Accounting/Finance 12345 
Data Processing/Statistics 12345 
Legal/Insurance 12345 
Senior management 12345 
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In the following questions the project is seen as passing through four stages. These are labelled and defined as 
follows: 
PRE-APPROVAL - The design or planning stage, ending with formal approval to rake the capital investments 
necessary for the project to be implemented. 
INSTALLATION - The construction/installation stage ending with the start of commissioning of the project. 
COMMISSIONING - The technical proving time involving the bringing of the project plant or equipment up to its design etc. capacity. 
OPERATION - The final integration of the project into the normal day-to-day operations of the 
organisation, perceived as starting at the same time as commissioning. 
16. Please give approximate dates to the following questions. 
ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS. 
Month Year 
a) When did cosmissioning of the project end? I' ]I) 
b) When did commissioning of the project start? I]I] 
c) When was final approval for the capital expenditure given? I]I] 
d) When was the stimulus that gave rise to the project first identified? I]I) 
Use the following scale to answer the next two questions. 
Equal - Equal value or contribution. - 
hod. - Moderately more valuable of one over the other. 
Ess. - Essentially or strongly more valuable. 
Dem. - Demonstrably more valuable. 
Abs. - Absolutely more valuable. 
17. Listed below are six questions obtained by pairing off the four project stages given above. Please indicate by a 
tick, which of the pair you consider made the greatest contribution to the reduction of uncertainty or 
resolution and identification of problems etc. with the project as it stands NOW. In addition, indicate on the 
adjacent scale (defined above) to what extent the ticked item made the greater contribution. 
TICK ONE ITEM (I ] AND CIRCLE ONE MJMBER PER LINE. 
Pre-approval (] vs. Installation (] 
'Commissioning (] vs. Pre-approval ( 
Pre-approval (] vs. Operation (] 
Operation (] vs. Installation (] 
Installation (] vs. Commissioning (] 
Commissioning (] vs. Operation (] 
Equal Mod. Ess. Dem. Abs. 
123l5 
123l5 
1235 
1235 
1235 
12345 
18. Listed below are six questions obtained by pairing off far underlying activities performed during the design 
stage of the project. The for activities are: 
1. The gathering or collection of facts and figures. 
2. The analysis of this data, particularly in relation to sophisticated calculations. 
3. The effective communication of data and conclusions drawn from the data. 
and I. The use of tools such as computers and the like, used to aid data gathering, 
analysis and communication. 
Please indicate by a tick, which of the pair you consider made the greatest contribution to the reduction of 
uncertainty or resolution and identification of problems etc. with the project as it stands NOW. In addition, 
indicate on the adjacent scale (defined above) to what extent the ticked item made the greater contribution. 
TICK ONE ITEM (i I AND CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
Equal Mod. Ess. Dec. Abs. 
Gathering (J vs. Analysis (J 123ä5 
Communication (J vs. Gathering IJ12345 
Gathering IJ vs. Tools IJ12345 
Analysis (J vs. Communication IJ123c5 Tools (J vs. Analysis (J 12345 
Communication (J vs. Tools 1J12345 
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19. How effectively has the new and unique experiences gained by your fin dring the whole of this project been 
transferred to other parts of your business? 
CIRCLE ONE ITEM PER LINE. (CIRCLE "14 IF NOT APPLICABLE) 
Little Sae Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
In the iaaediate working area (departaent) around 123l5 
the project. 
Throughout other areas of your site. 123i5 
Between other s&sidiaries or divisions of your organisation. 12345 
20. To at extent do you feel that probleus with the project were caused by the following? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE. 
o Underestimating the complexity of completing the project by 
concentrating on immediate commercial and technical decisions and 
making optimistic assumptions about the consequential effects. 
Extent of problem 
little Minor Mod- Sub- Major 
or none erate stantial 
1234 
,5 
o Having a lack of confidence in planning. 1235 
o By making slow or unco-ordinated responses to changes or problems 123t5 
affecting objectives after starting the project. 
o Having inexperience in planning or controlling contracts. 12365 
o Not having a system for learning from experience, particularly a1235 
reluctance to analyse successful and unsuccessful past decisions. 
oA failure during planning to define key tasks and objectives, or 12345 
to provide sufficient detail with adequate design reviews or to 
anticipate possible faults. 
o By failure to secure commitment to the plan. 12345 
o By failure to control sub-contractors adequately or specify 12345 
responsibilities and acceptance criteria in contracts. 
o By failure to provide or use appropriate management controls, 12345 
information systems, or detailed data analysis methods during the 
project. 
o Too great a dependence on individuals' unrecorded knowledge of 12345 
plant, services, operating principles etc. 
oA lack of prior training of operators and supervisors. 12345 
o By failure to clearly define changes in roles and responsibilities, 123 "4 5 
provide adequate rewards and incentives, or anticipate anxieties 
of persons affected by the project. 
o making late changes to the project's design or programme. 12345 
o By failure to allow for changes in the environment' (markets, 12345 
government policies etc. ) that were beyond the control of your 
firm. 
o By failure to vest authority for and over all parts of the project 12345 
with people of sufficient seniority and experience. 
o through competing activities and crises distracting attention from 123l 
the project. 
o Having insufficient support during implementation from top 123l5 
management, key formulators or advocates of the project. 
o Financial resources made available were not sufficient. 12365 
o Through a reluctance to consult specialists. 12345 
o Assuming that licensed or patented designs will work without 12345 
checking or testing. 
o OTHER (specify) 12345 
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21. Would you please describe how the major aanagerial problems (it any) encountered in integrating the project into 
the organisation, were resolved. 
22a. To at extent do you feel this project could have been handled rove successfully during the for stages listed 
below? 
CIRCLE ONE MJMBER PER LINE. 
Little Minor Mod- Sub- Major 
or none crate stantial 
Pre-approval. 12345 
Installation. 123l5 
Co. aissioning. 12345 
Operational. 12345 
22b. Please describe in at way You feel the project could have been handled differently. 
23. To what extent did your firm delegate responsibility for the aanapeaent of the project to an outside agency, 
consultant or contractor at each of. the following stages? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
Pre-approval stage 
Installation stage 
CoNissioning stage 
Operation stage 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none ly a lot deal 
1235 
123E5 
1235 
12345 
26. How such of the nev and Unique experience gained by your firs during the four stages of this project would be 
lost if certain key individuals were to leave the firs? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER PER LINE (CIRCLE 'NONE' IF DON'T KNOW) 
Little Sore Slight- Quite A great 
or none 1r a lot deal 
New Pre-approval experience 1235 
New Installation experience 1235 
New Commissioning experience 1235 
New operational experience 12345 
25. To at extent has the new and Unique experience gained by your fin during the four stages of this project been 
transferred fro* the heads of individuals onto written records/sanuals/reports? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or cane ly a lot deal 
Pre-approval experience 12365 
Installation experience 12345 
Coreissioning experience 12345 
operation experience 12345 
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26. To at extent has the net' end unique experience gained by your fin during the four stages of this protect been 
transferred from the heads of individuals onto computer based data bases? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
Pre-approval experience 
Installation experience 
Comissionin9 experience 
Operation experience 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lY a lot deal 
123(5 
12345 
123l5 
12345 
27. To what extent has the new and unique experience gained by your firm during the four stages of this project been 
transferred from the heads of individuals onto computer based expert systems? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
Pre-approval experience 
Installation experience 
Commissioning experience 
Operation experience 
Little Some Slight- Quite A great 
or none lr a lot deal 
12345 
1235 
1235 
12345 
28. To what extent were Personnel hired, trained, re-skilled to solve any of the problems encountered with the 
project? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not significantly 
slightly 
To some extent 
Greatly 
To a very great extent 
29. Has the time taken to handle similar decisions and projects changed over the years? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Much less time than in the past. 
Takes less time on average than in the past. 
No significant or noticeable change. 
Now seem to take longer than in the past. 
Much longer than in the past. 
I] 
I] 
I] 
I] 
I] 
(l 
(l 
Il 
O 
() 
30. How much time after commissioning did it take for the project to achieve the performance and/or returns expected 
from it? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Much less than expected. 
Less than expected. 
About the sane as expected. 
Longer than expected. 
Much longer than expected. 
() 
(l 
(l 
(l 
O 
31. In relation to what was originally expected to occur, do you feel the implementation of this project to be: 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Much easier than expected. 
Easier than expected. 
About as expected. 
Less easy than expected. 
Much less easy than expected. 
[] 
(] 
I) 
t] 
I] 
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32. Did this project undergo any changes in product market, design capacity, specification etc. between approval and 
final use of the capital item? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not significantly Il 
slightly (l 
To some extent (l 
Greatly (l 
To a very great extent fl 
33. To at extent were unanticipated technical problems encountered with the project dring and after it was 
- commissioned? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not significantly 
Slightly 
To some extent 
Greatly 
To a very great extent 
Il 
(l 
Il 
I] 
C] 
U. To what extent were unanticipated non-technical (organisational, personnel) problems encountered with the 
project during and after it was commissioned? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not significantly (] 
Slightly (] 
To some extent () 
Greatly 
To a very great extent 
35. To what extent were existing standard procedures and practices found to be inadequate to finally implement the 
project? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not significantly () 
Slightly () 
To so. e extent (J 
Greatly () 
To a very great extent 
36. If things had gone wrong with the project, how serious would it have been for your firm? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not at all (] 
Slightly (] 
Quite (] 
A great deal (] 
A very great deal. (] 
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I SECTION 2c. -THE PROJECT - What about the future? 
1. To what extent have the consequences of the project ctwged the way you do business? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. 
Not at all 
A little 
Quite a lot 
Substantially 
Radically 
I] 
I] 
[] 
f] 
[] 
2. -How vide a general applicability do you feel any changes in operating procedures, new skills or ways of working 
etc. have to other parts of your firm? 
TICK ONE BOX ONLY. - 
Not significantly 
slightly 
To sooe extent 
Greatly 
To a very greet extent 
7. 
(l 
(l 
() 
() 
(l 
3. Are there or have there been any plans to duplicate or repeat a sl. iler type of project within your lira? 
TICK ONE BOX PER LINE. 
At your site Yes () No () 
At some other site (if applicable) Not applicable () Yes (] No (] 
L. In view of the experience pained during this project, if an Identical project were to be proposed now, how 
willing do you think your fire would be to undertake it? 
CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY. 
The 
Me 
Very unwilling 123t5 Very willing 
Sa. How do you now rate your fire's ability to implement important capital projects which are technically simple and 
have only minor organisational effects or consequences? 
(Note. Organisational effects refer to the effect on managerial or operational working systems and practices. ) 
CIRCLE ONE MIMBER ONLY. 
Poor Fair Good 
Very Poor 12345 Excellent 
5b. How do you now rate your firm's ability to implement important capital projects which are technically complex, 
but have only minor organisational effects or consequences? 
CIRCLE ONE MMER ONLY. 
Poor Fair Good 
Very Poor 12345 Excellent 
Sc. Now do you now rate your fire's ability to ioplerent important capital projects which are technically simple but 
which have major organisational effects or consequences? 
CIRCLE ONE WJIBER ONLY. 
Poor Fair Good 
Very Poor 12345 Excellent 
5d. How do you now rate your fin's ability to implement important capital projects which are technically complex 
and also have major organisational effects or consequences? 
CIRCLE ONE M1NIBER ONLY. 
Poor Fair Good 
Very Poor 12315 Excellent 
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6. To at extent has this project affected your attitude to your firm's ability to handle the technical and 
organisational complexities of capital investment projects which are? 
CIRCLE ONE MIMBER ONLY PER LINE. 
Reduced No 'EManced 
(decreased) change (increased) 
Technically and organisationally simple. 123l5 
Technically complex but organisationally simple. 12315 
Organisationally complex but technically simple. 123l5 
Both technically and organisationally complex. 12345 
SECTION 3. FURTHER INTEREST 
Please check throus the questionnaire to ensure you have completed all the questions, as incomplete data presents 
major problems in subsequent analysis. 
Place a tick in the box at the end of this line if your company would be interested in 
taking part in follow-up research. 
II 
Place a tick in the box at the end of this line if your company would be interested in a 
copy of the report summarising the findings of this study, when available. 
If you ticked either of the above, then please complete. 
Name: 
Company: 
Address: 
Tel. No. 
Thank you for your time and co-operation 
with this project. 
I 
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APPENDIX B 
ROMPASS MAIN INDUSTRIAL GROUPS 
01 livestock. 
02 Agricultural Products. 
03 Horticulture, Aquatic Plants. 
04 Agricultural Services. 
08 Forestry. 
09 Fresh Fish and other Sea Products. 
11 Coal and Peat. 
12 Ores. 
13 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas. 
It Quarrying. 
16 Precious and Semi-precious Stones, 
Uncut. 
19 Minerals. 
20 Food and Tobacco. 
21 Beverages. 
22 Leathers, Furs and their products, 
Footwear. 
23 Textile Industry. 
24 Wearing Apparel and Make-Up Textile 
Goods, Umbrellas etc. 
25 Wood and Cork Products. 
26 Furniture. 
27'''Cellulose, Paper and Board 
Industry. 
28 Printing and Publishing. 
29 Rubber Products. 
30" Plastic Products. 
31/2 Chemical and Oil Industry. 
33 Non-Metallic Mineral Products. 
34 Basic Metal Industry. 
35/6 Metal Industry. 
37 Electrical, Electronic, Data 
38 
39 
to 
Processing and Nucleonic Equipment. 
Precision Equipment; Measuring, 
Testing, Optical, Photographic, 
Cinematographic, Medical and 
Surgical Equipment. 
Transport Equipment, 
Infrastructure. 
Hydraulic and Pneumatic Equipment, 
Pumps, Compressors, Refrigerators, 
Heating and Air Conditioning 
Equipment. 
41 Agricultural, Horticultural and 
12 
43 
It 
Forestry Equipment, Food and Drink 
and Tobacco Equipment. 
Chemical, Rubber and Plastics Plant 
and Equipment. Mechanical 
Preparation of Materials. 
Collecting and Processing Equipment 
for Industrial and Domestic refuse. 
Water Treatment Equipment for 
Industrial and Domestic Refuse. 
Water Treatment Equipment. 
Packaging Machinery. 
Textile, Clothing, Leather Industry 
and Shoemaking Equipment. 
Pulp and Paper Industry. Printing 
Office Machinery and Equipment. 
L5 Mining and Quarrying, Oil and Gas 
Extraction Equipment. Stone and 
Earth, Ceramic and Glass Industry 
Equipment. Mechanical Handling 
Equipment. Road Making, Building, 
Offshore and Underwater Equipment. '' 
46 Heavy Industry and Metal Working 
Plant and Machinery. 
47 Metal and Woodworking machines, 
Machine Tools and Accessories, 
Special Purpose Machines, 
Industrial Robots. 
l8 General Mechanical Engineering Sub- 
Contractors. 
'49 Watches, Jewellry, Souvenirs and 
Religious Articles, Brushes, Wigs, 
Advertising and Display Articles, 
Labels, Games, Toys, Musical 
Instruments, Vending Machines, 
Office Equipment, Camping and Life 
Saving Equipment. 
51 Public Works. 
52 Building Contractors and Auxiliary 
Services. 
°" 53 Building Services Contractors. 
56 Public Utility Services. 
61 Importers/Exporters, Brokers, large 
Purchasing and Selling 
Organisations, Department Stores. 
62/5 Wholesale Distributive Trades; 
Consumer Goods 6617 Wholesale 
Distributive Trades; Investment, 
Office, Building and Hospital 
Equipment and Supplies. 
68., Wholesale Distribution; Transport 
Equipment and Installation. 
69 Hotels, Motels, Restaurants, 
Catering, Conference Centres, etc. 
71/3 Land Transportation 
74 Sea Transportation, Ports. 
75 Air Transportation, Ports. 
7617 Transport Services, Goods Storage. 
79 Communication Services, Radio and 
Television. 
80 Administrative, Personnel and Real 
Estate Services. 
81 Commercial Services, 
82 Financial and Insurance Services. 
83 Leasing/Renting Services. 
8t Technical Services, Engineering. 
85 Various Services, Research. 
86 Training. 
87 Public Administration, Social 
Services, Medical Care. 
88 Economic and Professional 
Organisations. 
89 Entertainments Industry. 
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APPENDIX C 
SPECIMEN INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER 
[UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT CENTRE LETTER HEAD] 
Dear Mr. CEO, 
I am engaged on research at the University of Bradford Management 
Centre, into the implementation of capital investment decisions in 
U. K. manufacturing companies. This work is being sponsored by the 
British Government's Economic and Social Research Council. The re- 
search team consists of myself, Mr. Stuart Sanderson and Dr. John 
Sharp. 
My research focuses on what a firm learns from investing in new 
plant or equipment. A major portion of the research attempts to dis- 
cover if learning about implementation gives a company deployable 
strategic advantages over its competitors. I have taken the view that 
in order to learn not all projects need necessarily have met their 
financial targets. 
To enable me to test these ideas I need to collect data from 
manufacturing companies such as yours. I therefore seek your co-opera- 
tion and request a personal interview with you so that I may ask a 
number of questions about your firm in general and a specific capital 
investment project of your choice in particular. This project should 
have been seen as important, that is, having a long term impact on 
your company's goals, profitability and/or growth. It is further 
suggested that this project should have been fully operational for at 
least six months. 
The interview will seek to identify where and how organisational 
learning has taken place within your firm. To do this I need to ask 
about the planning, management and operation of the project. However, 
because these questions focus on the broader managerial effects of the 
project, as opposed to its purely technical or financial content, it 
is felt the-questions should be answered by a senior manager within 
your firm who has knowledge of your firm's business environment and 
the specific project. Such a person may be yourself. If not yourself, 
would you identify a project and a suitable respondent for interview. 
I will be contacting yourself or your secretary in the near future to 
arrange, if you are agreeable, a time and date for the interview, or 
to find the name of a person within your firm that I may interview 
with your permission. I anticipate the duration of the interview to be 
90 minutes. 
I can assure you that the responses to this questionnaire will be 
kept in the strictest confidence and only reported in aggregate form 
for bona fide research purposes. Finally, let me thank you in antici- 
pation for your time and co-operation. Believe me, your responses are 
vital to the success of this research. 
Yours sincerely, 
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APPENDIX D 
RAW AND TRANSFORMED DATA SCALE COMPARISONS 
PEARSON CORRELATION MATRICES. 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS FOR BOTH MATRICES: 45. 
LOWER DIAGONAL SEMI-MATRIX - SCALES BASED ON TRANSFORMED DATA. 
UPPER DIAGONAL SEMI-MATRIX - SCALES BASED ON RAW DATA. 
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS: 
Uncertainty scales: Information scales: Success scales: 
UXX - Uncertainty IMX - Mechanicity SEX - Expectation 
USX - Scope IRX - Range SEE - Ease 
UNX - Novelty ILX - Lubrication SES - Satisfaction 
UUX - Urgency IAX - Activity SCX - Change 
UCX - Complexity 
RSk - Skewness for scales based on raw data. 
TSk - Skewness for scales following data transformations. 
UXX USX UNX UUX UCX I11X IRX ILX IAX SEX SEE SES SCX 
U( - 0.860 0.345 0.778 0.666 0.650 -0.336 -0.617 0.647 
USX 0.874 - 0.412 0.551 0.257 0.170 -0.457 0.518 
UNX 0.456 0.181 - -0.294 0.300 
UUX 0.806 0.589 - 0.163 0.521 -0.288 -0.689 0.508 
ucx 0.576 0.663 - 0.556 -0.306 -0.510 0.111 
IMX -0.262 - 0.327 0.361. 
IRX 0.282 - 0.254 
ILX 0.316 
IAX 0.610 0.480 0.514 0.551 0.368 0.321 - -0.116 0.443 
SEX -0.633 -0.322 -0.368 -0.382 -0.254 - 0.818 0.862 
SEE -0.624 -0.181 -0.312 -0.489 -0.509 -0.101 0.881 - 0.117 -0.271 
SES 0.805 0.437 - 0.281 
SCX 0.618 0.523 0.377 0.508 0.111 0.442 -0.271 0.266 - 
RSk 0.973 1.727 1.288 0.068 0.336 0.772 1.099 -0.738 0.239 -1.473 -0.295 -2.513 0.369 
TSk 0.321 0.301 1.124 0.068 0.336 0.772 0.881 -0.738 0 . 186 -0.802 -0.295 -1.526 0.369 
Two-tailed significance levels for correlations: 
p>0.10 not shown. 
0.05 <ps0.10 shown in italic type. 
0.01 <pS0.05 shown in normal type. 
pS0.01 shown in bold type. 
Note: Where RSk and TSk are identical, data transformations have not 
been applied. 
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